JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ashok Bhushan, J.—Heard Sri Surendra Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri N.L. Pandey learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3 and also the learned Standing Counsel. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been filed. Supplementary affidavit has also been filed by the petitioner dated 1.5.2005 to which supplementary counter affidavit and supplementary rejoinder affidavit have also been filed. As prayed by counsel for both the parties the writ petition is being finally decided. 2. By this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 12.11.1999 passed by the Joint Director of Education, XII Region, Moradabad. A writ of mandamus has also been sought restraining the respondents No. 1 and 2 from reinstating the respondent No. 3 as Head Clerk of the institution. 3. Brief facts of the case necessary for deciding the writ petition are : The respondent No. 3 had been working as a Head clerk in Adarsh Inter College, Umari District Bijnor. The election of the Committee of Management was held by the Authorised Controller appointed by this Court on 3.1.1995 in which one late Hari Singh was elected as Manager. The District Inspector of Schools approved the constitution of the Committee of Management. Writ petition No. 13339 of 1995 filed by one Gopal Singh, challenging the constitution of the Committee of Management, was dismissed on 16.1.1995 holding that the aggrieved party may challenge the election proceedings in civil suit or election petition. A civil suit No. 505 of 1995 was filed by Dilip Singh and others which was decreed on 21.8.1996 declaring the election dated 3.1.1995 illegal. Against the judgment dated 21.8.1996 civil appeal was filed by the Manager Hari Singh which was allowed in part by the appellate Court vide its judgment dated 24.9.1996. The appellate Court declared the election dated 3.1.1995 illegal but further directed that the Authorised Controller (S.D.M. Dhampur) to hold election. A second appeal No. 900 of 1996 was filed before this Court in which after hearing the parties following order was passed on 30th October, 1996 : “In this case counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged and Sri A. K. Yog, learned counsel has been heard at length. However, the arguments of Sri Khalil Ahmad, learned counsel appearing for the caveator/respondents have not been concluded. List this case on 8.11.1996 for further hearing. However, the arguments of Sri Khalil Ahmad, learned counsel appearing for the caveator/respondents have not been concluded. List this case on 8.11.1996 for further hearing. In the meantime the office is directed to summon the lower court records through the special messenger at the cost of appellant who will deposit the necessary charges within three days. The record of writ petition Nos. 32248 of 1994 and 17414 of 1994 shall also be produced on the next date of hearing of the case. Shri Khalil Ahamad has stated that the S.D.M. has taken over the charge in pursuance of the decree passed by the lower appellate Court, if it is so then the S.D.M. will continue as Authorised Controller till next date of listing of the case but the election as directed by the courts below shall not be held till next date of listing of the case. However, in any case status quo as today shall be maintained.” 4. The interim order dated 30.10.1996 was extended by the Court from time to time. The respondent to second appeal filed an application in the Court that action be taken against the Authorised Controller for disobeying the order dated 30th October, 1996 and the subsequent order on which application no contempt notice was issued by this Court. Subsequently, the Sub Divisional Officer also wrote to the District Inspector of Schools on 18.9.1997 stating that in past Authorised Controller has already written a letter that he never took the charge as Authorised Controller and the Committee of Management has been functioning. The Authorised Controller opined that in view of the impugned order dated 30.10.1996 passed by the High Court the charge was never taken and specific direction be given as to whether on 30th October, 1996 Authorised Controller was working. 5. The Committee of Management which was functioning in the institution passed resolution dated 28.2.1997 deciding to suspend the respondent No. 3 on several charges including the charges of removing the records of the Institution, and attacking the officiating Principal in the college premises. A charge-sheet dated 28.2.1997 was also issued to the respondent No. 3 containing 12 charges. The suspension order dated 1.3.1997 was also issued to the respondent No. 3. Immediately after suspension one serious incident took place in the premises of the Institution. A charge-sheet dated 28.2.1997 was also issued to the respondent No. 3 containing 12 charges. The suspension order dated 1.3.1997 was also issued to the respondent No. 3. Immediately after suspension one serious incident took place in the premises of the Institution. The manager of the institution Hari Singh while he went to the institution to stop certain persons from making unauthorised construction on the college land, was killed. A first information report was lodged by the son of Manager naming the respondent No. 3 also as one of the accused. Respondent No. 3 was arrested and had sent to jail. The Committee of Management again passed a resolution on 4.4.1997 for obtaining approval of suspension of the respondent No. 3. The District Inspector of Schools approved the suspension vide order dated 26.4.1997. A notice was given to the respondent No. 3 by the Manager dated 7.7.1997 asking the respondent No. 