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2006 DIGILAW 3048 (PNJ)

Sujan Singh v. Amar Singh

2006-07-31

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL

body2006
Judgment Adarsh Kumar Goel, J. 1. This order will dispose of F.A.O. Nos. 872 and 873 of 1986 as both the appeals arise out of the same accident. 2. F.A.O. No. 872 of 1986 has been preferred by Sujan Singh etc. who have made claim on account of death of Lal Singh, aged 12 years, who was travelling in tractor No. HYM-1208 on 27.6.1985 at 3 PM, which was being driven by Babu Ram, driver, respondent No. 2. The tractor was carrying a marriage party which had left for village Rampura in a trolley attached to the tractor and when the tractor reached Navdi turning near Village Rampura, the trolley turned turtle, resulting in the death of Lal Singh. The claimants are parents and minor brothers and sister of the deceased. 3. F.A.O. No. 873 of 1986 filed by Smt. Rewti etc. is for claim for death of Balbir Singh, aged 60 years, who also died in the same accident. It was alleged that Balbir Singh was earning Rs. 2000/- per month and Lal Singh was a student, who was assisting in agricultural operations of the family and his income was Rs. 300/- per month. 4. The claims were contested. The Insurance Company also filed written statement with the plea that the driver was not holding valid licence and that the owner had no insurable interest, as he was not registered owner of the vehicle. It was also pleaded that under the policy, carriage of passengers for hire or reward was not covered and the vehicle was to be used for agricultural and forestry purposes. 5. following issues were framed: 1. Whether the accident involving the death of Lal Singh and Balbir Singh was the result of rash and negligent driving of vehicle No. HYM-1208 by respondent No. 2? OPP. 2. To what amount of compensation, the petitioners are entitled and against whom? OPP 3. Relief. 6. The Tribunal dismissed both the claims. It was held that the claimants failed to prove that Lal Singh and Balbir Singh died due to rash and negligent act of respondent No. 2. The Tribunal noticed evidence of Sujan Singh, PW-3, father of Lal Singh and son of Balbir Singh, who deposed that he was informed by one Billu about the accident. It was held that the claimants failed to prove that Lal Singh and Balbir Singh died due to rash and negligent act of respondent No. 2. The Tribunal noticed evidence of Sujan Singh, PW-3, father of Lal Singh and son of Balbir Singh, who deposed that he was informed by one Billu about the accident. Billu also appeared as a witness as PW-4 and deposed that he was a member of the marriage party and the tractor met with an accident on account of rash and negligent driving of Babu Lal. PW-6 Ramehswar Dyal, Sarpanch of village Rampura deposed that he lodged FIR Ex. PW5/A. Babu Lal appeared as RW-1 and denied having taken the marriage party or the accident. The Tribunal drew adverse inference on account of non-examination of bridegroom, his father or other near relations or bride or her relations. It was observed that none of the occupants of the tractor had lodged the report with the police; the tractor-trolley number was not mentioned in the F.I.R., Ex.PW5/A or in proceedings under Section 174 Cr.P.C. Post mortem report of Lal Singh is Ex.PA. The death was on account of crush injury on the skull. Dr. O.P. Podar was examined as PW-1, who conducted post mortem examination of Lal Singh and Dr. Aseem Chaudhry, was examined as PW-2 to prove post mortem of Balbir Singh. Insurance policy is on record as Ex. Rule.1. Ex. PB is report of post mortem of Balbir Singh. 7. Learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that evidence of Billu, PW-4 and Sujan Singh, PW-3 was wrongly rejected. Billu, PW-4 was member of the marriage party and his evidence was natural. Evidence of PW-6 Ramehswar Dyal, Sarpanch was also not duly considered by the Tribunal. 8. Learned Counsel for the appellants also submitted that the Tribunal was not justified in drawing adverse inference on account of the parties to the marriage or relations having not been examined as witnesses. From the FIR lodged immediately after the occurrence by the Sarpanch and the post mortem report proved on record and evidence of Sujan Singh, Billu and Ramehswar Dyal, it was clearly proved that death of Lal Singh and Balbir Singh took place on account of rash and negligent driving of the tractor. It was submitted that on account of breach of conditions of policy, the claimants could not suffer and they were entitled to compensation. It was submitted that on account of breach of conditions of policy, the claimants could not suffer and they were entitled to compensation. At best, the Insurance Company could be given liberty to recover the amount from the owner and the driver. Reliance is placed on judgments of Hon ble Supreme Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh and Ors. (2004-1) 136 P.L.R. 510 (S.C.) Manju Devi and Anr. v. Musafir Paswan and Anr. IV (2005) A.C.C. 15 and judgments of this Court in Major R.S. Rawat and Anr. v. Tilak Raj and Ors. (2004-2) 137 P.L.R. 233, Nirmal Maria v. Ram Singh and Ors. (2006-1) 142 P.L.R. 476 and Ram Kumar and Ors. v. Haryana Roadways, Chandigarh through its General Manager and Ors. (2005-3) 141 P.L.R. 809. In Manju Devis case (supra), for death of minor child, compensation of Rs. 2.25 lacs was awarded by applying multiplier of 15, relying upon second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 9. Learned Counsel for the Insurance Company referred to Insurance policy, Ex. Rule 1, in support of his submission that the vehicle was for agricultural and forestry purposes and the policy did not cover use of the said vehicle for carriage of passengers for hire or reward and the Insurance Company was, in no case, liable for the compensation. 