JUDGMENT Vinod K. Sharma, J. - This revision petition has been filed by the defendant- petitioner against the order of injunction passed by the learned trial Court as confirmed by the learned Additional District Judge, Chandigarh-II. The facts giving rise to the present petition are that Gurcharan Singh Brar one of the co-owners of the suit property filed a suit stating therein that the basement of the building was meant for store and the ground floor for shop while the first and second floors thereof were meant for office as per the conditions of allotment. The basement of the building was rented out by the respondent-plaintiffs to the petitioner-defendant for running a store. However, the defendant started running a discotheque club under the name and style of Aerizzona and thus changed its user and also carried out structural changes in the building by making cabins and by raising a partition wall. 2. In view of the violation committed by the tenant-petitioner, the Estate Officer, Chandigarh issued a notice under Rule 10 of the Chandigarh Lease Hold of Site and Building Rules, 1973 for the change of user for running business of discotheque club. The petitioner-defendant was asked to remove the misuse of the building vide order dated 5.10.1989, the Estate Officer cancelled the lease in favour of the landlord-respondent and resumed the building. The appeal was filed by the respondent-landlord to the Chief Administrator, Chandigarh, who granted time upto 30.11.2001 for removal of misuse and violations as a condition for restoration of lease of the building. The case of the plaintiff-respondent was that in spite of the request having been made to the defendant to remove the misuse and violations to avoid resumption of building altogether, he has not done so. 3. The plaintiff-respondent further pleaded that he had filed a separate appeal before the Chief Administrator wherein an order dated 5.10.1999 was passed giving (sic) defendant-respondent to remove the violation by 30.11.2001. The plaintiff-respondent also filed a revision against the order dated 30.10.2001, which was heard by the Advisor to the Administrator, U.T. Chandigarh on 6.3.2002 who also gave another 6 months time for removal of violations and misuse. However, the said order of Administrator passed in revision of both the petitioner and respondents on 6.3.2002 was not complied with. The plaintiff-respondent also filed a revision against the order dated 30.10.2001, which was heard by the Advisor to the Administrator, U.T. Chandigarh on 6.3.2002 who also gave another 6 months time for removal of violations and misuse. However, the said order of Administrator passed in revision of both the petitioner and respondents on 6.3.2002 was not complied with. The plaintiff also alleged that there was only one stair case available for accessing the basement and on account of discotheque club being run in the basement, there is a great rush of customers and in case any fire breaks out, there would be danger to the life of customers. 4. The plaintiff-respondent further pleaded that the permission for running discotheque club was not granted by the authorities under the U.T. Administration and faced with the situation, the suit had to be filed seeking a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to remove the violations and stop misusing of the suit property. Along with the suit, an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC was filed seeking temporary injunction restraining the petitioner-defendant from running a discotheque club from the suit property during the pendency of the suit. The plaintiff-respondent claimed that he had a prima facie case in his favour and the balance of convenience was also in his favour. It was further the case that the plaintiff-respondent was likely to suffer irreparable loss in case immediate relief by way of temporary injunction was not granted to him. The suit was contested by the petitioner-defendant wherein a preliminary objection was taken that the jurisdiction to deal with the matter in dispute was barred by Section 19 of the Capital of Punjab (Development & Regulation) Act, 1952, as resumption proceedings were pending before the Advisor to Administrator, U.T. Chandigarh. It was further pleaded that the site for shop-cum-office has already been resumed by the Estate Officer, Chandigarh, therefore, the plaintiff-respondent has no locus standi to file the suit. 5. On merits, it was contended by the petitioner-defendant that right from the date of inception of tenancy, he is using the demised premises for running discotheque club and there was no change of user on his part. 5. On merits, it was contended by the petitioner-defendant that right from the date of inception of tenancy, he is using the demised premises for running discotheque club and there was no change of user on his part. The petitioner-defendant further pleaded that the U.T. Administration has permitted the use of basement for habitable purpose and he was always cooperative with the plaintiff and it was the plaintiff-respondent who has not complied with the directions of the U.T. Administration for getting the user changed. It was further the case that the appeals were taken against the order by both the parties to the suit. The filing of revision petitions was also admitted. The petitioner defendant further denied that he had made any violation to the building. It was the case of the defendant-petitioner that he had always permitted the plaintiff to remove the same, however, the plaintiff had not taken any steps. The learned trial Court after hearing the arguments of the parties and appreciating the material brought before it ordered that if the defendant-petitioner does not abide by the undertaking given by it before the Administrator, U.T. Chandigarh for removal of violation within one month from the date of order, the running of discotheque club from the suit property be stopped till the disposal of the suit. It was further ordered that if the violations are removed which were noticed by the Administrator within one month from the date of the order, the compliance would be submitted to the Administrator. 6. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the trial Court, the petitioner- defendant filed an appeal before the Additional District Judge, Chandigarh. It was the case of the petitioner-defendant that by way of judgment dated 23.4.2004 passed by the High Court in CWP No. 12775 of 2003 the directions have been given to the U.T. Administration for the purpose of considering the possibility of permitting the habitable use in basement of Shop-cum-offices and thereafter to take a decision about resumption of building. Both the parties contended that after the order passed by the High Court, U.T. Administration has come up with a notification sanctioning permission to use basement for habitable use subject to certain conditions. Both the parties contended that after the order passed by the High Court, U.T. Administration has come up with a notification sanctioning permission to use basement for habitable use subject to certain conditions. The petitioner- defendant made reference to the report dated 17.11.2003 made by the Junior Engineer which was considered by the High Court in the writ petition referred to above to claim that there was no violation on the part of the defendant in running a discotheque from the basement. However, the said appeal was rejected in view of the specific order passed by the High Court, which was to be complied by the parties instead of interpreting the report of Junior Engineer. The learned lower Appellate Court did not agree with the appellant that since the matter of resumption of the said building was pending disposal before the Finance Secretary, Chandigarh Administration, the proceedings should be stayed before the Civil Court. This plea was rejected on the plea that mere pendency of the resumption proceedings for cancellation thereof did not create any statutory bar against the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The view taken by the learned Court was that since the question of resumption of the building was not directly involved in the suit, nor any relief was sought against the order of resumption, the jurisdiction under (of ?) the Court was not barred to deal with the instant suit. The Court also did not agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner that violations, additions or alterations in the building were compoundable. The plea of acquiescence on the part of plaintiff-respondent was also rejected and the learned lower Appellate Court held that the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of M/s. Ram Gopal Banarsi Dass v. Satish Kumar, 1986(1) RCR 236 was not applicable to the facts of the present case as the petitioner defendant has failed to show that the suit property was being used as discotheque club right from the date of inception of tenancy and that also with the consent of the landlord. Learned Lower Appellate Court came to the positive finding that the discotheque club was not being run with the consent of the plaintiff from the date of inception of tenancy. Learned Lower Appellate Court came to the positive finding that the discotheque club was not being run with the consent of the plaintiff from the date of inception of tenancy. It was noticed that the date on which the discotheque club started running was not disclosed in the written statement, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner tenant that the plaintiff himself was not doing the needful for obtaining sanction to use basement of the building for habitable purpose was not accepted by taking notice of the fact that U.T. Administration has not granted permission for the running of discotheque club from the suit property. Accordingly, it was held that the defendant-petitioner could not claim any legal or vested right to continue running of discotheque club. 7. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant that grant of temporary mandatory injunction would result in grant of final relief was also rejected. The learned lower Appellate Court observed that the trial Court had not given any direction to remove the alterations etc. in the suit property. The learned trial Court had pointed out the short-comings in the suit property which was operating obstacles for running of discotheque club for which the permission was not granted. It was also noticed that in case the short-comings as observed by the U.T. Administration are removed, then it would be possible for the defendant to ask the U.T. Administration to pass an appropriate order. The learned lower Appellate Court rightly held that the order of the trial Court is only to the effect that till the violations are rectified and permission for running discotheque club is obtained, defendant should not be allowed to run the club, therefore, the learned lower Appellate Court did not find any infirmity in the impugned order. The learned lower Appellate Court rightly held that the order of the trial Court is only to the effect that till the violations are rectified and permission for running discotheque club is obtained, defendant should not be allowed to run the club, therefore, the learned lower Appellate Court did not find any infirmity in the impugned order. The learned lower Appellate Court thereafter by relying upon the judgments in the case of Guru Nanak Education Trust v. Balbir Singh, 1995(2) PLR 625; Krishan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 1992(1) PLR 667; Maman Chand v. Kamla, 1996(2) PLR 147 and Man Singh v. H.S. Kohli, 1997(1) PLR 643 held that the lower Appellate Court could not upset an order of the trial Court without holding that the trial Court had erred in recording a finding on issue of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss or without holding that the conclusions recorded by the trial Court are perverse or against the settled principles of law and in view of this by holding that the learned trial Court has not acted arbitrarily or perversely declined to interfere with the order and confirmed the order passed by the learned trial Court. 