ORDER Dipak Misra, J. The respondent-plaintiff initiated a civil action seeking relief of declaration and injunction on the ground that he was the owner of the suit land which were adjoining to the land of the present petitioners. Some part of the land were occupied by the petitioner-defendants, but after demarcation by the revenue authorities the respondent-plaintiff came to be in possession. It was the case of the plaintiffs that after taking over possession he started cultivating and when there was some dispute he was compelled to file the suit for declaration and injunction and a prayer for issue of an order of injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in his possession on the suit land situated in Khasra Nos. 532, 536/1 and 531/1707 of Village Luharguwa. It was the stand that the demarcation was done by the revenue authorities on above suit land and the defendants-petitioners had parted with possession as per the demarcation done by the revenue authorities. The defendants-petitioners denied the right, title and interest on plaintiff on the suit land, disputed the factum of possession and also pleaded that there had been no demarcation to show any unauthorised possession by them. The learned trial Judge dismissed the application preferred under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC (for short 'the CPC) by order dated 22-6-2004. It is put forth that the case of the plaintiff rested on the pleading that the defendants were in illegal possession and after demarcation left possession of the suit land. After dismissal of the order of injunction he filed an application under Order 6, Rule 17 of the CPC seeking amendment of the pleading that he had not been in possession and accordingly, he wanted recovery of possession. The learned trial Judge allowed the amendment by order dated 28-9-2004 as per impugned order contained in Annexure-P/4. The said order is the subject-matter of assail in this writ petition. I have heard Mr. B. M. Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Paritosh Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent. Questioning the tenability of the order passed by the learned trial Judge it is submitted by Mr. The said order is the subject-matter of assail in this writ petition. I have heard Mr. B. M. Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Paritosh Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent. Questioning the tenability of the order passed by the learned trial Judge it is submitted by Mr. Prasad that by allowing the amendment the admission that was made in the plaint to the effect that the defendants had parted with their possession after demarcation is wiped off as a consequence of which serious prejudice is caused to the defendants and further nature and character of the suit has changed. Per contra, contended Mr. Gupta that the plaintiff sought to amend the paragraph 5 of the plaint wherefrom he wanted to delete the words "CHHOD DIYA THA" and to incorporate "NAHIN CHHODA" in its place. It is put forth by him that the learned trial Judge correctly allowed the amendment as such amendment does not change the nature and character of the suit and also does not tantamount to withdrawal of admission of such nature which would cause serious prejudice to the defendants. To appreciate the rivalised submissions raised at the Bar, I have carefully perused the plaint which has been brought on record as Annexure-P/2. In the relief clause the plaintiff had prayed for declaration of possession and alternatively prayed for that in case it is found that he was not in possession there should be a decree for recovery of possession. The question that arises for consideration is whether the amendment brought is in consonance and would change the nature and character of the suit or would be a step to put the controversy to rest. Before I proceed to deal with the rivalised contentions raised at the Bar, it is appropriate to notice certain decisions in the field. In the case of Srinivas Ram Kumar Vs. Mahabir Prasad and Others, it has been held that the plaintiff may rely upon different rights alternatively and there is nothing in the Code to prevent a party from making two or more inconsistent sets of allegations and claiming relief thereunder in the alternative. In Pirgonda Hongonda Patil Vs. In the case of Srinivas Ram Kumar Vs. Mahabir Prasad and Others, it has been held that the plaintiff may rely upon different rights alternatively and there is nothing in the Code to prevent a party from making two or more inconsistent sets of allegations and claiming relief thereunder in the alternative. In Pirgonda Hongonda Patil Vs. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil and Others, the Supreme Court has expressed the view as under : All amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions (a) of not working injustice to the other side, and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. Amendments should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleadings had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs. It is merely a particular case of this general rule that where a plaintiff seeks to amend by setting up a fresh claim in respect of a cause of action which since the institution of the suit had become barred by limitation, the amendment must be refused; to allow it would be to cause the defendant an injury which could not be compensated in costs by depriving him of a good defence to the claim. The ultimate test