10. Learned Counsel for the Insurance Company distinguished judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellants on ground that in Manju Devis case (supra), accident had taken place on 2.7.1998 and thus, the said decision related to the new Act. It was submitted that this distinction has not been considered in the judgments of this Court in Major R.S. Raw at and Ram Kumar (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellants. 11. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the record. 12. Following questions arise for consideration: 1. Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the claimants failed to prove that death arose out of accident and rash and negligent driving of the vehicle? 2. Whether Insurance Company is not liable in respect of claim arising out of death of passengers being carried in a tractor, which was not insured for. carrying passengers? 3. Whether and to what extent claimants are entitled to relief? 13. Re: (i) Negligence. 2. Whether Insurance Company is not liable in respect of claim arising out of death of passengers being carried in a tractor, which was not insured for. carrying passengers? 3. Whether and to what extent claimants are entitled to relief? 13. Re: (i) Negligence. As already noticed, the Tribunal has held that it was not proved that the death was no account of accident, which was due to rash and negligent driving of respondent No. 2. The basis of this finding is non-examination of bridegroom or bride or their relatives and that number of tractor-trolley was not mentioned in the FIR. In my view, these reasons cannot be held to be sufficient, in the circumstances of the case, for rejecting the evidence led by the claimants. No doubt, burden of proof is, in the first instance, on the claimants. This is a case where principle of res ipsa loquitur will be attracted. In a claim of this nature, pragmatic approach is to be adopted for appreciating evidence and if the evidence on record gives rise to a reasonable inference that accident took place on account of negligent act, the burden will shift on the respondents. FIR Ex. PW5/A was lodged by Rameshwar Dyal, Sarpanch, PW-6 and has been duly proved, which mentions death having been caused on account of tractor having turned turtle. Post-mortem reports Exhibits PA and PB and evidence of Dr. O.P. Podar, PW-1 and Dr. Aseem Chaudhry, PW-2 lead to a reasonable inference that death took place on a count of accident. In these circumstances, evidence of PW-4 Billu and Sujan Sipgn, PW-3 cannot be thrown out by drawing adverse inference on account of non-examination of bride, bridegroom or their relatives. Evidence of driver is not enough to rebut the inference which arises. In these circumstances, negligence of the driver can reasonably be held to be proved. In Pushpahai Parshotlam Udeshi and Ors. v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Anr., it was observed: 6. The normal rule is that it is for the plaintiff to prove negligence but as in some cases considerable hardship is caused to the plaintiff as the true cause of the accident is not know to him but is solely within the knowledge of the defendant who caused it, the plaintiff can prove the accident but cannot prove how it happened to establish negligence on the part of the defendant. This hardship is sought to be avoided by applying the principle of res ipsa loquitur. The general purport of the words res ipsa loquitur is that the accident "speaks for itself or tells its own story. There are cases in which the accident speaks for itself so that it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove the accident and nothing more. It will then be for the defendant to establish that the accident happened due to some other cause than his own negligence. Salmond on the Law of Torts (15th Ed.) at P.306 states: "The maxim res ipsa loquitur applies whenever it is so improbable that such an accident would have happened without the negligence of the defendant that a reasonable jury could find without further evidence that it was so caused". In Halsburys Laws of England, 3rd Ed., Vol. 28, at page 77, the position is stated thus: "An exception to the general rule that the burden of proof of the alleged negligence is in the first instance on the plaintiff occurs wherever the facts already established are such that the proper and natural inference arising from them is that the injury complained of was caused by the defendants negligence, or where the event charged as negligence tells its own story of negligence on the part of the defendant, the story so told being clear and unambiguous. : Where the maxim is applied the burden is on the defendant to show either that in fact he was not negligent or that the accident might more probably have happened in a manner which did not connote negligence on his part. For the application of the principle it must be shown that the car was under the management of the defendant and that the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those who had the management used proper care. Present is a fit case where principle of res ipsa loquitur can be invoked for the reasons already mentioned. The finding of the Tribunal is, thus, liable to be set aside. It will be reasonable to hold that death of Lal Singh and Balbir Singh took place on account of rash and negligent act of driver Babu Ram, respondent No. 2. 