( 1 ) THE revision petitioner is the husband of the first respondent. The first respondent-wife filed M. C. No. 4 of 1995 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of First class, Yellareddy against the husband seeking monthly maintenance of Rs. 500/ -. The learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class dismissed the said petition. ( 2 ) AGGRIEVED by the same, the first respondent-wife filed Criminal Revision petition No. 8 of 1997 on the file of the sessions Court at Nizamabad. By his order, dated 31st July, 2001, the learned sessions Judge allowed the revision, set aside the order of the learned Magistrate and allowed the M. C. granting monthly maintenance of Rs. 500/ -. Aggrieved by the said order, the husband filed the present revision petition. ( 3 ) FOR convenience of reference, the petitioner will be hereinafter referred to as the husband and the first respondent as the wife. ( 4 ) THE case of the wife is that her marriage was solemnized about 5 years prior to April, 1995. She joined her husband after marriage and lived happily with him for about 4 years. No children are born out of the wedlock. Therefore, her husband and parents-in-law began to harass and ill-treat her. While so, her mother brought her to the house of her parents for Ekadasi festival. Thereafter, the husband did not visit her nor showed any interest to take her back. Her father wrote four letters through the caste men to her husband within two months before issuing legal notice, dated 15-3-1995, but the letters and the legal notice were returned unserved. Her father accompanied by six caste elders approached her husband and his parents and a panchayath was also held. Even then they did not evince any interest to take her back. She came to know that her husband was going to marry one U. Pochavva, daughter of Pentaiah and therefore she got issued a legal notice dated 15-3-1995 to her husband and also the said Pochavva. The notice sent to the husband was returned and Pochavva refused to receive the said notice. Thus, she was willfully and intentionally neglected by her husband. The husband has 20 acres of wet land with two bore-wells and three wells therein, two residential houses, three pairs of bullocks, 20 cows and 4 she-buffaloes. Therefore, she is claiming Rs. 500/- per month towards maintenance. Thus, she was willfully and intentionally neglected by her husband. The husband has 20 acres of wet land with two bore-wells and three wells therein, two residential houses, three pairs of bullocks, 20 cows and 4 she-buffaloes. Therefore, she is claiming Rs. 500/- per month towards maintenance. ( 5 ) THE case of the husband briefly set-forth is as under : at the time of marriage his wife was a minor. She was hardly 15 years of age as on the date of filing counter i. e. , on 30-11-1995. She attained puberty before dasara Festival of 1995. The marriage was not consummated and she has been staying with her parents only, as she is a minor. Hence, the question of ill-treatment or harassment by the husband or his parents does not arise. No letters were addressed to him by his father-in-law. His father-in-law never approached him or his parents. The allegation that he tried to marry u. Pochavva is false. He has no immovable or movable properties. He himself is a boy aged 17 years, a minor and he is dependent on his parents for his livelihood. The marriage itself is void since both the spouses were minors at the time of marriage and it was never consummated. Despite all this he is willing to maintain his wife in order to discharge his conjugal duties. In the year 1989 his father-in-law obtained a loan of Rs. 4,000/- from his father agreeing to repay the same with interest, but failed to repay the same. When himself and his father demanded his father-in-law to repay the amount, the maintenance case is filed with false allegations. ( 6 ) ON behalf of the wife, 4 witnesses were examined, including herself as P. W. 1 and 7 documents were marked as Exs. P. 1 to P. 7, while on behalf of the husband 2 witnesses R. Ws. 1 and 2 were examined, including himself as R. W. 1. ( 7 ) AS already stated, the trial Court dismissed the petition and the Sessions Court reversed the decision of the trial Court and granted maintenance of Rs. 500/- per month. P. 1 to P. 7, while on behalf of the husband 2 witnesses R. Ws. 1 and 2 were examined, including himself as R. W. 1. ( 7 ) AS already stated, the trial Court dismissed the petition and the Sessions Court reversed the decision of the trial Court and granted maintenance of Rs. 500/- per month. ( 8 ) THE points that are urged mainly before me on behalf of the husband are that the wife was a minor by the date of the marriage and therefore the marriage is null and void and as such maintenance cannot be granted; that there was no negligence on the part of the husband and the quantum of maintenance awarded is also heavy. It is also contended that the husband is a minor by the date of petition even and therefore a minor is not liable to maintain his wife. ( 9 ) THEREFORE, the points that arise for consideration are : (1) Whether the wife was a minor by the date of the marriage and if so the marriage is void ? (2) Whether a minor husband is not liable to maintain his wife ? (3) Whether the husband neglected to maintain the wife and if so whether the quantum of maintenance granted at the rate of Rs. 500/- per month is justified ?point No. 1 : ( 10 ) IT is alleged in the counter of the husband that the wife was hardly 15 years of age as on the date of filing of counter i. e. , 30-11-1995 and it goes without saying that