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2006 DIGILAW 3081 (MAD)

Neycer India Limited, Rep. by its Manager (Finance), T. Mani v. The Commercial Tax Officer, Cuddalore Taluk Asst. Circle, Manjakuppam, & Others

2006-11-14

K.CHANDRU

body2006
Judgment :- (Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking for issuance of writ of certiorarified Mandamus for the reasons as stated therein.) The petitioner has filed this writ petition seeking for issuance of Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for records comprised in RCA 3/5843/2000 dated 21.9.2006 on the file of the first respondent, quash the same and to consequently forbear the first respondent from resorting to any recovery proceedings unless a fresh scheme is sanctioned and implemented under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 by the fourth respondent. 2. I have heard Mr.R.Karthikeyan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as Mr.Shanmugasundaram, learned Government Advocate (Taxes) for the first respondent and Mr.F.B.Benjamin George, learned counsel appearing for the respondents 5 and 6 and perused the records. 3. The prayer as sought for by the petitioner cannot be countenanced for two reasons. Firstly, the provisions for recovery is very much present in the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act (for short, 'TNGST Act'). Secondly, the embargo placed upon any further proceedings based upon the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 is not available for the petitioner. Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (for short, 'SICA') has been interpreted by the Apex Court in the decision reported in (1997) 10 SCC 649 [Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and others vs. Corromandal Pharmaceuticals and others]. While dealing with the collection of Sales Tax vis-à-vis found the provisions of Section 22 of the SICA, the Supreme Court in paragraphs 10 and 13 of the judgment held as follows: "Para 10: ....All that is required by Section 22 (1) of the Act is that in cases where an inquiry is pending or scheme is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or an appeal is pending, no proceedings, as stated in Section 22 of the Act for execution, distress or the like, shall be proceeded with except with the consent of the Board or the appellate authority. What is contemplated by Section 22(1) of the Act is only a previous consent of the Board for the proceedings to be initiated against a sick company. It is not an absolute bar. ........... .......... ............. ............ ........ ........... .......... ............. ............ ........ What is contemplated by Section 22(1) of the Act is only a previous consent of the Board for the proceedings to be initiated against a sick company. It is not an absolute bar. ........... .......... ............. ............ ........ ........... .......... ............. ............ ........ Para 13: On a fair reading of the provisions contained in Chapter III of Act 1 of 1986 and in particular Sections 15 to 22, we are of the opinion that the plea put forward by the Revenue is reasonable and fair in all the circumstances of the case. Under the statute, the BIFR is to consider in what way various preventive or remedial measures should be afforded to a sick industrial company. In that behalf, BIFR is enable to frame an appropriate scheme. To enable the BIFR to do so, certain preliminaries are required to be followed. It starts with the reference to be made by the Board of Directors of the sick company. The BIFR is directed to make appropriate inquiry as provided in Sections 16 and 17 of the Act. At the conclusion of the inquiry, after notice and opportunity afforded to various persons including the creditors, the BIFR is to prepare a scheme which shall come into force on such date as it may specify in that behalf. It is in implementation of the scheme wherein various preventive, remedial or other measures are designed for the sick industrial company, steps by way of giving financial assistance etc., by Government, banks or other institutions, are contemplated. In other words, the scheme is implemented or given effect to, by affording financial assistance by way of loans, advances or guarantees or reliefs or concessions or sacrifices by Government, banks, public financial institutions and other authorities. In order to see that the scheme is successfully implemented and no impediment is caused for the successful carrying out the scheme, the Board is enabled to have a say when the steps for recovery of the amounts or other coercive proceedings are taken against sick industrial company which, during the relevant time, acts under the guidance/control or supervision of the Board (BIFR). Any step for execution, distress or the like against the properties of the industrial company or other similar steps should not be pursued which will cause delay or impediment in the implementation of the sanctioned scheme. Any step for execution, distress or the like against the properties of the industrial company or other similar steps should not be pursued which will cause delay or impediment in the implementation of the sanctioned scheme. In order to safeguard such state of affairs, an embargo or bar is placed under Section 22 of the Act against any step for execution, distress or the like or other similar proceedings against the company without the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the