JUDGMENT 1. - This petition under Section 482 Cr.PC. has been filed by the petitioners and seeks quashing of the order dated 5.10.2004 of the learned Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Cases, Jaipur city, Jaipur and the order dated 17.4.2004 of the learned Addl. Civil Judge (Junior Division) cum Judicial Magistrate No.9, Jaipur city, Jaipur. 2. The material facts giving rise to this petition and necessary for its disposal are that petitioner No.1 is the father-in-law and petitioner No.2 is the mother-in-law of complainant Mst. Hema Agrawal. Mst. Hema Agrawal, filed a complaint before the aforesaid trial court against four persons with the allegations that she was married to Yogendra Jain, who from the very first night of their marriage, started demanding dowry and from the next day all the accused persons named in the FIR started demanding dowry and threatened her that if she did not bring Rs.3 lacs cash from her father, they would deprive her of her marital rights. They also did not return her 'stridhan' and dowry articles despite demand. She resisted their illegal demand where-upon they perpetrated mental and physical cruelty upon her. It was also alleged that her husband was having illicit relations with another women. The complaint was forwarded to the police under Section 156(3) Cr.PC. for investigation. The police after registering the FIR and after investigation filed challan against Yougendra Jain, the husband only for the offences under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC and submitted negative final report as against other accused persons named in the FIR. The trial court took cognizance on 24.10.2002 against Yougendra Jain. After hearing both the sides and on the basis of the materials on record, the trial court framed charges against him to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 3. After the prosecution examined six witnesses, the complainant filed an application on 18.7.2003 for taking cognizance against other persons named in the FIR namely, two petitioners and Mst. Pushpa, the sister-in-law of the complainant stating that PW1 Mst. Hema Agrawal, PW-2 Kavita Dadhich and PW-3 Ras Behari Lal have proved the involvement of all these four persons in the allegd offences which application was allowed on 17.4.2004 on the basis of the statements of the aforesaid witnesses and after consideration of the cited authorities. Pushpa, the sister-in-law of the complainant stating that PW1 Mst. Hema Agrawal, PW-2 Kavita Dadhich and PW-3 Ras Behari Lal have proved the involvement of all these four persons in the allegd offences which application was allowed on 17.4.2004 on the basis of the statements of the aforesaid witnesses and after consideration of the cited authorities. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner filed a revision petition before the learned court below which was dismissed and the order passed by the learned trial court was up-held. Hence, this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this court. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the orders of both the courts below tantamount to abuse of the process of the court in as much as the complainant has no locus standi to move such an application which is otherwise also highly belated and has been filed with ulterior motive at the fag end of the trial. The complainant was examined in July 2001 and the application has been filed on 18.7.2003 i.e. after about two years. The order arraigning the petitioners as additional accused in the case to face trial along-with Yogendra Jain will cause great mental agony and trauma to him who has already faced trial for over five years. It is submitted that these extraordinary powers under Section 319 Cr.PC. are to be exercised very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist. It is further submitted that the allegations of demand of dowry and cruelty are general in nature and not specific. Besides this, the learned courts below have not kept in view of provisions of Section 468 Cr.PC. which prohibit taking of cognizance after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation. It is pointed out that the alleged demand of dowry and cruelty is said to have taken place on 19.2.1999 and on the following day and the cognizance has been taken on 17.4.2004 i.e. much after the expiry of the prescribed period of three years. So, the orders of the learned courts below are liable to be and should be quashed. 5. Learned Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel for the complainant have both vehemently opposed the aforesaid contentions and have tried to support the orders of the courts below. 6. So, the orders of the learned courts below are liable to be and should be quashed. 5. Learned Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel for the complainant have both vehemently opposed the aforesaid contentions and have tried to support the orders of the courts below. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions made at the bar and have perused the impugned orders and the relevant record particularly the statements of the witnesses recorded during the trial before filing of the application under Section 319 Cr.PC. 7. It is well nigh settled that the court may pass an order under Section 319 Cr.PC. suo motu or on the application of the complainant or the prosecution if it appears during the course of inquiry or trial of an offence from the evidence adduced arraigning any person he appears to not being an accused or has committed any offence for which he could be tried together with the accused. So, the objection of the learned counsel for the petitioners in this regard is untenable. 8. A perusal of the order of the trial court makes it abudantly clear that it is based on proper consideration and appreciation of the statements of the witnesses examined during the trial. The trial court has given detailed and cogent reasons for arraigning the petitioners as additional accused persons. It is also given weighty and convincing reasons for not proceeding against Smt. Pushpa, sister-in-law, Jeth and Jethani of the complainant. 9. Section 319(1) and (2) Cr.PC. has been held to be directory in nature and sub-section (4)(a) of Section 319 Cr.PC. has been held to be mandatory in Shashikant Singh v. Tarkeshwar Singh & anr., 2002 (1) WLC (SC) Cri. 586 : 2002 Cr. L.J. 2806 . 