JUDGMENT Hon’ble A.P. Sahi, J.—The applicant contends that he was prevented from offering “Qurbani", which was a violation of his fundamental right to practice religion freely, guaranteed under the Constitution. Aggrieved he approached the District Administration and filed a representation before the District Magistrate, Sant Kabir Nagar, on 14.10.2004 entailing his grievances and seeking a direction from the District Magistrate in this regard. Having failed to get his grievances redressed from the District Administration, he preferred a writ petition before this Court which was disposed of on 3.12.2004 by the following order : “Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents. The writ petition is finally disposed of with a direction to respondent No. 2 to decide the petitioner’s representation dated 14.10.2004 filed as Annexure-3 to the writ petition by a reasoned and speaking order within three weeks from the date of production of certified copy of this order before him.” 2. The applicant has narrated in this application that the certified copy of the said order was served through letter dated 14.12.2004 received in the office of the District Magistrate, Sant Kabir Nagar, thereafter a reminder was sent on 14.1.2005 and he also approached the Parliamentary affairs Minister of the State apprising him of the grievances which in turn was communicated by the opposite party No. 2, the Sub Divisional Magistrate. The applicant also claims to have approached the Chief Minister and also His Excellency the President of India. It is alleged by the applicant that he was under a bona fide impression that his grievances would be attended to in the month of April 2005, he was given an assurance that action will be taken in future. It is further alleged by him that when he went to the office of the District Magistrate in the month of May 2005, he was informed, that since the festival during which such practices are permitted, shall occur in the month of December 2005, therefore, he should approach then and that no order can be passed in anticipation. 3. It is further alleged by him that when he went to the office of the District Magistrate in the month of May 2005, he was informed, that since the festival during which such practices are permitted, shall occur in the month of December 2005, therefore, he should approach then and that no order can be passed in anticipation. 3. The applicant thereafter in paras 11 and 15 of this application has stated that he had been earlier advised by his local counsel that he had no remedy left but in para 15 he contends that he met another counsel practicing at Gorakhpur, the Headquarters of the Commissioner, who informed him that he should approach the Hon’ble Court by way of filing a contempt application and, accordingly, as per the aforesaid advice which was tendered to him on 7.11.2006, the applicant has approached this Court by means of this application. 4. The Stamp Reporter has reported this application to be beyond time by 324 days as per Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 quoted herein below : “20. Limitation for actions for contempt.—No Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.” 5. Learned Counsel for the applicant confronted with the aforesaid objection has urged, that in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and others, (2001) 7 SCC 549 , coupled with the facts of this case, the objection taken by the Stamp Reporter deserves to be over ruled and the application be entertained as being within time. He contends that the wrong complained of is a continuing wrong and therefore the cause of action is a recurring one. 6. Sri Arvind Srivastava, learned Counsel for the applicant, has invited the attention of the Court to various paragraphs of the said decision to contend that the conclusion drawn in the aforesaid decision widens the interpretation of Section 20, according to which the aforesaid provision has to be construed in a manner to avoid hardship of litigants and also by avoiding pointless fetters on the power of the Court to punish for its contempt. He has further urged that para 41 read with paras 43, 46 and 47 of the said judgment makes it clear that this Court has the power to proceed to entertain a contempt application even beyond the period of one year. 7. The question, therefore, that has arisen before this Court is as to whether the wordings used in Section 20 can be construed to be a complete bar on the initiation of contempt proceedings after one year or this Court has the power to entertain contempt applications even if the aforesaid statutory period of one year has expired. This would further be dependant on the meaning given to the words “continuing wrong” and “recurring cause of action”. 8. The scheme of the Constitution clearly empowers the Parliament to frame laws on the subject matter. This need not detain this Court as Item No. 77 & 78 of the List I of the Vllth Schedule to the Constitution empowers the Parliament to enact, Laws on the jurisdiction and the powers of the High Court. Article 215 of the Constitution empowers the High Court to punish any person for disobedience of its own orders. The manner in which such power has to be exercised is further provided for under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 read with the rules framed by the respective High Courts in exercise of the powers conferred under Article 225 of the Constitution of India. It would be relevant to mention that in exercise of such powers the Allahabad High Court has framed its own rules of procedure to be followed in matters arising out of contempt proceedings which are contained in Chapter XXXV-E of the Rules. There can be little doubt that the power to legislate, therefore, vests with the Parliament in respect of such matters. 