Judgment :- (Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus to call for the records pertaining to the order of the first respondent made in 293/BDFGISV/2005 dated 22.06.2005, set aside the same and direct the respondents to produce the detenu Manikandan, son of Somasundaram, presently confined in the Central Prison, Chennai, before this Hon’ble Court and set him at liberty.) The petitioner, who was detained as 'Goonda' as contemplated under the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Slum Grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982), by the impugned detention order dated 22.06.2005, challenges the same in this Petition. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, after taking us through the grounds of detention and all other connected materials, has raised the following contentions, (i) There was no ground for passing the order of detention under Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982; (ii) In the Special Report submitted by the Inspector of Police (S8 Adambakkam Police Station), which finds place at page No.55 of the Booklet, the Officer has recommended for passing the detention order by describing the detenu as a ‘dangerous person’ (ga';fukhdtu;). It shows that the authorities predetermined to invoke Act 14 of 1982 against the detenu; (iii) The arrest of the detenu was not properly communicated to his family members; and (iv) There was delay in disposal of the representation of the detenu. 3. Learned Government Advocate, by placing all the relevant records, met all the contentions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 4. Now, let us consider the contentions in seriatim. 5. Coming to the first contention that there was no material/ground for detaining the detenu under Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982, learned counsel for the petitioner, by drawing our attention to the five adverse cases and the ground case under which the detenu was detained, submitted that inasmuch as the ground case incident is the solitary instance, the Detaining Authority is not justified in passing the detention order. In support of his contention, he very much relied on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2003) 2 SCC 313 (Darpan Kumar Sharma @ Dharban Kumar Sharma vs. State of Tamil Nadu). In support of his contention, he very much relied on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2003) 2 SCC 313 (Darpan Kumar Sharma @ Dharban Kumar Sharma vs. State of Tamil Nadu). He also placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 2004-1-Law weekly (Criminal) 392 (Dhanalakshmi v. The Commissioner of Police, Chennai). 6(a). Before considering the details regarding the adverse cases and the ground case relating to the detenu, let us consider the factual details in the above referred decision of the Supreme Court (Darpan Kumar Sharma's case). It is clear from paragraph No.6 of the said decision that all the three incidents/cases referred to in the grounds of detention therein are thefts arising under Section 379 IPC. and only the ground case relates to robbery in a public place. After finding that there is no material on record to show that the reach and potentiality of the single incident of robbery was so great as to disturb the even tempo or normal life of the community in the locality or disturb general peace and tranquility or create a sense of alarm and insecurity in the locality; and after pointing out that the solitary instance of robbery is not relevant for sustaining the order of detention for the purpose of preventing the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court quashed the order of detention therein. 6(b). In the Division Bench decision, viz., 2004-1-L.W.(Cri.)392, it is seen from paragraph No.4 that all the three adverse cases relate to the offence of theft arising under Section 379 IPC. and the ground case was only a solitary instance, wherein, a case was registered under Section 397 IPC. Since the factual position therein was almost similar to Darpan Kumar Sharma’s case, the Division Bench rightly, following the decision the Supreme Court, quashed the impugned order of detention. 7. Before considering catena of decisions relied on by the learned Government Advocate, it is useful to refer the factual details relating to the adverse cases and the ground case relating to the detenu herein. The adverse cases are extracted here-under, 8. The above details show that the first two adverse cases relate to house-breaking and trespass as well as theft and both the cases ended in conviction. The adverse cases are extracted here-under, 8. The above details show that the first two adverse cases relate to house-breaking and trespass as well as theft and both the cases ended in conviction. Adverse case Nos.3 and 4 relate to theft of cash from a shop belonging to a State owned corporation, namely, TASMAC. The fifth adverse case relates to theft of Motorcycle parked at St. Thomas Mount Railway Reservation Counter, which is a public place. The occurrence relating to the ground case is assaulting public and threatening them with knife, for which, a case