14. The finding of the Tribunal is, thus, liable to be set aside. It will be reasonable to hold that death of Lal Singh and Balbir Singh took place on account of rash and negligent act of driver Babu Ram, respondent No. 2. 14. Re: (II) Liability of Insurance Company: Since accident in the present case took place on 27.6.1985, the case will be governed by the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Section 95 of the said Act is as under: 95. Requirements of policies and limits of liability. 14. Re: (II) Liability of Insurance Company: Since accident in the present case took place on 27.6.1985, the case will be governed by the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Section 95 of the said Act is as under: 95. Requirements of policies and limits of liability. - (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which- (a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer [or by a cooperative society allowed under Section 108 to transact the business of an insurer); and (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in Sub-section (2) - (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; (ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; Provided that a policy shall not be required - (i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee- (a) engaged in driving the vehicle; or (b) if it is a public service vehicle, engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or (c) if it is a goods vehicle, being carried in the vehicle, or (ii) except where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, to cover liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which a claim arises, or (iii) to cover any contractual liability. Explanation. - For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party shall be deemed to have been caused by or to have arisen out of, the use of a vehicle in a public place notwithstanding that the person who is dead or injured or the property which is damaged was not in a public place at the time of the accident, if the act or omission which led to the accident occurred in a public place. (2) Subject to the proviso to Sub-section (1), a policy of insurance shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any one accident upto the following limits, namely- (a) where the vehicle is a goods vehicle, a limit of one lakh and fifty thousand rupees in all, including the liabilities, if any, arising under the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 (89 of 1923), in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, employees (other than the driver), not exceeding six in number, being carried in the vehicle; (b) where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment,- (i) in respect of persons other than passengers carried for hire or reward, a limit of fifty thousand rupees in all; (ii) in respect of passengers, a limit of fifteen thousand rupees for each individual passenger; (c) save as provided in Clause (d), where the vehicle is a vehicle of any other class, the amount of liability incurred; (d) irrespective of the class of the vehicle, a limit of rupees (six thousand) in all in respect of damage to any property of a thirty party. (4) A policy shall be of no effect for the purposes of this Chapter unless and until there is issued by the insurer in favour of the person by whom the policy is effected a certificate of insurance in the prescribed form and containing the prescribed particulars of any conditions subject to which the policy is issued and of any other prescribed matters; and different forms, particulars and matters may be prescribed in different cases. (4-A) Where a cover note issued by the insurer under the provision of this Chapter or unless made thereunder is not followed by a policy of insurance within the prescribed time, a insurer shall, within seven days of the expiry of the period of the validity of the cover note, notify the fact to the registering authority in whose records the vehicle to which the cover note relates has been registered or to such other authority as the State Government may prescribe. (5) Notwithstanding anything elsewhere contained in any law, a person issuing a policy of insurance under this section shall be liable to indemnify the person or classes of person specified in the policy in respect of any liability which the policy purports to cover in the case of that person or those classes of person. The above provision has been interpreted by the Hon ble Supreme Court in Pushpabais case (supra). It was observed in para 20: 20. Sections 95(a) and 95(b)(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act adopted the provisions of the English Road Traffic Act, 1960, and excluded the liability of the insurance company regarding the risk to the passengers. Section 95 provides that a policy of insurance must be a policy which insures the persons against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of death or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. The plea that the words "third party" was wide enough to cover all persons except the person and the insurer is negatived as the insurance cover is not available to the passengers made clear by the proviso to sub-section which provides that a policy shall not be required : "(ii) except where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reasons of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, to cover liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which a claim arises". Therefore, it is not required that a policy of insurance should cover risk to the passengers who are carried for hire or reward. Therefore, it is not required that a policy of insurance should cover risk to the