the wife was a minor at the time of marriage which was performed about 5 years prior to the date of filing of the counter. In such a case the age of the wife stands at somewhere about 9 years by the time of marriage. P. W. 1 gave conflicting versions of her age as on the date of the marriage. At one stage she states that she obtained puberty after her marriage in the in-law s house and at another stage she says that she was aged about 18 years at the time of her marriage. About her attaining puberty, on one occasion she states that she attained puberty at the time of marriage and at another breath she admits that two years after marriage she attained puberty. About her attaining puberty, on one occasion she states that she attained puberty at the time of marriage and at another breath she admits that two years after marriage she attained puberty. She says that nuptial ceremony was held four years prior to 5-8-1996. Thus, she blowed hot and cold with regard to her age as on the date of the marriage, of course, she is an illiterate village lady. ( 11 ) THE father of the wife examined as P. W. 2 claims that the age of his daughter at the time of marriage was 18 years which is contradicted by P. W. 1 herself. He also says that two years after marriage his daughter attained puberty in the house of her in-laws. P. W. 3, who claims that he attended a Panchayat held in connection with disputes, states that the age of the petitioner was 18 years at the time of the marriage and two years after the marriage she attained puberty. ( 12 ) AS against the above evidence of wife, there is the evidence of R. W. 1 and r. W. 2 on behalf of the husband. ( 13 ) R. W. 1 states that at the time of marriage he was aged 12 years and the petitioner was aged 8 years. R. W. 2 states that at the time of the marriage P. W. 1 s age was 8 years and R. W. 1 s age was 12 years. Thus, he repeats the version of R. W. 1. P. W. 1 gave her age as 20 years as on the date of examination i. e. , 5th August, 1996. If that is taken into account, as on the date of M. C. , which was filed on 17-4-1995, she must have been about 19 years of age. It is evident from the evidence of P. W. 1 that she is not sure about her age as on the date of marriage. Her evidence is woefully lacking consistency with regard to her age. She turned ambivalent. The marriage took place about 6 years prior to the date of her examination i. e. , 5-8-1996. In such a case also the age of the wife as on the date of marriage comes to 14 years. Both the wife and the husband are illiterates. I can appreciate the dilemma. She turned ambivalent. The marriage took place about 6 years prior to the date of her examination i. e. , 5-8-1996. In such a case also the age of the wife as on the date of marriage comes to 14 years. Both the wife and the husband are illiterates. I can appreciate the dilemma. However, if we read in between the lines it is not difficult to guess the truth. There cannot be any doubt in view of the inconsistent and ambivalent evidence of P. W. 1 that her marriage took place when she was a minor. In fact it appears that the husband was also a minor by the date of his marriage. ( 14 ) NOW comes the question whether such a marriage is void. ( 15 ) AS the child marriages were prevalent in British India, the British government enacted the Child Marriage restraint Act, 1929 (Act 19 of 1929) to restrain the solemnization of child marriages. I shall make a brief survey of the said act. The word minor is defined under section 2 (d), as amended by Act 2 of 1978, to mean a person of either sex who is under eighteen years of age. Section 3 prescribes punishment for male adult below twenty-one years of age marrying a child. Section 4 prescribes punishment for male adult above twenty one years of age marrying a child. Section 5 prescribes punishment for solemnizing a child marriage. Section 6 prescribes punishment for parent or guardian concerned in a child marriage. Section 7 deals with cognizance of offences. Section 8 deals with the jurisdiction under the Act. Section 9 deals with the mode of taking cognizance of offences and Section 10 deals with preliminary enquiries. Section 12 confers the power on the Court to issue injunction prohibiting marriage in contravention of this Act. ( 16 ) THE enactment as a whole is a very short enactment of 12 sections. It nowhere lays down that a child marriage is invalid or void. It is only a penal enactment aimed at prohibiting child marriages by prescribing punishment. ( 17 ) THE Hindu Marriage Act was enacted in the year 1955 for the first time. Now I shall make a brief reference to the said Act. It nowhere lays down that a child marriage is invalid or void. It is only a penal enactment aimed at prohibiting child marriages by prescribing punishment. ( 17 ) THE Hindu Marriage Act was enacted in the year 1955 for the first time. Now I shall make a brief reference to the said Act. ( 18 ) SECTION 5 of the Hindu Marriage act, 1955 (for short "the Act") lays down conditions for a Hindu marriage in the following terms. "5. Conditions for a Hindu marriage :-A marriage may be solemnized between any two Hindus, if the following conditions are fulfilled, namely:- (i) neither party has a spouse living at the time of marriage; (ii) at the time of the marriage, neither party- (a) is incapable of giving a valid consent to it in consequence of unsoundness of mind; or (b) though capable of giving a valid consent, has been suffering from mental disorder of such a kind or to such an extent as to be unfit for marriage and the procreation of children; or (c) has been subject to recurrent attacks of insanity (iii) the bridegroom has completed the age of twenty-one years and the bride the age of eighteen years at the time of marriage; (iv) the parties are not within the degrees of prohibited relationship, unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two; (v) the parties are not sapindas of each other, unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two; ( 19 ) CHAPTER 4 deals with nullity of marriages and divorce. Sections 11 and 12 are relevant for our purpose and for better appreciation they can be extracted :"11. Void marriages :-Any marriage solemnized after the commencement of this act shall be null and void and may, on a petition presented by either party thereto against the other party, be so declared by a decree of nullity if it contravenes any of the conditions specified in Clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of Section 5. 12. Void marriages :-Any marriage solemnized after the commencement of this act shall be null and void and may, on a petition presented by either party thereto against the other party, be so declared by a decree of nullity if it contravenes any of the conditions specified in Clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of Section 5. 12. Voidable Marriages :- (1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be voidable and may be annulled by a decree of nullity on any of the following grounds, namely- (a) that the marriage has not been consummated owing to the impotence of the respondent; or (b) that the marriage is in contravention of the conditions specified in clause (ii) of section 5. (c) that the consent of the petitioner, or where the consent of the guardian in marriage of the petitioner was required under Section 5 as it stood immediately before the commencement of the Child marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act, 1978 (2 of 1978) the consent of such guardian was obtained by force or by fraud as to the nature of the ceremony or as to any material fact or circumstances concerning the respondent; or (d) that the respondent was at the time of the marriage pregnant by some person other than the petitioner. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) no petition for annulling a marriage- (a) on the ground specified in Clause (c) of sub-section (1) shall be entertained if,- (i) the petition is presented more than one year after the force had ceased to operate or, as the case may be, the fraud had been discovered; or (ii) the petitioner has, with his or her full consent, lived with the other party to the marriage as husband or wife after the force had ceased to operate or, as the case may be, the fraud had been discovered; (b) on the ground specified in clause (d) of sub-section (1) shall be entertained unless the Court is satisfied (i) that the petitioner was at the time of the marriage ignorant of the facts alleged; (ii) that proceedings have been instituted in the case of a marriage solemnized before the commencement of this Act within one year of such commencement and in the case of marriages solemnized after such commencement within one year from the date of the marriage; and (iii) that marital intercourse with the consent of the petitioner has not taken place since the discovery by the petitioner of the existence of the said ground. ( 20 ) SECTION 18 of the Act prescribes punishment for contravention of clauses (iii), (iv) and (v) of Section 5 in the following terms:"18. Punishment for contravention of certain other conditions for a Hindu marriage :-Every person who procures a marriage of himself or herself to be solemnized under this Act, in contravention of the conditions specified in Clause (iii), (iv) and (v) of Section 5 shall be punishable,- (a) in the case of a contravention of the condition specified in clause (iii) of section 5, with simple imprisonment which may extend to fifteen days, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both; (b) in the case of a contravention of the condition specified in clause (iv) or clause (v) of Section 5, with simple imprisonment which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both. " ( 21 ) SECTION 11 declares only the marriages that contravene any of the conditions specified in Clause i, iv and v of section 5 as void. " ( 21 ) SECTION 11 declares only the marriages that contravene any of the conditions specified in Clause i, iv and v of section 5 as void. It does not make reference to Section 5 (iii) of the Act, which lays down that the bridegroom shall complete the age of 21 years and the bride the age of 18 years at the time of marriage. Thus, the child marriage performed is untouched by the provisions of Section 11. It declares those marriages as void where (1) either party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage (2) the parties are within the degrees of the prohibited relationship, unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two; and (3) where the parties are sapindas of each other unless the custom or usage permits them to have a marriage. Thus, the marriage where one spouse or both spouses are children is not touched by the provisions of Section 11. The intention of the Legislature is obvious in omitting such type of marriages from the purview of Section 11. ( 22 ) SECTION 12 which deals with the marriages that are voidable, also does not lay its hand on Section 5 (iii) of the Act. Though Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act makes a reference to Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act, 1978, that brought about an amendment to the definition of minor with respect