was registered in Crime No.541 of 2005 under Sections 392, 427, 336 and 506 (II) IPC. Thus, the cases not only relate to house-breaking, theft, trespass etc., but also committing theft of government properties. These details amply show that the adverse cases are not mere cases of theft as in Darpan Kumar Sharma’s case. In such circumstances, we are of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Supreme Court in Darpan Kumar Sharma’s case is not applicable to the case on hand. 9. Now, we shall consider various decisions relied on by the learned Government Advocate. It is relevant to note that in all the decisions, which we are going to refer, various Division Benches of this Court, after referring the factual details and the decision in Darpan Kumar Sharma’s case, distinguished the same and upheld the respective detention orders under challenge 10. In H.C.P. No.3 of 2003 (Order dated 08.10.2003), after pointing out the fact that the petitioner/detenu therein was a rowdy, involved in six cases as also in lurking house trespass under Section 457 IPC. and subsequent incidents, the Division Bench held that Darpan Kumar Sharma’s case is not applicable to the case on their hand, accepted the objections raised by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appeared in that case and confirmed the order of detention. 11. In H.C.P. No.1709 of 2003 (Order dated 12.02.2004), there were 8 adverse cases to the credit of the detenu, out of which, 2 cases were under Section 392 IPC. and 6 cases under Section 379 IPC. Insofar as the ground case therein is concerned, it was found that during busy evening hours, the detenu got involved in an incident for which a case was registered under Sections 341, 336, 427, 397 and 506 (II) IPC. and 6 cases under Section 379 IPC. Insofar as the ground case therein is concerned, it was found that during busy evening hours, the detenu got involved in an incident for which a case was registered under Sections 341, 336, 427, 397 and 506 (II) IPC. In the light of those details and after finding that the detenu committed a grave crime in a busy residential-cum-business area in the heart of Chennai City and created an alarm and a feeling of insecurity in the minds of the people of the area; and also taking note of the antecedents of the detenu that he involved in many theft and robbery cases, the Division Bench arrived at a conclusion that the decision of the Supreme Court in Darpan Kumar Sharma’s case is not applicable to that case and confirmed the order of detention. 12. In H.C.P. No.739/05 (Order dated 25.10.2005), the Division Bench, after referring the Judgment of the Supreme Court in 2004 (8) SCC 591 (State of U.P. v. Sanjai Pratap Gupta), arrived at a conclusion that a single act also can be taken as a ground for holding that public order is likely to be affected. From the judgment of the Supreme Court, that is, 2004 (8) SCC 591 (cited supra), the Division Bench pointed out that it is not the number of the cases that matters and what has to be seen is the effect of the act on the even tempo of life, the extent of its reach upon society and its impact. Based on the above principles, the Division Bench confirmed the order of detention based on solitary instance. 13. In H.C.P. No.761 of 2003 (Order dated 20.11.2003), after referring the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1994 SCC (Crl) 1325 (Attorney General for India vs. Amratlal Prajivandas), the Division Bench accepted the stand taken by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appeared in that case and confirmed the order of detention, dismissing the Habeas Corpus Petition. 14. In H.C.P. No.186 of 2004 (Order dated 20.04.2004), after referring Darpan Kumar Sharma’s case and pointing out the explanation to Section 2(3) of Act 14 of 1982 and in the light of the different set of facts incomparable with that of the factual details in Darpan Kumar Sharma's case, the Division Bench confirmed the order of detention. 14. In H.C.P. No.186 of 2004 (Order dated 20.04.2004), after referring Darpan Kumar Sharma’s case and pointing out the explanation to Section 2(3) of Act 14 of 1982 and in the light of the different set of facts incomparable with that of the factual details in Darpan Kumar Sharma's case, the Division Bench confirmed the order of detention. It is further seen from the said decision that the modus operandi of the detenu was only that of committing theft of two wheelers, mostly in the area of K.K. Nagar and the adjoining M.G.R. Nagar besides other places. It was seen that out of the 12 adverse cases, seven cases relate to K.K. Nagar and M.G.R. Nagar, which created panic amongst the people parking their two wheelers in those areas. Considering the ground case of robbery, the Detaining Authority felt that the detenu should be clamped with an order of detention. The Division Bench, after distinguishing the case on their hand with Darpan Kumar Sharma’s case, confirmed the order of detention and dismissed the Habeas Corpus Petition. 