8. Mr. Arun Jain, Advocate appearing with Mr. Kanwaljit Singh, Advocate on behalf of the petitioner vehemently contended that the suit for mandatory injunction was not competent as no violation was specified and the vague allegations were made in the complaint. The arguments of the learned counsel were that the suit was not maintainable as it was barred under Section 19 of the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952. Section 19 of the Capital of Punjab Act reads as under :- "19. Bar of Jurisdiction. - No Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or preceding in respect of the recovery of any arrears or penalty under Section 8 or in respect of the resumption of any site or building, or both, as the case may be, under Section 8-A or the forfeiture of any money under that section, or in respect of any order made, by the Central Government or any other authority in the exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act." 9. This contention of the counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted as the suit filed was not to challenge any recovery of arrears for penalty under Section 8 or with respect to resumption of any site or building nor the suit challenged the forfeiture of any money ordered to be recovered under Section 8-A of the 1952 Act or with respect to any order made by the Central Government or any other authority. The present suit was been filed for mandatory injunction directing the tenant petitioner to remove the violation committed by him and stop misuse of the property which is not permitted under any law. Therefore, the suit as framed or the relief claimed does not fall under the provisions of the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952 to attract the provisions of Section 19 of the Act. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner thereafter contended that CWP No. 12775 of 2003 filed by the petitioner was disposed of by this Court in which directions were given to U.T. Administration to give report of violation. According to learned counsel, all violations pointed out were found to be compoundable/sanctionable. 11. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that administration has allowed the running of the discotheque club under Entry No. 107 under the heading General Trade in the basement and that the composition fee for the said purpose would be paid only by the landlord-respondent and thus according to him, there is no violation on the part of the petitioner which could entitle the Courts to pass mandatory injunction. 12. It was further the case of the petitioner that though the request of the petitioner and the respondent for setting aside resumption proceedings has been declined by the Assistant Estate Officer but the appeal against the order was pending before the Finance Secretary and Chief Administrator U.T. Chandigarh. 13. Learned counsel places wrong reliance in the appeal filed by the landlord wherein in the grounds of appeal, it is stated that the respondent-landlord has himself claimed that discotheque club could run as a general trade and that he is to clear the outstanding dues and pay conversion charges for using the basement as habitable purpose. 13. Learned counsel places wrong reliance in the appeal filed by the landlord wherein in the grounds of appeal, it is stated that the respondent-landlord has himself claimed that discotheque club could run as a general trade and that he is to clear the outstanding dues and pay conversion charges for using the basement as habitable purpose. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that it was for the respondent-landlord to pay composition fee and take steps to remove the violation and thus there was no occasion for the Courts below to issue injunction in favour of the respondent. 14. Learned counsel also contended that most of the violations have been removed except widening of stair case which could not be done by the petitioner-tenant. 15. The learned counsel then sought to rely upon the principle of acquiescence on the part of landlord to contend that right from the inception of the second lease-deed dated 1.6.1980 when the rent was increased new trade i.e. Discotheque club was started. It is the case of the petitioner that he has been making payment through cheque issued by M/s. Aerizzona and therefore placed reliance on the judgment of Full Bench of this Court in the case of M/s. Ram Gopal Banarsi Dass v. Satish Kumar, 1986(1) RCR 236 to contend that the orders cannot be sustained under the provisions of Section 41(g) and (i) of the Specific Relief Act as the respondent landlord on the principle of acquiescence is barred to seek injunction. He also placed reliance on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court reported in Metro Marins and another v. Bonus Watch Co. Pvt. Ltd. and others, AIR 2005 SC 1444 to contend that interim mandatory injunction cannot be granted as it would result in granting the main relief. The stand taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that by way of the impugned orders, the suit of the plaintiff-respondent stand decreed, even before allowing the parties to lead evidence. The final contention was that once the petitioner has removed all the violations and the only violation left is the widening of the stair case, the revision deserves to be allowed. 16. On the other hand, Mr. The final contention was that once the petitioner has removed all the violations and the only violation left is the widening of the stair case, the revision deserves to be allowed. 16. On the other hand, Mr. Ajay Tiwari, the learned counsel appearing for respondent vehemently contended that the petitioner has failed to make out a case for interference in the well considered judgments of the learned Courts below in exercise of the extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 17. It is contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the petitioner has made deliberate mis-statement of fact which dis-entitles him to discretionary relief of injunction in exercise of extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as in para 4 of the present revision petition, it has been mentioned that he has been using the premises right from the beginning of the tenancy for running of discotheque club though initially it was given for running a pharmaceutical unit. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that in the lease-deed, it was categorically mentioned that the building is to be used as per provisions of laws and therefore the stand of the petitioner that the same was being used right from inception as Discotheque Club amounts to misstatement of facts and thus, disentitling him to discretionary relief from the Courts. 18. Mr. Ajay Tiwari further vehemently argued that the reliance of the petitioner on the judgments of this court in CWP No. 12775 of 2003 and CWP No. 14640 of 2003 is also misplaced as this Honble court had remanded the case back to the Estate Officer for fresh decision and thereafter by way of order dated 31.1.2005, the Estate Officer rejected the application of the petitioner for running discotheque club in the demised premises. It was the case of the respondent that after passing of the order on 31.1.2005, a notice was issued to the petitioner tenant to stop the misuse of the premises immediately. However, in spite of this, he has not done so which has forced the landlord to move an application for vacation of stay order. 19. It was the case of the respondent that after passing of the order on 31.1.2005, a notice was issued to the petitioner tenant to stop the misuse of the premises immediately. However, in spite of this, he has not done so which has forced the landlord to move an application for vacation of stay order. 19. Learned counsel for the respondent by placing a reliance on the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in Ram Chand Jain v. Chander Kanta Khosla, 1991(1) R.C.R.(Rent) 128 : AIR 1991 SC 744 contended that if a building was given for residential purpose and that was used by the tenant for commercial purpose, mere acceptance of rent would not constitute acquiescence. 20. Learned counsel for the respondent also placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Bimla Rai v. Lajja Kumari, 1999(2) RCR(Civil) 650 to contend that there can be no acquiescence as both the allottees as well as tenants are bound by the conditions imposed by owner notwithstanding the permission of allottee to use the premises for commercial purposes. It was contended by the learned counsel for respondent that the revision petition being without any merit may kindly be dismissed. 21. I have considered the respective arguments of the parties and find no force in the present revision petition. Section 19 of the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952 does not bar the maintainability of suit for mandatory injunction for enforcement of terms and conditions when the right to hold the property is threatened as in the present case. There is no challenge to any proceedings under the aforesaid Act or with regard to any order passed under the said Act with respect to forfeiture or resumption. The plaintiff-respondent is seeking to enforce his civil right and therefore provision of Section 19 cannot be read to bar the present suit. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the present suit is barred under Section 19 of the Act is hereby rejected. 22. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the suit for injunction was not competent on ground of acquiescence on the part of the landlord-respondent also cannot be sustained as the lease-deed brought on record clearly shows that a specific bar was imposed on the tenant to use the building in violation of bye-laws. 22. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the suit for injunction was not competent on ground of acquiescence on the part of the landlord-respondent also cannot be sustained as the lease-deed brought on record clearly shows that a specific bar was imposed on the tenant to use the building in violation of bye-laws. It is not in dispute between the parties that in the lease-deed, there is a specific stipulation and therefore, mere acceptance of rent from Aerizzona by the landlord cannot be treated to be an acquiescence. Otherwise also the violation has been complained of the Punjab Capital (Development and Regulation) Building Rules, 1952 framed by the Chandigarh Administration in exercise of statutory powers and therefore no party can be permitted to violate the statutory provisions of law. It is also well settled law that there can be no acquiescence against law. Once it is not in dispute, that the site in dispute has in fact been resumed on account of violation by exercise of powers under the statutory provisions of law, there can be no acquiescence on the part of respondent. The learned Courts below have rightly come to the conclusion to this effect. The judgment of the Full Bench in the case of M/s. Ram Gopal Banarsi Dass v. Satish Kumar, 1986(1) RCR 236 ibid was not applicable to the facts of the present case. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that no mandatory injunction by way of interim order can be passed can also not be sustained as there is no bar to grant of mandatory injunction in case the three ingredientis, i.e., prima facie case, balance of convenience as well as the irreparable injury being caused or likely to be caused to the applicant is proved on record. In the present case, the respondent had prima facie case as his right to hold the property is threatened. The balance of convenience is also in favour of the respondent that his right in the property is to be extinguished, which cannot be compensated. In the present case, the respondent had prima facie case as his right to hold the property is threatened. The balance of convenience is also in favour of the respondent that his right in the property is to be extinguished, which cannot be compensated. Therefore, keeping in view the fact that the petitioner has used the property in violation of the terms of allotment as also that there has been violation of statutory bye-laws, no error can be found in the exercise of jurisdiction by the learned Courts below, which may call for any interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, finding no merit in the present petition, the same is dismissed. Petition dismissed.