to the age lays down where the consent of the petitioner or where the consent of the guardian in marriage of the petitioner was obtained by force or by fraud as to the nature of the ceremony or as to the material fact or circumstances concerning the respondent is voidable, it does not say that the child marriage as such is voidable. Only in the circumstances specified therein the marriage can be challenged as voidable at the instance of one of the spouses. Thus, both Sections 11 and 12 left out from their extent and ambit the provisions of Section 5 (iii) of the Act. ( 23 ) THE meaning of the word void as per the Law Lexicon, of the celebrated author Ramanatha Aiyar, (1997 edition) is as follows : "no valid, of no effect; invalidate. Thus, both Sections 11 and 12 left out from their extent and ambit the provisions of Section 5 (iii) of the Act. ( 23 ) THE meaning of the word void as per the Law Lexicon, of the celebrated author Ramanatha Aiyar, (1997 edition) is as follows : "no valid, of no effect; invalidate. " ( 24 ) THE West s Legal Thesaurus/dictionary gives the meaning of the word void and its synonym as follows :"void 1. adj. Having no legal force or binding effect (void signature ). Nugatory, null, ineffectual, unenforceable, inoperative, futile, invalid, cancelled, nonviable, useless, meaningless, vain, dead, annulled, unavailing, unproductive, powerless, ineffective, invalidated, rescinded, disestablished, inane, inconsequential, worthless, idle, incurable, 2. v. To invalidate. See rescind, quash, destroy, 3. adj. Lacking (void of meaning ). Devoid, empty, unsupplied, deserted, bare, wanting, destitute, free, hollow, unfilled, barren lacking, clear, blank. 4. n. See vacancy. Ant. Valid, validate; replete. " ( 25 ) THUS, the meaning of the word void takes within its ambit the word invalid also. One is the synonym of the other. As already pointed out the intention of the Legislature appears to be not to declare the child marriages performed in contravention of Section 5 (iii) of the Act as void. Society takes time to get rid of old customs and conventions and to adjust to changes brought about by reform, revolution or by law. Transition always requires time. That is why it appears that the legislature avoided to include Section 5 (iii) of the Act in the provisions of Sections 11 and 12 of the Act. ( 26 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner cited a ruling of my brother Justice k. C. Bhanu rendered in Seenappa v. Lakshmi Devi and another, 2004 (2) ALT (Crl.) 358 (AP ). The petition before his lordship was filed under Section 482 cr. P. C. , wherein his Lordship held as follows :"6. When there is abuse of process of court or otherwise, the inherent powers can be exercised by this Court under section 482 of Cr. P. C. A finding has been recorded by the trial Court to the effect "even her marriage took place on her 7th year with the respondent her marriage cannot be said to be void marriage and based, it will become voidable marriage. P. C. A finding has been recorded by the trial Court to the effect "even her marriage took place on her 7th year with the respondent her marriage cannot be said to be void marriage and based, it will become voidable marriage. "under Sections 11 and 12 of the Hindu marriage Act, if the bridegroom has not completed the age of 12 years, the marriage is neither void nor voidable marriage. One of the conditions required for solemnization of the marriage is that the bridegroom and the bride should have completed the age of 21 years and 18 years, respectively, at the time of the marriage. Admittedly, the 1st respondent was aged about 7 years at the time of marriage and therefore, though it is neither void or voidable marriage, but it is not a valid marriage. Even if it is not a valid marriage, if the 1st respondent lives with the petitioner for a considerable length of period as wife and husband, then she is entitled for maintenance. But the evidence on record would indicate that the 1st respondent was aged 7 years at the time of marriage, and after attaining puberty she was not taken to the house of the petitioner at any point of time. Therefore, the question of 1st respondent living with the petitioner does not arise. This important aspect of the case has been overlooked by both the trial Court as well as the Revisional Court. The document Ex. P-1 ration card shows that the 1st respondent is the wife of the petitioner herein. Based on only that document it cannot be said that both the petitioner and the 1st respondent were living together as husband and wife for a considerable length of period. Even the oral evidence adduced on behalf of the 1st respondent also clearly shows that they were living separately. They speak about the solemnization of marriage between the petitioner and the 1st respondent. According to them, the petitioner did not take the 1st respondent after she attained puberty. As the marriage is not a valid marriage in the eye of law, the 1st respondent is not entitled for any maintenance under section 125 of Cr. They speak about the solemnization of marriage between the petitioner and the 1st respondent. According to them, the petitioner did not take the 1st respondent after she attained puberty. As the marriage is not a valid marriage in the eye of law, the 1st respondent is not entitled for any maintenance under section 125 of Cr. P. C. " ( 27 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner lays stress on the following observation of his Lordship in the above para and contends that in terms of his lordship s ruling the marriage between the parties in