10. Section 319(1) and (2) Cr.PC. provides that where, it appears from the evidence in the course of any inquiry into or trial of an accused, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed. 11. Sub-section (4) (a) of Section 319 Cr.PC. 11. Sub-section (4) (a) of Section 319 Cr.PC. provides that where the Court proceeds against any such person under sub-section (1) of Section 319 Cr.P.C., the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh and the witnesses already examined shall be re-heard. Sub-section 4(b) of Section 319 Cr.PC. further provides that the case may be proceeded as against such person as if he had been accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offences upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced. 4 12. This clearly provides an answer to the objection of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the learned court below has not kept in view the provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C. in taking cognizance against the petitioners. The provisions of Section 468 Cr.PC. would not be attracted to the case of an accused arraigned subsequently as additional accused under the provisions of Section 319(1) Cr.PC. in view of the clear provisions of sub- Section 4(b) of Section 319 Cr.PC. The objection of the learned counsel in this regard, therefore, does not hold water and the order of the learned court below is obviously unassailable on this ground. 13. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners on the strength of Laxman Ram Meghwal & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, 2005 (7) RDD 2434 (Raj.) that the material witnesses having not stated exect words used by the accused while abusing the complainant, the trial court as well as revisional court were not justified in arraigning the petitioners as accused. But it was a case for the offence under Section 3(1) (x) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 alongwith other offences whereas the instant case is for offences under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC. 14. In the case of Michael Machado & anr. v. Central Bureau of Investigation & anr., 2000 (3) SCC 262 which case has been relied upon in the aforementioned authority, it has been held that the basic requirement for invoking the above section is that it should reasonably appear to the Court from the evidence collected during trial or in the inquiry that some other person, who is not an accused in that case, has committed an offence for which such a person could be tried together with the accused already facing trial. This apart, there is specific allegation of demand of Rs.3 lacs and cruelty in connection there-with on account of non-fulfillment of the said illegal demand of dowry against two petitioners alongwith Yogendra Jain though, there is no such specific allegation against Smt. Pushpa, sister-in-laws and names of jeth and jethani have not been mentioned in the FIR. Therefore, the aforesaid authority on the basis of which this argument is tried to be built up rather supports the case of the complainant and is of little help to the petitioners. 15. It is true as held in Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka, 2004 (2) WLC (SC) Cri. 636 : 2004 (6) Supreme 432 that power to summon an accused under Section 319 Cr.PC. is an extraordinary power conferred on the court which should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist and there is not dispute about this legal position in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court in catena of cases. But, the trial court has kept in view the law laid down in this authority while passing the impugned-order and judicial discretion exercised by it as well as by the learned revisional court does not suffer from any infirmity or illegality. 16. On a re-consideration of the entire material on record, I also do not find any cogent and valid reason to interfere in the aforesaid orders in exercise of the inherent powers of this court vested under Section 482 Cr.PC. which, as per the settled law, are also to be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection to prevent the abuse of the process of the court or the gross miscarriage of justice or to secure the ends of justice. In my view, no such case seems to have been made out here so as to call for and justify interference of this Court. 17. In Duni Chand & anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 2004 (1) R.C.C. 251 , the High Court noticed that the witnesses have made 1 improvements over their earlier statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.PC. on account of which there was little chance of the accused being found guilty for the offences under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC, but the same cannot be stated in the instant case. 18. on account of which there was little chance of the accused being found guilty for the offences under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC, but the same cannot be stated in the instant case. 18. Thus, the instant case being distinguishable on facts the aforesaid authority does not help the petitioners. 19. It is true as held in Michael Machado & Anr. v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. (supra) that the extraordinary power conferred on the Court under Section 319 Cr.PC. is only discretionary which ought to be exercised only if the court is hopeful that there is reasonable prospect of the case against the newly brought accused ending in conviction, but on the basis of the evidence on record without going into the details of the same it would suffice to say that the trial court cannot be said to have wrongly exercised the judicial discretion or without there being reasonable prospect of the case ending in conviction. The court has at this stage to see only if there is a prima-facie case against the newly brought accused. 20. In this view of the matter, therefore, no fault can be found with the orders of the learned court below in this regard. 