therefore, still remains the same can the amendment be allowed without injustice to the other side, or can it not? In Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. and Another Vs. Ladha Ram and Co., it has been ruled that inconsistent pleas can be made in pleadings but the effect of such inconsistent pleadings should not displace the plaintiff completely from the admission made by the defendants in the written statement. If such amendments are allowed the plaintiff will be irretrievably prejudiced by being denied the opportunity of extracting the admission from the defendants. In the case of Haridas Aildas Thadani and Others Vs. Godrej Rustom Kermani, the Apex Court after referring to the decision rendered in the case of Pirgonda Hongonda Patil (supra) has expressed the view that the test for allowing the amendment is to find out whether the proposed amendment works any serious injustice to the other side. In the case of Haridas Aildas Thadani and Others Vs. Godrej Rustom Kermani, the Apex Court after referring to the decision rendered in the case of Pirgonda Hongonda Patil (supra) has expressed the view that the test for allowing the amendment is to find out whether the proposed amendment works any serious injustice to the other side. In the aforesaid case their Lordships expressed the view that it is well settled that the Court should be extremely liberal in granting prayer of amendment of pleading unless serious injustice or irreparable loss is caused to the other side. In the case of Sanatan Jena (after him) Nidu Dei and Others Vs. Babji Sahu, in paragraph 5 it has been held as under : 5. A bare perusal of the order goes to show that the same is not sustainable in law. It need not be re-emphasized that the provisions contained in Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code aim at furtherance of ends of justice. One of the major factors which should weigh with the Court while dealing with an application for amendment is to ascertain whether intention of the party seeking amendment is mala fide and/or aimed at delaying the due process of law. The circumstances should indicate that the defendant would not suffer grave injustice or would not be materially prejudiced, if the prayer of amendment is allowed. If the ends of justice is sub-served by allowing the amendment then the power to allow the amendment should be liberally exercised, subject to the rider that by amendment, nature and character of the suit is not materially affected or altered. The power to grant amendment of the pleadings is intended to serve the ends of justice and is not fettered by any narrow or technical limitation..... In the case of (1994) 2 SCC 29 (SC) the Apex Court in paragraphs 3 and 4 has held as under : 3. It is settled law as laid down by this Court in Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar vs. Mahabir Prasad that it is open to the parties to raise even mutually inconsistent pleas and if the relief could be founded on the alternative plea it could be granted. If the facts are admitted in the written statement, the relief could be granted to the plaintiff on the basis of the evidence though inconsistent pleas were raised. If the facts are admitted in the written statement, the relief could be granted to the plaintiff on the basis of the evidence though inconsistent pleas were raised. Amendment to written statement cannot be considered on the same principle as an amendment to the plaint. The pleas in the written statement may be alternative or on additional ground or to substitute the original plea. It is equally settled law that amendment of the pleadings could be made at any stage of the proceedings. Instances are not wanting that pleadings are permitted to be amended even when second appeal is pending. Equally it was refused. It is not necessary to burden the judgment by copious references thereof. But each case depends upon its own facts. The essential requisites are that the delay in making the application; the reason therefor should be given and considered; and there should be no prejudice caused to the other side. Bar of limitation which is available to the parties cannot be permitted to be defeated. It is also settled law that if the relief is found on the same cause of action, though different sets of facts are sought to be brought on record by appropriate pleadings, it cannot be refused. In those circumstances, permission to amend the pleadings could be granted. 4. The question in this case is whether the plea of adverse possession sought to be set up by the respondent could be permitted to be raised. The pleas based on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced. It is his own case that he came into possession of the suit house in his own right and remained in possession as an owner. The appellant is only benamidar. Therefore, his plea is based on his own title. He never denounced his title nor admitted the title of the appellant. He never renounced his character as an owner asserting adverse possession openly to the knowledge of the appellant and the appellant's acquiescence to it. Thereafter, he remained in open and peaceful possession and enjoyment to the knowledge of the appellant without acknowledging/or acquiescing the right, title and interest of the appellant. The plea of adverse possession, though available to the respondent, was never raised by him. Thereafter, he remained in open and peaceful possession and enjoyment to the knowledge of the appellant without