Judgment :- 1. The defendants are the appellants herein. 2. This appeal has arisen from the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge, Poonamallee granting a decree for specific performance in favour of the plaintiff/first respondent. 3. The case of the plaintiff as set out in the plaint is as follows: The defendant entered into a sale agreement on 06.07.1985 with the plaintiff to sell the suit property for Rs. 54,000/- at the rate of Rs. 500/- per cent and received an advance of Rs. 18,000/- on 06.07.1985 itself. The first defendant received another sum of Rs. 10,000/- on 26.04.1986 and made an endorsement at the back of the agreement. The plaintiff had been ready and willing to pay the balance of sale consideration of Rs. 26,000/- at all relevant times. The defendants had given some of the documents and the plaintiff wanted the defendants to produce the remaining title deeds also to the plaintiff for finalising the sale and wanted the defendants to fixup a date for sale. The plaintiff by a legal notice dated 19.04.1988, called upon the defendant to fixup a date for sale. But the defendants without complying with the request, sent a reply setting out all false frivolous and vexatious allegations. Though there is a clause in the agreement that the sale has to be completed before 06.10.1985, but time was not treated as the essence of the contract. The fact that the defendant had received Rs. 10,000/- on 26.04.1986 itself is a proof enough that the time is not the essence of the contract. The defendants have put the plaintiff in occupation of the suit property and they had planted 20 coconut plants and has also raised gingely crop. The first defendant had filed a suit in O.S. No. 1028 of 1988 on the file of the District Munsif court, Poonamallee. The defendants are trying to interfere with his possession and deposes him. 4. With the above said pleadings, the plaintiff filed the suit in O.S. No. 224 of 1988 praying for a decree for specific performance and a decree for permanent injunction against the defendants. 5. The suit was contested by the first defendant by filing a separate written statement with the following averments. The second defendant is the absolute owner of the suit property. The agreement is admitted and the payment of Rs. 5. The suit was contested by the first defendant by filing a separate written statement with the following averments. The second defendant is the absolute owner of the suit property. The agreement is admitted and the payment of Rs. 18,000/- as advance on the date of the agreement is also admitted. It was specifically agreed and stated in the agreement, that the balance of the sale consideration should be paid within a period of three months i.e. on or before 06.10.1985 and time was of the essence of the agreement. The plaintiff was not at all ready to pay the balance of sale consideration and to have the sale deed within the stipulated time. Hence the agreement stood cancelled and the advance amount paid was also forfeited. The plaintiff has no right in the agreement. 6. The plaintiff obtained all the documents of title deeds relating to the suit property and they are with him. The plaintiff was not in a position to pay the balance of the sale consideration and he was never ready to perform his part of the contract. The fact that he was not able to pay the entire balance sale consideration within the time stipulated would clearly go to show that he was not having the balance of the sale consideration to pay and also to have the sale deed. Hence the plaintiff is a defaulter and he is not entitled to any relief much less the greater relief of specific performance of the contract. 7. The plaintiff came with Rs. 10,000/- on 26.04.1986 and the second defendant refused to receive the amount as the agreement has already expired. The plaintiff begged the first defendant to accept the said amount and also further agreed to pay the entire sale consideration within a week or 10 days time and agreed to have the sale deed and only in the said circumstances, the first defendant received the amount without prejudice to the right of the second defendant about her stand that the agreement had already been cancelled. It is not correct to state that the time was not the essence of the contract. The plaintiff did not keep up his promise made on 26.04.1986 and hence the suit is liable to be dismissed. 8. It is not correct to state that the time was not the essence of the contract. The plaintiff did not keep up his promise made on 26.04.1986 and hence the suit is liable to be dismissed. 8. The second defendant filed a separate written statement with the following averments: — (i) The various allegations in paragraph 3 to 5 of the plaint that in pursuance of the sale agreement dated 06.07.1985, the plaintiff has been ready and willing to pay the balance of the sale consideration, that the defendants have given only some documents and failed to produce the remaining documents and hence, the plaintiff was not able to finalise the sale deed, that the time stipulated in the agreement was not the essence of the Contract, that the defendants put the plaintiff in possession of the suit property and he has also planted 20 coconut plants and raised gingelly crops are all false. (ii) The time specified in the agreement for completion of the sale is three months and the said time was the essence of the contract. But the plaintiff did not come forward to pay the balance sale consideration and complete the sale transaction and hence the agreement stood cancelled and the advance amount had also been forfeited. All the documents of title deeds relating to the suit property were handed over on the date of the agreement itself. The plaintiff was not in a position to pay the balance of the sale consideration and hence he had not come forward to honour the agreement. The second defendant never handed over possession of the suit land to the plaintiff as alleged in the plaint and he also had not received Rs. 10,000/- on 26.04.1986. (iii) On 11.04.1988, the plaintiff attempted to trespass into the suit land with a view to dig a well and the same was prevented and the matter was reported to the police and only thereafter the plaintiff gave a notice on 19.04.1988 setting out false allegations. As the plaintiff attempted to trespass into the suit properly, the suit in O.S. No. 1028 of 1988 was filed before the District Munsif Court, Poonamallee for permanent injunction and the present suit is only a counterblast to the same. (iv) The plaintiff never tendered the balance sale consideration within the stipulated time as he had no money and hence the plaintiff has committed breach of agreement. (iv) The plaintiff never tendered the balance sale consideration within the stipulated time as he had no money and hence the plaintiff has committed breach of agreement. The second defendant arranged to sell the suit property to purchase the house property of one Savithri Ammal at New Colony, Pallik-karanai and the second defendant could not purchase the said property as the plaintiff failed to complete the sale in time and hence the second defendant also could not purchase the said house property and now it was purcahsed by one Muthukrishnan, employed in State Bank of India. The second defendant incurred heavy loss because of the breach of the agreement committed by the plaintiff and hence he is liable to pay damages for the same. Only with a view to avoid the payment of damages incurred by the defendants, the plaintiff has issued the notice and filed this suit. The allegation regarding handing over of possession by the defendants to the plaintiff is denied. The plaintiff was never ready to perform his part of the contract and hence the suit filed by him for specific performance is liable to be dismissed. (v) The second defendant also filed an additional written statement, which was adopted by the first defendant and the same reads as follows: Though the plaintiff had stated in the plaint that he was put in possession of the suit property, he had not stated the date on which he was put in possession of the suit property. The defendant obtained an order of status quo in I.A. No. 1246 of 1988 in O.S. No. 1028 of 1988 and in the said suit also the plaintiff had not stated as to when he was put in possession of the suit property. When the plaintiff was examined on 24.07.1990 in the above case, he had stated that possession of the suit property was given to him and the same is also incorporated in the agreement Ex.A-1. When Ex.A-1 was inspected by the defendants Advocate and by the second defendant, it was found that there was some interlineation in the said agreement as if the defendant had given possession of the suit property and the same is false and denied. When Ex.A-1 was inspected by the defendants Advocate and by the second defendant, it was found that there was some interlineation in the said agreement as if the defendant had given possession of the suit property and the same is false and denied. The interlineation is also made in a different ink and thereby the plaintiff had tampered with the agreement and there is a material alteration of the document hence it cannot be relied upon. 9. The plaintiff filed a reply statement with the following averments: The possession of the suit property was handed over to the plaintiff on 06.07.1985 and there is a recital in the sale agreement to that effect. The allegation of material alteration is denied. The suit agreement has not been tampered with. 10. On the above said pleadings, the Trial Court framed the following issues: i) Whether the second defendant handed over possession of the suit property to the plaintiff? ii) Whether time is the essence of the contract? iii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of specific performance? iv) To what relief the parties are entitled to? An additional issue was framed on 26.11.1990 which reads as follows: i) Whether there is any material alteration in the sale agreement dated 06.07.1985? 11. During Trial, the plaintiff was examined as P.W.1 and one Ekambaram, who was the scribe of Ex.A-1 was examined as P.W.2. On the side of the plaintiff, Ex.A-1 Sale agreement and Ex.A-2 the endorsement dated 26.04.1986 were marked. On the side of the defendants, the second defendant was examined as D.W.1 and Ex.B-1 was marked. On a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced in the case, the learned Subordinate Judge granted the relief of specific performance. Aggrieved by that the defendants have filed the above appeal. 