3 to submit a reply to the charges. The letter further stated that in the event the respondent No. 3 does not reply it will be assumed that he accepts the charges and papers for his removal will be sent to the District Inspector of Schools. A letter was sent by the respondent No. 3 dated 29.7.1997 addressing the Manager as alleged Manager and asking certain documents to be shown. The said letter was immediately replied by the Manager by her letter dated 2.8.1997. The letter further stated that if the respondent No. 3 wanted to peruse any document he may appear before the Manager by giving prior information to the Principal and inspect the document. Notice was also published in the newspaper asking the petitioner to submit reply. The letter dated 2.8.1997 of the Manager was replied by the respondent No. 3 and he stated that he be given copy of the record instead of asking him to inspect the record. In the said letter again the Manager was addressed as alleged Manager. Letter dated 23.8.1997 was also sent to the respondent No. 3 and several copies of documents were also sent. The Committee of Management passed resolution on 19.9.1997 informing the District Inspector of Schools that no reply has been submitted by the respondent No. 3 to the charge-sheet. In the said letter again the Manager was addressed as alleged Manager. Letter dated 23.8.1997 was also sent to the respondent No. 3 and several copies of documents were also sent. The Committee of Management passed resolution on 19.9.1997 informing the District Inspector of Schools that no reply has been submitted by the respondent No. 3 to the charge-sheet. The charges have to be accepted since in spite of opportunity no reply is being given, a decision was taken to dismiss the respondent No. 3 from service and the Manager forwarded the papers to the District Inspector of Schools for approval. The District Inspector of Schools vide his order dated 1.5.1998 approved the resolution of the Committee of Management dated 19.9.1997 dismissing the respondent No. 3 from service. Against the order of the District Inspector of Schools an appeal was filed by the respondent No. 3 before the Joint Director of Education. The Joint Director of Education vide his order dated 12.11.1999 allowed the appeal and set aside the order dated 1.5.1998 and directed reinstatement of the respondent No. 3 on his post. The said order dated 12.11.1999 has been challenged in this Court by the Committee of Management. This Court passed an interim order on 2.12.1999 in this writ petition directing the reinstatement of respondent No. 3. Against the order dated 2.12.1999 an Special Appeal was filed by the Committee of Management and the Special Appellate Court vide its judgment dated 12.1.2000 set aside the interim direction issued in the writ petition for reinstatement of respondent No. 3. No further order was passed in this writ petition . The respondent No. 3 has not been reinstated or paid any amount. 6. A subsequent fact which took place during the pendency of the writ petition deserves to be specifically noted. The respondent No. 3 who was accused in the murder of Manager was charge-sheeted and Session Trial No. 416 of 1997 proceeded in the court of Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 3, Bijnor. The Additional Sessions Judge convicted the respondent No. 3 under Section 302/149, I.P.C. for life imprisonment. Respondent No. 3 was also convicted for the offence under Sections 148 and 307, I.P.C. and was sentenced for two years and 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment respectively. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. The Additional Sessions Judge convicted the respondent No. 3 under Section 302/149, I.P.C. for life imprisonment. Respondent No. 3 was also convicted for the offence under Sections 148 and 307, I.P.C. and was sentenced for two years and 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment respectively. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. Criminal Appeal No. 1508 of 2003 has been filed by the respondent No. 3 in which following order was passed by this Court : “Admit. Issue notice. Perused the order of the Sessions Judge. The appellants were on bail during trial and they had not misused the liberty. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and pending appeal appellants Rajendra Singh, Kailash and Devendra Singh convicted in S.T. No. 416 of 1997 shall be released on bail on each of them executing a personal bond and on furnishing two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the court concerned. Until further orders realisation of fine shall also remain stayed.” 7. The writ petitioner has brought on record the judgment dated 31.3.2003 of the Additional Sessions Judge by supplementary affidavit. The respondent No. 3 filed counter affidavit and brought on record the order of this Court dated 4.4.2003 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 1508 of 2003. The supplementary affidavit containing the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge dated 31.3.2003 has been taken on record by order of this Court passed on 16.9.2005 and the time was also allowed to the learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 to file reply to the said affidavit which has also been filed. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner challenging the order of Joint Director of Education contended that the respondent No. 3 was rightly dismissed by the Committee of Management vide its resolution dated 19.9.1997. He submits that the view taken by the Joint Director of Education that the Committee of Management which took action against the respondent No. 3 was not the Committee of Management entitled to function or to take its action is wholly erroneous and incorrect. The Committee of Management was fully entitled to function in view of the interim order dated 30.10.1996 passed by this Court in Second Appeal No. 900 of 1996 and in fact the Committee of Management had been functioning throughout and had every jurisdiction to take disciplinary action against the respondent No. 3. The Committee of Management was fully entitled to function in view of the interim order dated 30.10.1996 passed by this Court in Second Appeal No. 900 of 1996 and in fact the Committee of Management had been functioning throughout and had every jurisdiction to take disciplinary action against the respondent No. 3. It is further contended that the petitioner was given several opportunity to submit reply to the charge-sheet which was not submitted by him. It is contended that in fact the respondent No. 3 never accepted the Committee of Management as valid Committee of Management and always referred it to be alleged Committee of Management and no reply has been submitted by the respondent No. 3. The Committee of Management passed resolution for dismissal of the respondent No. 3. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in any view of the matter the appellate authority had no jurisdiction to direct reinstatement of the respondent No. 3 on his post and in the event without admitting that there was any violation of principles of natural justice the enquiry can be directed to take place from that stage and the respondent No. 3 was not entitled for reinstatement. The counsel for the petitioner lastly contended that in view of the conviction of the respondent No. 3 of murder of ex-Manager by the Sessions Court he is neither entitled to be reinstated or to work in the institution. Mere stay of execution of sentence by this Court does not wipe out the conviction. 9. Sri N.L. Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3 refuting the submissions of the counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the Committee of Management was not entitled to initiate disciplinary proceedings or to pass a resolution dismissing the respondent No. 3 since it was not authorised to function and it was only Authorised Controller who was entitled to function and take disciplinary action if any. Sri Pandey has supported the order of Joint Director of Education holding that the Committee of Management was not authorised to take any disciplinary action. Sri Pandey further contended that principles of natural justice were violated in the disciplinary enquiry since respondent No. 3 was not given copies of documents demanded. The respondent No. 3 was not given any notice after the enquiry and before passing the resolution dated 19.9.1997. Sri Pandey further contended that principles of natural justice were violated in the disciplinary enquiry since respondent No. 3 was not given copies of documents demanded. The respondent No. 3 was not given any notice after the enquiry and before passing the resolution dated 19.9.1997. He submitted that the conviction order passed against the respondent No. 3 has already been challenged by filing a criminal appeal in this Court in which an interim order has been passed by this Court hence the conviction order cannot be looked into. 10. Counsel for both the parties have also placed reliance on various decisions which shall be referred to while considering their respective submissions. 11. The first issue which arises for determination is as to whether the Committee of Management which extended its disciplinary action against the respondent No. 3, was authorised to took disciplinary action or not. The Joint Director of Education has allowed the appeal filed by the respondent No. 3 holding that the Committee of Management was not authorised to take action and it was the Authorised Controller who was entitled to take disciplinary action if any. 12. As noticed above the Committee of Management was constituted on 3.1.1995 by the Authorised Controller appointed by the High Court which fact has been specifically pleaded in paragraph 4 of the writ petition which has not been specifically denied in paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit. The writ petition against the said election by the rival claimants of the Management was dismissed by this Court on 16.1.1995. Civil suit was filed which was decreed by the trial court. On an appeal filed by the Manager of the Committee of Management Hari Singh, the appeal was partly allowed taking the view that the election dated 3.1.1995 being declared legal again fresh election be conducted by the Authorised Controller within three months who shall remain the Authorised Controller till the election is held. Against the order dated 24.9.1996 the Second Appeal No. 900 of 1996 was filed in which an interim order was passed on 30.10.1996. Against the order dated 24.9.1996 the Second Appeal No. 900 of 1996 was filed in which an interim order was passed on 30.10.1996. From the interim order dated 30.10.1996 it is clear that the Court directed that in the event the Authorised Controller had taken over he shall continue but however, the court further directed for maintaining the status quo which clearly meant that in the event the Authorised Controller has not taken over and the Committee of Management is still functioning the status quo regarding functioning be maintained. The extension of interim order was granted from time to time. The letter of the Authorised Controller dated 18.9.1997 has been brought on record as Annexure-6 by the writ petitioner, the said letter was written in reply to the letter of the District Inspector of Schools asking from the Authorised Controller as to