acknowledging/or acquiescing the right, title and interest of the appellant. The plea of adverse possession, though available to the respondent, was never raised by him. Only on receipt of the first notice he denied title of the appellant and made it known to him for the first time through the reply notice got issued by him. Even then the plea of adverse possession was not raised in the written statement. No explanation for the belated plea was given. Even assuming that the reply dated March 15, 1971 constitutes assertion of adverse possession, the limitation would start running against the appellant only from March, 15, 1971 and not earlier. The suit was filed in 1978 within 12 years. Under these circumstances, the High Court is not justified in permitting the respondent to raise the plea of adverse possession. It is made clear that we are not expressing any opinion on merits. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits according to law. The appeal is allowed but without costs. In the case of Akshaya Restaurant Vs. P. Anjanappa and Another, Their Lordships clearly expressed the view that inconsistent pleas could be taken in the pleadings. In Basavan Jaggu Dhobi v. Sukhnandan Ramdas Choudhary the Apex Court ruled that it is open to the defendant to take even contrary stands or contradictory stands and thereby the cause of action is not in any manner affected. In Mrs. Evelyn J. Disney Vs. Rajeshwar Nath Gupta and others, the High Court of Delhi expressed the view as under : 9..... It is a trite proposition of law, culled out from various pronouncements, that bona fide amendments vital for adjudication of the real question in controversy between the parties should be allowed, howsoever negligent the first omission and howsoever delayed the proposed amendment, if the opposite party can be compensated with costs or other terms to be imposed in the order. It is a trite proposition of law, culled out from various pronouncements, that bona fide amendments vital for adjudication of the real question in controversy between the parties should be allowed, howsoever negligent the first omission and howsoever delayed the proposed amendment, if the opposite party can be compensated with costs or other terms to be imposed in the order. Conversely, amendment should be refused where it is not necessary for the purpose1 of determining the real question in controversy between the parties, is merely technical or useless or of no substance or where the plaintiffs suit will be wholly displaced or it would take away the legal right which has accrued to the defendant by lapse of time or it would introduce a totally new and inconsistent case; and the application is made at a late stage of the proceedings or the application for amendment is not made in good faith. We are sure that the learned single Judge was alive to this elementary proposition of law. The real ground for dismissal of the application is epitomized in his following sentence that the application has been filed "to delay the disposal of the case," indicating that the learned Judge considered "the application to be mala fide and the proposed amendments unnecessary, though not saying in so many words. In the case of G. Nagamma and Another Vs. Siromenamma and Another, it has been ruled thus : The appellants laid the suit for specific performance of the agreement of reconveyance dated 30-8-1967. Application under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was filed seeking amendment of the plaint by incorporating averments in paragraph 3 thereof. Thus the appellants pleaded that the transactions of execution of sale deed and obtaining a document for reconveyance were single transactions, viz., mortgage by conditional sale. In paragraph 9, they wanted alternative relief to redeem the mortgage. At the end of the prayer, the plaintiff sought alternatively to grant a decree for a redemption of mortgage. This application was rejected by the trial Court. On revision, the High Court of A. P. confirmed the same holding that in the original plaint the suit was for specific performance and the reconveyance was not incorporated in the sale deed and that, therefore, the amendment was not warranted. Amendment would change the nature of the suit as well as cause of action. On revision, the High Court of A. P. confirmed the same holding that in the original plaint the suit was for specific performance and the reconveyance was not incorporated in the sale deed and that, therefore, the amendment was not warranted. Amendment would change the nature of the suit as well as cause of action. We called upon the appellant to produce original agreement of reconveyance. We have seen the original document which contains the recitals in support of the contention raised by the appellants. It is settled law that the plaintiff is entitled to plead even inconsistent pleas. In this case, they are seeking alternative reliefs. The application was for amendment of the plaint whereby neither cause of action could change nor the relief could be materially affected. We allow the same. In the case of B.K.N. Narayana Pillai Vs. P. Pillai and Another, in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 it has been held as under : The purpose and object of Order 6, Rule 17, CPC is to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just. The power to allow the amendment is wide and can be exercised at any stage of the proceedings in the interests of justice on the basis of guidelines