12. Mr. Rajendran, learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the Trial Court has not considered the entire evidence properly, that the question, whether time is the essence of the contract has not been considered in the light of the law laid down by this Court and the Honourable Supreme Court of India in various decisions. The Clause contained in Ex.A-2 endorsement would go to show that time was made the essence of the contract. The Clause contained in Ex.A-2 endorsement would go to show that time was made the essence of the contract. The finding of the Trial Court that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract is erroneous and it is not supported by any legally acceptable evidence. The plaintiff was never ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and that is evident from the oral and documentary evidence on record. The learned counsel also submitted that because of the failure on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract, the second defendant could not purchase the property from one Savithri Ammal and on that ground she has suffered huge loss. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel relied upon the following decisions: i) 1998 (1) C.T.C. 186 = 1997 2 L.W. 820 (Vasantha v. M. Senguttuvan) ii) 2004 (IV) C.T.C. 278 (Indravathi v. Kamala) iii) 1997 (1) C.T.C. 360 = 1996 2 L.W. 461 (Seeni Ammal v. Veerayee Ammal) iv) A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1742 (Chand Ram v. Kamal Rani) 13. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff argued that only after scrutinising the entire evidence, the Trial Court have granted relief of specific performance, that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and that the time was not the essence of the contract. Since the defendants did not hand over part of the tide deeds relating to the suit properties, the sale deed could not be got executed. There is no material alteration in the sale agreement Ex.A-1. The fact that the first defendant received a sum of Rs. 10,000/- and made the endorsement Ex.A-2 and the time was extended will itself show that time was not treated as the essence of the contract. The evidence adduced by both sides has been elaborately considered and discussed by the Trial Court and hence the findings of the Trial Court have got to be sustained and the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 14. Admittedly, defendants 1 and 2 executed Ex.A-1, Sale agreement on 06.07.1985 agreeing to sell an extent of 1.08 acres of land for a total consideration of RS. 54,000/- and have received an advance of Rs. 18,000/-. The time stipulated for completing the sale transaction is three months from 06.07.1985. 14. Admittedly, defendants 1 and 2 executed Ex.A-1, Sale agreement on 06.07.1985 agreeing to sell an extent of 1.08 acres of land for a total consideration of RS. 54,000/- and have received an advance of Rs. 18,000/-. The time stipulated for completing the sale transaction is three months from 06.07.1985. There is a default clause in Ex.A-1 that if the balance sale consideration is not paid before 06.10.1985 and the sale deed is got executed, the plaintiff will lose the advance amount. There is a recital in Ex.A-1 to the effect that the possession of the suit property was handed over to the plaintiff. Though the three months time stipulated in the agreement expired on 06.10.1985, the first defendant after receiving a further sum of RS. 10,000/- on 26.04.1986 had made an endorsement on the back of Ex.A-1. The endorsement in Ex.A-1 has been marked as Ex.A-2. In the said endorsement, there is a recital that the sale deed should be got executed on 20.05.1986 and if the sale deed is not got executed the plaintiff is not entitled for the amount paid by him. In the schedule to the sale agreement Ex.A-1, it is specifically mentioned that the tide deeds pertaining to the suit properties and the patta passbook have been handed over to the plaintiff. 15. Though it was extensively argued by Mr. Rajendran, learned counsel for the appellant that there is a material alteration in Ex.A-1 by contending that the last line in Ex.A-1 has been written with a different ink and the letters are smaller and it is even clear to a naked eye that the inter-lineation has been made in Ex.A-1 to the effect that possession of the suit property was handed over and a look at Ex.A-1 also shows that the recital has been written with a different ink and in smaller letters, the contention is liable to be rejected for the following reasons D.W.1 the second defendant in her cross examination has stated as follows: Tamil This admission of D.W.1, that possession was handed over to the plaintiff after the agreement and he is in possession of the suit property will falsify the defence taken by the defendants that the plaintiff was not put in possession of the suit property. The further contention that in Ex.A-1 there is interpolation and the recital to the effect that possession was handed over has been incorporated subsequently is also liable to be rejected. 