JUDGMENT By the Court.—This petition raises substantial questions of law as to whether the Lokayukta has the jurisdiction to entertain and decide a matter which has already been adjudicated upon by a Competent Court of law including this Court or which is still sub-judice. Shri A.K. Mishra, learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed a very heavy reliance upon the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Lokayukta and Up-Lokayuktas Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the Act 1975) submitting that the said provisions put a complete embargo upon the jurisdiction of the Lokayukta to deal with a case if the complainant has a remedy before a Court or Tribunal. It is submitted by Shri Mishra that it is not a question of having the remedy, in the instant case the respondent No. 2 has already exhausted the remedies and at least one case is still sub-judice. He has also referred to the provisions of Section 8(5) of the Act 1975 which puts a complete bar in respect of matters where the discretion has been exercised by the Statutory Authority. 2. Shri P.C. Srivastava, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 has raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition, pointing out that it is against a impugned show cause notice and, therefore, not maintainable. However, Shri Mishra has submitted that where the notice itself is challenged for want of jurisdiction, the writ petition is maintainable. 3. It is settled legal proposition that a show cause notice cannot be challenged in the writ jurisdiction unless the authority, which has issued it, is found to be having no jurisdiction in the matter, as held by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Companies District 1st, Calcutta and another, AIR 1961 SC 372 , wherein the Court observed as under : “It is well settled, however, that though the writ of prohibition or certiorari will not be issued against an executive authority, the High Courts have power to issue, in a fit case, an order prohibiting an executive authority from acting without jurisdiction. Where such action of an executive authority, acting without jurisdiction subjects or is likely to subject a person to lengthy proceedings and unnecessary harassment, the High Court, it is well settled, will issue appropriate orders or directions to prevent such consequences.” 4. Where such action of an executive authority, acting without jurisdiction subjects or is likely to subject a person to lengthy proceedings and unnecessary harassment, the High Court, it is well settled, will issue appropriate orders or directions to prevent such consequences.” 4. A similar view has subsequently been reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Special Investigation Circle B, Nagar, (1965) 57 ITR 637; State of Madras v. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 681 ; M/s. S.B. Gurbaksh Singh v. Union of India and others, AIR 1976 SC 1115 ; Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. and another v. State of Orissa and another, AIR 1983 SC 603 ; Chief of Army Staff and others v. Maj. Dharam Pal Kukrety, AIR 1985 SC 703 ; Union of India and another v. M/s. Brij Fertilizers Pvt. Ltd. and others, (1993) 3 SCC 564 ; Union of India and others v. Upendra Singh, (1994) 3 SCC 357 ; Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housinq Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh and others, AIR 1996 SC 691 ; Union of India and others v. Metal Box Co. of India Ltd. and others, (1996) 11 SCC 122 ; and Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others, (1998) 8 SCC 1 . 5. While dealing with a similar issue in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brahm Datt Sharma and another, (1987) 2 SCC 179 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under : “When a show-cause notice is issued to a Government servant under the statutory provision seeking upon him to show cause ordinarily the Government servant must place his case before the Authority concerned by showing cause and the Court should be reluctant to interfere with the notice at that stage unless the notice is shown to have been issued pulpably without any authority of law. An order violating fundamental principles of law and causing substantial injustice to a party may also be examined in a writ jurisdiction.” 6. Thus, in view of the above, there can be no dispute to the settled legal proposition that if an authority purports to take any action which is prima facie shown to be null and void and devoid of any jurisdiction, the show cause notice can also be challenged in writ jurisdiction and the proceedings can be quashed even at the stage of show cause notice. 7. The officers of the petitioner authority have raised the issue of the jurisdiction of the Lokayukta in the matter before the Lokayukta himself which fact is undisputed. This has been clearly stated in paragraphs 17 to 20 of the present petition and which point has been noticed in the order dated 8.9.2006 of the Lokayukta (Annex. 17 to the petition). It was urged by the learned Counsel of the Development Authority before the respondent No. 1 that the litigation already pursued by the complainant and the decisions rendered therein by this Court as well as by the authority in the discharge of its statutory functions, was sufficient for the Lokayukta to not proceed with the same subject-matter. 8. The Lokayukta has by the order dated 8.9.2006 refused to decide the issue of jurisdiction on the ground that there is no such embargo or obligation for the Lokayukta to decide any issue as a preliminary issue, as the institution of Lokayukta is only a recommendatory body and not an adjudicatory authority. 9. A perusal of the orders passed by this Court and by the Apex Court on the judicial side and the remedy availed of by the opposite party No. 2 indicates that a decision was ultimately rendered by the Competent Authority on 8.2.2006. This decision has been rendered consequent to the directions of this Court in exercise of powers conferred on the Development Authority under the provisions of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act. The nature of the complaints made by the opposite party No. 2 before the Lokayukta, prima facie, indicate the same issues as is evident from the pleadings on record. The notice issued on 4th October, 2006 by the respondent No. 1 also includes queries which were not even subject-matter of the complaint or contest between the parties. The nature of the queries raised, therefore, raise a serious doubt about the jurisdiction sought to be exercised by the opposite party No. 1 which, prima facie, in our opinion, cannot be done keeping in view the provisions of Section 8 of the Act 1975. The nature of some of the allegations also appear to be prima facie barred by limitation. The nature of some of the allegations also appear to be prima facie barred by limitation. In our opinion, every authority has to function within its jurisdiction and in accordance with the period of limitation prescribed therein and in the event the said limits are transgressed, then in that event they can be subject-matter of judicial review. In the facts of the present case, we find that the aforesaid issues do arise for consideration and, therefore, require a scrutiny. The opposite party No. 1 was obliged to consider the aforesaid aspects before proceeding to enter upon any such arbitration as attempted by the issuance of the impugned notice. The officers of the Development Authority under the provisions of Act and Statute have proceeded to pass an order against which remedies have been availed of by the opposite party No. 2 and, therefore, any exercise at this stage was, prima facie, seems to be uncalled for by the Lokayukta. 10. Section 50 of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 provides a protection to the officials of the Authority from prosecution or any other legal proceeding for anything done by them under the Act in good faith. Therefore, before initiating the proceedings by the Lok Ayukta, this aspect was also required to be considered. Otherwise, the proceedings become liable to be quashed. (Vide Bhappa Singh v. Ram Pal Singh, AIR 1982 SC 779 ; and Costao Fernandes v. State, AIR 1996 SC 1383 ). 11. Admit. 12. Notice on behalf of respondent No. 1 has been accepted by the learned Chief Standing Counsel. He may file reply by the 1st week of January, 2007. Rejoinder affidavit, if any, may be filed within a period of one week thereafter. 13. List the petition on 16.1.2007 before the appropriate Bench for final hearing. 14. Meanwhile, proceedings in Complaint Case No. 1525 of 2005 pending before the respondent No. 1, the Lokayukta shall remain stayed and the records thereof shall be transmitted to this Court in a sealed cover to the Registrar General of this Court for being placed as and when directed by this Court. ———