laid down by various High Courts and this Court. It is true that the amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right and under all circumstances. But it is equally true that the Courts while deciding such prayers should not adopt a hypertechnical approach. Liberal approach should be the general rule particularly in cases where the other side can be compensated with the costs. Technicalities of law should not be permitted to hamper the Courts in the administration of justice between the parties. Amendments are allowed in the pleadings to avoid uncalled for multiplicity of litigation. This Court in A. K. Gupta and Sons Ltd. vs. Damodar Valley Corporation held : The general rule, no doubt, is that a party is not allowed by amendment to set up a new case or a new cause of action particularly when a suit on new case or cause of action is barred. Weldon vs. Neal. This Court in A. K. Gupta and Sons Ltd. vs. Damodar Valley Corporation held : The general rule, no doubt, is that a party is not allowed by amendment to set up a new case or a new cause of action particularly when a suit on new case or cause of action is barred. Weldon vs. Neal. But it is also well recognised that where the amendment does not constitute the addition of a new cause of action or raise a different case, but amounts to no more than a different or additional approach to the same facts, the amendment will be allowed even after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation : See Charon Das vs. Amir Khan and L.J. Leach and Co. Ltd. vs. Jardine Skinner and Co. The principal reasons that have led to the rule last mentioned are, first, that the object of Courts and rules of procedure is to decide the rights of the parties and not to punish them for their mistakes (Cropper vs. Smith) and secondly, that a party is strictly not entitled to rely on the statute of limitation when what is sought to be brought in by the amendment can be said in substance to be already in the pleading sought to be amended (Kisandas Rupchand vs. Rachappa Vithoba Shilwant approved in the Pirgonda Hongonda Patil vs. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil). The expression 'cause of action' in the present context does not mean 'every fact which it is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed' as was said in Cooke vs. Gill in a different context, for if it were so, no material fact could ever be amended or added and, of course, no one would want to change or add an immaterial allegation by amendment. That expression for the present purpose only means, a new claim made on a new basis constituted by new facts. Such a view was taken in Robinson vs. Unicos Property Corpn. Ltd. and it seems to us to be the only possible view to take. Any other review would make the rule futile. The words 'new case' have been understood to mean 'new set of ideas' : Dornam vs. J. W. Ellis and Co. Ltd. This also seems to us to be a reasonable view to take. Ltd. and it seems to us to be the only possible view to take. Any other review would make the rule futile. The words 'new case' have been understood to mean 'new set of ideas' : Dornam vs. J. W. Ellis and Co. Ltd. This also seems to us to be a reasonable view to take. No amendment will be allowed to introduce a new set of ideas to the prejudice of any right acquired by any party by lapse of time. Again in Ganga Bdi vs. Vijay Kumar his Court held : (SCC p. 309, para 22) The power to allow an amendment is undoubtedly wide and may at any stage be appropriately exercised in the interest of justice, the law of limitation notwithstanding. But the exercise of such far-reaching discretionary powers is governed by judicial considerations and wider the discretion, greater ought to be the care and circumspection on the part of the Court." In Ganesh Trading Co. vs. Moji Ram it was held : (SCC p. 93 para 4): It is clear from the foregoing summary of the main rules of pleadings that provisions for the amendment of pleadings, subject to such terms as to costs and giving of all parties concerned necessary opportunities to meet exact situations resulting from amendments, are intended for promoting the ends of justice and not for defeating them. Even if a party or its counsel is inefficient in setting out its case initially the shortcoming can certainly be removed generally by appropriate steps taken by a party which must not doubt by costs for the inconvenience or expense caused to the other side from its omissions. The error is not incapable of being rectified so long as remedial steps do not unjustifiably injure rights accrued. The principles applicable to the amendments of the plaint are equally applicable to the amendments of the written statements. The Courts are more generous in allowing the amendment of the written statement as the question of prejudice is less likely to operate in that event. The defendant has a right to take alternative plea in defence which, however, is subject to an exception that by the proposed amendment the other side should not be subjected to injustice and that any admission made in favour of the plaintiff is not withdrawn. The defendant has a right to take alternative plea in defence which, however, is subject to an exception that by the proposed amendment the other side should not be subjected to injustice and that any admission made in favour of the plaintiff is not withdrawn. All amendments of the pleadings should be allowed which are necessary for determination of the real