16. The whole appeal rests on the two main questions, whether time is of the essence of the contract and whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract as required by law. Mr. Rajendran, learned counsel for the appellant relied upon a judgment reported in 2000 (IV) C.T.C. 278 (Indravathi v. Kamala) wherein it has been held, that specific performance cannot be granted when time is the essence of the contact of or when there is inordinate delay. In S.S. Chokkalingam v. R.B.S. Mani and five others, 1994 (2) M.L.J. 76 : 1994 (1) L.W. 321 (D.B.), it has been held as follows: — “No doubt, ordinarily in contracts relating to immovable property, time is not the essence of the contract. But, in the facts and circumstances of each case, the court can come to a conclusion that in a particular case, time has been made the essence of the contract” In Periambillai v. Somayan, 1993 (2) M.L.J. 272 (D.B.): “this Honourable Court has held that if there is unexplained delay in seeking the remedy it is enough to deny the remedy of specific performance. In Sandhyarani v. Sudha Rani , A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 537, it is laid down “Where there is inordinate delay on the part of the plaintiff to perform his or her part of contract a decree for specific performance can be refused”. Relying upon this, learned counsel submitted that three months time is stipulated in Ex.A-1 agreement for completing the sale and three months time expired on 06.10.1985 and thereafter the first defendant alone has received a further sum of RS. 10,000/- from the plaintiff on 26.04.1986 and in Ex.A-2 endorsement, it is specifically stated that the sale deed should be got executed on 20.05.1986 and if the plaintiff fails to perform his part of the contract, he is liable to lose the advance paid by him. Though, time for performance of the contract had been extended by the first defendant, a specific date has been fixed for execution of the sale deed and hence it should be held that time is the essence of the contract. Though, time for performance of the contract had been extended by the first defendant, a specific date has been fixed for execution of the sale deed and hence it should be held that time is the essence of the contract. He further submitted that Ex.A-2 endorsement has been made only by the first defendant and the second defendant is not a party to Ex.A-2 endorsement and as such the same is not binding on her. 17. In Govind Prasad Chaturvedi v. Hari Dutt Shastri, (1977) 2 SCC 539 : (A.I.R. 1977 SC 1005) it is held as follows: “It is settled law that the fixation of the period within which the contract has to be performed does not make the stipulation as to time the essence of the contract. When a contract relates to sale of immovable property it will normally be presumed that the time is not the essence of the contract. (Vide Gomalthinayagam Pillai v. Pallaniswami Nadar, (1967) 1 S.C.R. 227 , 233) : (A.I.R. 1967 SC 868 at p. 871). It may also be mentioned that the language used in the agreement is not such as to indicate in unmistakable terms that the time is of the essence of the contract. The intention to treat time as the essence of the contract may be evidenced by circumstances which are sufficiently strong to displace the normal presumption that in a contract of sale of land stipulation as to time is not the essence of the contract”. If in the light of the above said principle, the facts set out above in this case are considered only one conclusion is possible and that is, that time is not the essence of the contract as far as this case is concerned. 18. Admittedly the agreement was entered into on 06.07.1985 agreeing to sell an extent of 1.06 acres and the time limit of three months fixed in the agreement expired on 06.10.1985. But after six months thereafter, that is on 26.04.1986, the first defendant had received a further advance of RS. 10,000/- and has extended the time for completing the sale transaction. This is a strong circumstance to show that time was not treated as the essence of the contract. Though the second defendant is not a party to Ex.A-2 endorsement, she had not taken any steps to get the agreement cancelled. 10,000/- and has extended the time for completing the sale transaction. This is a strong circumstance to show that time was not treated as the essence of the contract. Though the second defendant is not a party to Ex.A-2 endorsement, she had not taken any steps to get the agreement cancelled. If really, the stand taken by the defendant is true, namely that the defendants wanted to sell the suit property only to purchase a property at Pallikarani from one Smt. Savithriammal and because of the failure on the part of the plaintiff to get the sale deed executed, they could not purchase the property from the said Savithriammal and she had sold it to somebody else and because of that the defendant had suffered huge loss, the defendants would not have kept quite without calling upon the plaintiff to complete the sale transaction. The inaction on the part of the defendants in not calling upon the plaintiff to complete the sale transaction will itself show that the time was not treated as the essence of the contract. Though the Trial Court has not discussed the issue