JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sushil Harkauli, J.—By this Habeas Corpus Writ Petition, the petitioner is challenging the order dated 22nd June, 2006 passed by the District Magistrate, Aligarh, whereby, the petitioner has been preventively detained under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980. The detention order is enclosed as Annexure 4 to this writ petition along with the grounds of detention. It appears from the record that the petitioner was under detention pursuant to an F.I.R., dated 8th August, 2006 under Sections 147/148/149/307/336/504/153-A, I.P.C., read with Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, registered as case crime No. 275 of 2006 at P.S. Delhi Gate district Aligarh. The allegation in the First Information Report is that the petitioner along with certain other persons indulged in rioting and spreading rumours from the spot. 2. The grounds of detention state that on 8th June, 2006 while curfew had been imposed in the Aligarh City, at around 12:00 noon, it was found that persons of the Hindus and Muslim community armed with dangerous weapons including fire arms were pelting stones at each other with religious slogans and abuses. It was also alleged in the detention order that rumours were being spread that a Muslim boy had been dragged away by Hindu boys. 3. The allegation in the grounds of detention against the petitioner is that the petitioner along with his accomplishes armed with dangerous weapons namely, country made pistols were shouting provocative slogans saying that Hindus should be assaulted as they have caught hold of a Muslim boy. They were also pelting stones. 4. It is also in the grounds of detention that it was common talk in the area that those persons of the Muslim community who had indulged in rioting on 8th June, 2006 are trying to get themselves released on bail and after release they would indulge in fresh rioting. This was recorded by two constables in a Report No. 27 on 15th June, 2006 and, this Beat Report was inquired into and found correct by Sub-Inspector Jaswant Singh, which had also been recorded in the G.D. Entry No. 31 on the same day. This was recorded by two constables in a Report No. 27 on 15th June, 2006 and, this Beat Report was inquired into and found correct by Sub-Inspector Jaswant Singh, which had also been recorded in the G.D. Entry No. 31 on the same day. On these facts, the detaining authority i.e., the District Magistrate, Aligarh, has recorded his subjective satisfaction in the grounds of detention that the petitioner has been involved in the aforesaid attempt to instigate communal disturbance and on his release on bail, he was likely to repeat the same kind of activity for the prevention of which his detention under the National Security Act, 1980, is required. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a birth certificate said to have been issued by the Nagar Palika, Aligarh, in which the petitioner’s date of birth is said to have been recorded as 23rd February, 1990 and has submitted on that basis that the petitioner was aged about 16 ½ years at the time of the incident. The detention order dated 22nd June 2006 mentions the petitioner’s age as 18-19 years. Moreover, the petitioner has not mentioned in the writ petition as to whether the petitioner has had any education and, if so, up to which class, in which school and in which year. The age could have been a factor for some sympathetic consideration but if the petitioner was guilty of such rioting and provocation attempt of criminal rioting, it could not be a legally valid ground for setting aside the preventive detention order. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted relying upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Nizamuddin v. State of U.P., 2002(44) ACC 593, that the activity attributed to the petitioner in the grounds of detention is not a subject matter of “public order” but is a problem merely of “law and order”. 7. When the Division Bench in the aforesaid decision in the case of Nizamuddin held that the incident involved in that case was merely a problem of “law and order” and not a problem of “public order”, it relied upon the fact that merely because assailants were Muslims and victims were Hindus, would not necessarily mean that it was a communal incident. In the judgment, the Division Bench says that “there was no mention that the petitioner and his associates were shouting that the Muslims should be killed or that there were clashes between the Hindus and Muslims”. 8. In the present case, the facts mentioned above clearly indicate that the grounds of detention expressly say that it was a case of communal disturbance and rioting and the petitioner has been attributed as shouting communal slogans as detailed above in this order. Provoking communal disturbance is subversive of “public order”. The distinction between “public order” and “law and order” has been clearly specified by the Supreme Court in the case of Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 1228 . 9. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has then urged that there were no good grounds for the satisfaction that the petitioner is trying to get himself released on bail. In the writ petition itself, it is mentioned that on 29th July, 2006, the petitioner was actually directed to be released on bail in the said offence by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 3, Aligarh. This obviously means that the bail application must have been moved and rejected by the Magistrate before that date. Besides, considering the nature of offences as also the fact that there was no role of fire assigned to the petitioner and no person had received any serious injury would make it obvious that the petitioner would try for bail and was likely to be released on bail also. Therefore, the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate on that count cannot be said to be baseless. 10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner then relied upon another decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bhanu Sharan v. Superintendent, Central Jail, Naini, Allahabad, 2002 (45) ACC 599, for the proposition that the solitary incident referred to in the detention order could not have found the basis for the detaining authority reaching the satisfaction that the petitioner was likely to repeat such acts in future to prevent which it was necessary to detaining preventively. 11. In the case of Debu Mahto v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 816 , it has been held that a solitary act attributed to a person can form the basis for reaching the satisfaction that he might repeat such acts in future. 11. In the case of Debu Mahto v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 816 , it has been held that a solitary act attributed to a person can form the basis for reaching the satisfaction that he might repeat such acts in future. It was observed by the Supreme Court that the past conduct may consist of one single act or of a series of acts. But whatever it be, it must be of such a nature that an inference can reasonably be drawn from it that a person concerned could be likely to repeat such acts. 12. Inciting communal violence in a communally sensitive area by committing the acts referred to in the grounds of detention are of a nature which are likely to be repetitive and, therefore, if the detaining authority has arrived at a subjective satisfaction about the likelihood of such repetition, this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot possibly say that such an inference could not have been drawn by any rational person that such act should be repeated. In deciding such matters, the Court has to have an objective approach taking into account all the relevant circumstances and considerations in order to strike a balance between the need to protect the community on the one hand and the need to preserve the liberty of a citizen as observed by the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Hari Singh Thakur, AIR 1987 SC 2080 . 13. No other point has been pressed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner during arguments. 14. In view of above, we do not find any legally sustainable ground either for quashing the detention order or for holding that further continued detention of the petitioner is not necessary or permissible. 15. In the circumstances, as above, the writ petition is dismissed as being without merit. ————