controversies in the suit provided the proposed amendment does not alter or substitute a new cause of action on the basis of which the original lis was raised or defence taken. Inconsistent and contradictory allegations in negation to the admitted position of facts or mutually destructive allegations of fact should not be allowed to be incorporated by means of amendment to the pleadings. Proposed amendment should not cause such, prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated by costs. No amendment should be allowed which amounts to or relates (sic results) in defeating a legal right accruing to the opposite party on account of lapse of time. The delay in filing the petition for amendment of the pleadings should be properly compensated by costs and error or mistake which, if not fraudulent, should not be made a ground for rejecting the application for amendment of plaint or written statement. 5. In this appeal the appellant - defendant wanted to amend the written statement by taking a plea that in case he is not held a lessee, he was entitled to the benefit of section 60(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. Learned counsel for the appellant is not interested in corporation of the other pleas raised in the application seeking amendment. The plea sought to be raised is neither inconsistent nor repugnant to the pleas already raised in defence. The alternative plea sought to be incorporated in the written statement is in fact the extension of the plea of the respondent-plaintiff and rebuttal to the issue framed regarding liability of the appellant of being dispossessed on proof of the fact that he was a licensee liable to be evicted in accordance with the provisions of law. The mere fact that the appellant had filed the application after a prolonged delay could not be made a ground for rejecting his prayer particularly when the respondent-plaintiff could be compensated by costs. The mere fact that the appellant had filed the application after a prolonged delay could not be made a ground for rejecting his prayer particularly when the respondent-plaintiff could be compensated by costs. We do not agree with the finding of the High Court that the proposed amendment virtually amounted to withdrawal of any admission made by the appellant and that such withdrawal was likely to cause irretrievable prejudice to the respondent. In the case of M/s. Estralla Rubber Vs. Dass Estate (Pvt.) Ltd., the Apex Court has expressed the opinion as under : 5........The proposed amendment is to elaborate the defence and to take additional plea in support of its case. Assuming that there was some admission indirectly, it is open to the defendant to explain the same. Looking to the proposed amendment it is clear that it is required for proper adjudication of the controversy between the parties and to avoid multiplicity of judicial proceedings. The High Court also found fault with the defendant on the ground that there was delay of three years in seeking amendment to introduce new defence. From the records it cannot be said that any new defence was sought to be introduced. Even otherwise, it was open for the defendant to take alternate or additional defence. Merely because there was delay in making the amendment application, when no serious prejudice is shown to have been caused to the plaintiff so as to take away any accrued right, the application could not be rejected. At any rate, it cannot be said that allowing the amendment caused irretrievable prejudice to the plaintiff. Further, the plaintiff can file his reply to the amended written statement and fight the case on merits....... In Ganesh Trading Co. Vs. Moji Ram, in paragraph 4 it has been held as under : 4. It is clear from the foregoing summary of the main rules or pleadings and provisions for the amendment of pleadings, subject to such terms as to costs and giving of all parties concerned necessary opportunities to meet exact situations resulting from amendments, are intended for promoting the ends of justice and not for defeating them. It is clear from the foregoing summary of the main rules or pleadings and provisions for the amendment of pleadings, subject to such terms as to costs and giving of all parties concerned necessary opportunities to meet exact situations resulting from amendments, are intended for promoting the ends of justice and not for defeating them. Even if a party or its counsel is inefficient in setting out its case initially the shortcoming can certainly be removed generally by appropriate steps taken by a party which must no doubt pay costs for the inconvenience or expense caused to the other side from its omissions. The error is not incapable of being rectified so long as remedial steps do not unjustifiably injure rights accrued. In the case of Shantibai (Mst.) and Others Vs. Ganpat Rao Gujar and Others, this Court expressed the view as under : The Court has very wide powers of allowing amendment, but amendments will be allowed only for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. The real questions in controversy between the parties are those on which issues are framed in the trial Court. Ordinarily, under law, a Court will not allow an amendment which involves a complete change of front in either the case set up in the plaint or in the defence. Just as a plaint cannot be allowed to be amended so as to introduce a new and inconsistent cause of action which would change the nature of the suit, so also the defence cannot