Judgment S.K.Katriar, J. 1. The two writ petitions raise common issues of law and facts and, in fact, one set of arguments on behalf of both the sides have been advanced. Therefore, both the writ petitions are being disposed of by a common judgment. Four petitioners have joined C.W.J.C. No. 10443 of 1998, and six petitioners have joined C.W.J.C. No. 10446 of 1998, make a common prayer that they are entitled to employment with the respondent National Thermal Power Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation), consequent upon acquisition of their lands. The Corporation as well as the State of Bihar and its functionaries have been impleaded as party respondents in the two writ petitions. No private person has been impleaded as party respondent. We shall draw the facts from C.W.J.C. No. 10443 of 1998. 2. The admitted position is that lands were acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) to enable the Corporation to set up a super thermal power station at Kahalgaon in the district of Bhagalpur. The petitioners claimed to be the oustees and awardees under the Act, whose lands have been acquired for the said purpose. In order to mitigate the rigours of acquisition, the Corporation and the State Government had jointly formulated a policy dated 17.2.1986, to provide employment to the awardees which was circulated under the joint signatures of the General Manager of the Project and the District Magistrate, Bhagalpur, vide notice dated 15.5.1992 (Annexure-1). The same provided for jobs to the oustees in accordance with the norms stated therein. The respondent authorities undertook the exercise of implementation in terms of the policy decision and issued merit-list dated 15.4.1993 (Annexure-3), and jobs were accordingly given to a large number of persons. Aggrieved by the list, the petitioners had preferred C.WJ.C. No. 6704 of 1993, which was disposed of vide order dated 9.2.1996, whereby the matter was referred back for the joint consideration of the Collector and the Corporation because it involved issues of facts, with the following directions: "7. Be that as. it may, this writ petition is disposed of with the following directions: (a) The respondent Corporation through his Counsel shall hand over a copy of the final list of the land oustees of the petitioners through their counsel arranged categories by 26th February, 1996. Be that as. it may, this writ petition is disposed of with the following directions: (a) The respondent Corporation through his Counsel shall hand over a copy of the final list of the land oustees of the petitioners through their counsel arranged categories by 26th February, 1996. (b) On being furnished each copy of the list, the petitioners are at liberty to make a detailed representation pointing out their grievances and such representation must be addressed to the said Corporation as well as the Collector and the District Magistrate, Bhagalpur, within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of the said list. (c) Thereafter the said District Magistrate, Bhagalpur is directed to hold an enquiry alongwith a Competent Officer of the said Corporation to find out if any person of a lower category than the category in which the petitioners are placed has got any job in the Mouza to which the petitioners belong. (d) If as a result of the enquiry, it is found that the person of the lower category than the petitioners in the same Mouza to which the petitioners belong has got job and the petitioners case has not been considered. In that case the petitioners must be treated to be discriminated against and must be considered by the Corporation for the grant of a job. In the said report the District Magistrate and the Competent Officer to the said Corporation must also indicate whether in any family two persons have been appointed. If on enquiry it is found that two persons of one family have been appointed in that case, one of them may be removed in accordance with the observations made in this judgment and if the vacancy arises out of it, against such vacancy persons of the Mouza concerned must be considered for appointment. (e) The entire exercise which is directed by this Court as aforesaid to be undergone by the District Magistrate alongwith the competent officer of the said Corporation and must be completed within three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this judgment." Identical writ petition bearing C.WJ.C. No. 5850 of 1993 was disposed of by judgment dated 4.12.1997 with just the same direction. 3 Pursuant to the order of the High Court, the aggrieved persons submitted a detailed representation dated 27.12.1997 (Annexure-5) alleging erroneous implementation of the policy dated 17.2.1986 (Annexure-1), indicating the errors in the selection of 30 oustees or so. The matter has been enquired in the light of the grievances raised in the representation and enquiry report dated 8.7.1998 (Annexure-6) was submitted whereby said merit-list dated 15.4.1993 (Annexure-3) has been reiterated with reasons, and impugned herein. 