9. Learned Counsel for the applicant contends that once the power has been conferred on the High Court then the interpretation given by the Apex Court in Pallav Sheth’s case should be read as acknowledging the power of the High Court to give effect to such powers. He contends that the said decision rightly observes that the provisions of the Limitation Act apply and hence this Court cannot be deprived of its power to entertain an application on such a strict interpretation of Section 20 which ultimately would amount to stultifying and negating the powers conferred by the Constitution itself. He contends that the said decision rightly observes that the provisions of the Limitation Act apply and hence this Court cannot be deprived of its power to entertain an application on such a strict interpretation of Section 20 which ultimately would amount to stultifying and negating the powers conferred by the Constitution itself. 10. The entire argument, therefore, centers round the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Pallav Sheth (supra). 11. The said decision after tracing the history of the provisions of contempt indicated that in order to bring about changes in the law relating to contempt, a bill was introduced after obtaining a report from the Sanyal Committee which did not contain any provision of limitation in relating to taken any action for the contempt of Courts. However, the report of the Joint Select Committee of the Parliament suggested a few changes and introduced a change for providing a period of limitation as a result whereof the provisions of Section 20 was incorporated in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The Court further held and reaffirmed that this power conferred on the High Court by the Constitution cannot take away the right of the Court to punish for contempt by making a provision which would in any way stultify or curtail the powers under the Contempt of Courts Act. 12. After having discussed the decision in the case of Baradakanta Mishra, (1975) 3 SCC 535 , the Apex Court held that the observations made in the said case in respect of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act were in the nature of obiter dicta and were not binding. It further held that the said decision did not consider the applicability of the provisions of Limitation Act to the proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act. 13. Thereafter, the Apex Court considered the ratio of Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar’s case, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 418, wherein the Apex Court found that the action had been taken within the period of one year and failure to comply with the directions was in the nature of a continuing wrong. Reference at this stage can be made to para 20 of Pallav Sheth’s case. 14. Reference at this stage can be made to para 20 of Pallav Sheth’s case. 14. The Apex Court then went on to discuss the decision in the case of State of West Bengal v. Kartik Chand, (1996) 6 SCC 342 , wherein it was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply to appeals filed under the Calcutta High Court Rules read with Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The Court also noted the ratio of the decision in Om Prakash Jaiswal’s case (2000) 3 SCC 171 , which had held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act in view of the provisions of Section 20. After noting the said decision and its ratio, the Apex Court in paragraph 30 of Pallav Sheth’s case held as follows : “It, however, appears to us that providing for the quantum of punishment or what may or may not be regarded as acts of contempt or even providing for a period of limitation for initiating proceedings for contempt cannot be taken to be a provision which abrogates or stultifies the contempt jurisdiction under Article 129 or Article 215 of the Constitution.” 15. However, in the very next paragraph i.e. paragraph 31 of the aforesaid judgment, the Apex Court held that grant or existence of absolute or unbridled power has always been frowned upon and that the provisions of Article 129 and Article 215 should be exercised in consonance with the provisions of a validly enacted law. In case of apparent or likelihood of conflict the provisions should be construed harmoniously. The ratio of the aforesaid 2 paragraphs is clearly to the effect that a law prescribing limitation for taking action does not abrogate or stultify the powers of contempt and in paragraph 32 of the decision it has been clearly stated that a reasonable period of limitation can be provided. 16. The Apex Court has further held in paragraph 42 of the judgment that the view taken in Om Prakash Jaiswal’s case is a narrow view of Section 20 which does not seem to be warranted and it does not only cause hardship but also such an interpretation would perpetrate injustice. 16. The Apex Court has further held in paragraph 42 of the judgment that the view taken in Om Prakash Jaiswal’s case is a narrow view of Section 20 which does not seem to be warranted and it does not only cause hardship but also such an interpretation would perpetrate injustice. In Pallav Sheth’s case, the Apex Court in paragraph 46 and 47 ruled that the provisions of Section 17 are clearly attracted and on the facts of that case found, that the facts and the material which were necessary to initiate the legal proceedings had been concealed from the department which fraud had prevented the authority from taking steps to initiate proceedings under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. In the opinion of the Apex Court the principle would also apply to contempt proceedings and it, therefore, went on to hold that in such a situation even if the cause of action arose after the period of one year, then the period of limitation would not begin to run until the concerned party had discovered the fraud or the mistake and had thereafter proceeded to take action within the period of one year from the date of such discovery. The Apex Court also made a reference to Kartik Chandra Das’s case and held that Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act stand attracted in appeals filed under Section 19 of the Act. 17. Learned Counsel for the applicant has urged that in view of the aforesaid ratio of Pallav Sheth’s case, the provisions of Limitation Act including Section 5 should also apply in proceedings initiated for contempt under Section 12 of the Act. For this, learned Counsel for the applicant seeks to derive support from the observations made in paragraph 34 of the judgment in Pallav Sheth’s case, wherein the Apex Court has indicated as follows : “There can be little doubt that Section 20, as framed, is not happily worded. The heading of the section, however, indicates what it was to provide for “Limitation for actions for contempt”. 