15. In the present case also, we have already referred to the details regarding the adverse cases. As rightly observed by the various Division Benches of this Court, the act of the detenu undoubtedly created panic among the public. It is also relevant to note that two adverse cases relate to theft of government property, viz., stealing away cash from TASMAC shop. 16. Distinguishing the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Darpan Kumar Sharma’s case, other Benches of this Court also confirmed the orders of detention, vide a. HCP No.688 of 2004, order dated 23.09.2004 b. HCP No.773 of 2004, order dated 06.10.2004 c. HCP No.218 of 2004, order dated 28.04.2004 17. It is pertinent to note that Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in the decision reported in 2004 (8) SCC 591 (cited supra), have held thus, “ The stand that a single act cannot be considered sufficient for holding that public order was affected is clearly without substance. It is not the number of acts that matters. What has to be seen is the effect of the act on the even tempo of life, the extent of its reach upon society and its impact.” 18. It is not the number of acts that matters. What has to be seen is the effect of the act on the even tempo of life, the extent of its reach upon society and its impact.” 18. In the light of the above referred decisions and in view of the factual details of the present case, as discussed above, we are unable to accept the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 19. Coming to the second contention, it is true that in the Special Report sent by the Inspector of Police, S8 Adambakkam Police Station, which finds place at page No.55 of the booklet, after furnishing various details, the Officer has concluded that the accused, who is confined in Central Prison, is a dangerous person (ga';fukhdtu;). It is only a Report, wherein, the Inspector of Police narrated certain events. Learned Government Advocate submitted that, first of all, the said Report is not a relied upon document while passing the order of detention. Secondly, there is no reference in the detention order relating to the Special Report of the Officer concerned. At the most, according to him, the said Report is only for crime detection and not for preventive detention as claimed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. We accept the submission of the learned Government Advocate and reject the stand taken by the counsel for petitioner. 20. Coming to the third contention that the arrest of the detenu was not properly communicated to the family members, the Arrest Report, which finds place at page No.47 of the Booklet shows that the detenu was arrested on 04.06.2005 at 5.30 A.M. near Palavanthangal Railway Station. Based on the address given by the arrestee, i.e., Udukkampalayam, Pungamuthur P.O., Pollachi Taluk, Coimbatore District, the arrest was intimated to his mother through a letter on 04.06.2005 itself. In such circumstances, taking note of the place of arrest, which is near Madras (Palavanthangal), and the fact that his mother is residing at a far away place, viz., Coimbatore District, the action taken by the Officer concerned cannot be faulted with. We are satisfied that there is no violation as claimed. 21. In such circumstances, taking note of the place of arrest, which is near Madras (Palavanthangal), and the fact that his mother is residing at a far away place, viz., Coimbatore District, the action taken by the Officer concerned cannot be faulted with. We are satisfied that there is no violation as claimed. 21. Coming to the last contention relating to delay in disposal of the representation of the detenu, the particulars furnished by the learned Government Advocate show that the representation of the detenu was received by the Government on 29.07.2005, remarks were called for on 01.08.2005 and the remarks were received on 04.08.2005. Thereafter, File was submitted and the same was dealt with by the Under Secretary and Deputy Secretary on 05.08.2005. Finally, the concerned authority, viz., the Minister for Prohibition and Excise, passed orders on 08.08.2005. If we exclude the holidays, ie., on 06.08.2005 and 07.08.2005, it cannot be said that the authority had taken longer time in considering the representation. Subsequent to the orders passed by the Minister, rejection letter was prepared on 12.08.2005. The said letter was sent to the detenu on 16.08.2005 and served to him on 17.08.2005. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that though the authority concerned passed orders on 08.08.2005, there is no justification in taking time till 12.08.2005 for preparation of the rejection letter. It is true that 9.8.2005, 10.8.2005 and 11.8.2005 were working days. The Officers working in the Department concerned ought to have prepared the rejection letter immediately. Inasmuch as the rejection letter was prepared on 12.08.2005, i.e., within a reasonable time, we are of the view that there is no undue delay as claimed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Accordingly, we reject the said contention also. 23. In the light of what is stated above, we do not find any valid ground for interference. Habeas Corpus Petition fails and the same is dismissed.