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2006 DIGILAW 314 (RAJ)

Suresh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan

2006-01-31

H.R.PANWAR

body2006
JUDGMENT 1. - This criminal revision petition under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'the Code' hereinafter) is directed against the order dated 29.07.2005 passed by the Special Judge, NDPS Cases, Chittorgarh, Camp Nimbaheda (for short, 'the trial Court' hereinafter) in Sessions Case No. 44/2004, whereby the trial Court framed charge for the offence under Section 27-A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short, 'the NDPS Act' hereinafter) against the petitioner. Aggrieved by the order impugned framing the charge, the petitioner has filed the instant revision petition. 2. The allegation against the petitioners is that in order to save the accused carrying contraband poppy straw, the petitioners tried to give bribe to the seizure officer in order to save the accused who were found transporting the huge quantity of poppy straw weighing 2291.600 kgs. from the penal consequence, whereupon they were taken on remand in FIR No. 38/2004, Police Station, Bhadsoda district Udaipur, for the offence under Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with Section 120-B IPC. Later on, the petitioners were arrested in connection with FIR No. 120/2004 of the same police station in connection with recovery of poppy straw and after investigation, Challan was filed against them for the offence under Section 8/15 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short, 'the NDPS Act' hereinafter). During trial, the prosecution could not connect the petitioners with the offence under Section 8/18 of the NDPS Act. However, vide impugned order dated 29.07.2005, the trial Court proceeded to frame charge against the petitioners for the offence under Section 27-A of the NDPS Act. Hence this revision petition. 3. I have heard learned Counsel for the petitioners and the Public Prosecutor for the State. Perused the impugned order and the Challan papers. 4. From the statement of PW. 15 Babu Lai Murariya, the seizure officer, it is prima facie established that the petitioners offered a bribe of Rs. 50,000/- to him for releasing the poppy straw and the truck seized by him, as also the accused persons who were found to have been transporting the poppy straw and not to register a crime report for the offence under the provisions of the NDPS Act. His statement finds support from the statements of PW. 50,000/- to him for releasing the poppy straw and the truck seized by him, as also the accused persons who were found to have been transporting the poppy straw and not to register a crime report for the offence under the provisions of the NDPS Act. His statement finds support from the statements of PW. 16 Rajesh Bhardwaj, Circle Officer of the area and other police officials who were the members of the police party of the recovery, seizure etc. Thus, prima facie, there is evidence on record that the petitioners, by offering illegal gratification/bribe to the seizure officer harboured the other accused person engaging in transportation of huge quantity of poppy straw weighing 2291.600 kgs. 5. So far as quashing the charges is concerned, it is settled law that at the stage of framing the charge the Court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and the Court is not required to appreciate the evidence and arrive at the conclusion that the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. It is also settled proposition of law that the High Court's power to qash the charge should not be exercised except for strong reasons to hold that in the interest of justice and in order to avoid the abuse of the process of the Court, the charge needed to be quashed. At the time of framing the charge, evidence cannot be weighed. 6. In Kanti Bhandra Shah & Anr. v. State of West Bengal, 2000 (1) SCC 272 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that framing the charge itself is prima facie order that the trial Judge has formed the opinion, upon considering the police report and other documents and after hearing both the sides, that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence concerned. The Apex Court further held that there is no legal requirement that the trial Court should write an order showing the reasons for framing the charge, why should the already burdened trial Courts be further burdened with such an extra work. The Apex Court further held that there is no legal requirement that the trial Court should write an order showing the reasons for framing the charge, why should the already burdened trial Courts be further burdened with such an extra work. Almost same view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018 ; