V. S. SIRPURKAR, C. J. ( 1 ) APPELLANTS herein challenged the judgment of the learned Single Judge allowing the writ petition filed by one Dr. Asok kumar Das, original writ petitioner (referred to as 'delinquent' hereinafter) and quashing the chargesheet thereby. In that writ petition, the delinquent had challenged the communication dated 11th April, 2003 by which a chargesheet for misconduct was served upon the delinquent. Following charges were framed in that chargesheet: "that Dr. Asok Kumar Das has applied for the post of Associate Professor of Organon of Medicine and Philosophy Chronic Disease and Psychology on 5th July, 1991 as per the advertisement No DAVP 91/147 dated 15. 6. 1991 published in Employment News for 15th - 21st June, 1991 furnishing false and fabricated teaching experience certificate as per the requirement of the advertisement and had submitted 7 years teaching experience certificate as a lecturer in Bengal Homoeopathic Medical college and Hospital, Asansol, whereas he had worked as an Honorary lecturer and that too, not for a full term of 7 years as because he was himself a student of M. Sc. (Life Science) at Agartala from 1985 to 1987 and was also an internee from 26. 9. 1984 to 25. 8. 1985 at Calcutta homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital for which he had drawn full stipend. Dr. Asok Kumar Das by his aforesaid act of suppressing the abovementioned facts, which if highlighted would have alerted the administrative authorities and thus by this fact had committed gross misconduct and thereby contravened Rule 3 (1) (I) (II) and (III) of the CCS conduct Rules, 1964. " ( 2 ) THE petitioner in support of his petition has claimed an outstanding academic record and bright career thereafter. His claim is that he passed his examination of Bachelor of Homoeopathic Medicine and Surgery in first division and secured gold medal in four subjects. He had also obtained the m. Sc. degree in first class and stood second in the order of merit. He further claimed that he was appointed as a lecturer on 26. 9. 1984 at a very young age in the Bengal Homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital at Asansol and was also a guest lecturer in National Institute of Homeopathy, Calcutta in the year 1991. He further claimed that he had also participated in research projects and worked as a Research Scholar under eminent personalities in the field. 9. 1984 at a very young age in the Bengal Homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital at Asansol and was also a guest lecturer in National Institute of Homeopathy, Calcutta in the year 1991. He further claimed that he had also participated in research projects and worked as a Research Scholar under eminent personalities in the field. He also claimed to have various publications to his credit. ( 3 ) HIS further case pleaded is that in pursuance of the advertisement dated 15. 6. 1991 for a post of Associate Professor in Organon of Medicine and Philosophy, Chronic Diseases and Psychology, the essential experience suggested in that advertisement was - (a) A recognized degree or equivalent qualification in Homoeopathy obtained after undergoing a regular course in recognized institute for at least 4 years duration and included in the II Schedule of HCC Act, 1973 (Central Council of Homoeopathy Act, 1973) or a qualification included in the III Schedule of the HCC Act, 1973. (b) Seven years teaching experience out of which at least four years of teaching experience in the concerned subject as assistant Professor/lecturer in a recognized Homoeopathic College/institute. 3. 1. He pointed out that while applying for this post, he had attached all the certificates and testimonials along with a Certificate issued by Dr. Amitava biswas, Principal, Bengal Homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital, asansol certifying that he was working as a Lecturer in the concerned subject since 26. 9. 1984. He claimed that he had not given any false or fabricated document nor had made any false statement and further had not suppressed any fact. He pointed out that he was called for interview to be held on 20th february,1992, along with all the original certificates. His further case was that he had never made any representation that he had seven years' teaching experience. It is pointed out that after interview and perusal of all certificates, he was selected for the post which fact was communicated to him vide letter dated March 19, 1994, which offer he accepted and ultimately, he came to be appointed on probation for a period of two years. It is then pointed out. It is pointed out that after interview and perusal of all certificates, he was selected for the post which fact was communicated to him vide letter dated March 19, 1994, which offer he accepted and ultimately, he came to be appointed on probation for a period of two years. It is then pointed out. that his success at a very young age caused jealousy in the mind of some others and therefore, a complaint was made to the CBI and a criminal case came to be registered against him by the CBI for offences under sections 420, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code on the allegations that he had furnished false and fabricated documents/information and had obtained employment thereby. 3. 2. He then refers to a writ petition filed by him being C. O. No. 12028 (W) of 1996 and also to an order dated 18. 11. 1996 by the Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court directing the CBI to file a chargesheet within a period of 10 days. He then points out that on 17. 12. 1996, the CBI filed a final report that sufficient evidence could not be collected in course of investigation. However, the CBI had recommended a disciplinary departmental action whereby the matter was referred to the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. 3. 3. He refers to the role played by the original respondent Nos. 1 to 3, appellants herein, and more particularly, the role of Director, National institute of Homoeopathy. He also made a reference to an advertisement for the post of Director, Central Council of Research and a writ petition filed by him in the Delhi High Court being Civil Writ Petition No. 7668 of 2002 praying for a writ of Mandamus directing the respondents to allow him to participate in the interview. He also referred that one Dr. S. K. Bhattacharjee, original respondent No. 5 to the petition, was also a competing candidate and it was because of his efforts that the petitioner was not given a professional call for the interview for the post of Director. He points out that ultimately Dr. Bhattacharjee was selected for that post and it was as a result of his efforts, that the chargesheet came to be filed against the petitioner. He points out that ultimately Dr. Bhattacharjee was selected for that post and it was as a result of his efforts, that the chargesheet came to be filed against the petitioner. Thus the chargesheet was challenged predominantly on three grounds that (1) chargesheet was hopelessly belated, (2) it was in colourable exercise of powers and on account of the malice on the part of the fifth respondent that the chargesheet surfaced and (3) the chargesheet did not disclose any misconduct. ( 4 ) THIS writ petition was opposed by the respondents and significantly the affidavit-in-opposition was sworn in by original respondent No. 5, Dr. Samir Kumar Bhattacharjee, who was the Director at the relevant time, on the question of delay in filing the chargesheet, it is pointed out that the chargesheet was made ready by the CBI itself on 30. 9. 1996 before which it was examined by the Adviser (Homoeo) and Central Vigilance Commissioner. It is then pointed out that under the relevant rules, it had to be signed by the Union Health Minister who desired to know the procedure as he was not inclined to sign the chargesheet. It was then pointed out that it was suggested to amend the bye-laws and for that purpose, the file was made over to the Law Officer to know his opinion and thereafter, the file travelled from Law Officer to the Minister and the various authorities. It is pointed out that the file appeared before the Minister almost thrice and ultimately, bye-laws were amended on 13. 1. 2003. It was, therefore, pleaded that there was no deliberate delay on the part of the department. ( 5 ) AS regards the other two objections raised, it was specifically pointed out that firstly the petitioner could not have been selected as a Lecturer on 26. 9. 1984 because on that date, he had not successfully completed the internship of one year and thus did not have the minimum qualification of bhms degree. It was pointed out that from 26. 9. 1984 upto 25. 9. 1985, he was doing his internship at Calcutta Homoeopathic Medical College and hospital for which the delinquent had drawn full stipend and thus he could not do his duty at the same time as a Lecturer in Asansol at Bengal homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital, which is more than 200 k. m. away from Calcutta. 9. 1984 upto 25. 9. 1985, he was doing his internship at Calcutta Homoeopathic Medical College and hospital for which the delinquent had drawn full stipend and thus he could not do his duty at the same time as a Lecturer in Asansol at Bengal homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital, which is more than 200 k. m. away from Calcutta. It was pointed out that a student who has not completed his graduation, that is BHMS, could not be appointed as a Lecturer since the degree of BHMS was granted only after undergoing one year of internship. Apart from this, it was pointed out that immediately thereafter from 1985 to 1987, the said petitioner was at Agartala pursuing his course of M. Sc. and as such, he could not be serving as a Lecturer, that too a full time Lecturer. It was thus pointed out that his claim of seven years' teaching experience as a full time Lecturer was obviously false and the departmental inquiry was essential to see the genuineness of his certificate of experience etc. ( 6 ) AS regards mala fides on the part of the respondent No. 5, the respondent No. 5 specifically denied the charge and pointed out that the petitioner's case could not be considered for the post of Director like other candidates who were found wanting for various reasons. ( 7 ) THE learned Single Judge after referring to all the facts noted that the selecting authorities has relaxed the qualifications and did not consider it necessary to insist on full seven years teaching experience. The learned judge also noted that there was no suppression of the fact that the petitioner had been completing internship from 26th September, 1984 and had prosecuted the post-graduate course from 1985 to 1987. The learned Judge further held that the authorities could have ascertained the truthfulness of the claims made by the petitioner and, therefore, there was no question of any fraud. Since he had not suppressed any facts no fault could be seen against the petitioner. The learned Judge also observed that though the high Court may not adjudicate the correctness of the charges it could examine whether the charges as framed at all constitute misconduct. Since he had not suppressed any facts no fault could be seen against the petitioner. The learned Judge also observed that though the high Court may not adjudicate the correctness of the charges it could examine whether the charges as framed at all constitute misconduct. Ultimately, the learned Judge held that the charges against the petitioner were stale charges since the same pertain to the time when the petitioner applied for the said post of Associate Professor 12 years back. Relying on the law laid down in the reported decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of State of m. P vs. Bani Singh in AIR 1990 SC 1308 , State of Punjab vs. V. K. Khanna and Ors. in AIR 2001 SC 343 , the learned Judge observed that the Court though does not, ordinarily, interfere with the charges, but when the charges are ex facie, stale, a chargesheet can certainly be interfered with. In that view, the learned Judge allowed the writ petition and quashed the chargesheet. This judgment is appealed against by the appellant before us. ( 8 ) SHRI Kapoor, the learned Senior Advocate and Shri Alok Ghosh assailed the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The learned senior Counsel contend first that the learned Judge did not correctly appreciate the settled legal position that mere delay in serving the chargesheet by itself is not. fatal to the departmental inquiry. The learned Counsel further argued that in the present case the delay if at all caused was properly explained by the appellant and therefore, the learned Judge should have also considered the fact that there was no prejudice caused to the petitioner at least no prejudice on account of delay was brought to the notice of the learned Judge. Lastly, the learned Counsel contends that the learned Judge had considered the merits of the charges though it was wholly impermissible. They after pointing out that it was absolutely essential to allow the departmental proceedings to proceed to examine as to whether the documents, certificates and the claims tendered by the petitioner were genuine or not. The learned Counsel also contended that the CBI who had conducted an investigation against the delinquent had not given a clean cheat to the delinquent but had merely suggested that it was difficult to prove the charges and had recommended departmental action against the delinquent. The learned Counsel also contended that the CBI who had conducted an investigation against the delinquent had not given a clean cheat to the delinquent but had merely suggested that it was difficult to prove the charges and had recommended departmental action against the delinquent. The learned Counsel further, also urged that the settled law in number of Supreme Court cases has been ignored by the learned Judge and, therefore, the judgment needs to be set aside. 8. 1. As against this, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent delinquent Shri Laxmi Gupta and Shri Dipankar Dutta supported the judgment and also relied on the reported decisions of the Supreme Court to suggest that the delinquent should not be made to suffer on account of delay on the part of the department. These rival claims have now to be examined by us in this appeal. Shri Kapoor first invited our attention to the statement of imputation of misconduct and misbehaviur alleged in the chargesheet. It is as under: "that Dr. Asok Kumar Das had applied for the post of Associate Professor of Organon of Medicine and Philosophy Chronic Disease and Psychology on 5th July, 1991 as per the advertisement No. DAVP/91/ 147 dated 15. 6. 1991 which was published in Employment News dated 15th-21st june, 1991 by the National Institute of Homeopathy, Salt Lake City, kolkata. That the said Dr. Asok Kumar Das had furnished false and fabricated teaching experience certificate as per the requirement of the said advertisement. That the said Dr. Asok Kumar Das had procured the said certificate from Dr. Amitava Biswas, the then Principal of Bengal Homeopathic medical College and Hospital, Asansol. That the said certificate states that Dr. Asok Kumar Das was working in the said College of Lecturer in Organon of Medicine and Repertory since 26. 9. 1984. The said certificate was issued on 3. 7. 1991 thus fulfilling the criteria of 7 years teaching experience as a lecturer. That in the said certificate was false can be proved from the fact that Dr. Asok Kumar Das was undergoing a complete 1 year compulsory internship from 26. 9. 1984 to 25. 8. 1985 at Calcutta Homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital for which he had drawn full stipend and thus this 1 year cannot be taken as his experience. Thus Dr. Asok Kumar Das was undergoing a complete 1 year compulsory internship from 26. 9. 1984 to 25. 8. 1985 at Calcutta Homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital for which he had drawn full stipend and thus this 1 year cannot be taken as his experience. Thus Dr. Asok Kumar Das had obtained employment in the capacity of honorary lecturer in the said Bengal Homoeopathic and Medical College and Hospital, Asansol during the period of internship in gross negligence of the rules laid down by the Central Council of Homeopathy (Degree course) B. H. M. S. Regulation, 1983, which states that a candidate after undergoing a 41/2 years course should undergo one year compulsory internship after which he is awarded a degree certificate by virtue of which he is eligible for teaching practice. That the said Asok Kumar Das during the period of 1985 to 1987 had studied in M. Sc (Life Science) at Agartala without taking permission of the Governing Body of Bengal Homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital, asansol but had included this period in the teaching experience as lecturer whereas he was a student himself at that time. That the teaching experience certificate procured by Dr. Asok Kumar das certifies that Dr. Asok Kumar Das was a Lecturer in the said Bengal homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital, Asansol whereas the appointment letter of Dr. Asok Kumar Das issued by the then Principal of the said college shows that Dr. Asok Kumar Das was a Honorary lecturer. That he has suppressed the abovementioned facts which if highlighted would have alerted the administrative authorities to the fact that act if 7 years teaching experience that he had claimed, he himself was a student for the period of 2 years at Agartala Life Science University and a year as an Internee at Calcutta Homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital. Thus the said Dr. Asok Kumar Das has failed to maintain absolute integrity, devotion to duty and his act was unbecoming of a public servant and thereby contravened Rule 3 (1) (I) (II) and (III) of the C. C. S. (Conduct) rules, 1964. " ( 9 ) WE were then taken through the application and the documents submitted by the delinquent while applying. We were also taken through the chargesheet filed by the. " ( 9 ) WE were then taken through the application and the documents submitted by the delinquent while applying. We were also taken through the chargesheet filed by the. The learned Counsel submitted that it was essential to consider these documents in the light of charges framed as also the statement of imputation of misconduct. According to the learned counsel the detection by the learned Single Judge that the charges did not disclose the misconduct was wholly incorrect. The learned Counsel invited our attention to an observation in the judgment which runs as under: "the correctness of the charges is not, however, ordinarily be scrutinized by this Court exercising its power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, as rightly argued by Mr. Kapur. This Court is, therefore, not inclined to go into the merits of the charges against the petitioner. " ( 10 ) THOUGH this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution of India may not adjudicate the correctness of the charges, this Court may examine whether the charges as framed at all constitute misconduct. On this backdrop the learned Counsel contended that in the earlier part of the judgment the learned Judge had actually considered the merits of the charges and had observed as under: "as rightly pointed out by Mr. Sengupta, the petitioner as per his own showing he did not have full 7 years' experience when he applied for the post. The selecting authorities relaxed the qualifications having regard to his over all achievements. The selecting authorities, therefore, did not consider it necessary to insist on full years teaching experience. The petitioner admittedly had four years' experience as a full time Lecturer of a recognized institution. " "it is not in dispute that the petitioner submitted his educational certificate for us with his application's. The originals were also produced. There was no suppression of the fact that the petitioner had been internee from September, 1984 and prosecuted the post-graduate course from 1985 to 1987. " "the authorities of the National Institute of Homoeopathy could have with due diligence ascertained whether the petitioner actually took any classes during the period during which he was an internee or during the period during which he prosecuted the post-graduate course, and if so, whether his attendance as a teacher was regular. " "as rightly argued by Mr. " "the authorities of the National Institute of Homoeopathy could have with due diligence ascertained whether the petitioner actually took any classes during the period during which he was an internee or during the period during which he prosecuted the post-graduate course, and if so, whether his attendance as a teacher was regular. " "as rightly argued by Mr. Sengupta anything that could have been detected with due diligence cannot constitute fraud. The petitioner did not suppress the fact of his having been an internee in 1984 or of his having prosecuted the post-graduate course from 1985 to 1987. Not highlighting facts, which might go against the petitioner, cannot possibly be construed as suppression, amounting to misconduct. The charge of furnishing a false certificate has on enquiry by the CBI, been found incorrect. " "the National Institute of Homeopathy could have ascertained how the petitioner prosecute his studies and taught at Bengal Homoeopathic medical College Asansol at the same time. According to the petitioner, the National Institute of Homoeopathy, in fact, did so and appointed the petitioner taking all factors into account. " ( 11 ) SHRI Kapur took serious objections to these observations and pointed out that after examining the charges and the merits the learned Judge observed that the merits of the charges were not being examined. He further points out that the observations of the learned Judge show that the Court had examined whether the charges as framed at all constitute misconduct and by necessary implication the learned Judge had given finding that they did not constitute the misconduct. The learned Counsel points out that the in the statement of imputation of miscondict or misbehaviour the allegation was that the delinquent had furnished "false" and "fabricated" teaching experience certificate which he had brought from Dr. Amitava Biswas. It is, therefore, argued that whether the certificate was a genuine certificate, was also to be examined in the departmental inquiry. The learned Counsel, therefore, urges that merely because the petitioner had given his certificates along with the information, it could not be said that the chargesheet did not disclose any misconduct. Amitava Biswas. It is, therefore, argued that whether the certificate was a genuine certificate, was also to be examined in the departmental inquiry. The learned Counsel, therefore, urges that merely because the petitioner had given his certificates along with the information, it could not be said that the chargesheet did not disclose any misconduct. Our attention was invited to the claim made by the delinquent in his application where the delinquent had claimed in paragraph 8 under the head "experience" as under: "i) Teaching- a) Lecturer, Bengal Homoeopathic Medical College and hospital in Organon of Medicine, Repertory and Practice of Medicine since 26. 9. 1984. b) Guest Lecture in National Institute of Homoeopathy, Calcutta in repertory/organon of Medicine and Physiology since 25. 2. 1991. " ( 12 ) SHRI Kapur has also invited our attention towards a claim made by the delinquent in the form to be filled up by the candidate which is at pages 67 and 68 of the paper book where the candidate had claimed under the column for "experience" which is as under: "whether part-time or full time or honorary :- The delinquent in his own handwriting claimed the experience as a lecturer from 26. 9. 1984 till now. He had also described this experience as a full time experience. " ( 13 ) THE Counsel also points out that this was a false claim made on the backdrop of the instructions to the candidates applying for the post and more particularly instruction (xv) at page 73 of the paper book to the following effect: "if any declaration given or information furnished by him/her proves to be false or if he/she is found to have wilfully suppressed any material information, he/she will be liable to removal from service and such other action as Government may deem necessary. " 13. 1. Shri Kapur points out that the claim made in the prescribed form that from 26. 9. 1984 he was a full time lecturer and thus had 7 years of experience was false to the knowledge of the delinquent. He also points out that it was an admitted position that from 26. 9. 1984 to 25. 9. 1985 he was doing his internship at Calcutta and did not even hold the degree of BHMS and strangely he claimed to be serving as a lecturer in the Bengal homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital at Asansol. He also points out that it was an admitted position that from 26. 9. 1984 to 25. 9. 1985 he was doing his internship at Calcutta and did not even hold the degree of BHMS and strangely he claimed to be serving as a lecturer in the Bengal homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital at Asansol. Shri Kapur further points out as if this was not sufficient thereafter for two years he was doing his M. Sc course at Agartala which is more than 800 kilometers away from calcutta and Asansol and yet claimed that he was a full time lecturer since 26. 9. 1984 till the day he filed the application. Shri Kapur, therefore, says that making of the false claims to his own knowledge amounted to misconduct and therefore, the learned Judge was not right in deducing that the chargesheet on the basis of it did not disclose any misconduct. The learned counsel is undoubtedly right. Apart from the fact that the genuineness of the certificate had to be examined, these claims made also had to be gone into in the departmental proceedings and, therefore, it cannot be said that the chargesheet did not disclose any misconduct. The learned Counsel rightly points out that the statement of imputation of charges it was specifically pointed out that after undergoing a 4/2 years degree course of BHMS the candidates had to be go one year compulsory internship and it is only after that he is awarded a degree certificate by virtue of which he is eligible for teaching practice. It is also alleged that since he was undergoing the internship between 26. 9. 1984 to 25. 9. 1985 for which he had drawn full stipend, he could not be serving as a lecturer. All these facts certainly needed to be probed in departmental enquiry. ( 14 ) SHRI Kapur points out that the delinquent did not have either qualification to teach nor the opportunity to teach as he could not be present in Calcutta and Asansol at the same time. It is also further pointed out that though he was appointed by one Dr. Asok Kumar Das as a honorary lecturer in Bengal Homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital he produced a certificate by Dr. Amitava Biswas as if he was a lecturer. It is also further pointed out that though he was appointed by one Dr. Asok Kumar Das as a honorary lecturer in Bengal Homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital he produced a certificate by Dr. Amitava Biswas as if he was a lecturer. According to the learned Counsel and in our opinion rightly, merely because the petitioner had filed the documents regarding his course and regarding his internship etc, it cannot be said that the chargesheet did not display the imputation of the misconduct. It is true that if the chargesheet itself does not disclose any misconduct then the said chargesheet can be interfered with under the powers of judicial review. However, we find that this chargesheet could not be said to be such as not disclosing and alleging any misconduct on the part of the delinquent. Shri Kapur also points out that even the table to which we have made a reference earlier contains false information as the candidate has shown that as he has passed three examinations of BHMS in the year 1982, and therefore, which in fact he had passed in 1984. We however, will not go into these aspects since we are of the opinion that it cannot be said that the chargesheet did not disclose any misconduct and the departmental enquiry is not yet complete. ( 15 ) AS against this the learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the delinquent pointed out that the delinquent had submitted all the documents and the genuineness of the certificate which is also examined by the. Not only this but there was a clear admission that his lack of experience of seven years relaxed. ( 16 ) WE are not herein examining whether delinquent was rightly selected or not. We are only examining as to whether the chargesheet against him was liable to be quashed for the reasons it was done by the learned Single judge. It is true that the advertisement for the posts suggested that the experience was relaxable and that minimum 4 years of experience as a full time lecturer as was required under the advertisement. What we are examining here is whether the chargesheet was liable to be quashed firstly on the ground that it did not disclose any misconduct on the part of the delinquent. Therefore, it will not be our task to examine as to whether the petitioner had actually committed any misconduct. What we are examining here is whether the chargesheet was liable to be quashed firstly on the ground that it did not disclose any misconduct on the part of the delinquent. Therefore, it will not be our task to examine as to whether the petitioner had actually committed any misconduct. It is not our task to examine that issue. Since no inquiry has ever taken place as yet, our task is to simply find out as to whether there is any allegation of misconduct in the chargesheet. Therefore, the argument that all the material was given and submitted by the delinquent at the time he applied for the post, and therefore, there was no question of fraud must necessarily fall to the ground. Though the learned Judge has specifically observed in the judgment that the learned judge was not inclined to go into the merits of the charges from the observations made in the judgment, the learned Judge actually considered the charges and has also made some observations suggesting that the delinquent was not guilty of the charges nor was his behaviour fraudulent. Lastly the learned Judge has given a halting finding that the learned Judge could examine where the charges, as framed, at all constituted misconduct thereby indicating that the learned Judge was holding that there was no charges as framed did not constitute misconduct. In our opinion, at the stage where the matters stood such exercise of appreciation of the merits of the chargesheet was unnecessary and impermissible. In our opinion, the finding by the learned Judge that the chargesheet did not disclose any misconduct is clearly incorrect. ( 17 ) WE may refer at this stage some of the reported decisions. In Union of India and Ors. vs. Upendra Singh, 1994 (3) SCC 357 , where the Apex Court observed: "in the case of charges framed in a disciplinary inquiry the Tribunal or court can interfere only if on the charges framed (read with inputation or particulars of the charges, if any) no misconduct or other irregularity alleged can be said to have been made out or the charges framed are contrary to any law. At this stage, the Tribunal cannot take over the functions of the disciplinary authority. The truth or otherwise of the charges in a matter for the disciplinary authority to go into. At this stage, the Tribunal cannot take over the functions of the disciplinary authority. The truth or otherwise of the charges in a matter for the disciplinary authority to go into. Indeed, even after the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, if the matter comes to Court or Tribunal, they have no jurisdiction to look into the truth of the charges or into the correctness of the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority as the case may be. " in paragraphs 6 and 7, the Supreme Court has further reiterated this principle. 