JUDGMENT:- (1) THREE writ applications are taken up for disposal analogously as the facts are identical and same points are involved in all the three writ applications excepting the premises in question. In the present judgment, W.P. No. 281 of 2003 is dealt with. (2) BEFORE entering into the merits of the case it will be convenient to look into the factual background of the case. In W.P. No. 281 of 2003, the premises in question is a godown being compartment No. D-2 on the ground floor of Calcutta Port Trusts Warehouse at Strand Road. Since, the said premises was unauthorisedly occupied by one m/s. Inland Transport, an application was filed by the respondent No. 1 before the Estate Officer invoking his jurisdiction under the Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 for eviction of said M/s. Inland Transport. After hearing the Estate Officer by Order No. 17 dated 6. 4. 99 in proceeding no. 258 of 1998 held that M/s. Inland Transport was an unauthorised occupant and a formal order of eviction was drawn up against them under Section 5 of the Act of 1971 and they were given 15 days time to vacate the said godown. (3) CHALLENGING such order of eviction dated 6. 4. 99 passed by the estate Officer, M/s. Inland Transport preferred an appeal under Section 9 of the 1971 Act before the learned Chief Judge, city Civil Court being Misc. Appeal no. 13 of 1999. The learned Chief Judge, city Civil Court by his order dated 30. 9. 99 dismissed the said appeal. Against the judgment and order dated 30. 9,99 passed by the learned Chief Judge, city Civil Court an application under article 227 of the Constitution of India was preferred by M/s. Inland Transport before this Court being C. O. No. 3261 of 1999 which was also dismissed by this court on 24. 05. 2002. M/s. Inland Transport thereafter preferred a Special Leave petition before the Honble Supreme Court and the said SLP was dismissed by the Honble Supreme Court on 25. 10. 2002. (4) IT may be mentioned here that the present writ petitioner filed a title suit being T. S. No. 1129 of 1990 in City Civil Court, Calcutta and by an order dated 12. 07. 1990 status-quo was directed to be maintained. 10. 2002. (4) IT may be mentioned here that the present writ petitioner filed a title suit being T. S. No. 1129 of 1990 in City Civil Court, Calcutta and by an order dated 12. 07. 1990 status-quo was directed to be maintained. The writ petitioner filed an application before the Estate Officer in proceeding No. 258-D of 1998 and prayed for an interim order on the ground that eviction order was passed behind the back of the writ petitioner although he was a necessary party in the said eviction proceeding. Such prayer for interim order was refused by the Estate Officer by an order dated 18. 02. 2002. Writ petitioner filed Misc. Appeal No. 3 of 2003 in the Court of learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court praying for stay of further proceeding in proceeding No. 258/d of 1998 including the execution of the eviction order. Learned Judge by his order dated 8. 1. 2003 stayed all further proceeding including the execution of eviction in proceeding no. 258/d of 1998. (5) IT is the contention of the learned Advocate of the petitioner that in spite of the communication of the order dated 8.1.2003, the respondent authority had executed the eviction order and removed all occupants of the said godown with the help of the police authorities on 19. 01. 2003. (6) THE respondent No. 1 challenged the order dated 8. 1. 2003 passed by the learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court by filing an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This Court by an order dated 28. 03. 2003 directed the Court below to hear out the application by 31. 05. 2003 and liberty was granted to the respondent No. 1 to proceed with the damage proceeding being no. 258/d of 1998 against M/s. Inland Transport. (7) IN such background of facts, the present writ application was filed before this Court. At the very outset, Mr. Mukherjee, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner raised a preliminary objection challenging the maintainability of the present writ application. Mr. Mukherjee draws the attention of this Court to the order dated 27. 02. 2006 passed by the Honble Supreme court in SLP (C) Nos. 7120-7122 of 2004 wherein it was made clear by the honble Apex Court that the point of maintainability of the writ application would be kept open to be decided in the writ petition itself. Mr. Mukherjee draws the attention of this Court to the order dated 27. 02. 2006 passed by the Honble Supreme court in SLP (C) Nos. 7120-7122 of 2004 wherein it was made clear by the honble Apex Court that the point of maintainability of the writ application would be kept open to be decided in the writ petition itself. (8) FIRST point raised by Mr. Mukherjee is that an order of Civil Court in a pending proceeding otherwise enforceable cannot be enforced by a writ of mandamus in the extraordinary jurisdiction. If any order of injunction is violated the remedy is available under the Code of Civil Procedure. In support of his contention. Mr. Mukherjee relies upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in 1977 (1) CLJ 85 (Calcutta Medical Stores v. Stadmed Private Limited and Ors.). In the said judgment, it was held that violation of an order of injunction made under Order 39 is civil contempt for which a remedy has been specifically provided in Order 39 itself. Where a specific remedy has been provided for violation of a Courts order, the party aggrieved by such violation should normally resort to the specific remedy. Mr. Mukherjee next relies upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in 2000 (1) CHN 491 (Maharani Mondal v. State of West Bengal and Ors.), wherein it was held by this Court that this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot function as an executing Court. In the case of Kanak Kumar Bar v. State of West Bengal (Cal. LT 1996 (2) HC 418) same principle was laid down that no writ application will be maintainable for enforcement of the order and this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction cannot function as an executing court. It was further held in the said judgment that two parallel proceedings should not be allowed to continue simultaneously. (9) NEXT submission of Mr. Mukherjee is that when there is an alternative remedy, which has already been, availed of by the writ petitioner by filing a suit in appropriate Civil Court, this Court should not interfere with this matter in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Mukherjee relies upon a judgment of the Honble supreme Court reported in AIR 1954 SC 207 (Jagannath v. Jaswant Singh). Mr. Mukherjee relies upon a judgment of the Honble supreme Court reported in AIR 1954 SC 207 (Jagannath v. Jaswant Singh). It was held in the said judgment that the remedy provided for in Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a discretionary remedy and High Court has always the discretion to refuse to grant any writ if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate and suitable relief elsewhere. Mr. Mukherjee, learned Counsel also relies upon a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in AIR 1967 Calcutta 382 (Sheonath Singh v. A. I. T. Commissioner). In Paragraph-5 of the said judgment, it was held as follows: - "mr. Sen appearing on behalf of the appellant, has cited several cases which were authority for the proposition that in cases of a writ of certiorari or prohibition, the mere existence of an alternative remedy is no bar to a writ petition, particularly where the question of initial jurisdiction or violation of rules of natural justice are concerned. This proposition is not denied by the respondent. But, a clear distinction is to be made between cases where one is considering the mere existence of an alternative remedy, and cases where there exists an alternative remedy in law and that remedy is being actively pursued, giving rise to parallel proceedings. It is only in such cases that the abovementioned principle applies and a writ application should fail or at least should not be allowed to be proceed with, so long as the legal action is pending. " (10) RELYING upon the aforesaid judgment, it is submitted by Mr. Mukherjee that since the petitioner has already availed of the alternative remedy by filing title Suit No. 1129 of 1990 in the City Civil Court, which is still pending, the present writ application is not maintainable and the same is liable to be dismissed. Mr. Mukherjee further points out that the Misc. Appeal No. 3 of 2003, which was preferred by the writ petitioner against the order dated 18.12.2002 passed by the Estate Officer refusing to pass any ad-interim order, is still pending in the court of learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court. Since, the petitioner has already availed of the alternative remedy by filing title suit and Misc. Appeal No. 3 of 2003, which was preferred by the writ petitioner against the order dated 18.12.2002 passed by the Estate Officer refusing to pass any ad-interim order, is still pending in the court of learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court. Since, the petitioner has already availed of the alternative remedy by filing title suit and Misc. Appeal as aforesaid; which are still pending in the said courts below, the present writ application should be dismissed on that score alone. (11) MR. Mukherjee next submits that no writ under Article 226 is available when the petitioner fails to establish his legal right belonging to himself. Not a single scrap of paper can be produced by the writ petitioner to prove that he had" any legal right or that he was ever given possession or that he was in possession of the said godown at any point of time. In support of his contention, Mr. Mukherjee relies upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in 78 CWN 183 (Corporation of Calcutta v. D. N. Sen and Ors.). Taking into consideration various judgments of the Honble Apex court, it was held by the Division Bench of this Court as follows: - "the ratio of the aforesaid decisions seems to be that in order to be entitled to relief under Article 226 of the Constitution to prevent interference with his property the petitioner must establish a legal right to the property in question. If the petitioner asserts a right which prima facie establishes a legal right and which requires adjudication then the Court must enquire into that right and if that right is established then interference with that right in appropriate cases, subject to other conditions regarding article 226 of the Constitution, should be prevented by appropriate orders. If, however, the petitioners right is not established or is not found to be tenable then the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. If, however, the petitioners right is not established or is not found to be tenable then the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. " "furthermore, it appears to us that where the State or the local authorities by executive fiat without the sanction of the law or the authority of any judicial authority interferes with the right or possession of a person, such interference will be prevented by appropriate order under article 226 of the Constitution but where a local