Judgment :- The above appeal is filed by the first defendant in O.S. No. 857 of 1989 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Thiruppur, who was the appellant in A.S. No. 17 of 1993 on the file of the, Sub-Court, Thiruppur. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their ranking in the suit. 3. The suit was filed by the plaintiff for partition and separate possession of her 1/5th share in the suit property and for a direction to defendants 5 to 8 to deposit their due rent for four months prior to filing of the suit and at the same rate every month in future also or to pay the plaintiffs 1/5th share of rents directly to the plaintiff. 4. The suit was decreed by the trial Court by a judgment and decree dated 29.1.1993. Aggrieved by that the first defendant filed an appeal in A.S. No.17 of 1993 before the Sub Court Thiruppur, which Court confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court and aggrieved by that the first defendant has filed the above second appeal. 5. The case of the plaintiff is as follows: The suit property is the self-acquired property of one Segamalai Boyan, by virtue of his purchase of an extent of 2 ½ cents, under a Registered Sale Deed dated 14.6.1957 and subsequent constructions put up by him there on. The suit property consists of house and shops having Door Nos.18, 19, 19-A, 19-B and 19-C. The said Segamalai Boyan died in 1974 intestate. The plaintiff is the wife of Segamalai Boyan. The first defendant is their son and defendants 2 to 4 are their daughters and as such all of them are entitled to 1/5th share each. Defendants 5 to 8 are tenants and paying Rs.300, Rs.150, Rs.100 and Rs.200 respectively. The plaintiff was residing in a part of the suit property and receiving the rents. While so, the first defendant, the son of the plaintiff, instructed the tenants not to pay the rents to her and the tenants stopped payment of rents from July 1989. Therefore plaintiff sent notice to all the tenants, but rents were not paid to her. Hence the plaintiff sent a notice demanding partition of 1/5th share in the suit property to the first defendant for which the first defendant sent a reply containing untenable allegations. Therefore plaintiff sent notice to all the tenants, but rents were not paid to her. Hence the plaintiff sent a notice demanding partition of 1/5th share in the suit property to the first defendant for which the first defendant sent a reply containing untenable allegations. Hence the suit for partition and separate possession has been filed. 6. The first defendant contested the suit by filing a written statement which was adopted by defendants 6 ad 7. In the written state­ment the first defendant inter alia contended that apart from the suit properties, there are other properties bearing Door Nos.19-D, 19­-E and 19-F and these properties have not been shown in the plaint schedule and, as such the suit seeking partial partition is not maintain­able. The first defendant contended that his father late Segamalai Boyan had executed Will dated 25.7.1974, in which the first defendant had be en given life interest and thereafter the entire property has been bequeathed to the first defendant and therefore the plaintiff is not entitled to seek partition of the suit properties. The first defendant further contended that he had let out the suit property to: defendants 5 to 8. The plaintiff, just a year before the filing of the suit, was residing with the first defendants thereafter she is residing with defendants 2 to 4 and she has permitted her daughters to reside in their house and run a shop. The first defendant disputed the quantum of rent being paid by defendants 5 to 8. He further contended that the value of the suit property is above Rs.1,50,000 and hence the District Munsif Court has no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit On the above said pleadings, he bought for the dismissal of the suit. 7. Defendants 2 and 4 filed a written statement which was adopted by the third defendant Defendants 2 to 4 contended that the suit prop­erty is the self-acquired property of their fur­ther late Segamalai Boyan, who died intestate and supported the case of the plaintiff. They also prayed for partition and allotment of their 1/5th share each. They further contended that the first defendant with an intention to defeat the rights of plaintiff and defendants 2 to 4 is collecting the rents from the tenants. On the above pleadings, they prayed to pass a decree as prayed for by the plaintiff. 8. They also prayed for partition and allotment of their 1/5th share each. They further contended that the first defendant with an intention to defeat the rights of plaintiff and defendants 2 to 4 is collecting the rents from the tenants. On the above pleadings, they prayed to pass a decree as prayed for by the plaintiff. 