the case on hand is an invalid marriage. ". . . Admittedly, the 1st respondent was aged about 7 years at the time of marriage and therefore, though it is neither void nor voidable marriage, but it is not a valid marriage". ( 28 ) THOUGH his Lordship held that at the time of the marriage the spouses were minors and it is neither void nor voidable marriage, it is not a valid marriage and even if it is not a valid marriage, if the 1st respondent lives with the petitioner for a considerable length of period as wife and husband, then only the wife is entitled for maintenance. My learned Brother has taken into account the living together of the spouses also in rendering the judgment. That apart, it is a case where his Lordship was exercising powers under Section 482 cr. P. C. The observation of his Lordship with regard to invalidity can at best be treated as obiter only. ( 29 ) I have surveyed the provisions of the Act and also the Child Marriage restraint Act, 1929 and came to the conclusion that it is not the intention of the legislature to take into account the marriages performed in violation of section 5 (iii) of the Act while declaring the void and voidable marriage in Sections 11 and 12 of the Act. Therefore, the above cited decision has no application. ( 30 ) THE husband has not initiated and proceedings for declaring the marriage as invalid or void. ( 31 ) THE question of validity of the child marriage came up before a Full Bench of this Court as long back as in the year 1977 in Pinninti Venkataramana and another, v. State, AIR 1977 AP 43 (FB ). ( 30 ) THE husband has not initiated and proceedings for declaring the marriage as invalid or void. ( 31 ) THE question of validity of the child marriage came up before a Full Bench of this Court as long back as in the year 1977 in Pinninti Venkataramana and another, v. State, AIR 1977 AP 43 (FB ). The Full bench referred to a catena of decisions of various High Courts including of this Court, and overruling an earlier decision of Division bench of this Court in P. A. Saramma v. G. Ganapatulu, AIR 1975 AP 193 , it concluded on the point as follows:"23. For these reasons we hold that the decision of the Division Bench of this high Court in P. A. Saramma v. G. Ganapatulu, (supra), does not lay down the correct law and it must be held that any marriage solemnized in contravention of clause (iii) of Section 5 is neither void nor voidable, the only consequence being that the persons concerned are liable for punishment under Section 18 and further if the requirements of clause (iv) of sub-section (2) of Section 13, as inserted by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act 1976 are satisfied, at the instance of the bride, a decree for divorce can be granted. Barring these two consequences, one arising under Section 18 and the other arising under clause (iv) of sub-section (2) of Section 13, after the enactment of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, there is no other consequence whatsoever resulting from the contravention of the provisions of clause (iii) of Section 5. " ( 32 ) A Full Bench of Supreme Court also had an occasion to consider the question in Lila Gupta v. Laxmi Narain and others, (1978) 3 SCC 258 . Although the question before the Apex Court was concerning the validity of remarriage of a divorced person within one year time from the date of decree of dissolution of the marriage which war prohibited by the provision to section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, as it was then existing, the provisions of section 5 (iii) of the Act were also considered. ( 33 ) IT is better I give the provisions of section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act as then existing :"15. ( 33 ) IT is better I give the provisions of section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act as then existing :"15. When a marriage has been dissolved by decree of divorce and either there is no right of appeal against the decree, or if there is such a right of appeal, the time for appealing has expired without an appeal having been presented, or an appeal has been presented but has been dismissed, it shall be lawful for either party to the marriage to marry again : provided that it shall not be lawful for the respective parties to marry again unless at the date of such marriage at least one year has elapsed from the date of the decree in the Court of the first instance. " ( 34 ) THE proviso was subsequently deleted under the provisions of Act 68 of 1976. ( 35 ) I shall give the relevant excerpts from the judgment for proper appreciation. "6. A comprehensive review of the relevant provisions of the Act unmistakably manifests the legislative thrust that every marriage solemnized in contravention of one or other condition prescribed for valid marriage is not void. Section 5 prescribes six conditions for valid marriage. Section 11 renders marriage solemnised in contravention of conditions (i), (iv) and (v) of Section 5 only, void, Two incontrovertible propositions emerge from a combined reading of Sections 5 and 11 and other provisions of the Act, that the Act specifies conditions for valid marriage and a marriage contracted in breach of some but not all of them renders the marriage void. The statute thus prescribes conditions for valid marriage and also does not leave it to inference that each one of such conditions is mandatory and a contravention, violation or breach of any one of them would be treated as a breach of a prerequisite for a valid marriage rendering it void. The law while prescribing conditions for valid marriage simultaneously