passengers who are carried for hire or reward. As under, Section 95 the risk to a passenger in a vehicle who is not carried for hire or reward is not required to be insured the plea of the counsel for the insurance company will have to be accepted and the insurance company held not liability under the requirement of the Motor Vehicle Act. Same view has been followed, inter-alia, in Smt. Mallawwa etc. v. Oriental lnsurance Co. Ltd. and Ors., National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chinnamma and Ors., National Insurance Co. ltd. v. Baljit kaur and Ors., National Insurance Co. Ltd v. Bommithi Subbhayamma and Ors. (2005-3) 141 P.L.R. 546 (SC) : (2005) 11 S.C.C. 419. In view New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Asha Rani and Ors., it was observed that as a result of amendment, the owner of goods or his representative was covered which was not applicable lo period prior to amendment. In Baljit Kaurs case (supra), it was observed in para 12 that gratuitous passengers were not covered in the liability of the insurer for third patty risks. The same view was followed in Bommdhis cave (supra). In Swaran Singhs case (supra), following earlier decision in New India Assurance Co. Shimla v. Kamla, it was held that Insurance Company will be liable to satisfy the decree even in case of zero liability. However, the Company will have liberty to recover the entire amount paid to third party. Relevant observations from paras 78, 99 and 105(x) of the judgment are quoted below: 78... The insurance company may not be liable to satisfy the decree and, therefore, its liability may be zero but it does mean that it did not have initial liability at all. Thus, if the insurance company is made liable to pay any amount, it can recover the entire amount paid to the third party on behalf of the assured. If this interpretation is not given to the beneficent provisions of the Act having regard to its purport and object, we fail to see a situation where beneficent provisions can be given effect to Sub-section (7) of Section 149 of the Act, to which pointed attention of the Court has been drawn by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, which is in negative language may now be noticed. The said provision must be read with Sub-section (1) thereof. The right to avoid liability in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 149 is restricted as has been discussed herein before. It is one thing to say that the insurance companies are entitled to raise a defence but it is another thing to say that despite the fact that its defence has been accepted having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal has power to direct them to satisfy the decree at the first instance and then direct recovery of the same from the owner. These two matters stand apart and require contextual reading. 99. It is, therefore, evident from the discussions made hereinbefore that the liability of the insurance company to satisfy the decree at the first instance and to recover the awarded amount from the owner or driver thereof has been holding the field for a long time. 105(x) Where an adjudication of the claim under the Act the tribunal arrives at a conclusion that the insurer has satisfactorily proved its defence in accordance with the provisions of Section 149(2) read with Sub-section (7), as interpreted by this Court above, the Tribunal can direct that the insurer is liable to be reimbursed by the insured for the compensation and other amounts which it has been compelled to pay to the third party under the award of the tribunal. Such determination of claim by the Tribunal will be enforceable and the money found due to the insurer from the insured will be recoverable on a certificate issued by the Tribunal to the Collector in the same marmer under Section 174 of the Act as arrears as land revenue. The certificate will be issued for the recovery as arrears of land revenue only if, as required by Sub-section (3) of Section 168 of the act and insured fails to deposit the amount awarded in favour of the insurer within thirty days from the date of announcement of the award by the tribunal. In view of the above discussion, it is held that the Insurance Company is not liable under the policy to meet the claim arising out of the death of the deceased in the accident who were being carried as passengers in the tractor trolley. In view of the above discussion, it is held that the Insurance Company is not liable under the policy to meet the claim arising out of the death of the deceased in the accident who were being carried as passengers in the tractor trolley. However, the Insurance Company will be liable to satisfy the decree with liberty to recover the amount from the owner and driver in execution proceedings itself without filing any separate suit or other proceedings. 15. Re: (iii): Relief The Tribunal has taken income of the deceased Balbir Singh at Rs. 300/- per month in absence of evidence and applying the multiplier of 5, it was held that dependency at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month could be worked out to be Rs. 9,000/-. It was further held that for death of Lal Singh, who was 12 years aged child, no compensation was payable. 