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2006 DIGILAW 303 (KAR)

YALLAMMA v. SHEKHARAPPAREDDY

2006-03-22

CYRIAC JOSEPH, V.G.SABHAHIT

body2006
JUDGMENT Cyriac Joseph, C.J. (Oral): This appeal is filed against the judgment dated 27-7-2005 in Writ Petition No. 34992 of 2003. The appellant is the second respondent in the writ petition. The first respondent herein is the petitioner in the writ petition. 2. The dispute relates to the claim for compensation in respect of 1 acre 33 guntas of land in Sy. No. 67/4 of Ballur Village, Davanagere Taluk. The said land was acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and award was passed on 18-12-2002 awarding the compensation amount of Rs. 1,19,846/- in favour of the writ petitioner as the land stood in the name of the writ petitioner. When award notice under Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act was sent to the writ petitioner, the appellant, who is a sister-in-law of the writ petitioner, filed an objection claiming half share in the award amount. The claim was based on a compromise decree passed in O.S. No. 1067 of 1989 in the Court of Munsiff at Davanagere. Admittedly, the suit was filed by the husband of the appellant and the first defendant in the suit was the writ petitioner. the suit was for partition and was in respect of plaint 'A: and 'B' schedule properties. The properties mentioned in plaint 'A: schedule did not include the above mentioned land of 1 acre 33 guntas in Sy. No. 67/4. Plaint 'B' schedule was the amount of compensation awarded in L.A.C. Nos. 113/80, 112/80 and 46/81. Thus, the land acquisition cases admitiedly did not relate to the above mentioned land of 1 acre 33 guntas in Sy. No. 67/4. Consequently, in the compromise decree passed in O.S. No. 1067 of 1989, neither the land in Sy. No. 67/4 nor the compensation amount in respect of the said land was mentioned. Therefore, as per the compromise decree relied on by the appellant, she had no claim over the land. However, the Land Acquisition Officer passed Annexure-G Order dated 25-6-2003 holding that the writ petitioner and the appellant are entitled to have share in the compensation amount. Challenging Annexure-G order, the first respondent filed the writ petition. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and quashed Annexure-G Order dated 25-6-2003 passed by the Land Acquisition Officer. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, the second respondent in the writ petition has filed this appeal. 3. Challenging Annexure-G order, the first respondent filed the writ petition. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and quashed Annexure-G Order dated 25-6-2003 passed by the Land Acquisition Officer. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, the second respondent in the writ petition has filed this appeal. 3. We have heard learned Counsel for the appellant and the learned Counsel for the first respondent and the learned Government Advocate. 4. It is not disputed that the land in question stood in the name of the first respondent. It is also not disputed that the claim of the appellant before the Land Acquisition Officer was on the basis of the compromise decree in O.S. No. 1067 of 1989. In the light of the averments contained in the objection filed by the appellant before the Land Acquisition Officer and in view of the terms of the compromise decree, it is crystal clear that based on the said decree, the appellant could not have raised any claim for a share in the amount of compensation. Therefore, the learned Single Judge was right and justified in quashing the order passed by the Land Acquisition Officer. 5. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Single Judge instead of holding that the appellant has no right to any share in the amount of compensation, ought to have directed the Land Acquisition Officer to refer the dispute for decision of the Civil Court under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. We are not impressed by this argument. 10 a case where no prima facie case is made out by the objector or elaimant, the case need not be referred to Civil Court under Section 30. If any objection filed by anybody calls for reference under Section 30, the legitimate rights of the owner of the land can be prejudiced and adversely affected. Only in cases where the objector makes out a prima facie case for a claim in the share of the amount of compensation, the Land Acquisition Officer is bound to refer the dispute under Section 30. The learned Single Judge has clearly held that on the basis of the compromise decree relied on by the appellant, she cannot have any claim for any share in the compensation. We do not find any reason to disagree with the learned Single Judge with regard to the above finding. The learned Single Judge has clearly held that on the basis of the compromise decree relied on by the appellant, she cannot have any claim for any share in the compensation. We do not find any reason to disagree with the learned Single Judge with regard to the above finding. Since the appellant is not able to establish a prima facie case in her favour, we do not find any reason for issuing a direction to the Land Acquisition Officer to make a reference under Section 30. 6. Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that even though the appellant's claim before the Land Acquisition Officer was based on the compromise decree, the land in question was a joint family property and it was registered in the name of the writ petitioner, who is the eldest son in the family. Learned Counsel further submits that this judgment should not stand in the way of the appellant to file a civil suit for establishing her right over the property and a share in the amount of compensation. Since the learned Single Judge or this Court has not considered the case of the appellant based on the above mentioned contention that the property was a joint family property and it happened to be registered in the name of the eldest son of the family, we make it clear that this judgment will not stand in the way of the appellant in approaching Civil Court, if so advised, to establish her right. 7. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is dismissed.