17. 1 Same principle is reiterated in Transport Commissioner, Madras-5 vs. A. Radha Krishna Moorthy, 1995 (1) SCC 332 . The question there was regarding the vagueness of the charges. In para 7 the Supreme Court stated the general principle which is as follows: "so far as the truth and correctness of the charges is concerned, it was not a matter for the Tribunal to go into- more particularly at a stage prior to the conclusion of the disciplinary enquiry. " 17. 2. The Supreme Court did ultimately interfere but only after recording its finding about the charges being vague. Such is not the case here. The principle in Upendra Singh's case thus is reiterated. The same principle is reiterated by the Supreme Court in 1995 Supp (1) SCC 180, Union of India and Anr. vs. Asok Kakher where the Supreme Court held that the respondent had full oportunity to reply to the chargesheet and to raise all the points available to him. In 1996 (3) SCC 157 , Secretary to Government, Prohibition and Excise Department vs. L. Srinivasan also the Supreme Court disapproved the decision on the part of the Administrative Tribunal in quashing the chargesheet on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary inquiry proceedings. The Supreme Court did not however, go into the merits since any observations would have prejudiced the delinquent. Same was the principle reiterated by the Supreme Court in 1997 (11) SCC 368 , State of punjab and Ors. vs. Ajit Singh. This view has remained unchanged in the case reported in 2000 (9) SCC 284 , District Forest Officer vs. R. Rajamanickam and Anr. ( 18 ) SHRI Laxmi Gupta has relied on the decision reported in Dr. M. S mudhol and Anr. vs. S. D. Halegkar and Ors. vs. Ajit Singh. This view has remained unchanged in the case reported in 2000 (9) SCC 284 , District Forest Officer vs. R. Rajamanickam and Anr. ( 18 ) SHRI Laxmi Gupta has relied on the decision reported in Dr. M. S mudhol and Anr. vs. S. D. Halegkar and Ors. , 1993 (3) SCC 591 and more particularly, in the paragraph 6 of the decision. The case is completely inapposite to the present controversy. It is a case where the Supreme Court held that when despite disclosure of qualifications an eligible person is selected and appointed the appointment cannot be disturbed after years. We do not see any relevance of this decision. ( 19 ) SHRI Laxmi Gupta further relied on the decision reported in AIR 2001 sc 343 , State of Punjab vs. V. K. Khanna and Ors. In paragraph 33, the Supreme court has observed: "while it is true that justifiability of the charges at this stage of initiating a disciplinary proceeding cannot possibly be delved into by any Court pending inquiry but it is equally well-settled that in the event there is an element of malice or mala fide, motive involved in the matter of issue of a chargesheet or the concerned authority is so biased that the inquiry would be a mere farcical show and the conclusions are well known then and in that event Law Court are otherwise justified in interfering at the earliest stage so as to avoid the harassment and humiliation of a public official. " ( 20 ) RELYING on these observations, the learned Counsel pointed out that there was very much an element of malice or mala fide motive involved in the issue of the present chargesheet. For this, it was pointed out that the respondent No. 5 was a competitor to the delinquent for the post of a Director and it was at his instance that the meterial which had become dormant was dug out by respondent No. 5 and the chargesheet was initiated. The learned counsel also relied on the pleadings in the writ petition, more particularly, in paragraphs 52, 53 and 60 where it was specifically alleged that it was Dr. Samir Bhattacharyya, respondent No. 5, who was instrumental in getting the chargesheet surfaced. Further decisions relied upon are AIR 2001 SC 343 (supra ). The learned counsel also relied on the pleadings in the writ petition, more particularly, in paragraphs 52, 53 and 60 where it was specifically alleged that it was Dr. Samir Bhattacharyya, respondent No. 5, who was instrumental in getting the chargesheet surfaced. Further decisions relied upon are AIR 2001 SC 343 (supra ). paragraphs 5 and 25 as also AIR 2001 SC 24 (Kumaon Mandal vikas Nigam Ltd. vs. Girja Shankar Pant and Ors.), paragraph 10. It was further stated that Dr. Bhattacharyya's appointment was made subject to the writ petition filed by the delinquent in the Delhi High Court and, therefore, he, in order to wreak vengeance on the writ petition, had ignited the authorities to take steps to start departmental proceedings. We are not impressed by these pleadings at all. In the first place", it cannot be denied that ultimately the delinquent withdrew his writ petition before the Delhi high Court. I cannot be forgotten that the chargesheet was introduced much earlier when the matter was entrusted to the CBI in October, 1994 itself. It was on 16. 1. 1995 itself that the Superintendent of Police, CBI had forwarded the reports of the investigation suggesting initiation of regular departmental action for major penalty against the delinquent. Respondent No. 5, at this juncture, was nowhere on the scene. Therefore, it cannot be said that it was respondent No. 5. who was responsible for digging our new material against the delinquent and causing to start the departmental inquiry. Since we are not accepting the case pleaded by the delinquent regarding the malice or mala fides about respondent No. 5, the reliance on the aforementioned decisions is wholly uncalled for and we need not test those cases though the principles stated in the aforementioned cases are beyond challenge. We, therefore, reject the contention. ( 21 ) CONSIDERING the overall situation, we are of the clear opinion that the finding by the learned Judge to the effect that the chargesheet did not disclose any misconduct, is not correct and has to be set aside. ( 22 ) THIS leaves us with the question of delay in filing the chargesheet and effect thereof on the departmental proceeding. The learned Judge has undoubtedly held that the chargesheet was delayed and on that ground, has quashed the same. ( 22 ) THIS leaves us with the question of delay in filing the chargesheet and effect thereof on the departmental proceeding. The learned Judge has undoubtedly held that the chargesheet was delayed and on that ground, has quashed the same. We have to now see the effect of delay, if any, in furnishing the chargesheet on the departmental proceedings. ( 23 ) IT is trite principle in law that the delay by itself cannot be fatal to chargesheet particularly where the delay is properly explained. It is undoubtedly true that where the delay remains unexplained, that by itself amounts to a prejudice to the delinquent. However, it is also equally true that the factum of delay would have to be balanced against the prejudice caused to the delinquent because of that delay and more