16. Principles of award of compensation/damages have been laid down in several decisions of the Hon ble Supreme Court. In Gobald Motor Service Limited and Anr. v. R.M.K. Veluswami and Ors., which was followed in Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. v. Northern Indian Transporters Insurance Co. Ltd. and Anr., it was observed that award of damages has to be just having regard to relevant data, though, such data cannot be ascertained accurately and has to be an estimate or even partly a conjecture. In R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Ors., para 9, it was observed that damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which is capable of being calculated in terms of money whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. The same have to be assessed having regard to the circumstances of a case. Under this head, damages are awarded for mental and physical shock, pain and suffering already suffered or likely to be suffered in future, loss of amenities of life like inability to work, run or sit, loss of expectation of life, inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress. In Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh and Ors., para 27, it was observed that there are three categories of damages-consolatory damages, compensatory damages and damages for loss of expectation of life. 17. In Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh and Ors., para 27, it was observed that there are three categories of damages-consolatory damages, compensatory damages and damages for loss of expectation of life. 17. Summing up the law on the point, Hon ble the Supreme Court in The Divisional Controller K.S.R.T.C. v. Mahadeva Shetty and Anr., observed: 12. It is true that perfect compensation is hardly possible and money cannot renew a physique or frame that has been battered and shattered, as stated by Lord Morris in West v. Shephard (1964 A.C. 326). Justice requires that it should be equal in value, although not alike in kind. The object of providing compensation is to place the claimant as far as possible in the same position financially as he was before the accident. Broadly speaking, in the case of death the basis of compensation is loss of pecuniary benefits to the dependents of the deceased which includes pecuniary loss, expenses etc. and loss to the estate. The object is to mitigate hardship that has been caused to the legal representatives due to the sudden demise of the deceased in the accident. Compensation awarded should not be inadequate and should neither be unreasonable, excessive, nor deficient. There can be no exact uniform rule for measuring the value of human life and the measure of damage cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculation; but amount recoverable depends on broad facts and circumstances of each case. It should neither be punitive against whom claim is decreed nor should it be a source of profit for the person in whose favour it is awarded. Upjohn, L.J. in Charterhouse Credit v. Tolly (1963) 2 C.B. 683 remarked, the assessment of damages has never been an exact science; it is essentially practical. 13. The damages for vehicular accidents are in the nature of compensation in money for loss of any kind caused to any person. In case of personal injury the position is different from loss of property. In the latter case there is possibility of repair or restoration. But in the case of personal injury, the possibility of repair or restoration is practically non-existent. In Parry v. Cleaver (1969) 1 All. E.R. 555. Lord Morris stated as follows: To compensate in money for pain and for physical consequences is invariably difficult but...no other process can be devised than that of making a monetary assessment. 14. But in the case of personal injury, the possibility of repair or restoration is practically non-existent. In Parry v. Cleaver (1969) 1 All. E.R. 555. Lord Morris stated as follows: To compensate in money for pain and for physical consequences is invariably difficult but...no other process can be devised than that of making a monetary assessment. 14. The main principles of law on compensation for injuries were worked out in the 19th century, where accidents were becoming common and all actions were tried by the jury. Though the cases have an antiquated air it is still useful to refer to them. The necessity that damages should be "full" and "adequate" was stressed by the Court by the Queens Bench in Fair v. London and North-Western Rly. Co. (1869) 21 L.T. 326. The word "compensation" is derived from the Latin word "compensate" meaning "weigh together" or "balance". In Rushton v. National Coal Board. (1953) 1 All. E.R. 314 : it was observed: Every member of this Court is anxious to do all he can to ensure that the damages are adequate for the injuries suffered, so far as they can be compensated for an injury, and to help the parties and others to arrive at a fair and just figure.... 15. It has to be kept in view that the Tribunal constituted under the Act as provided in Section 168 is required to make an award determining the amount of compensation which to it appears to be "just". It has to be borne in mind that compensation for loss of limbs or life can hardly be weighed in golden scales. Bodily injury is nothing but a deprivation which entitles the claimant to damages. The quantum of damages fixed should be in accordance with the injury. An injury may bring about many consequences like loss of earning capacity, loss of mental pleasure and many such consequential losses. A person becomes entitled to damages for mental and physical loss, his or her life may have been shortened or that he or she cannot enjoy life, which has been curtailed because of physical handicap. The normal expectation of life is impaired. But at the same time it has to be borne in mind that the compensation is not expected to be a windfall for the victim. The normal expectation of life is impaired. But at the same time it has to be borne in mind that the compensation is not expected to be a windfall for