8. Defendants 5 and 8 filed a separate written statement. The fifth defendant claimed to be a tenant in respect of Door No.18 on a monthly rent of Rs.150. He further contended that he had paid a sum of Rs.6,000 to the first defendant and as per the agreement till the sum of Rs.6,000 is repaid to the fifth defendant the fifth defendant was allowed to occupy the shop bearing Door No.19 without payment of rents and hence he is not paying any separate rent for Door No.19. The eighth defendant is a tenant in the back portion of Door No.19-B and the front portion of Door No.19-C and according to him, the monthly rent payable by him is Rs.180 only. He claimed that though he is occupying Door No.19-D, it does not belong to the parties to the suit but it belongs to one Sivalingam and he is paying rent to the said Sivalingam. Defendants 5 and 8 contended that they have paid rents to the first defendant and hence they are not liable to pay the rent as claimed by the plaintiff. On the abovesaid pleadings, they sought for the dismissal of the suit. 9. On the abovesaid pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: (i) Whether the Court has got jurisdiction to try the suit? (ii) Whether the suit is barred for seeking partial partition without including other properties belonging to late Segamalai Boyan? (iii) Whether the Will dated 25.7.1974 said to have been executed by Segamalai Boyan in favour of the first defendant is true and genuine? (iv) Whether the parties are entitled for partition and if so, to what share they are entitled to? (v) To what relief the plaintiff is entitled to? During trial, on the side of the plaintiffs, three witnesses were examined and documents Exs. A1 to A21 were marked. On the side of the defendants, five witnesses were examined and documents 1 to 28 were marked. 10. (v) To what relief the plaintiff is entitled to? During trial, on the side of the plaintiffs, three witnesses were examined and documents Exs. A1 to A21 were marked. On the side of the defendants, five witnesses were examined and documents 1 to 28 were marked. 10. The trial Court on a consideration of oral and documentary evidence came to the conclusion that the first defendant has not, by documentary evidence, established the market value of the suit property to sustain his objection regarding the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. The trial Court pointed out that simply because the plaintiff who is an illiterate lady had stated in her cross-examination that her husband constructed the house spending about Rs.1 lakh, it cannot he held that the suit property is worth more Rs.1 lakh. Holding so, the trial Court held that it has got jurisdiction to entertain the suit and accordingly answered issue No.1 against the plaintiff. 11. On issue No. 2, the trial Court on the basis of Exs. A17 and A18 and the evidence of PW2 came to the conclusion that Door Nos.19-D, 19-E and 19-F did not belong to late Segamalii Boyan, whereas they belong to one Sivalingam and Bangaru and by holding so, the trial Court held that the suit is not bad for seeking partial partition. The trial Court on a consideration of oral evidence, adduced by the defendants and on the failure of the first defendant in not stating the date, month and year of execution of the Will, Ex. B14, in the reply notice Ex.A12 sent by him to the legal notice Ex.A3 sent by the plaintiff, and his failure to furnish. a copy of the Will to the plaintiff, which she sought for in the rejoinder; the failure of the first defendant to produce either the Xerox copy of the Will or the original along with the written statement, though the first defendant had stated in the written statement that the Xerox copy of the Will was being produced along with the written statement and the discrepancies, in the identity of the attesting witnesses and the scribe disbelieved the execution of the Will by Segamalai Boyan and accepted the caste of the plaintiff and decreed the suit as prayed for. 12. 12. The lower appellate Court on an independent consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced in the, case and after considering the reasoning recorded by the trial Court concurred with the judgment of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by that the first defendant has filed the above second appeal. 13. While admitting the second appeal, this Court has framed the following questions of law: (i) When the plaintiff herself admits that the value of the suit properties is more than Rs.1 lakh and that the first defendant has taken specific objection as to pecuniary jurisdic­tion of the trial Court is not the learned Subordinate Judge wrong in holding that the first defendant has not proved the value of suit properties and that the District-Mun­sif Court has got jurisdiction to try the suit? (ii) When the first defendant has examined DWs. 2, 3 and 4 and filed material documents to prove the execution and attestation of the Will under Ex. B14 in accordance with Section 68 of Indian Evidence Act and Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, is the learned Subordinate Judge right in holding that the Will under Ex.B14 has not been proved and that the same is not admissible in evidence? (iii) Is not the learned Subordinate Judge wrong in deciding the title in respect of Door Nos.19-D, 19-E, 19-F without considering the material documents filed by the first defendant and the oral evidence of DW5 which would clinchingly disprove the case of the plaintiff? (iv) Is not the suit bad for partial partition? 14. I heard Ms. P. Veena, learned counsel for the appellant and R. Thirugnanam, learned counsel for respondents 1, 2, 4 and 5. In the appeal, notice has been dispensed with to the respondents 3 and 6 to 8. 15. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the plaintiff herself in her evidence had admitted that the value of the suit property is more than Rs. 1 lakh and the first defendant had taken specific objection as to pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial court and therefore the lower appellate Court is wrong in holding that the first defendant had not proved the value of the suit properties. She further contended that the first defendant had not proved the value of the suit properties. 