18. The wording of the Section is negative but it is clear that terminus ad quem is the initiation of proceedings for contempt. The question that arises is as to how or when are the proceedings for contempt initiated. 19. The heading of the section, however, indicates what it was to provide for “Limitation for actions for contempt”. 18. The wording of the Section is negative but it is clear that terminus ad quem is the initiation of proceedings for contempt. The question that arises is as to how or when are the proceedings for contempt initiated. 19. He has further reiterated the observations made in paragraph 41 which is to the following effect : “Section 20, therefore, has to be construed in a manner which would avoid such an anomaly and hardship both as regards the litigants as also by placing a pointless fetter on the part of the court to punish for its contempt. An interpretation of Section 20, like the one canvassed by the appellant, which would render the constitutional power of the Courts nugatory in taking action for contempt even in cases of gross contempt, successfully hidden for a period of one year by practising fraud by the contemner would render Section 20 as liable to be regarded as being in conflict with Article 129 and/or Article 215. Such a rigid interpretation must therefore be avoided.” 20. It is to be noted that a case is an authority on what it actually decides. In the opinion of this Court Pallav Sheth’s case has not over ruled Om Prakash Jaiswal’s case in so far as the question of applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is concerned. The Apex Court has only held that a narrow view of Section 20 has been taken which was not warranted. Further the decision in Pallav Sheth’s case does not rule that all the principles enshrined in the Limitation Act do apply to the proceedings initiated under Section 12 of the Act. The observations therein in paragraph 34 to the effect that the wordings of Section 20 are not happily worded does not amount to hold that all the provisions of Limitation Act squarely apply or the principles enshrined in the provisions of Limitation Act are attracted for initiating proceedings beyond the period of one year like any other law. The observations therein in paragraph 34 to the effect that the wordings of Section 20 are not happily worded does not amount to hold that all the provisions of Limitation Act squarely apply or the principles enshrined in the provisions of Limitation Act are attracted for initiating proceedings beyond the period of one year like any other law. However, learned Counsel for the applicant contends that once it has been held that the provisions have to be interpreted to harmonize them with the powers of the Court to punish for contempt, then in that event the same principle would also apply in the matter of initiating contempt under Section 12 more so when the Apex Court has already held that the said principle is applicable in matters arising out of appeals under Section 19 of the Act. Learned Counsel contends that no distinction should be drawn between initiation or filing of appeals and that this Court should not surrender its inherent power for initiating proceedings as per the observations in Pallav Sheth’s case. 21. At this juncture, it would be useful to take notice of the judgment of Calcutta High Court by a learned single Judge in the case of Tata Iron & Steel Company Limited v. R. Poddar and others, AIR 1989 Cal 375 , wherein learned single Judge of the said Court struck down Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act as being ultra vires the powers of the contempt enshrined under Article 215 of the Constitution. The said view was, however, reversed by a Division Bench of the same Court in another case i.e. Arthur Branwell & Company Limited and another v. Indian Fibers Limited, 1993 (2) CLJ 182. The Division Bench ruled that the Parliament has the power to legislate in respect of the procedure and jurisdiction of the High Court and since Section 20 is procedural in nature, the Parliament cannot be said to have acted without authority in introducing the said provision. The Court held that the said prescription of limitation has been provided to remove any uncertainty and to eliminate the filing of stale complaints. 22. The question, therefore, is can the principles and provisions of the Limitation Act be pressed into service as is being sought to be raised in the present application. The Court held that the said prescription of limitation has been provided to remove any uncertainty and to eliminate the filing of stale complaints. 22. The question, therefore, is can the principles and provisions of the Limitation Act be pressed into service as is being sought to be raised in the present application. Further whether such a continuing wrong gives a recurring cause of action so as to eliminate the Bar created by Section 20 of the Act. This gives rise to a further question as to whether the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can proceed to condone and waive the delay, if any, as suggested by the learned Counsel for the applicant for initiating proceeding under Section 12 of the Act even after the expiry of one year. 23. A bare perusal of Section 20 would leave no room for doubt that the words used in the said section are almost prohibitory in nature to the effect that no Court shall initiate any proceedings after the expiry of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. The Section takes away the jurisdiction of the Court to initiate proceedings and, as such, the Court cannot proceed to try and punish a person in the event the initiation has not taken place within the period of one year. In my opinion, the provisions of Section 20 cannot be rendered nugatory by applying the principles of Section 5 of the Limitation Act conferring powers on this Court to extend the period of limitation in exercise of its inherent power under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. The ratio of the decisions including Pallav Sheth’s case, also hold that a law can be enacted to provide a period of limitation and such a prescription cannot be said to be ultra vires. In such a situation, can this Court proceed to interpret the law on the ground of harmonious construction and extend the applicability of principles of the Limitation Act with special reference to Section 5 in respect of proceedings under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. 