relating to this aspect and has not recorded proper reasons, in the light of the reasons stated by me as above, I held that the time is not the essence of the contact in this case. 19. Now, the only question to be decided is whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract as required by law. Needless to say, that it is the duty of the plaintiff to specifically aver and prove the same. 20. The admitted facts are the date of agreement Ex.A-1 is 06.07.1985, the date of Ex.A-2 endorsement is 26.04.1986 where under time was extended up to 20.05.1986, a notice is said to have been issued on 19.04.1988 and the suit was filed on 16.06.1988 i.e. just a few days before the expiry of three years from 06.07.1985. It is also admitted that the first defendant filed a suit in O.S. No. 1028 of 1988 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Poonamallee, against the plaintiff for injunction and before that there was a police complaint also. Though it is stated in the plaint, that the plaintiff had been ready and willing to pay the balance of sale consideration of Rs. Though it is stated in the plaint, that the plaintiff had been ready and willing to pay the balance of sale consideration of Rs. 26,000/- at the relevant times, there is no acceptable evidence to substantiate this plea. The reason given by the plaintiff for non-execution of the sale deed is that the defendants had given some of the documents and the plaintiff wanted defendants to produce the remaining title deeds also to the plaintiff for finalising the sale, but the defendants did not hand over the remaining title deeds. The plaintiff claims to have sent a notice dated 19.04.1988 which is also admitted by the defendants and the plaintiff also has stated in the plaint that a reply notice has also been sent by the defendants. But unfortunately, neither the nouce nor the reply have been marked as documents by both the parties. Similarly, the pleadings relating to O.S. No. 1028 of 1988 have also not been filed before the Court by either side. Hence, we are unable to know the contents of the notice and the reply and the pleadings in O.S. No. 1028 of 1988. 21. The learned counsel for the appellant relies upon a judgment reported in 1997 (1) C.T.C. 360 = 1996 2 L.W. 461 ( Seni Ammal v. Veerayee Ammal ) wherein by relying upon a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court reported in 1994 (1) M.L.J. 44 , it has been held that, “When the burden is on the plaintiff to prove clearly in order to get the equitable relief of specific performance, he ought to have produced the best evidence with him and his failure to do so would enjoin the court to draw an adverse inference against him” 22. The learned counsel submits that the plaintiff in this case has not produced the best evidence to show that he was having necessary funds to complete the sale transaction and he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The learned counsel submitted that the plaintiff has not even produced the notice dated 19.04.1988 sent by him. As the notice has not been produced an adverse inference could be drawn that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It is not the case of the defendants that the plaintiff had not stated his readiness and willingness in the said notice. As the notice has not been produced an adverse inference could be drawn that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It is not the case of the defendants that the plaintiff had not stated his readiness and willingness in the said notice. When admittedly the notice had been received by the defendant, if the defendant had taken such a stand, then from the non-production of the notice an adverse inference could be drawn, but not otherwise. Therefore the contention of the learned counsel cannot be accepted. 23. In 1998 (1) C.T.C. 186 = 1997 2 L.W. 820 (Vasantha v. M. Senguttuvan), it is held that, even if for a single day, plaintiff/agreement holder is not ready to take the sale agreement, the equitable remedy should not be granted. Readiness and willingness must be there continuously from the date of agreement upto the date of hearing. The learned counsel relying upon the above said judgment submits that there is absolutely no acceptable legal evidence to show that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract continuously from the date of agreement up to the date of hearing. The fact that the plaintiff did not get the sale deed executed within the three months stipulated in Ex.A-1 and almost after the expiry of six months, he paid a further sum of Rs. 10,000/-and even after getting a months time he was not able to pay the balance sale consideration will show that the plaintiff was not having sufficient funds and he was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and he was not continuously ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. This contention of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be easily brushed aside. In reply to this averment, the learned counsel for the respondent only submits that, since there was smooth relationship between the parties till sometime in 1988 and the defendants did not hand over the remaining title deeds the sale deed could