authority or State or a statutory body interferes with the possession, in assertion of its property rights and dispossesses a person of his possession in which he has no right to be in possession under the law, even without any the process of the Court of law, such a person is not entitled to any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution to be put in possession; he may be entitled to other reliefs in other proceedings. " (12) RELYING upon the aforesaid judgment, it is submitted by Mr. Mukherjee that the writ petitioner could riot produce a single scrap of paper to show that he was ever given possession or that he was in possession of the said godown at any point of time. It is submitted by Mr. Mukherjee that a writ may be issued only after a finding arrived at by the Court that the aggrieved party has a legal right which entitles him to any of the aforesaid writs and that such legal right has been infringed. Since, the petitioner has no legal right over the property and since he was never in possession of the said property, the present writ application is liable to be dismissed. (13) IT is the contention of Mr. Mukherjee that an eviction proceeding was initiated against one M/s. Inland Transport. Had the writ petitioner been in actual possession of the godown, he could have participated in the said proceeding. Such proceeding for eviction was initiated after due compliance of Section 4 (3) of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act by affixing the notice on the outside wall of the premises. The writ petitioner did not raise any objection before the Estate Officer in course of the eviction proceeding. The writ petitioner had waived his right and now he is bound by the order of eviction, which was upheld by the Supreme Court. The writ petitioner did not raise any objection before the Estate Officer in course of the eviction proceeding. The writ petitioner had waived his right and now he is bound by the order of eviction, which was upheld by the Supreme Court. The writ petitioner remained silent so long the eviction proceeding continued. After the eviction order was passed by the Estate Officer and was affirmed by different Courts and by the Supreme court and after the possession was taken by the respondent authority/ C.P.T., the writ petitioner came forward with the present writ application with a grievance that eviction order was passed against m/s. Inland Transport and he was not given any notice of such eviction proceeding although he was in possession of the said property. Such contention of the writ petitioner should never be accepted by this Court and the writ petition should be dismissed as not maintainable. (14) MR. Banerjee, learned Advocate appearing for the writ petitioner submits that existence of an alternative remedy is not a bar to the relief under article 226 of the Constitution of India. In support of his contention, Mr. Banerjee relies upon a judgment of the Apex Court reported in 1998 (8) SCC 1 (Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai). It was held in the said judgment that alternative remedy would not operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, i.e. (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is violation of principle of natural justice and (iii) where the order or the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction. (15) I have gone through the judgment referred to above. This is settled principle of law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court. But, this is a circumstance, which the Court is to take into consideration keeping in view the facts and circumstances of each case. There is a clear distinction between the "remedy available" and "remedy availed of" Where the alternative remedy has already been availed of the Court normally should not interfere. A clear distinction is to be made between cases where there exists an alternative remedy and the cases where such alternative remedy is being actively pursued giving rise to a parallel proceeding. There is a clear distinction between the "remedy available" and "remedy availed of" Where the alternative remedy has already been availed of the Court normally should not interfere. A clear distinction is to be made between cases where there exists an alternative remedy and the cases where such alternative remedy is being actively pursued giving rise to a parallel proceeding. In my view, the judgment referred to above is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case, which does not come within the purview of the three contingencies mentioned in the said judgment. (16) NEXT judgment relied upon by Mr. Banerjee reported in AIR 1977 SC 1718 (State of Madhya Pradesh v. Babulal and Ors.) is also not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the said case, State filed an application under Article 226 for a declaration that the suit filed by the respondent was in violation of the statutory provisions of M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. The High Court said that the State could file a suit for declaration that the decree was null and void. The Honble Supreme court having found that the order passed by the Court below was beyond jurisdiction set aside the order of the high Court and issued a writ of cert/bran to quash the judgment and decree passed by the Court below, The facts and circumstances of the case referred to above are quite different from the present case. (17) MR. Banerjee next relies upon a judgment of the Honble Supreme court reported in JT 2002 (3) SC 166 (State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Vishnunarayan and Associates (P) Limited). From a reading of the said judgment, it appears