what action has been taken for compliance of the interim order passed by the High Court on 30th October, 1996, 18.12.1996, 9.1.1997 and 30.1.1997 and 28.2.1997. The Sub Divisional Officer in his letter dated 18.9.1997 has stated that he had never taken the charge of the Institution. Another letter dated 14.2.1997 of the then Sub Divisional Officer has been referred in which it was stated that at that time it was not proper to take charge. The letter of the District Inspector of Schools dated 31.1.1997 written to the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Moradabad has also been referred by which letter the District Inspector of Schools informed that the Sub Divisional Officer, Dhampur has not taken the charge of the Institution, in the letter dated 18.9.1997 the District Inspector of Schools after informing above position asked clear direction as to whether the Authorised Controller was functioning on 30th October, 2006 so thereafter he may take proceedings for taking over charge. No material has been brought on the record that the Authorised Controller ever took charge of the Institution after decree of the appellate Court. The Sub Divisional Officer Dhampur himself having written to the District Inspector of Schools that the charge of the Institution had not been taken over by the then Sub-Divisional Officer, there is no doubt that it was the Committee of Management which was throughout functioning. In view of the interim order dated 30th October, 1996 the status quo with regard to functioning of the Management on the said date was to be maintained. In view of the interim order dated 30th October, 1996 the status quo with regard to functioning of the Management on the said date was to be maintained. The Sub Divisional Officer having not taken over the charge on 30th Otober, 1996 as is clear from the materials on record, the Committee of Management was fully entitled to function. Thus the Committee of Management functioning on 30.10.1996 was entitled in law to function and it was actually functioning on that date. There is no iota of evidence on record to show that the Authorised Controller took charge before 30.10.1996 and has discharged any duties as Management. Thus there was no lack of jurisdiction in the Committee of Management to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the respondent No. 3. The counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the judgment of the apex Court reported in 1991 Supp. (2) SCC 264, Nand Deo Pandey v. Committee of Management and others and another judgment of the apex Court reported in 2001(4) E.S.C. 522 (SC), Shoran Lal Sharma v. Deputy Director of Education, Meerut and others. In Nand Deo Pandey v. Committee of Management and others case (supra) dispute pertaining to Committee of Management was pending before the Deputy Director of Education under the U.P. Intermediate Education Act and also before the Sub-Divisional Officer under the Societies Registration Act pertaining to society running the institution. The apex Court in view of the fact that the dispute was pending before the Sub Divisional Officer and the Deputy Director of Education took the view that the disciplinary enquiry shall remain stayed. Following was observed by the apex Court in paragraph 6 : “We are of the opinion that the petitioner is certainly entitled to urge that the Committee which is proceeding to inquire into his conduct should be properly constituted committee of management of the Vidyalaya. Since the issue is pending before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and the Deputy Director of Education (Deputy Director of Education), we direct the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and Deputy Director of Education to proceed with the enquiry before them and complete the same within one month from today. Thereafter the committee held to be the properly constituted Committee of Management will be at liberty to continue the proceedings of inquiry against the petitioner. In the meantime, the inquiry initiated by the present Committee of Management will stand stayed. Thereafter the committee held to be the properly constituted Committee of Management will be at liberty to continue the proceedings of inquiry against the petitioner. In the meantime, the inquiry initiated by the present Committee of Management will stand stayed. We do not, however, interfere with the order of the High Court that the petitioner should continue to be paid his full salary and allowances since the order for his suspension has not been approved by the Education Department.” 13. In the present case as noticed above the Committee of Management was constituted on 3.10.1995 by the Authorised Controller appointed by the High Court and the Committee of Management which initiated disciplinary action against the respondent No. 3, was functioning on the strength of the interim order of this Court dated 16.10.1996 passed in Second Appeal No. 900 of 1996. Thus there was clear order of this Court giving authority to the Committee of Management to function hence the case of Nand Deo Pandey v. Committee of Management and others (supra) has no applicability. Another judgment of the apex Court in Shoran Lal Sharma v. Deputy Director of Education, Meerut and others (supra) was a case where the dispute regarding legality of the Committee of Management was pending but the appellant did not approach the Court at the very initial stage and raised the issue only when termination order was passed which was duly approved by the District Inspector of Schools. The apex Court held that subsequently the civil court held in favour of the Committee of Management and the argument that the Committee of Management had no jurisdiction to initiate disciplinary proceedings was rejected by the apex Court. The above judgment of the apex Court in no manner support the case of the respondent No. 3. 