prescribes that breach of some of the conditions but not all would render the marriage void. The law while prescribing conditions for valid marriage simultaneously prescribes that breach of some of the conditions but not all would render the marriage void. Simultaneously, the Act is conspicuously silent on the effect on a marriage solemnised in contravention or breach of the time bound prohibition enacted in Section 15-A further aspect that stares into the face is that while a marriage solemnised in contravention of Clauses (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi) of Section 5 is made penal, a marriage in contravention of the prohibition prescribed by the proviso does not attract any penalty. The Act is suggestively silent on the question as to what is the effect on the marriage contracted by two persons one or both of whom were incapacitated from contracting marriage at the time when it was contracted in view of the fact that a period of one year had not elapsed since the dissolution of their earlier marriage by a decree of divorce granted by the Court of first instance. Such a marriage is not expressly declared void nor made punishable though marriages in breach of conditions Nos. (i), (iv) and (v) are expressly declared void and marriages in breach of conditions Nos. (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi) of Section 5 are specifically made punishable by Section 18. These express provisions would show that Parliament was aware about treating any specific marriage void and only specific marriages punishable. This express provision prima facie would go a long way to negative any suggestion of a marriage being void though not covered by Section 11 such as in breach of proviso to Section 15 as being void by necessary implication. The net effect of it is that at any rate Parliament did not think fit to treat such marriage void or that it is so opposed to public policy as to make it punishable. 7. xxxx 8. Did the framers of law intend that a marriage contracted in violation of the provision contained in the proviso to section 15 to be void ? While enacting the legislation, the framers had in mind the question of treating certain marriages void and provided for the same. 7. xxxx 8. Did the framers of law intend that a marriage contracted in violation of the provision contained in the proviso to section 15 to be void ? While enacting the legislation, the framers had in mind the question of treating certain marriages void and provided for the same. It would, therefore, be fair to infer as legislative exposition that a marriage in breach of other conditions for valid marriage in Section 5 each of the six conditions was not considered so sacrosanct as to render marriage in breach of each of it void. This becomes manifest from a combined reading of Sections 5 and 11 of the Act. If the provision in the proviso is interpreted to mean personal incapacity for marriage for a certain period and, therefore, the marriage during that period was by a person who had not the requisite capacity to contract the marriage and hence void, the same consequence must follow where there is breach of condition (iii) of Section 5 which also provides for personal incapacity to contract marriage for a certain period. When minimum age of the bride and the bridegroom for a valid marriage is prescribed in condition (iii) of Section 5 it would only mean personal incapacity for a period because every day the person grows and would acquire the necessary capacity on reaching the minimum age. Now, before attaining the minimum age if a marriage is contracted Section 11 does not render it void even though Section 18 makes it punishable. Therefore, even where a marriage in breach of a certain condition is made punishable yet the law does not treat it as void. The marriage in breach of the proviso is neither punishable nor does Section 11 treat it void. Would it then be fair to attribute an intention to the Legislature that by necessary implication in casting the proviso in the negative expression, the prohibition was absolute and the breach of it would render the marriage void ? If void marriages were specifically provided for it is not proper to infer that in some cases express provision is made and in some other cases viodness had to be inferred by necessary implication. It would be all the more hazardous in the case of marriage laws to treat a marriage in breach of a certain condition void even though the law does not expressly provide for it. It would be all the more hazardous in the case of marriage laws to treat a marriage in breach of a certain condition void even though the law does not expressly provide for it. Craies on statute Law, 7th Edn. , pages 263 and 264 may be referred to with advantage : the words in this section are negative words, and are clearly prohibitory of the marriage being had without the prescribed requisites, but whether the marriage itself is void. . . . is a question of very great difficulty. It is to be recollected that there are no words in the Act rendering the marriage void, and i have sought in vain for any case in which a marriage has been declared null and void unless there were words in the statute expressly so declaring it (emphasis supplied ). . . . From this examination of these Acts I draw two conclusions. First, that there never appears to have been a decision where words in a statute relating to marriage, though prohibitory and negative, have been held to infer a nullity unless such nullity was declared in the Act. Secondly, that, viewing the successive marriage Acts, it appears that prohibitory words without a declaration of nullity, were not considered by the legislature to create a nullity (Ed. Quoting catterall v. Sweetman, (1845) 9 Jur 951, 954 ). 