not be executed. This contention of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be easily brushed aside. In reply to this averment, the learned counsel for the respondent only submits that, since there was smooth relationship between the parties till sometime in 1988 and the defendants did not hand over the remaining title deeds the sale deed could not be executed. But the learned counsel for the respondent relying upon the judgments reported in 1999 (III) C.T.C. 394 = 1999 3 L.W. 702 (Rathinam Chettiar v. Embar Naidu) and 1997 (2) S.C.C. 200 (Sukhbir Singh v. Brij Pal Singh) submits that it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender the money to the defendant or deposit the money except when so directed. There is no need to produce any document to show that the purchaser was having money. The learned counsel relying upon a judgment reported in 2005 (5) C.T.C. 800 (Aniglase Yohannan v. Ramlatha) submits that any person seeking benefit of specific performance of contract must establish that his conduct is blemishless throughout entitling him to the specific relief, there cannot be any quarrel with the above said legal principles, but we have to see whether those legal principles apply to the facts and circumstances of this case. 24. Relying upon a judgment reported in 2000 (IV) C.T.C. 278 (Indravathi v. Kamala), the learned counsel for the appellant contents that if really the plaintiff was ready to perform his part of the contract, there is no reason as to why he has not come forward with a suit for specific performance immediately either before the expiry of the period mentioned in agreement Ex.A-1 or before the expiry of the extended period under Ex.A-2. The learned counsel further submitted that the plaintiff has not explained the delay in seeking the remedy of specific performance. He further submitted that the unexplained delay in seeking the remedy disentitled him from getting a decree for specific performance. He further submitted that delay has brought about a situation, where it would be inequitable to give a relief of specific performance to the plaintiff. 25. He further submitted that the unexplained delay in seeking the remedy disentitled him from getting a decree for specific performance. He further submitted that delay has brought about a situation, where it would be inequitable to give a relief of specific performance to the plaintiff. 25. In a case reported in 1997 (3) S.C.C. 1 (K.S. Vaidyanathan v. Vairavan), the Apex Court has considered the nature of the discretionary power of the Court to decree the suit for specific performance and has held that even where time is not of the essence of the contract, the plaintiff must perform his part of the contract within a reasonable time and the reasonable time should be determined by looking at all the surrounding circumstances including the express terms of the contract and the nature of the property. The Apex Court has also pointed out that where an agreement specifying the period of six months within which plaintiff had to purchase the stamp papers, tender the balance amount of consideration and require the defendants to execute the sale deed, the total inaction for 2 1/2 years after initial payment of a small amount as earnest money by the plaintiff would be a circumstance which would weigh against exercise of discretion for grant of specific performance of the agreement in favour of the plaintiff. 26. In this case, P.W.1, in his cross examination has stated as follows: Tamil The above deposition of P.W.1 makes it clear that P.W.1 is unable to say the month and year in which he made ready the money. He had specifically stated that when the money was ready he tendered the same to the defendants, but they refuse to receive the same and only a month thereafter he issued the notice. According to the plaintiff the notice was issued on 19.04.1988. Unfortunately, the notice has not been marked as an exhibit in the suit. Hence, we are unable to know the contents of the same. The plaintiff has also stated in his deposition as follows: Tamil It shows that the plaintiff is unable to depose about the contents of the notice. It is not the case of the plaintiff that in the notice which is said to have been sent by him it was stated that after making the money ready he tendered the same to the plaintiff but they refused to receive the same. It is not the case of the plaintiff that in the notice which is said to have been sent by him it was stated that after making the money ready he tendered the same to the plaintiff but they refused to receive the same. Admittedly, the suit came to be filed on 16.06.1988. If really the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract right from the date of agreement or at least from the date of Ex.A-2 endorsement i.e. 26.04.1986, as claimed by him, there was no difficulty for the plaintiff to state as to when he got the money and was ready to perform his part of the contract. Even according to him, only a month after the defendants refused to receive the money from him he sent a notice. The notice is said to have been issued on 19.04.1988. From that, we have to hold that the plaintiff made ready the money somewhere in March 