ORDER : Ruma Pal, J. Leave granted. 2. The appellant was the Deputy Materials Manager at the Regional Stores, Rajrappa Area in the year 1996. Certain procedural irregularities in issuing a tender notice were alleged to have been committed by him. A vigilance inquiry was initiated on the basis of which a decision was taken on 20-1-1999 for initiating disciplinary proceedings against the appellant. Before the disciplinary proceedings were initiated, the Departmental Promotion Committee was constituted for considering the promotion of various persons including the appellant for promotion to the next higher grade. The Departmental Promotion Committee which met on 8-10-1999 did not promote the appellant. It is the appellant's case that the appellant's juniors were promoted. It was only thereafter that on 10-11-1999 a charge-sheet was served on the appellant. The disciplinary proceedings ended with a censure order passed against the appellant on 21-6-2000. On 30-8-2000 a Departmental Promotion Committee was again constituted. This time the appellant was promoted to the next higher grade. 3. The appellant filed a writ petition claiming promotion with effect from 8-10-1999 when his juniors were promoted. His submission in the writ petition was that there were no departmental proceedings pending within the meaning of relevant rules when the 8-10-1999 DPC was held and as such the appellant was entitled to be considered for promotion on that date. 4. The learned Single Judge accepted the appellant's contention and allowed the writ petition. This was reversed on the respondents' appeal by the Division Bench. The Division Bench noted that the vigilance proceedings had already been commenced against the appellant with the approval of the Chairman-cum-Managing Director on 20-1-1999 much prior to the holding of the October 1999 DPC. The Division Bench construed the applicable rule in this regard and came to the conclusion that having regard to the language therein the appellant could not be selected for promotion on 8-10-1999 as contended for by him. 5. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred this appeal by special leave. The relevant rule as has been quoted in the office memorandums dated 19-6-1979 and 27-6-1979 is: "An executive, who has been placed under suspension pending inquiry and/or against whom departmental/vigilance proceedings are pending will be promoted, if selected and placed in the select list by a DPC, only after completion of the proceedings and his complete exoneration of the charges. The relevant rule as has been quoted in the office memorandums dated 19-6-1979 and 27-6-1979 is: "An executive, who has been placed under suspension pending inquiry and/or against whom departmental/vigilance proceedings are pending will be promoted, if selected and placed in the select list by a DPC, only after completion of the proceedings and his complete exoneration of the charges. Such an officer shall be promoted in the first vacancy that may be available immediately after his complete exoneration with prospective effect." The rule makes it clear that even if vigilance proceedings are pending, the selection can be made only after completion of the proceedings and the complete exoneration from the charges. 6. From the uncontroverted statement in the counter-affidavit, it is clear that the vigilance proceedings were pending against the appellant much prior to the date on which DPC first promoted the appellant's juniors. 7. Our attention has been drawn to another circular issued by the respondents on 8-1-1991 in which it has been clarified that all orders of promotion will be issued only after vigilance clearance and that vigilance clearance should be withheld inter alia when "in the case of a preliminary inquiry, either by CBI or departmental agencies, the competent authority, on consideration of the results of the investigation, has formed the opinion that a charge-sheet may be issued on specific imputations for departmental action". 8. In the present case, the decision to take action against the appellant had been formed on 20-1-1999. Therefore, the appellant could not have been granted vigilance clearance. In the circumstances, we see no reason to interfere with the order under challenge. 9. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.