particularly, when the said delay remains unexplained. This principle was reiterated in number of decisions. It would be better first to examine that law laid down by the supreme Court on the question of delayed chargesheet. ( 24 ) IN the Food Corporation of India vs. George Varghese and Anr. , reported in AIR 1991 SC 1115 , the delinquent was proceeded against in the Criminal courts. He was, however, acquitted as he was given the benefit of doubt. His dismissal order passed earlier was, therefore, set aside. However, during the pendency of the criminal proceedings, the disciplinary proceedings were not initiated which was initiated after the delinquent was reinstated in service. A writ petition was filed challenging the said chargesheet on the ground that it was delayed. A Single Judge of the High Court has held that since there was an acquittal, there could be no departmental proceedings. In the letters Patent appeal filed by the employer, the Division Bench held that the learned Single Judge was not right in so holding, but refuse to interfere with the ultimate order holding that the chargesheet was delayed. The supreme Court held that the delay was not occasioned on account of inaction on the part of the employer and that employer had acted fairly by staying its hands since the prosecution was initiated. In that view, the Supreme Court allowed the departmental inquiry to proceed. The supreme Court held that the delay was not occasioned on account of inaction on the part of the employer and that employer had acted fairly by staying its hands since the prosecution was initiated. In that view, the Supreme Court allowed the departmental inquiry to proceed. ( 25 ) IN another judgment of State of Punjab and Ors vs. Chaman Lal Goyal, reported in 1995 (2) Supreme Court Cases 570, the Supreme Court observed that there was a delay of 51/2 years in serving the charges. The question was as to whether the delay vitiated the quashing of charges. The Supreme court observed as follows: "it is trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, mala fides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the Court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long always depends upon the facts of the given case. Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a plea is raised, the Court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. In other words, the Court has to indulge in a process of balancing. " (Emphasis supplied.) 25. 1. The Court in paragraph 11 referred to the Constitution Bench decision in A. R. Antulay vs. R. S. Nayak, reported in 1992 (1) SCC 225 and the observations therein are to the following effects: "ultimately the Court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors- balancing test or balancing process- and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. " ( 26 ) IN B. C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and Ors. " ( 26 ) IN B. C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in 1995 (6) supreme Court Cases 749, which was a pertaining to the disproportionate asset owned by the delinquent, the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 11 that each case depends upon its own facts. It was observed that delay by itself is not fatal in such type of cases where enormous evidence had to be collected. ( 27 ) IN another decision of Food Corporation of India and Anr. us. V. P. Bhatia, reported in 1998 (9) Supreme Court Cases 131, the Apex Court observed that the undue delay in initiation of disciplinary proceeding may cause prejudice to the employee in defending himself and that the disciplinary proceeding should be initiated with promptitude. It was further observed that question regarding the undue delay has to be considered in the light of the facts of the particular case. Here also a CBI investigation was going on and, therefore, in keeping with the rules in the Vigilance Manual, the departmental investigation was avoided. The Supreme Court ultimately held that the High Court was not justified in quashing the charge-memos on the ground of delay. ( 28 ) IN Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Faizabad vs. Sachindra nath Pandey and Ors. , reported in 1995 (3) Supreme Court Cases 134, the supreme Court ignored 16 years of delay on the ground that the charges were very serious, namely, misappropriation and absconding along with the official records. It was also considered that the department alone was not to be blamed for the delay. ( 29 ) IN Additional Superintendent of Police vs. T. Natarajan, reported in 1999 Supreme Court Cases (Lands) 646, it is observed by the Supreme Court in paragraph 7: "in regard to the allegation that the initiation of disciplinary proceedings was belated, we may state that it is settled law that mere delay in initiating proceedings, would not vitiate the enquiry unless the delay results in prejudice to the delinquent officer. In this case, such a stage as to examine that aspect has not arisen. " ( 30 ) A Division Bench judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court reported in 2000 (2) SLR 681 (O. P. Sachdeva and Ors. In this case, such a stage as to examine that aspect has not arisen. " ( 30 ) A Division Bench judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court reported in 2000 (2) SLR 681 (O. P. Sachdeva and Ors. vs. Food Corporation of india and Ors.) was also pressed into service where the learned Judges have held relying on the Full Bench decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in dr. Ishar Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in 1993 (4) SLR 655, that the delay itself was not ground to quash the proceedings and it did not entitle the delinquent officer to escape his trial. ( 31 ) ALL these decisions were heavily relied upon by the appellant's Counsel. It was reiterated before us that if in this case the delay is well-explained, there would be no question of any prejudice and in fact, there was no prejudice caused to the delinquent in this case. It was also stated that the delay was not caused on account of the departmental inaction. It is also reiterated that the delinquent had not disclosed as to how the prejudice would be caused and lastly, it was contended that the learned Judge has proceeded to quash the chargesheet merely on the ground that the chargesheet was delayed which was not permissible in law. ( 32 ) ON this backdrop, it would have to be seen first as to whether there was any delay at all and secondly, whether the delay was caused on account of the inaction on the part of the appellant and further whether the reasons for the delay having been explained or acceptable. ( 33 ) WE were taken through various dates which emerge from the record. These dates are mainly based on the affidavit-in-opposition filed before the learned Single Judge. It is pointed out that the delinquent was appointed in the post on 14. 7. 1994 and immediately thereafter in October, 1994, the investigation by the CBI began on the basis of the reliable information received that the delinquent had furnished false and fabricated documents/information received that the delinquent had furnished false and fabricated documents/information. The said investigation was completed on 16. 1. 1995 when the Superintendent of Police, CBI forwarded an investigation report suggesting that a regular departmental action should be taken for major penalty against the delinquent. The said investigation was completed on 16. 1. 1995 when the Superintendent of Police, CBI forwarded an investigation report suggesting that a regular departmental action should be taken for major penalty against the delinquent. This report was examined on 20th February, 1995 by the Adviser (Homoeo) who sought some documents to examine the case further. The matter, thereafter, was sent to the Central Vigilance commission for their advice on 1. 