1998. This admission of the plaintiff will show that from 26.04.1986 to March 1988, the plaintiff was not ready with the money. The various judgments of this Court and the Honourable Supreme court of India referred to above, are to the effect that the plaintiff should not only aver in the plaint about his readiness and willingness but also should prove the same by acceptable evidence that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and he should be continuously ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and the readiness should continue from the date of agreement till the date of hearing of the suit. If the evidence of P.W.1 is considered in the light of the above said principles, it can be concluded without any difficulty that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. This admission of P.W.1 is fatal to his case. Even after the issue of notice dated 19.04.1988 the contents of which is also not before the Court. The plaintiff had filed the suit only on 16.06.1988 and there is absolutely no explanation as to why the suit was not filed immediately. The facts of the case reported in 1999 (III) C.T.C. 394 = 1999 3 L.W. 702 (Rathinam Chettiar v. Embar Naidu) are different from the facts of this case. The plaintiff had filed the suit only on 16.06.1988 and there is absolutely no explanation as to why the suit was not filed immediately. The facts of the case reported in 1999 (III) C.T.C. 394 = 1999 3 L.W. 702 (Rathinam Chettiar v. Embar Naidu) are different from the facts of this case. In that case, the purchaser had sent a legal notice calling upon the vendor to execute the sale deed as there was no reply from the vendor, telegram was sent and the vendor was personally approached, but the vendor did not sent any reply and did not execute the sale deed. Hence the ratio laid down in that case is not applicable to this case. 27. The total inaction from 20.05.1986 to 19.04.1988 on the part of the plaintiff would be a strong circumstances which would weigh against the exercising of discretion for granting a decree for specific performance of the agreement in favour of the plaintiff. I hold that the plaintiff has not established by acceptable evidence that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. 28. The Trial Court has not considered as to whether the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, in the light of the evidence available on record. The Trial Court has simply accepted the plea of the plaintiff that since the defendants had not handed over some of the title deeds in respect of the suit properties, the sale could not be completed. There is absolutely no evidence to substantiate this plea by the plaintiff. In Ex.A-1 itself it is stated that the tide deeds have been handed over to the plaintiff. But yet the Trial Court has held that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. This finding of the Trial Court is totally erroneous and bereft of reasoning. There is absolutely no acceptable evidence to hold that the defendants were not willing to execute the sale deed. 29. The property is situated at Kolathur village which is in the out-skirts of Chennai. This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that the price of urban properties are sky-racketing day by day. There is absolutely no acceptable evidence to hold that the defendants were not willing to execute the sale deed. 29. The property is situated at Kolathur village which is in the out-skirts of Chennai. This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that the price of urban properties are sky-racketing day by day. The sale agreement was entered into on 06.07.1985, but the plaintiff has failed to get the sale deed executed within a reasonable time and has not established his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the agreement of sale and the Trial Court without considering all these aspects has granted a decree for specific performance. 30. The jurisdiction to decree specific relief is discretionary and the Court can consider various circumstances to decide whether such relief is to be granted. Merely because, it is lawful to grant specific relief, the Court need not grant the decree for specific relief; but this discretion shall not be exercised in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. Certain circumstances have been mentioned under Section 20 (2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 as to under what circumstances the Court shall exercise such discretion granting of specific performance is an equitable relief. The guidelines contained in Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act shall be in the forefront in the mind of the Court. But unfortunately, the Trial Court has not kept the principles incorporated in Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act in mind, while considering and granting the relief as prayed for by the plaintiff in his favour. In my considered view, it will be highly inequitable to grant a decree in favour of the plaintiff in the light of the evidence discussed above. The judgment of the Trial Court is bereft of reasons and hence the same is liable to be set-aside and accordingly it is set-aside. The appeal is allowed. No costs.