1 lakh and the first defendant had taken specific objection as to pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial court and therefore the lower appellate Court is wrong in holding that the first defendant had not proved the value of the suit properties. She further contended that the first defendant had not proved the value of the suit properties. She further contended that due execution of Ex.B14, Will, has been proved by the first defendant by examining DWs.2, 3 and 4 in accordance with Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act and Section 63 (c) of the Indian Evidence Act and the finding of the Courts below are erroneous. She further contended that the lower appellate Court erred in deciding the title to Door Nos.19-D, 19-E and 19-F, without considering the material documents filed by the first defendant and the oral evidence of DW5. 16. Per contra the learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted-that in the ab­sence of documentary proof to show that the value of the suit properties is more than Rs.1 lakh the Courts below have rightly held that the trial Court has got pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. He further contended that when both the Court below on a consideration of oral and documentary evidence adduced in the case have concurrently found that Ex. B14, Will could not have been executed by Segamalai Boyan and the due execution of Ex. B14 has not been proved and when both the Courts below have disbelieved the evidence of the at­ testing witness DW2, it is not open to this Court to re-appreciate the evidence under Section 100, CPC. He further contended that both die Courts below have considered Exs.A17 and A18, the title deeds relating to Door Nos.19D, 19E and, 19-F and evidence of PW2 and have rightly held that Door Nos.19-D, 19-E and 19-F did not belong to late Segamalai Boyan and no exception can be taken to the findings. 17. Though the learned counsel for the appellant tried to submit that the Courts below have not property appreciated the evidence of DWs.1 to 5, the evidence of witnesses have not been typed and filed before this Court. The learned counsel only took me through the judgment of the Courts below. I will take up for consideration the first substantial question of law pertaining to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial Court. The learned counsel only took me through the judgment of the Courts below. I will take up for consideration the first substantial question of law pertaining to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial Court. Both the Courts below have pointed out that the first defendant has not produced any documents to prove the market value of the suit properties and merely on the oral evidence, the market value of the property cannot be fixed. The Courts below have further pointed out that simply because the plaintiff, an illiterate lady, as PW1 in her cross-examination has stated that her husband constricted the buildings in the suit property spending about Rs.1 lakh, it cannot be constructed to be the value of the suit properties. The Courts below have also pointed out that PW1 is unable to state as to how many thousands or hundreds are there in Rs.1 lakh. On the abovesaid reasoning both the Courts below have held that the suit is maintainable. 18. In this context it is useful to refer to Section 21(2) of CPC: "21(2). No objection as to the competence of a Court with reference to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any appellate or revisional Court, unless such objection was taken in the executing Court at the earliest possible opportunity, and, in all cases where issues are settled, at or before said settlement and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice". In this context, it is also relevant to consider Section 54 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act: "54. In this context, it is also relevant to consider Section 54 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act: "54. Procedure where objection is taken on appeal or revision that a suit or appeal was not properly valued for jurisdictional purposes­ (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 99 CPC, an objection that by reason of the over-valuation or under-valuation of a suit or appeal, a Court of first instance or lower appellate Court which had no jurisdiction with respect to the suit or appeal exercised jurisdiction with respect thereto shall not be entertained by an appellate Court unless: (a) the objection was taken in the Court of first instance at or before the hearing at which issues were first framed and recorded, or in the lower appellate Court in the memorandum of appeal to that Court, or (b) the appellate Court is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, that the suit or appeal was over-valued, or undervalued and that the over-valuation or under-valuation thereof has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on its merits". A reading of the above two provisions contemplate raising of objections at the threshold, that is to say, prior to settlement of the issues. On a plain reading of sub-section (2) of Section 21 of CPC, it is manifest that two conditions must be satisfied before an objection to the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of a Court can be sustained and these are, that the objection must have been taken in the Court of the first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases, where issues are settled, at or before such settlement and that there: must have been a