10,1995 which advice was received on 6. 5. 1996. In that, the Central Vigilance Commission had suggested certain amendment in the draft chargesheet. On 30th September, 1996, the Central vigilance Commission submitted the amended chargesheet. It was at this juncture that the delinquent filed a writ petition. On 18. 11. 1996, Hon'ble sri Justice S. B. Sinha (as His Lordship then was) directed the CBI to file the chargesheet within ten days. On 14. 12. 1996, the CBI filed a final report. In the meantime, the department prepared the chargesheet and presented the same to the Union Health Minister on 25. 2. 1997 for his signature as he was the President of the appellant. The office of the Union Health Minister desired to know the procedure on 7. 3. 1997 as the Minister did not desire to put his signature on the chargesheet. On 21. 5. 1997, it was suggested to amend the bye-laws which had required Union Health Minister to put his signature on the chargesheet and for that purpose, the opinion of the Law officer was sought. The said opinion was given within nine days on 30. 5. 1997. He had opined to take recourse to Rule 12 of CCS (CCA) Rules for nominating ad hoc disciplinary authority. The file was further submitted to the concerned minister for delegation of powers to the Joint Secretary of the concerned ministry. However, it was decided to examine the matter further. On 24. 10. 1997, the Vigilance Division ruled that such powers cannot be delegated and, therefore, the concerned file was put up for signature of Union Health minister on 13. 11. 1997. The Minister on 8. 12. 1997 desired to know the procedure in Medical Institute and PGI, Chandigarh. Thereafter, on 12. 10. 1998, this position was explained in detail and again, the chargesheet was put up for the third time before the Union Health Minister for signature. 11. 1997. The Minister on 8. 12. 1997 desired to know the procedure in Medical Institute and PGI, Chandigarh. Thereafter, on 12. 10. 1998, this position was explained in detail and again, the chargesheet was put up for the third time before the Union Health Minister for signature. However, the Minister further desired to know the bye-laws and the difficulty in delegating the powers to the Director of the Institute. That was done on 23. 10. 1998. Therefore, the amendments proposing authorization to the director of the Institute empowering him to sign the chargesheet were suggested on 5. 2. 1999, but on 5. 3. 1999, the Department of Personnel and training ruled that the chargesheet had to be issued only under the control of the disciplinary authority. Therefore, within four days thereof, the chargesheet was again submitted for signature of the Minister concerned. This time, however, the Minister desired to know the system followed in aiims and. The file was again put up for signature of the Minister on 17. 2. 2000. However, on 10. 3. . 2000, the Minister suggested to know the prevailing position in AIIMS and ICMS. Therefore, on 1. 8. 2000, the case was sent to the Central Vigilance Commission for having a re-look. Therearter, it seems that Central Vigilance Comission took time of two years in advisiong the immediate issuance of chargesheet after doing the necessary amendment. These amendments were approved barely within one month thereof, that is on 13. 1. 2003 and on 11. 4. 2003, the chargesheet was issued. ( 34 ) ALL this will show that there was continuous effort on the part of the appellant's department and the exercise of investigation was taken up against the delinquent in October, 1994. It was on account of the refusal on the part of the Union Health Minister to put his signature on the chargesheet that the matter was delayed. However, it cannot be said that the department remained idle during all this period. The two years of delay in between 1. 8. 2000 and 19. 12. 2002 was also caused on account of the Central Vigilance commission and not on account of the appellant's department. Therefore, it cannot be said that firstly there was any inaction on the part of the appellant's department or that there was no explanation for the delay. The two years of delay in between 1. 8. 2000 and 19. 12. 2002 was also caused on account of the Central Vigilance commission and not on account of the appellant's department. Therefore, it cannot be said that firstly there was any inaction on the part of the appellant's department or that there was no explanation for the delay. It must be remembered that the Union Health Minister has refused to sign the chargesheet at least on five occasions and suggested the amendment of the rules instead, which took all the time and in the process, the chargesheet was delayed almost by six years, after it was prepared. We cannot, therefore, blame the department alone for this delay nor could it be said that the delay has remained unexplained in this matter. However, we would still have to examine as to whether there was any prejudice caused on account of this delay. ( 35 ) INDEED, the learned Single Judge, who has quashed the chargesheet on account of delay, has not shown the prejudice at all. Very strangely, we do not find any pleading regarding the said prejudice on the part of the delinquent. In what manner has this delay caused prejudice to the delinquent and what is the nature of the prejudice, is not either pleaded nor argued before us. It was suggested that the evidence by which the delinquent could prove his innocence was lost. We wonder as to how the delinquent could raise such a plea because that stage has not yet come. For that purpose, the departmental inquiry would have to start and then alone, it could be shown that some evidence has become unavailable due to delay. We cannot presume that some evidence is lost. We say this because it is clear from the allegations that in this case, the misconduct is based on the original documents which were filed by the delinquent at the time of applying for the post. We, therefore, cannot visualize any prejudice having been caused to the delinquent on account of the delay. If at all some witnesses are not available, the prejudice would be to the appellant. Again further, it must be realized that the delinquent has not, in any manner, even challenged the factum of his having produced certain documents. We, therefore, cannot visualize any prejudice having been caused to the delinquent on account of the delay. If at all some witnesses are not available, the prejudice would be to the appellant. Again further, it must be realized that the delinquent has not, in any manner, even challenged the factum of his having produced certain documents. The entire burden is going to be on the appellant's department to prove that the documents which the delinquent had submitted were fake or fabricated documents. There is also no dispute about the details submitted by the delinquent regarding his qualifications and his experience. It is not his case that he had not submitted the information which he actually allegedly gave to the authorities at the time he applied for the post in question. All that would have to be looked into only at the stage of the inquiry. It is, therefore, futile to consider at this stage the alleged factor of prejudice because that stage has not yet come. In this behalf, the reference must be made to the observations made in t. Natarajan's case (supra), which we have referred to in paragraph 29 of this judgment. We again reiterate that when we balance the said delay caused as against the prejudice likely to be caused, it can be clearly said that at least, at this stage, no such prejudice is discernible. ( 36 ) THE Counsel for the delinquent has, however, relied on the oft quoted decision reported in 2005 (6) Supreme Court Cases 636 (P. V. Mahadevan vs. Md. T. N. Housing Board) and AIR 1998 SC 1833 (State of Andhara Pradesh vs. N. Radhakishan ). ( 37 ) THE decision reported in AIR 1998 SC 1833 (supra) was heavily relied on by Sri Laxmi Gupta. That was a case where the Supreme Court quashed the charge-memo finding that the case depended only on the departmental records and no explanation was given why the inquiry officer for all the years had not examined those records. It was also found that the delinquent had not contributed to the delay and, therefore, the charge-memo came to be quashed by the High Court. The decision of the High Court was affirmed by the Supreme Court. It was also found that the delinquent had not contributed to the delay and, therefore, the charge-memo came to be quashed by the High Court. The decision of the High Court was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Our attention was particularly drawn to the observations made in paragraph 19 where the Supreme Court specifically held that it is not possible to lay down any pre-determined principles applicable in all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding disciplinary proceedings. It was reiterated that whether on the ground of delay, there should be any proceedings to be terminated, is to be decided on the facts of that case. The Supreme Court observed. "the essence of the matter is that the Court has to take into consideration all relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unncessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the Court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the Court is to balance these two diverse considerations. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the Court is to balance these two diverse considerations. " ( 38 ) THERE can be no question about these principles, but we fail to see as to how the observations can help the delinquent in this case. We have already pointed out that this was a case where a highly placed officer was being proceeded against for serious charges of submitting fake and fabricated documents and for committing fraud by giving false information regarding his career. Therefore, the misconduct alleged was of a serious nature, particularly considering that the delinquent was in the teaching profession. Further it is pointed out by us that the department had not remained static or in a state of hibernation. Constant efforts were being made to supply the chargesheet. The chargesheet was submitted before the Minister five times for the signature of the Minister, who under the rules as prevailing, was to put his signature on the chargesheet. However, on account of the views of the Hon'ble Minister, the rule ultimately had to be amended. In the meantime, the department had not kept quiet and had made every effort to pursue the matter. Even in this case, there was an investigation by the cbi, which also took a couple of years to complete. Thus, the delay, in this case, could not be said to be such as unexplained delay. There was a reasonable explanation offered for the same. Further when we consider the prejudice caused on account of the delay, it is obvious that there was no prejudice to the delinquent who has not even been suspended and has continued all through to work in the selected post. The allegation against him being that he had submitted false and fabricated certificates to secure that post. The facts involved in the aforementioned case are certainly different as there was no explanation for the delay much less a satisfactory one. In that view, this case would be of no help to the delinquent. ( 39 ) THE learned Counsel also relied on the decision of State of Madhya pradesh vs. Bani Singh and Anr. , reported in 1990 (Supp.) Supreme Court cases 738. In that view, this case would be of no help to the delinquent. ( 39 ) THE learned Counsel also relied on the decision of State of Madhya pradesh vs. Bani Singh and Anr. , reported in 1990 (Supp.) Supreme Court cases 738. In this case, there was delay of twelve years in initiating the departmental disciplinary proceedings and the Central Admistrative Tribunal had given a clear finding that the delay was not explained at all in any manner. The concerned delinquent in that case was being proceeded against the incident which took place in the year 1975-76, whereas the departmental proceedings were initiated in 1987. There can be no question about the principle. However, there was a clear finding given which was affirmed by the Supreme Court that there was no explanation whatsoever for the delay. There the department remained dormant for a long period of 12 years though the department was aware of the irregularities committed by the delinquent officer. In view of the fact that in this case, there is a clear explanation for the delay, we are of the opinion that this ruling would be of no support to the delinquent. In fact, N. Radhakishan's case, cited supra, has followed this very case and we have shown as to why this case is not helpful to the delinquent herein. ( 40 ) THE learned Counsel also relied on the ruling reported in 2005 (6) supreme Court Cases 636 (supra), in which case the earlier two cases of bani Singh and N. Radhakishan's case have been followed. Again, there can be no question of the principles stated, but the fact remains that even in the present case, there was no proper explanation for the delay of more than 10 years. This is apart from the fact that the Supreme Court had specifically noted in this case that the employer could have easily come to know of the misconduct much earlier in view of the provisions of Tamil Nadu State housing Board Act. Here the case was entirely different. As soon as the misconduct came to the light, the department has not kept quiet and has chosen to move from time to time. We are, therefore, of the clear opinion that the delay, in this case, could not be attributable to the department and on that count, the delinquent is not likely to suffer. As soon as the misconduct came to the light, the department has not kept quiet and has chosen to move from time to time. We are, therefore, of the clear opinion that the delay, in this case, could not be attributable to the department and on that count, the delinquent is not likely to suffer. ( 41 ) BY way of almost desperate argument, Sri Laxmi Gupta argued that there was no fraud played by the delinquent nor was there any forgery alleged against him. We have already shown that there are clear imputations against the delinquent. It was further suggested that his lack of experience was relaxed by the Selection Committee and that there is clear admission that it was after relaxation of the experience that the delinquent was selected and, therefore, there was no question of proceeding against him departmentally. It was urged that the delinquent had given all the information and had not suppressed any information whatsoever and probably that is why, his lack of experience of seven years was relaxed and he was selected on the basis of his experience of four years , which was an admitted fact. In our opinion, all this would have to be urged during the departmental inquiry and it would not be proper for us to give any finding on that issue as to whether because of the relaxation, the delinquent could get any benefit. In our opinion, that would not, in any manner, suggest that the departmental inquiry for the misconduct imputed against him should not be held. We are, therefore, not in a position to agree with the contentions raised in this behalf. ( 42 ) FOR all these reasons, we set aside the judgment of the learned Single judge and dismiss the writ petition filed by the delinquent challenging the charge-meno. We express hope that the departmental inquiry would now proceed in pursuance of our orders as expeditiously as possible and would be completed within six months of the orders reaching the department. The appeal is allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.