that it was undisputed case of the parties that the respondents were the tenants of shops, offices and godowns in the hotel under the erstwhile company and were in occupation of their respective portions. The hotel authority accepted them as tenants by accepting rents from them and there was no lawful termination of their tenancy. But inspite of that some of the occupants were forcibly dispossessed by the respondent authorities. A writ petition was filed by them challenging the illegal action of the State Government authorities and praying for restoration of possession. The High Court held the forcible eviction to be unauthorized. But inspite of that some of the occupants were forcibly dispossessed by the respondent authorities. A writ petition was filed by them challenging the illegal action of the State Government authorities and praying for restoration of possession. The High Court held the forcible eviction to be unauthorized. The matter was brought upto the Honble Apex court by the State of West Bengal and order passed by the High Court was upheld. From a reading of the said judgment, it becomes clear that it was undisputed that there was a relationship of landlord and tenant and hotel authority used to accept rent from the tenants and such relationship continued even after take-over by the Government. In such circumstances, it was held that action of the State Government in-forcefully dispossessing the tenants was not justified in law. But, the facts and circumstances in the present case are quite different from the case referred to above. In the present case, there was no relationship of landlord and tenants between the parties. Not a single document could be produced by the writ petitioner to show that he was ever inducted as a tenant and that he was ever in possession of the godown / premises in question. The judgment referred to above, in my considered view, does not have any manner of application in the present case. (18) NEXT judgment relied upon by Mr. Banerjee, reported in AIR 1996 SC 2005 (Delhi Dev. Authority v. Skipper Construction) is also not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case for the same reason as it has already been discussed above. Not a single document could be produced before this Court to show that the writ petitioner was ever inducted as a tenant or that he was ever in possession of the said premises. So, the question of illegal and forceful dispossession by the respondent authority does not arise in the present case. (19) NEXT judgment relied upon by Mr. Banerjee is reported in 2004 (3)SCC 553 (A. B. L International Limited v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation), wherein it was held that in appropriate cases the writ Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition involving disputed questions of fact and there is no absolute bar in regard thereto. (19) NEXT judgment relied upon by Mr. Banerjee is reported in 2004 (3)SCC 553 (A. B. L International Limited v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation), wherein it was held that in appropriate cases the writ Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition involving disputed questions of fact and there is no absolute bar in regard thereto. In the said judgment, it was also held that a writ petition involving disputed questions of facts, which requires consideration of evidence, which is not on record, will not normally be entertained by a Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. I have gone through the said judgment. These are settled principles of law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in number of judgments. This judgment does not have any manner of application in the present case, where the facts and circumstances are totally different. This judgment is also not relevant for deciding the present application. (20) IN course of hearing Mr. Banerjee all along tried to make out a case that the writ petitioner was in possession of the premises in question. According to Mr. Banerjee a person, even if he is in unlawful possession, cannot be dispossessed without the authority of law. Law respects possession even if there is no title to support it. A person should not be allowed to take the law in his own hands and to dispossess a person in actual possession. In support of his contention, Mr. Banerjee relies upon a Full Bench decision of Orissa High court reported in AIR 1972 Orissa 40 (R. C. Indrakumar (P.) Ltd. v. State of orissa). The said judgment is also not applicable in the present case. In the judgment referred to above, it was held that where a mining lease with a reentry clause had expired by efflux of time and the lessee continued in possession, he could not be ousted from the leasehold without assistance of the Court and where the State Government as lessor had resumed possession of the leasehold by force, the dispossessed lessee can claim protection of his interest under article 226 of the Constitution of India. From a reading of the said judgment, it is clear that there was a relationship of lessor and lessee between the parties and even after the expiry of the lease period he continued to be in possession. From a reading of the said judgment, it is clear that there was a relationship of lessor and lessee between the parties and even after the expiry of the lease period he continued to be in possession. In such circumstances, Orissa High Court was of the view that such a person cannot be dispossessed without the authority of law. But, the facts and circumstances are quite different in the present case, where there was no such relationship between the parties as it has already been stated above. (21) I have heard