consequent failure of justice. Section 54(1) also contains a similar provision. The emphasis of both the sections is that the objection must have been taken in the Court of the first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and there must have been a consequent failure of justice. This Court in a judgment AIR 1920 Mad. 1017, has laid down that objection to jurisdiction based on erroneous decision cannot be entertained unless good reasons are given for considering that the wrong valuation has prejudicially affected the dismissal of the suit on merits. In yet another decision AIR 1946 Mad. This Court in a judgment AIR 1920 Mad. 1017, has laid down that objection to jurisdiction based on erroneous decision cannot be entertained unless good reasons are given for considering that the wrong valuation has prejudicially affected the dismissal of the suit on merits. In yet another decision AIR 1946 Mad. 209 , this Court has laid down that even if the under-valuation of the suit had resulted in the trial being conducted in the Court of lower pecuniary jurisdiction, the objection in the appeal cannot be raised unless it has prejudicially affected the appellant. In Somasundaram Pillai v., The Official Receiver, South Arcot, 1946 (2) MLJ 282 , this Court has laid down that even though objection to the jurisdiction is taken at the earliest opportunity and the function of the trial Court is patently against the facts, it is not enough to justify interference in the absence of prejudice. In yet another judgment Appat Krishna Poduval v. Lakshmi Nethiar and others, 1950 (1) MLJ 120 , this Court has held that the want of pecuniary jurisdiction is a mere irregularity and it is not sufficient to render a decree a nullity and no interference is warranted in the absence of material prejudice. 19. All the above said decisions emphasise that unless material prejudice is caused to the party raising an objection regarding pecuniary jurisdiction, the appellate Court cannot interfere. In this case, the first defendant had remained quiet without raising the question of pecuniary jurisdiction as a preliminary issue and allowed the Court to proceed with the trial and after the trial, relying on a stray answer elicited from PW1, has sought to raise the issue which is not permissible in law. Further the Counts below have on facts held that the first defendant has not proved by acceptable evidence that the market value of the property is above the pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial Court. Further, it is neither pleaded nor proved as to how the first defendant is prejudiced. In the absence of proof of prejudice, this Court will not interfere. Accordingly this substantial question of law is answered against the appellant. 20. Now, I take up the second question of law pertaining to the Will, Ex. B14. The learned counsel for the appellant mainly submitted that the reasons recorded by the Courts below for disbelieving Ex. In the absence of proof of prejudice, this Court will not interfere. Accordingly this substantial question of law is answered against the appellant. 20. Now, I take up the second question of law pertaining to the Will, Ex. B14. The learned counsel for the appellant mainly submitted that the reasons recorded by the Courts below for disbelieving Ex. B14, Will, after rejecting the testimony of the witness DW2 are not correct. Though it is not open to this Court to re-appreciate the evidence under Section 100, CPC as laid down in a catena of decisions by the Apex Court in-deference to the submission made by the counsel for the appellant I went, through the evidence of DW2 and other witnesses. The plaintiff before instituting the suit issued Ex.A3 notice dated 11.7.1989 for which the first defendant had sent a reply Ex. A12 in which the first defen­dant had stated that the plaintiff is not entitled to seek 1/5th share in the suit property and as per the Will, executed by his father, the plaintiff is entitled to only a life interest in Door No.19-A present 19-B, 19-E and 19-F). But in the said reply the details as to on which date, month and year, the Will was executed is not stated. After receiving Ex. A12 reply, the plaintiff sent a rejoinder through her counsel under Ex. A13. In the said rejoinder, it is specifically stated that there is no Will as claimed by the first defendant and as far as the plaintiff knows, her husband had not executed any Will in favour of anybody and if there is any such Will, the plaintiff called upon the first defendant to furnish a copy of the same. But curiously the first defendant did not send any copy of the Will to the plaintiff Further in the written statement filed, by the first defendant, it is stated that a photocopy of the Will dated 25.7.1974 has been enclosed and the original Will, will be produced at the time of trial. But no such photocopy was enclosed with the written statement and no reason has been stated as to why the photocopy was not enclosed with the written statement. During trial, the first defendant filed I.A. No. 914 of 1991, for issuing summons to one Ramaswamy calling him to produce the Will and it was marked as Ex. B14 under protest. But no such photocopy was enclosed with the written statement and no reason has been stated as to why the photocopy was not enclosed with the written statement. During trial, the first defendant filed I.A. No. 914 of 1991, for issuing summons to one Ramaswamy calling him to produce the Will and it was marked as Ex. B14 under protest. The Will is not a registered one. It is pertinent