21. The case of Kans Raj v. State of Punjab & Ors., (2000) 5 SCC 207 was a case of dowry death wherein controversy involved and the law laid down has little bearing on the facts of the instant case. 22. The extraordinary power conferred on the court under Section 319 Cr.PC. for arraigning additional accused persons can be exercised at any stage of the proceedings. The same cannot be refused to be exercised simply on the ground of delay although, as held in Michael Machado & anr. v. Central Bureau of Investigation & anr. (supra), the court should keep in view stage of the trial and other relevant facts mentioned therein. In that case 54 witnesses had been examined and cross-examined. Only three witnesses remained to be examined who were also not material witnesses whereas when the application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. was filed in the instant case only six witnesses had been examined and their testimony prima-facie showed the involvement of the petitioners in the alleged offences as demonstrated by the learned court below in its order which is under challenge. So, no interferenece in the impugned-order on the ground of delay can be said to be justified and called for. 23. In Kailash Verma v. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation & anr., (2005) 2 SCC 571 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that in view of the prohibition provided under Section 397(3) Cr.PC., the complainant or the accused cannot be allowed to take recourse to a second revision, but High Court can entertain a petition under Section 482 Cr.PC. where there is serious miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the court or when mandatory provisions of law are not complied with or the High Court is satisfied that inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised to correct the mistake committed by the revisional court. In the case under consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court, the Sessions Court had confirmed the order of discharge of the accused by the Magistrate in the first revision but the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 Cr.PC. set-aside the said order holding that the allegation in the complaint was of civil nature and no criminal case was made out. The complainant in that case had also initiated arbitration proceedings. Considering the aforesaid facts, the Apex Court held that the High Court was not justified in exercising its inherent jurisdiction as there was no miscarriage of justice warranting interference by the High Court. This authority rather supports the complainant. 24. In Rukhsana Khatoon (Smt.) v. Shekhawat Hussain & Ors., (2002) 10 SCC 661 several persons were named as assailants of the deceased in the FIR. The Investigating Officer excluded the names of such persons. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses coroborated the role of the excluded persons in the incident. The trial court summoned the excluded persons to stand trial which order was held to be proper and did not suffer from any illegality or irregularity. It was observed that the High Court committed error in holding that the power of the court under Section 319 Cr.PC. could not be invoked when a person named in the F.I.R. was not charge-sheeted. 25. It was observed that the High Court committed error in holding that the power of the court under Section 319 Cr.PC. could not be invoked when a person named in the F.I.R. was not charge-sheeted. 25. In Geeta Ram v. Vedi Ram & Ors., (2002)10 SCC 499 , it was held that trial court can issue summon against persons appearing to be guilty whose name was mentioned in the FIR but no charge-sheet had been filed against him and no protest petition was also filed. 26. In Atar Khan & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, 2001 Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 707 , elder brother of the complainant was assaulted by the persons named in the FIR resulting in his death on the way to hospital. The investigating agency chose to file challan against two persons and a negative final report against the petitioners. Complainant did not file any protest petition against the negative final report. However, an application was filed under Section 319 Cr.PC. during the trial. The trial court issued process against the accused-petitioners and ordered for their arrest. Petitioners were named in the FIR and their names also appear in the statements of two eye witnesses examined by the trial court. It was held that there was no ground for interference in the said order under Section 482 Cr.PC. 27. In Shashikant Singh v. Tarkeshwar Singh & anr., 2002 Cr.L.J. 2806 , the Apex Court has laid down as under "A Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance of an offence in the manner provided under Section 190 of the Code. Section 209 enjoins upon a Magistrate to commit the case to the Court of Session when it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session. Section 193 provides for the power of the Court of Session to take ecognizance of any offence. It uses the expression 'cognizance of any offence' and not that of 'offender'. These three provisions read with Section 319 makes it clear that the words 'could be tried together with the accused' in Section 319 is only for the purpose finding out whether such a person could be put on trial for the offence. Once it is so found, as already stated, sub-section (4) of Section 319 comes into play. These three provisions read with Section 319 makes it clear that the words 'could be tried together with the accused' in Section 319 is only for the purpose finding out whether such a person could be put on trial for the offence. Once it is so found, as already stated, sub-section (4) of Section 319 comes into play. On the magistrate committing the case under Section 209 to the Court of Session, the bar of Section 193 is lifted thereby investing the Court of Session complete an unfettered jurisdiction of Court of original jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence which could include summoning of the person or persons whose complicity in the commission of crime can, prima facie, be gathered from the material on record (see Kishun Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (1993) 2 SCC 16 ." In view of the aforesaid legal position, the High Court was clearly in error in coming to the conclusion that the order dated 7th April, 2001 had become without jurisdiction as a result of the conclusion of trial against Chandra Shekhar Singh. The impugned order of the High Court is, therefore, set-aside." 28. In view of foregoing discussion, therefore, and the law laid down in this regard and considering the evidence and other materials on record, I do not find any cogent and valid reason to interfere in the orders of the learned courts below.Consequently, this petition under Section 482 Cr.PC. desereves to be and is hereby dismissed.Petition Dismissed. *******