the victim. Statutory provisions clearly indicate that the compensation must be "just" and it cannot be a bonanza; nor a source of profit but the same should not be a pittance. The courts and tribunals have a duty to weigh the various factors and quantify the amount of compensation, which should be just. What would be "just" compensation is a vexed question. There can be no golden rule applicable to all cases for measuring the value of human life or a limb. Measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations. It would depend upon the particular facts and circumstances, and attending peculiar or special features, if any. Every method or mode adopted for assessing compensation has to be considered in the background of "just" compensation which is the pivotal consideration. Though by use of the expression "which appears to it to be just", a wild" discretion is vested in the Tribunal, the determination has to be rational, to be done by a judicious approach and not the outcome of whims, wild guesses and arbitrariness. The expression "just" denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness, and non-arbitrary. If it is not so, it cannot be just. (See Helen C. Rebellow v. Maharashtra. State Road Transport Corporation). 16. This Court in R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) (P) Ltd., laying the principles posited: 9. Broadly speaking while fixing an amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which are capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include expenses incurred by the claimants : (i) medical attendance (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include expenses incurred by the claimants : (i) medical attendance (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. So far as non-pecuniary damages are concerned, they may include (i) damages for mental and physical shock, pain and suffering, already suffered or likely to be suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters i.e. on account of injury the claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of expectation of life i.e. on account of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned is shortened; (iv) inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life. 17. Here also, because of the accident the appellant had become paraplegic. The principle has been reagitated by the Court in Ashwani Kumar Mishra v. P. Muniam Babu 1909 A.C.J. 1105 (S.C.). 18. A person not only suffers injuries on account of accident but also suffers in mind and body on account of the accident throughout his life and a feeling is developed that he is no more a normal man and cannot enjoy the amenities of life as another normal person can. While fixing compensation for pain and suffering as also for loss of amenities of life, features like his age, marital status and unusual deprivation he has undertaken in his life have to be reckoned. 18. Applying the above principles, view taken by the Tribunal cannot be sustained. 19. In absence of satisfactory evidence, the income of the deceased Balbir Singh could he taken at Rs. 600/- per month, out of which dependency could be worked out to be Rs. 4007- per month and multiplier of 10 could be applied, having regard to the age of the deceased, which was 60 years. The claimants are also entitled to funeral expenses and non-pecuniary damages on account of loss of company and shock, which are assessed at Rs. 10,000/-. The claimants would be, thus, entitled to compensation of Rs. 58,000/-. which will carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of application till the date of payment. The claimants are also entitled to funeral expenses and non-pecuniary damages on account of loss of company and shock, which are assessed at Rs. 10,000/-. The claimants would be, thus, entitled to compensation of Rs. 58,000/-. which will carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of application till the date of payment. The amount will be paid to the widow of the deceased, if aslrve, failing which the amount will be paid to co-claimant Sujan Singh son of Balbir Singh. The amount will be paid by the Insurance Company in the first instance but the Insurance Company will be at liberty to recover the same from the owner in execution proceedings. 20. As regards claim for death of Lal Singh, even if it is accepted that the child was not earning anything at the time of death, it cannot be ignored that he would have started earning after few years. The fact that the child would have got married and would have been required to support his family, can also not be excluded from consideration. One has to take into account uncertainties of future, while considering claim of parents of a young child. Having regard to all consideration, it would be reasonable to apply multiplier of, 5 to minimum earning and family contribution of the child to the parents in due course. In the present case, in respect of the death of Lal Singh, the claimants who are parents, brothers and sister of the deceased, are entitled to loss of earning for a period of five years at the rate of Rs. 500/- per month anda sum of Rs. 20,000/- for shock and disappointment as non-pecuniary damages. In all, they are entitled to Rs. 5(5,000/-, which will carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of application till the date of payment. The amount will be paid by the Insurance Company in the first instance but the Insurance Company will be at liberty to recover the same from the owner in execution proceedings. 21. The decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellants are not applicable to claims arising under the old Act.