24. In order to interpret the provisions of Section 20 of the 1971 Act, it would be appropriate to keep in mind the rules of interpretation that have been acknowledged and widely accepted even in the pronouncements of our courts. 24. In order to interpret the provisions of Section 20 of the 1971 Act, it would be appropriate to keep in mind the rules of interpretation that have been acknowledged and widely accepted even in the pronouncements of our courts. A note on the subject has been recently circulated prepared by Hon. Mr. Justice Markandey Katju, Judge Supreme Court of India, which is broadly illustrative and can be usefully taken aid of while dealing with this issue. His Lordship after discussing the general rules applicable and the authorities on the subject has noted that : “Moreover, individual cases of hardship and injustice have no bearing for rejecting the literal rule of interpretation. It is often found that laws enacted for the general advantage do result in individual hardship, e.g. laws of Limitation, Registration, etc. It is only when the natural construction leads to some general hardship or injustice that, in exceptional cases, or when there is an ambiguity, we can depart from the literal rule. However, difficulty arises because words used by the legislature do not always bear a plain meaning. This may be due to bad or clumsy drafting or for any other reason. Moreover, Judges sometimes differ on the issue whether certain words are plain or not. Even when there is an agreement that the words are plain, difference of opinion may arise on the question as to what the plain meaning is. In cases of such doubts, therefore, the court has to have an eye on the object and purpose of the statute. However, if the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not ordinarily be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act vide Kanailal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, AIR 1957 SC 907 (910). Hardship or inconvenience cannot alter the meaning of the language employed by the legislature if such meaning is clear on the fact of the statute. As observed by Lord Atkin “when the meaning of the words is plain, it is not the duty of the court to busy themselves with supposed intentions” vide Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor, AIR 1939 PC 47. In Major and St. As observed by Lord Atkin “when the meaning of the words is plain, it is not the duty of the court to busy themselves with supposed intentions” vide Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor, AIR 1939 PC 47. In Major and St. Mellons Rural District Council v. Newport Corporation, (1951) 2 All E.R. 839, the House of Lords considered the following remarks of Lord Denning in the Court of Appeals who had observed : “We sit here to find out the intention of Parliament and Ministers and carry it out, and we do this better by filling in the gaps and making sense of the enactment than by opening it up to destructive analysis”. Overruling the said decision, the House of Lords described it as a “naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of interpretation”. It was observed that if there is a gap in the law, the remedy lies in amending the Act, and not by filling the gap by a judicial verdict.” 25. There does not appear to be a complete answer to this grey area of issues which have been raised by the learned Counsel for the applicant and which do not find answered in Pallav Sheth’s case. The observations made therein as relied on by the learned Counsel, therefore, in my opinion, require a further authentic pronouncement by a larger Bench of this Court so as to remove any doubts as the issue, in my opinion, is not only one of public importance but is also of a considerable legal importance for the exercise of powers under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. 26. In my opinion the ratio in Pallav Sheth’s case is confined to the applicability of the principles contained in Section 17 of the Limitation Act. The said decision is not an authority on the issue of applicability of the other provisions of the Act or the principles enshrined therein and treat the same to be available with the inherent powers of this Court. In this case, the provisions of Section 17 are not attracted and, therefore, in my opinion the ratio of the decision in Pallav Sheth’s case is not attracted herein. Nevertheless the issues raised by the learned Counsel for the applicant are of far reaching consequences and, therefore, they deserve to be answered in my opinion by a larger Bench. In this case, the provisions of Section 17 are not attracted and, therefore, in my opinion the ratio of the decision in Pallav Sheth’s case is not attracted herein. Nevertheless the issues raised by the learned Counsel for the applicant are of far reaching consequences and, therefore, they deserve to be answered in my opinion by a larger Bench. The questions, therefore, which are required to be considered are : (i) Whether the decision in Pallav Sheth’s case, (2001) 7 SCC 549 , can be construed so as to apply all the principles enshrined in the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act (except Section 17 thereof) and as to whether the same can be made applicable to proceedings to be initiated under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971? (ii) Whether the High Court in exercise of its powers for initiating contempt of its Court or the contempt of its subordinate court or Tribunal, as the case may be, has the power to condone and waive the delay in initiation of contempt proceedings under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. Let the papers be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice/Senior Judge for appropriate orders keeping in view the provisions of Chapter V Rule 6 of the Allahabad High Court Rules. ———