9. In the Act under discussion there is a specific provision for treating certain marriages contracted in breach of certain conditions prescribed for valid marriage in the same Act as void and simultaneously no specific provision having been made for treating certain other marriages in breach of certain conditions as void. In this background even though the proviso is couched in prohibitory and negative language, in the absence of an express provision it is not possible to infer nullity in respect of a marriage contracted by a person under incapacity prescribed by the proviso. " ( 36 ) THE above ruling was subsequently followed by the Apex Court in Tejinder kaur v. Gurmit Singh, (1988) 2 SCC 90 . " ( 36 ) THE above ruling was subsequently followed by the Apex Court in Tejinder kaur v. Gurmit Singh, (1988) 2 SCC 90 . ( 37 ) THEREFORE, in view of clear position of law as laid down by this Court and the supreme Court and the reasons already given by me, I have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the marriage between the parities in the case on hand who were minors by the date of their marriage is not void. Point Nos. 2 and 3 : ( 38 ) THOUGH the husband (R. W. I) gave his age as 17 years as on the date of his evidence except his ipsi dixit there is no other evidence. Even otherwise as a minor husband also he is liable to maintain his wife provided he is in a position to earn. Under the provisions of Section 125 cr. P. C. where the wife is unable to maintain herself and the husband neglects or refuses to maintain, the competent Court can grant maintenance to the wife. No distinction is made between a major husband and a minor husband. The Courts have gone to the extent of laying down that a husband be an insolvent or a professional beggar or a minor or a monk, he is liable to support his wife so long as he is an able-bodied and can ekeout his livelihood. ( 39 ) A Division Bench of Orissa High court in Basanta Kumari Mohanty v. Sarat Kumar Mohanty, 1982 Crl. LJ 485, held as under:"7. No doubt an order under Section 125 can be passed only if a person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain his wife, child, parents, etc. It is, however, well settled that the expression means occurring in Section 125 does not signify only visible means, such as, real property or definite employment and if a man is healthy and able-bodied he must be held to be possessed of means to support his wife, child etc. The Courts have gone to the extent of laying down that the husband may be insolvent or a professional beggar or a minor or a monk, but he must support his wife so long as he is able-bodied and can ekeout his livelihood. In Chandra Prakash s case ( AIR 1968 Del. 174 ) = (1968 Crl. LJ. The Courts have gone to the extent of laying down that the husband may be insolvent or a professional beggar or a minor or a monk, but he must support his wife so long as he is able-bodied and can ekeout his livelihood. In Chandra Prakash s case ( AIR 1968 Del. 174 ) = (1968 Crl. LJ. 1153), Chief Justice I. D. Dua (as his Lordship then was) was of the view. (Para 7) : "an able-bodied young man has to be presumed to be capable of earning sufficient money so as to be able reasonably to maintain his wife and child and he cannot be heard to say that he is not in a position to earn enough to be able to maintain them according to the family standard. It is for such able-bodied person to show to the court cogent grounds for holding that he is unable for reasons beyond his control, to earn enough to discharge his legal obligation of maintaining his wife and child. When the husband does not disclose to the Court the exact amount of his income, the presumption will be easily permissible against him. "this Court in Veragam s case (ILR1963 Cut. 415) held : ". . . . the words sufficient means should not be confined to the actual pecuniary resources but should have reference to the earning capacity. . . . "the opposite party has not led any evidence for holding that he is unable, for reasons beyond his control, to earn enough to discharge his legal obligation of maintaining his wife. The learned Magistrate, therefore erred in law in rejecting the wife s application for maintenance. 8. The question that arises next is what should be the amount of maintenance ? The principles are to be kept in mind : the object of provisions being to prevent vagrancy and destitution, it has to be found out as to what is required by the wife to maintain a standard of living which is neither luxurious nor penurious; but is modestly consistent with the status of the family. The needs and requirements of the wife, child or parents for a moderate living, the earnings of the husband, son or father or his capacity to earn and his commitments are relevant factors. The needs and requirements of the wife, child or parents for a moderate living, the earnings of the husband, son or father or his capacity to earn and his commitments are relevant factors. ( 40 ) MAKING a reference to the decision of the Madras High Court rendered in 1925 in Sri Raja Bommadevara Raja lakshmi Devi Amma Garu v. Sri Raja B. Naganna Naidu Bahadur Zamindar Garu, air 1925 Mad. 757 , and the Hindu Law, his Lordship held as under :"6. Sri Bidhayak Patnaik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the learned Magistrate did not keep the law in view while disposing of the application of the petitioner and drew my attention to the case