be allowed to be altered so as to introduce different set of circumstances inconsistent with the circumstances pleaded to begin with.... In the case of Om Prakash Gupta Vs. Ranbir B. Goyal, it has been ruled thus : 12. Such subsequent event may be one purely of law or founded on facts. In the former case, the Court may take judicial notice of the event and before acting thereon put the parties on notice of how the change in law is going to affect the rights and obligations of the parties and modify or mould the course of litigation or the relief so as to bring it in conformity with the law. In the former case, the Court may take judicial notice of the event and before acting thereon put the parties on notice of how the change in law is going to affect the rights and obligations of the parties and modify or mould the course of litigation or the relief so as to bring it in conformity with the law. In the latter case, the party relying on the subsequent event, which consists of facts not beyond pale of controversy either as to their existence or in their impact, is expected to have resort to amendment of pleadings under Order 6, Rule 17, Civil Procedure Code. Such subsequent event, the Court may permit being introduced into the pleadings by way of amendment as it would be necessary to do so for the purpose of determining real questions in controversy between the parties. In Trojan and Co. vs. RM. NN. Nagappa Chettiar this Court has held that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found; without the amendment of the pleadings the Court would not be entitled to modify or alter the relief. In Sri Mahant Govind Rao vs. Sita Ram Kesho Their Lordships observed that, as a rule, relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted. In the case of Sampath Kumar Vs. Ayyakannu and Another, the Apex Court expressed the view that if it is permissible for the plaintiff to file an independent suit, in the facts and circumstances, same relief could be prayed for incorporation in the pending suit. In the said case Their Lordships proceeded further to state as under : Order 6, Rule 17, CPC confers jurisdiction on the Court to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings at any stage of the proceedings and on such terms as may be just. Such amendments as are directed towards putting forth and seeking determination of the real questions in controversy between the parties shall be permitted to be made. The question of delay in moving an application for amendment should be decided not by calculating the period from the date of institution of the suit alone but by reference to the stage to which the hearing in the suit has proceeded. The question of delay in moving an application for amendment should be decided not by calculating the period from the date of institution of the suit alone but by reference to the stage to which the hearing in the suit has proceeded. Pre-trial amendments are allowed more liberally than those which are sought to be made after the commencement of the trial or after conclusion thereof. In the former case generally it can be assumed that the defendant is not prejudiced because he will have full opportunity of meeting the case of the plaintiff as amended. In the latter cases the question of prejudice to the opposite party may arise and that shall have to be answered by reference to the facts and circumstances of each individual case. No straitjacket formula can be laid down. The fact remains that a mere delay cannot be a ground for refusing a prayer for amendment. An amendment once incorporated relates back to the date of the suit. However, the doctrine of relation-back in the context of amendment of pleadings is not one of universal application and in appropriate cases the Court is competent while permitting an amendment to direct that the amendment permitted by it shall not relate back to the date of the suit and to the extent permitted by it shall be deemed to have been brought before the Court on the date on which the application seeking the amendment was filed. (See observations in Siddalingamma vs. Mamtha Shenoy). If the obtaining factual matrix is tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid pronouncements of law, it is clearly perceivable that the order allowing the amendment by the learned trial Judge is absolutely presentable and does not require any interference. As has been indicated earlier, the Court below accepted the prayer for amendment on the ground that cause of justice would be best subserved. On a scrutiny of the plaint and the averments made in the plaint as well as relief clause, there can be no iota of doubt that if the amendment is allowed, no serious prejudice is caused to the defendants and further, the character and nature of the suit does not change. There was already an alternative prayer for recovery of possession. The factum of possession is the core issue that arises in the suit. There was already an alternative prayer for recovery of possession. The factum of possession is the core issue that arises in the suit. In my considered opinion, by virtue of allowing the amendment justice has been done and the purpose engrafted in the provision for amendment has been met with. In the result, I do not find any infirmity in the order passed by the Court below and accordingly, the same deserves the stamp of approval of this Court, which is hereby conferred. The writ petition is dismissed without any order as to costs. Final Result : Dismissed