4. While assailing the validity of the impugned action, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that exercise of the power of Eminent Domain envisages adequate and meaningful compensation to the land oustees in India in general, and in the present case in particular, where most of the land oustees have been deprived of their lands which were sources of livelihood. In other words, the money compensation in the present case is inadequate and the oustees must in addition be provided with additional compensation by way of jobs etc. He relies on the treatise entitled Nichols on the Law of Eminent Domain. He also relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1995 Supp. (1) S.C.C. 596 (Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar and Ors. V/s. State of Gujarat and Anr.). 4.1) He next submitted that in view of the policy decision of the respondent Corporation, the provision for employment has ripened into enforceable rights by the Courts. He relies on the judgment reported in (2000)10 S.C.C. 664 (Narmada Bachao Andolan V/s. Union of India and Ors.) (paragraphs 53, 57 and 62). 4.2) He next submitted that poverty-alleviation programme in general, and in a situation like the present one where majority of the land oustees have been deprived of their sources of livelihood, is part of sustainable development. He relies on the following reported judgments: (i) (1996)5 S.C.C. 647 (Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum V/s. Union of India and Ors.), (ii) (2002)10 S.C.C. page 606, para-graph-40 (T.N. Godavarman Thirumalpad V/s. Union of India and Ors.). 4.3) Learned counsel for the petitioners next submitted that the petitioners have been rejected and have not found their way in the merit-list because of erroneous application of the principles, whereas thirty persons have been appointed without any merit test. He has attempted to prove that two of them were appointed in spite of the age-bar. 4.3) Learned counsel for the petitioners next submitted that the petitioners have been rejected and have not found their way in the merit-list because of erroneous application of the principles, whereas thirty persons have been appointed without any merit test. He has attempted to prove that two of them were appointed in spite of the age-bar. More than one person of each family has been given employment ignoring the definition of "Family" in the policy decision. 4.4) He next submitted that in case the court finds the pleadings on behalf of the petitioners to be lacking, then the respondents may be called upon to provide the relevant documents and informations in the interest of justice. He relies on the following reported judgments: (i) (1987)1 S.C.C. 227 , paragraph 30 (Shivaji Rao Nilangekar Patil V/s. Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi and Ors.); (ii)(2005)5 S.C.C. 598, paragraph 42 (Ashok Lanka and Anr. V/s. Rishi Dixit and Ors.); (iii) 1976(3) All England Law Reports 452 (R V/s. Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council, ex parte Hook). 4.5) He lastly submitted that in case the Court comes to the conclusion that it was dishonest abuse of power in contradistinction to error of judgment, then it would amount to misfeasance in public office and the petitioners would be entitled to compensation. He relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (1999)6 S.C.C. 667 (Common Cause, a Registered Society V/s. Union of India and Ors.). 5. Learned counsel for the Corporation has supported the impugned action. He submitted that the petitioners are overlooking the constraints of the policy decision. He next submitted that the petitioners were called for interview, were duly considered, but their names did not find place in the merit-list because of the conditions attached to the policy decision. He next submitted that the order passed by the High Court has been carried out and the cases of all the persons have been thoroughly revised and no fault has been detected. He relies on the following reported judgments: (i) A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2478, paragraph 4 (Domodar Valley Corporation and Anr. V/s. Damodar Valley Corporation Displaced Empoyees Union and Ors.); (ii) A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 520, paragraph 5 (Yadu Nandan Garg V/s. State of Rajasthan and Ors.). 5.1) He lastly submitted that the writ petition suffers from non-joinder of parties. (i) (1998)2 S.C.C. 332 , paragraph-13 (Arun Tewari and Ors. V/s. Damodar Valley Corporation Displaced Empoyees Union and Ors.); (ii) A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 520, paragraph 5 (Yadu Nandan Garg V/s. State of Rajasthan and Ors.). 5.1) He lastly submitted that the writ petition suffers from non-joinder of parties. (i) (1998)2 S.C.C. 332 , paragraph-13 (Arun Tewari and Ors. V/s. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh and Ors.); (ii) A.I.R. 1999 S.C, 562 paragraphs 6 and 7 (State of Kerala V/s. W.I. Services and Estates Ltd. and Ors.). 6. I have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. Nichols in his well-known treatise states that Eminent Domain is the sovereign right of the State to take over the citizens property without his consent but only if the public necessity or public interest demands it in which case the private interest should give way to the public purpose, and the State is bound to repair the losses of individuals at the public expense. In other words, it has been described as forced sale after appropriate compensation. The property of subjects is under the Eminent Control/Domain of the State, and the State in exercise of its sovereign powers can use the property and destroy, or alienate it, without consent of the owner but only for public purpose and after compensation to him. 7. The principle does not need much discussion because the State Government acquired the lands by virtue of the powers vested in it under the Land Acquisition Act which provides for money compensation, solatium and interest which has admittedly been paid to all the land oustees including the petitioners. The respondent authorities have in addition framed a policy decision to provide employment to the oustees within the four corners of the policy decision which is over and above the money compensation under the Act. Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioners is right in his submission that the provision to get employment under the policy decision has ripened into rights in favour of the land oustees who are entitled to get employment within the four corners of the policy. I must hasten to add that no right, much less an enforceable right, is created in favour of those of the land oustees who are not found entitled to employment in view of the terms and conditions of the policy, or have been found unfit, or disqualified. 8. I must hasten to add that no right, much less an enforceable right, is created in favour of those of the land oustees who are not found entitled to employment in view of the terms and conditions of the policy, or have been found unfit, or disqualified. 8. Learned counsel for the Corporation is right in his submission that the petitioners are overlooking the constraints of the policy decision. The preface dated 15.5.1992 (Annexure-1), to the policy decision, is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference: NATIONAL THERMAL POWER CORPORATION LTD., KAHALGAON SUPER THERMAL POWER PROJECT PO KAHALGAON DISTT. BHAGALPUR (BIHAR) Ref Kha. C 99: PIA: Law: 336 Sub: Implementation of Policy for Land Oustees of Kahalgaon Super Thermal Power Project of National Thermal Power Corporation. 1. It has been decided that Land Oustees will be provided job in NTPC within the overall policy as agreed between the Bihar Govt. and NTPC vide Minutes of Meeting dated 15.2.86 and the employment to the Land Oustees of different mouza shall be in proportion to the land acquired for the said mouza within the guidelines as enumerated in the agreement dated 15.2.86. If required number of Land Oustees falling under Priority I do not exist in any particular mouza acquired, Priority II Land Oustees for that mouza shall not be considered unless all priority-I Land Oustees for all the mouzas are employed. The employment shall be, however, limited to number of vacancies in the NTPC/kh. STPP. Sd/- Sd/- (S.M.Nagmoti) (A.K.Singh) GENERAL MANAGER DISTRICT MAGISTRATE NTPC/kh. STPP BHAGALPUR 8.1) It is thus manifest that the terms and conditions of the policy are as follows: (i) The employment shall be limited to the number of vacancies in the Kahalgaon Power Project; (ii) The vacancies in Class-IV shall alone be filled up by the land oustees; (iii) All the posts shall be filled up first by Priority-I land oustees, and Priority-II land oustees shall be considered if the vacancies remain unfilled; (iv) Employment to the land oustees of different mouzas shall be in proportion to the lands acquired for each mouza as per the guidelines enumerated in the agreement dated 15.2.1986. 9. The petitioners have not set up a case that the land oustees can get employment over and above the vacancies in the Kahalgaon Power Project, nor have they set up a case that the vacancies have remained unfilled. 9. The petitioners have not set up a case that the land oustees can get employment over and above the vacancies in the Kahalgaon Power Project, nor have they set up a case that the vacancies have remained unfilled. Their main contention is that thirty persons have been appointed who had either crossed the age-bar or more than one person from one "Family" has been appointed or without verification of age, or without holding the merit-test. Their further case is that once it is found that thirty or less persons have been wrongly appointed, then the petitioners must be appointed even though the Corporation is unable to remove them. 10. The authorities also formulated the administrative instructions setting out the relevant definitions and providing the guidelines for effective implementation of the aforesaid policy decision dated 15.5.1992 (Annexure-1). It defines land oustees, family etc. The definition of family has to be read with the clause providing for nomination. It also provides that only one job would be provided to one member of a family of Priority Group-I only. Group-I and Group-II have also been defined. It also provides the details as to the method of selection including a limited written test/trade test/interview and also the method to assign them seniority. 