the learned Advocates of the respective parties. I have also perused the judgments referred to above. An eviction proceeding under the Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 was initiated before the Estate Officer at the instance of the respondent No. "1"/ C. P. T. authority against one M/s. Inland Transport. Such proceeding was initiated after due compliance of Section 4 (3) of the 1971 Act, which runs as follows: -Section 4 (3) - "the Estate Officer shall cause the notice to be served by having it affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises, and in such other manner as may be prescribed, whereupon the notice shall be deemed to have been duly given to all persons concerned. " (22) NOTICE was hung up on the outside wall of the premises in compliance with the said provision. Had the writ petitioner been in possession of the said premises, he could have appeared before the Estate Officer and contested the said proceeding. He had not done so. This it self shows that he was not in possession. Eviction order was passed by the Estate Officer, which was affirmed by all the Courts including the Supreme Court. When the possession of the property was taken by the respondent No. 1/c. P. T. authority, the writ petitioner came up with the writ application stating that eviction order was passed without serving any notice upon him, although he was in possession, and that possession was taken forcibly without any authority of law in violation of the interim order passed by the Civil Court. Such contention cannot be accepted at this stage. If there is any violation of order passed by the Civil Court, the petitioner is always at liberty to bring it to the notice of the Civil Court by filing an application for contempt. Such contention cannot be accepted at this stage. If there is any violation of order passed by the Civil Court, the petitioner is always at liberty to bring it to the notice of the Civil Court by filing an application for contempt. (23) BY referring to the report submitted by the Special Officer appointed by this Court, Mr. Banerjee submitted that such report was sufficient to indicate that the writ petitioner was in possession of the premises. But, after going through the said report, I do not find anything to indicate that the writ petitioner was in possession of the premises in question. (24) NO writ under Article 226 is available when the petitioner fails to establish his legal right belonging to himself. The words "any other purpose" appearing in the Article 226 are very significant, which means "the enforcement of any legal right". A legal right means legally enforceable right. In the present case, the writ petitioner, as it has already been discussed above, having no legal right is not entitled to any writ in his favour. (25) THE petitioner has already instituted a suit in the year 1990, which is still pending. The petitioner has also filed a Misc. Appeal in the Court of learned chief Judge, City Civil Court challenging the order dated 18. 2. 2002 passed by the Estate Officer in Misc. Appeal No. 3 of 2003, which is also pending. If any order of the Civil Court is violated, the petitioner is always at liberty to bring it to the notice of that Court by filing an application for contempt. Where the petitioner has already instituted a suit or other proceedings under the ordinary law of the land, no application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should be entertained on the same question at least so long as those proceedings are not disposed of. A person should not be allowed to pursue two parallel proceedings at the same time. A petition under article 226 cannot be converted to a suit. Normally, therefore, a disputed question of fact is not investigated in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. When the petitioner has already instituted a suit, which is pending determination of the disputed question of fact, it will not be proper for this Court to exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Normally, therefore, a disputed question of fact is not investigated in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. When the petitioner has already instituted a suit, which is pending determination of the disputed question of fact, it will not be proper for this Court to exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (26) ON repeated asking by this Court, not a single document could be produced before this Court to show that the petitioner was ever inducted as a tenant or was given possession of premises in question by the respondent authority at any point of time. There is also nothing in the report of the Special officer appointed by this Court to indicate that writ petitioner was ever in possession of the said premises/godown. (27) IN view of the discussion made above, this Court finds sufficient merit in the submission of Mr. Mukherjee, learned Advocate of the respondent. The writ application, in my considered view, is not maintainable and the same is accordingly dismissed. (28) SINCE similar points of law are involved in other two writ application, i.e. W.P. No. 282 of 2003 and W.P. No. 283 of 2003, the present judgment delivered in W.P. No. 281 of 2003 shall also govern the other two writ applications and those are accordingly dismissed. (29) IT is also made clear that this judgment shall not stand in the way of the Civil Court, before whom the civil proceedings are pending and said Courts will be at liberty to proceed with the matters independently without being influenced in any way by the judgment and order passed by this Court. (30) THE writ applications are accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.