appellate authority. The language of Section 22 of the Act is certainly wide. But, in the totality of the circumstances, the safeguard is only against the impediment, that is likely to be caused in the implementation of the scheme. If that be so, only the liability or amounts covered by the scheme will be taken in, by Section 22 of the Act. So, we are of the view that though the language of Section 22 of the Act is of wide import regarding suspension of legal proceedings from the moment an inquiry is started, till after the implementation of the scheme or the disposal of an appeal under Section 25 of the Act, it will be reasonable to hold that the bar or embargo envisaged in Section 22(1) of the Act can apply only to such of those dues reckoned or included in the sanctioned scheme. Such amounts like sales tax, etc., which the sick industrial company is enabled to collect after the date of the sanctioned scheme legitimately belonging to the Revenue, cannot be and could not have been intended to be covered within Section 22 of the Act. Any other construction will be unreasonable and unfair and will lead to a state of affairs enabling the sick industrial unit to collect amounts due to the Revenue and withhold it indefinitely and unreasonably. Such a construction which is unfair, unreasonable and against the spirit of the statute in a business sense, should be avoided." 4. Any other construction will be unreasonable and unfair and will lead to a state of affairs enabling the sick industrial unit to collect amounts due to the Revenue and withhold it indefinitely and unreasonably. Such a construction which is unfair, unreasonable and against the spirit of the statute in a business sense, should be avoided." 4. Similar view was also taken by the Supreme court in respect of collection of Sales Tax in its decision reported in AIR 1998 SCC 2928 [Tata Davy Ltd. vs. State of Orissa and others] and the relevant passage found in paragraph 12 reads as follows: "The Central Act does not impair or interfere with the rights of the States to legislate with respect to sales tax under entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. In the larger interest of the industrial health of the nation, Section 22 of the Central Act requires all creditors seeking to recover their dues from sick industrial companies in respect of whom an inquiry under Section 16 is pending or a scheme is under preparation or consideration or has been sanctioned to obtain the consent of the said Board to such recovery. If such consent is not secured and the recovery deferred, the creditors' remedy is protected for the period of deferment is, by reason of sub-section (5) of Section 22, excluded in the computation of the period of limitation." 5. In the present case, there is no such claim pending and all proceedings have come to a close. Therefore, the protest under Section 22 is not available. In any event, it is worth quoting the supporting opinion of Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy in the Corromandal Pharmaceuticals case (cited supra): "The fact, however, remains that it is no longer thought advisable to keep alive inefficient and uneconomic industries by injecting public funds or in the name of safeguarding the employment of the workers. And here in this Act, a product of the era of protectionism, seeking to keep alive"sick" companies by pumping in funds - mostly public funds – and by providing various concessions. In the process, nobody enquires why a particular industrial company has become sick, viz., whether it is an induced one or whether it is on account of factors beyond their control. In the process, nobody enquires why a particular industrial company has become sick, viz., whether it is an induced one or whether it is on account of factors beyond their control. The object of the Act is undoubtedly laudatory but it must also provide for appropriate measures against persons responsible where it is found that sickness is caused by factors other than circumstances beyond the control of the management. It is also a well-known fact that the proceedings before the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction take a long time to conclude and all the while the protective umbrella of Section 22 is held over the company which has reported sick. We have come across cases where unfair advantage is sought to be taken of the provisions of Section 22 by certain industrial companies – and the wide language employed in the section is providing them a cover. We are sure Section 22 was not meant to breed dishonesty nor can it be so operated as to encourage unfair practices. The ultimate prejudice to public monies should not be overlooked in the process of promoting industrial progress." Therefore, the writ petition must fail. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner states that in the interest of 500 workers involved and in view of the fact that the petitioner is willing to pay the current tax, there should be some leniency with reference to the arrears. Such a prayer cannot be granted by this court and it is for the Government to pass appropriate orders in this regard. It must also be seen that even in this writ petition, the Government is not shown as a party. Therefore, this Court cannot grant any such direction. 7. In the light of the above, the writ petition fails and the same shall stand dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected M.P. Nos.1 and 2 of 2006 also stand dismissed.