of Sri Raja bommadevara Raja Lakshmi Devi Amma garu v. Sri Raja B. Naganna Naidu bahadur Zamindar Garu, ( AIR 1925 Mad. 757 ) where their Lordships held :- "the obligation of a husband to maintain his wife is one arising out of the status of marriage. It is a liability created by the hindu Law, in respect of the jural relations of a Hindu family. . . . " And to Article 554 of mulla s Hindu Law (Fourteenth Edition) "a wife is entitled to be maintained by her husband, Whether he possesses property or not. . . "manu, as cited in Mitakshara, has enjoined :"the aged parents, a virtuous wife and an infant child must be maintained even by doing a hundred misdeeds. "the obligation to support the wife is a personal obligation attaching from the moment of marriage. It is independent of possession of property. (Mayne s Hindu law, 11th Edition, 818 ). ( 41 ) THUS, the position of law appears to be that a minor husband so long as is an able-bodied person and can ekeout his livelihood, is liable to maintain his wife. ( 42 ) COMING to the question, whether the husband in this case is an able-bodied person or not, I have no doubt in my mind that he is able-bodied person. In the case of agriculturists and agricultural labourers either males or females would be working in the field from childhood. ( 42 ) COMING to the question, whether the husband in this case is an able-bodied person or not, I have no doubt in my mind that he is able-bodied person. In the case of agriculturists and agricultural labourers either males or females would be working in the field from childhood. Though child labour is prohibited in this country, the practical truth and nude fact is that children in poor and down trodden families, school dropouts and illiterate children in agricultural families in rural areas are toiling in fields under the blazing sun. The husband in this case is the son of rural soil and an illiterate person of a backward area. Therefore, whether he is under or over 18 years of age must be earning. ( 43 ) COMING to the question of means, the Orissa High Court in the Basanta kumari Mohanty case (supra), following the decision of Delhi High Court in Chander prakash Bodh Raj v. Smt. Shila Rani chander Prakash, 1968 Crl. LJ 1153 = air 1968 Del. 174 , ruled that the expression means occurring in Section 125 Cr. P. C. does not signify only visible means such as real property or definite employment and if a man is healthy and able-bodied, he must be held to be possessed of means to support his wife, child etc. ( 44 ) THE husband in the present case is an able-bodied person and I have held supra that he is earning. Irrespective of the property held by him, he is liable to maintain his wife. ( 45 ) NOW, coming to the question of negligence, P. W. 1 in her evidence says that she lived with her husband for four years. In fact, at one stage P. Ws. 1 and 2 stated that P. W. 1 attained puberty at the house of the in-laws. P. W. 3 says that about two years prior to 4-10-1996 they went to drop the wife in her in-law s house, but husband refused to take her on the ground that she was not having good personality and physique and has no child. On the other hand, R. W. 1 claims that the parents of P. W. 1 never sent p. W. 1 to join him. R. W. 2 says that P. W. 1 was residing with her parents as she was a minor. On the other hand, R. W. 1 claims that the parents of P. W. 1 never sent p. W. 1 to join him. R. W. 2 says that P. W. 1 was residing with her parents as she was a minor. The parties belong to a remote village in Medak District. As already stated, the girl, as per her own statement, was about 19 years old as on the date of filing of the petition. Both the parties are not affluent and rich. When child marriage was performed I do no think that the girl will be kept in the house of her parents till she attained 18 years or 19 years of age. In poor families the more the hands are the more the earnings will be. The purpose of performing the marriage would be defeated if she is kept in the family of her parents till she attained the age of more than 18 years. The rural background of the spouses cannot be given a go-bye while appreciating the evidence in this regard. Judged against the rural backdrop, the context and the situation, i am of opinion that the weight of preponderance of probabilities tilts in favour of drawing conclusion that the girl joined her husband and lived with him for some time at least. P. W. 1 expressed her readiness to join her husband. But the husband appears to be not ready to take her back. The allegation is that he scontracted second marriage. Therefore, in the above circumstances, I am of the opinion that there is negligence on the part of the husband in maintaining the wife/p. W. 1. ( 46 ) COMING to the quantum of maintenance, the revisional Court granted rs. 500/- per month on appreciation of evidence, which is the barest minimum as per the present standards of living. I do not see any valid reason to disturb the said finding. ( 47 ) ACCORDINGLY, point Nos. 2 and 3 are also answered against the husband holding that even if he is a minor he is liable to maintain his wife; that he neglected to maintain her and the quantum of maintenance granted at the rate of Rs. 500/- by the revisional Court is quite justified. ( 48 ) IN view of my findings on point nos. 1 to 3, this criminal revision petition is liable to be dismissed. 500/- by the revisional Court is quite justified. ( 48 ) IN view of my findings on point nos. 1 to 3, this criminal revision petition is liable to be dismissed. In the result, the criminal revision petition is dismissed.