14. Now comes to the submission of the counsel for the respondent No. 3 that the principles of natural justice were violated in the disciplinary inquiry. In the present case the receipt of the charge sheet by the respondent No. 3 has not been denied. There are letters of the respondent No. 3 himself on the record in which he asked the Management to give certain papers. It is further relevant to note that the respondent No. 3 has addressed the Manager as alleged manager in all letters subsequent to his suspension. There are letters of the respondent No. 3 himself on the record in which he asked the Management to give certain papers. It is further relevant to note that the respondent No. 3 has addressed the Manager as alleged manager in all letters subsequent to his suspension. The respondent No. 3 at no point of time accepted the management as management and there is specific allegation by the petitioner that the respondent No. 3 in fact was helping the rival claimant Dilip Singh in the management dispute. The letter of the Manager dated 2.8.1997 asking the petitioner to appear before the Manager and inspect the record has been admitted to have been received but the petitioner did not appear for inspecting the record but insisted for giving copies of document. Sri Pandey has submitted that there is violation of Regulation 36 and 37 of Chapter III of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act; hence the entire proceedings are vitiated and are liable to be set aside. He has placed reliance on the judgments of this Court reported in 1980 UPLBEC 110, Ram Kumar Dixit v. Deputy Director of Education. Bareilly and others and (1991) 2 UPLBEC 1106, Kanhaiya Lal v. District Inspector of Schools. Bareilly and others. 15. There is nothing on record to show that the Committee of Management issued a notice to the respondent No. 3 before passing the resolution dated 19.9.1997 dismissing the respondent No. 3 from service. The Division Bench judgment in Ram Kumar Dixit v. Deputy Director of Education, Bareilly and others (supra) has laid down following in paragraph 6 : “6. In the instant case the petitioner was served with the order of the Managing Committee dated 9.5.1972 placing him under suspension pending enquiry. A perusal of the resolution of the Committee of Management shows that the Committee unanimously resolved that the petitioner was guilty of the charges. The resolution shows that the Committee of Management prejudged the charges against the petitioner even before obtaining petitioner’s explanation. Since the Committee of Management prejudged the issues against the petitioner even before obtaining petitioner’s explanation the subsequent proceedings are vitiated. Assuming that the Committee of Management did not prejudge the charges the entire proceedings are vitiated as the petitioner was denied opportunity of defence. The Committee of Management allowed three weeks’ time to the petitioner to submit his explanation. Since the Committee of Management prejudged the issues against the petitioner even before obtaining petitioner’s explanation the subsequent proceedings are vitiated. Assuming that the Committee of Management did not prejudge the charges the entire proceedings are vitiated as the petitioner was denied opportunity of defence. The Committee of Management allowed three weeks’ time to the petitioner to submit his explanation. The petitioner sought 10 days’ extension of time by his letter dated 31.5.1972 on the ground of his illness and thereafter the petitioner submitted his explanation by post on 8.6.1972, which reach the office of the institution on 12.6.1972. Meanwhile the Committee of Management at its meeting held on 11.6.1972 passed the resolution dismissing the petitioner from service. No enquiry officer was appointed, no enquiry was held, no evidence was recorded and no report of the enquiry officer was considered by the Committee of Management after notice to the petitioner. Even if the petitioner had failed to submit his explanation in time it was incumbent on the Committee of Management to act in accordance with Regulation 37 by giving him notice and opportunity to appear before the Committee on the date the matter was finally considered by it. The Committee of Management however, did not issue any notice to the petitioner regarding its meeting dated 11.6.1972 and it did not afford him any opportunity to appear before it on that date to state his case before the members. The procedure adopted by the Committee of Management was in contravention of the statutory provision of Regulations 36 and 37 which rendered the decision of the Committee illegal.” 15. The resolution of the Committee of Management dismissing the respondent No. 3 does not refer to any enquiry report even though the respondent No. 3 has not submitted any reply to the charge-sheet. It was open for the Committee of Management to conduct ex parte enquiry and submit an enquiry report on the basis of the material already on the record. As noticed above, the notice under Regulation 37 by the Committee of Management before deciding to punish was also necessary. 16. However, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner is right in submission that if a defect was found in the enquiry the employee was not entitled for reinstatement automatically. As noticed above, the notice under Regulation 37 by the Committee of Management before deciding to punish was also necessary. 