11. After determining the number of vacancies, the respondent authorities had published the merit-list on 15.4.1993 (Annexure-3), prepared mouza-wise. All the selected persons are found in this list under one or the other mouza and appointments were made in accordance with the policy decision summarised hereinabove, namely, not more than one person of one family of land oustees of Priority-I. The number of vacancies were thus restricted by two factors, namely, the total number of Class-IV vacancies available in the Kahalgaon Plant, and were to be filled up from amongst the land oustees in proportion to acquired lands of each mouza. 12. The representation of the aggrieved persons pointed out the defects in the candidature of the persons named therein. The respondent authorities conducted a detailed enquiry and examined the cases of each and every person mentioned in the representation who are alleged to have been wrongly included in the merit-list dated 8.7.1998 (Annexure-6) and ultimately appointed. The enquiry report records detailed reasons wherein they have found that the persons had been rightly included in the merit-list (Annexure-3) and the grievances of the petitioners are unfounded. The enquiry report records detailed reasons wherein they have found that the persons had been rightly included in the merit-list (Annexure-3) and the grievances of the petitioners are unfounded. These are basically issues of facts, and it is difficult for this Court to come to a different conclusion on the basis of the limited materials on record. For example, the Court has not been informed by either side as to the total number of vacancies of Class-IV to be filled up by such land oustees. Secondly, the Court has neither been informed, nor it expected to be informed, as to the total area of lands of each mouza acquired so as to determine the number of posts allotted to each mouza. There are issues of facts which the authorities have examined in depth twice, and in pursuance of the order of this Court on the second occasion. This Court is convinced on a perusal of the enquiry report that they have made a thorough enquiry of the grievances raised by the aggrieved persons including the petitioners and have disposed of the same with a reasoned order reiterating the merit list (Annexure-3). I do not feel persuaded to disagree with the same. The petitioners are overlooking the constraints of the policy decision. All the land oustees were never promised employment. 13. I must further state that there is really no occasion to advert to the doctrine of Eminent Domain because the undisputed position is that, in view of the laws of the land governing the issues, the State has provided for compensation for compulsory acquisition of land without consent under the Act and has already been paid to all the land oustees including the petitioners. The administrative decision for jobs is a largesse, is more in the nature of gratitutous bounty to the extent the policy decision provides. This Court is in no doubt that all the posts contemplated by the policy decision have been filled up without any manifest error in the selection process. No discrimination or arbitrariness has been alleged. The petitioners are stretching their efforts needlessly and only because of their purposive refusal to realise the constraints of the policy decision. 14. Granting relief to the petitioners may amount to interference with the policy decision of the respondent authorities which, subject to the recognised exceptions, is impermissible in law. No discrimination or arbitrariness has been alleged. The petitioners are stretching their efforts needlessly and only because of their purposive refusal to realise the constraints of the policy decision. 14. Granting relief to the petitioners may amount to interference with the policy decision of the respondent authorities which, subject to the recognised exceptions, is impermissible in law. The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa and Ors. V/s. Gopinath Dash and Ors., reported in Judgments Today 2005 (10) S.C. 484, is relevant in the present context. The State of Orissa had framed a policy for allotment of Government accommodation on rotation basis in view of shortage of accommodation. The Orissa High Court set aside the policy decision holding that it was contrary to and inconsistent with justness and fair play and hence illegal. The Supreme Court did not agree with the judgment of the High Court, allowed the appeal, and restored the policy. Paragraphs 6 and 9 of