to point out that the said. Ramaswamy has not been examined as a witness and no reason whatsoever has been adduced for his non-examination. As rightly pointed out by the Courts below, if really Segamalai Boyan had executed the Will, as claimed by the first defendant, he could have given all the details in Ex. A12 notice and the Will could have been produced before the Court along with the written statement; but it had not been done. This raises a strong suspicion regarding the genuineness of the Will. A perusal of Ex. B14, shows that one Vaiyapuri is said to have written the Will and Balakrishnan and Palani have attested the Will. The first defendant claimed that Vaiyapuri and Balakrishnan are dead. One, Easwara Murthy has been examined as D.W4 to show that the said Vaiyapuri only wrote Ex. B14. Ex. B16 Which is a Will, was marked to show that the said Vaiyapuri who is said to have written Ex. B16 also wrote Ex. B14, Will. Both the Courts below have considered the discrepancies in the father's name, of the said Vaiyapuri and other discrepancies which according to me are not without substance. One of the attesting witnesses to Ex. B14 is one Palani, S/o. Raghavan belonging to Somanur. But in Court, Palani S/o. Raghavan of 'Motipalayam has been examined. All these aspects have been considered by the Courts below and disbelieved Ex. B14, Will and held that the first defendant has not proved Ex. B14, Will beyond doubt and, recorded a finding that, it is not a genuine Will. When both the Courts below on a detailed consideration of the evidence on record have arrived at concurrent findings regarding Ex. B14, it is not open for this Court to re-appreciate the evidence and record a different finding. Further, I do not find anything wrong with the reasonings of the Courts below for recording such a finding regarding Ex. B14. When both the Courts below on a detailed consideration of the evidence on record have arrived at concurrent findings regarding Ex. B14, it is not open for this Court to re-appreciate the evidence and record a different finding. Further, I do not find anything wrong with the reasonings of the Courts below for recording such a finding regarding Ex. B14. Accordingly this substantial question of law is also answered against the appellant. 21. The first defendant has stated in the written statement that Door Nos. 19-D, 19-E and 19-F also belong to his father Segamalai Boyan but the same have not been included in the plaint schedule and hence the slit is barred for seeking Partial partition. Both the Courts below on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence available on record have recorded a finding that the said properties did not belong to Segamalai Boyan. The lower appellate Court has pointed out that the case putfourth by the first defendant regarding Door Nos.19-D, 19-E and 19-F are mutually contradictory. In the written statement filed by the first defendant, it is stated as follows: "Vernacular matter omitted - Ed.” The abovesaid pleading shows that Door Nos. 19-D, 19-E and 19-F are in Poramboke. But at the same time, the first defendant had stated that Door No.19-A was in a dilapidated condition and the same was demolished and in that place Door Nos. 19-D, 19-E and 19-F were constructed. This mutually contradictory pleading will show that there is no truth in the claim of the first defendant. One Sivalingam has been examined as PW2 and through him Exs. A17 and A18, two sale deeds have been marked. PW2 has stated that he purchased Door No. 19-D under Ex. A 17 from one Nachimuthu and hence it belongs to him and on the West of his house the house of one Bangaru is situated and the said Bangaru purchased Door Nos. 19-E and 19-F from the said Nachimuthu under Ex. A18, Sale Deed. Ex. A15 Property Tax receipt stands in the name of PW2 in respect of Door No.19-D. Ex. A16 shows that electricity charges have been paid in respect of PW2's house. Ex-A19 property tax receipt in respect of Door. No. 19-E and 19-F stands in the name of one Bangaru. A18, Sale Deed. Ex. A15 Property Tax receipt stands in the name of PW2 in respect of Door No.19-D. Ex. A16 shows that electricity charges have been paid in respect of PW2's house. Ex-A19 property tax receipt in respect of Door. No. 19-E and 19-F stands in the name of one Bangaru. A Perusal of Exs-A15 to A19 and the evidence of PW2 clearly shows that Door Nos.19-D, 19-E and 19-F, did not belong to Segamalai Boyan, the father of the first defendant as claimed by him. These aspects have been elaborately considered by both the Courts be­low. This finding has been arrived at to decide ether me suit is bad for seeking partial­ Partition. It cannot be said that the Courts below have decided the title to the Door Nos. 19-D, 19-E and 19-F. For the limited Purpose of deciding the issue relating to Door Nos.19-D, 19-E and 19-F has been considered by the Courts below. 22. The learned counsel for the appellant has failed to show as to how this finding of the Courts below is wrong. Therefore there is nothing wrong on the Part of the Courts below in deciding this issue. The substantial question of law is accordingly. 23. The foregoing discussions on the substantial questions of law 1 to 3 covered the substantial question of law No.4, viz., is not a suit barred for partial partition. When the courts below have rightly found that Door Nos.19D, 19-E and 19-F does not belong to late Segamalai Boyan, the question of seeking partial partition. Hence, the above appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs throughout.