16. However, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner is right in submission that if a defect was found in the enquiry the employee was not entitled for reinstatement automatically. The enquiry should have been directed to take place from the stage where the defect was found as laid down by the apex Court in (1996 ) 9 SCC 322, State of Punjab and others v. Dr. Harbhajan Singh Greasy following was laid down in paragraph 3 : “3. It is seen that the Enquiry Officer’s report is based on the alleged admission made by the respondent. But, unfortunately, the Enquiry Officer has not taken his admission in writing. Subsequently, the respondent has denied having made any admission. As against the denial of the delinquent, we have only the statement of the Enquiry Officer which is not supported by any statement in writing taken from the respondent. Under those circumstances, High Court may be justified in setting aside the order of dismissal. It is now a well settled law that even the enquiry was found to be faulty, it could not be proper to direct reinstatement with consequential benefits. Matter requires to be remitted to the disciplinary authority to follow the procedure from the stage at which the default was pointed out and to take action according to law. Pending enquiry, the delinquent must be deemed to be under suspension. The consequential benefits would depend upon the result of the enquiry and order passed thereon. The High Court had committed illegality in omitting to give the said direction. Since the respondent had retired from service, now no useful purpose will be served in directing to conduct enquiry afresh. However, the respondent is not entitled to the back wages as he avoided responsibility as a doctor to treat the flood victims and that was cause for the suspension.” 17. The fact of conviction of the respondent No. 3 by criminal court vide judgment dated 31.3.2003 although a subsequent fact has relevance and is necessary to be taken note of while considering grant of any relief to the respondent No. 3 in this writ petition. The fact of conviction of the respondent No. 3 by criminal court vide judgment dated 31.3.2003 although a subsequent fact has relevance and is necessary to be taken note of while considering grant of any relief to the respondent No. 3 in this writ petition. A person convicted of criminal offence of murder as in the present case, murder of ex-manager of the very institution where the respondent No. 3 is working, is sufficient ground for dismissal of the respondent No. 3 from service. The fact that the criminal appeal has been filed and an order has been passed by this Court for staying the execution of sentence, has no bearing on the conviction. In 1998(1) ESC 619 (DB), Mohan Lal v. State of U.P. and others. The Division Bench of this Court has held that merely because the sentence is suspended by the appellate court taking proceedings for dismissal are not barred. Following was laid down in paragraph 6 : “6. In Dy. Director of Collegiate Education v S. Nagoor Meera, AIR 1995 SC 1364 , it has been held that taking proceedings for and passing orders of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of a Government servant who has been convicted by a criminal court is not barred merely because the sentence and Order is suspended by the Appellate Court or on the ground that the said Government servant- accused has been released on bail pending the appeal. In view of this authoritative pronouncement, the order dismissing the appellant from service cannot be set aside on the ground that the operation of the judgment by which the appellant had been convicted under Section 304, Part-I, IPC has been stayed in the Criminal Appeal preferred by him.” 18. The respondents having been convicted of the murder of the Manager of the college, this fact is sufficient to disentitle reinstatement of the respondent No. 3 in the institution on his post and further in view of conviction it is always open for the management to dismiss the respondent No. 3 from service. 19. As noticed above the Joint Director of Education has allowed the appeal recording finding that the Committee of Management was not authorised to take disciplinary action against the respondent No. 3 which was stated above, was an erroneous premise taken by the Joint Director of Education without considering relevant facts and materials. 19. As noticed above the Joint Director of Education has allowed the appeal recording finding that the Committee of Management was not authorised to take disciplinary action against the respondent No. 3 which was stated above, was an erroneous premise taken by the Joint Director of Education without considering relevant facts and materials. In view of this alone the order of the Joint Director of Education is liable to be set aside. Further, thus even though no notice was given to the respondent No. 3 by the Committee of Management before passing resolution dated 19.9.1997 dismissing the respondent No. 3 from service I am not inclined to set aside the dismissal order and direct for reinstatement of the respondent No. 3 in view of facts and circumstances as noted above. To direct the appellate authority to hear the appeal again after lapse of such a long time, is also not desirable in view of the subsequent events. 20. In view of foregoing discussions the order of the appellate authority dated 12.11.1999 is set aside. In view of the fact that this Court has taken into consideration the subsequent conviction of the respondent No. 3 under Section 302, I.P.C., a liberty is given to respondent No. 3 to make an application before the appropriate authority for considering his reinstatement in event of his acquittal from the criminal charge. The writ petition is allowed accordingly. Parties shall bear their own costs. ———