the judgment are relevant in the present context and are set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference: "6. While exercising the power of judicial review of administrative action, the court is not the appellate authority and the Constitution does not permit the court to direct or advise the executive in matter of policy or to sermonize any matter which under the Constitution lies within the sphere of the Legislature or the executive, provided these authorities do not transgress their constitutional limits or statutory power. (See Ashif Hamio V/s. State of J. & K. (JT 1989(2) SC 548: 1989 SC 1899), Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. V/s. Union of India (JT 1990(2) SC 225: AIR 1990 SC 1277 . The scope of judicial enquiry is confined to the question whether the decision taken by the Government is against any statutory provisions or it violates the fundamental rights of the citizens or is opposed to the provisions of the Constitution. Thus, the position is that even if the decision taken by the Government does not appear to be agreeable to the Court it cannot interfere." "9. The Court should constantly remind itself of what the Supreme Court of the United States said in Metropolis Theatre Company V/s. City of Chicago [(1912) 57 L Ed. 730. "The problems of Government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations, illogical it may be, and unscientific. The Court should constantly remind itself of what the Supreme Court of the United States said in Metropolis Theatre Company V/s. City of Chicago [(1912) 57 L Ed. 730. "The problems of Government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations, illogical it may be, and unscientific. But even such criticism should not be hastily expressed. What is the best is not always discernible, the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned. Mere errors of Government are not subject to our judicial review." 14.1) The judgment of the Supreme Court in U.P. Katha Factories Association V/s. State of U.P. [ (1996)2 S.C.C. 97 , paras 4 and 5 = A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1997], may also be noted. The State Government had decided to ban completely the registration of small-scale units based on forest produce due to its non-availability from a particular date while entitling those registered prior to that date to be considered for allotment of the said produce, being a policy decision of the State. The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the policy decision. 14.2) The Supreme Court in its judgment in the case of State of Punjab V/s. Ram Lubhaya Bagga [ (1998) 4 S.C.C. 117 (paras 23 and 25) = A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 1703] held that the right of the State to change its policy from time to time under the changing circumstances cannot be questioned, though the changed policy deviated from the judicial pronouncements of the Supreme Court. 14.3) The Supreme Court has held in its judgment reported in Krishna Kakkanth V/s. Government of Kerala, [ (1997)9 S.C.C. 495 (paras 35 to 38): A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 1703 that the Government policy is not subject to judicial review unless it is demonstrably arbitrary, capricious, irrational, discriminatory or violative of constitutional or statutory provisions. No such case has been made out by the petitioner calling for interference by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 15 The writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of non-joinder of parties. It may not be possible for this Court to grant any relief to the petitioners even if it had come to the conclusion that certain persons were wrongly appointed. 15 The writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of non-joinder of parties. It may not be possible for this Court to grant any relief to the petitioners even if it had come to the conclusion that certain persons were wrongly appointed. It is trite law that no adverse order can be passed against a person behind his back, i.e. unless he has been impleaded as a party respondent and has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to explain his position. The Supreme Court has observed as follows in paragraph no. 13 of its judgment in Arun Tewari and Ors. vs. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh and Ors. (supra): "13. All the original applicants before the Tribunal who have challenged these provisions for recruitment of Assistant Teachers under the Operation Blackboard Scheme did not possess the requisite qualifications for being selected under the said scheme as Assistant Teachers. Their names do not figure among the lists forwarded by the District Employment Exchanges concerned. Surprisingly, the applications filed by all these persons and/or groups before the Tribunal did not made the selected/appointed candidates who were directly affected by the outcome of their applications, as party respondents. The Tribunal has passed the impugned order without making them parties or issuing notice to any of them. The entire exercise is seriously distorted because of this omission. They have now filed the present appeals after they have been granted leave to file the appeals. In the case of Prabodh Verma vs. State of U.P. (SCC at p. 273), this Court observed that in the case before them there was a serious defect of non-joinder of necessary parties and the only respondents to the Sanghs petition were the State of Uttar Pradesh and its Officers concerned. The employees who were directly concerned were not made partiesnot even by joining some of them in a representative capacity considering that their number was too large for all of them to be joined individually as respondents. This Court observed that the High Court ought not to have decided a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution without the persons who would be vitally affected by its judgment being before it as respondents or at least some of them before it as respondents in representative capacity. These observations apply with equal force here. This Court observed that the High Court ought not to have decided a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution without the persons who would be vitally affected by its judgment being before it as respondents or at least some of them before it as respondents in representative capacity. These observations apply with equal force here. The same view has been reiterated by this Court in Ishwar Singh vs. Kuldip Singh where the Court said that a writ petition challenging selection and appointments without impleading the selected candidates was not maintainable (Vide also J. Jose Dhanapaul vs. S. Thomas (SCC p. 588, para 4). On this ground alone the decision of the Tribunal is vitiated. However, even on merit we do not find that the judgment of the tribunal can be sustained." 16. The following observations of the Supreme Court in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the judgment in the State of Kerala vs. W.i. Services and Estates Ltd. and Ors. (supra) is equally apposite: "6. Shri Venugopal, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, has submitted that the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the High Court were in error in holding that respondent No. 1 could maintain the writ petition without impleading the other applicants who had been selected. The learned counsel has urged that the principle laid down by this Court in General Manager, South Central Rly., Secundrabad V/s. AVR Sidhanti, AIR 1974 SC 1755 , and A. Janardhana V/s. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 769 has no bearing in the facts of this case because in the present-case the quantity of liquid fuel that has been made available by the Central Government to the State of Kerala is limited and since the entire quantity has been allocated for the I.RPs. of other applicants which have been selected, no further quantity of liquid fuel is available for allocation to respondent No. 1 and in the event of the I.RR of respondent No. 1 being selected on the basis of fresh consideration, one of the applicants whose I.P.P. had been selected earlier would have to make way for respondent No. 1 and since none of the applicants was impleaded as party in the writ petition no order adversely affecting the interests of such applicants could be passed and no effective relief could be granted in favour of respondent No. 1. We find considerable merit in the aforesaid submissions of the learned counsel." "7. In order to ascertain whether any additional quantity of liquid fuel quota could be allotted to the State of Kerala we issued notice to the Ministry of Power, Government of India (respondent No. 4) and the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India (respondent No. 5). In response to the said notice a counter affidavit of Shri Sumeet Jerath has been filed on behalf of respondent No. 4 wherein it is stated that it will not possible for the Government of India to release additional allotment of power fuel quota for the State of Kerala as the supply of liquid fuel is limited and liquid fuel based power is expensive. In view of the said affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 4, we have to proceed on the basis that the liquid fuel quota that has been allotted to the State of Kerala as already been allocated for the I.P.Ps. of the applicants which had been selected and in the event of its being selected respondent No. 1 would be displacing one of the applicants-who has been selected. Since none of the applicant has been impleaded as a party to the writ petition, we are of the opinion that the learned Judges on the Division Bench of the High Court were in error in granting relief to respondent No. 1 in the said writ petition. We are in agreement with the judgment of the learned Single Judge in this regard." 17. There is no merit in these writ petitions, and are accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case there shall, however, be no order as to costs.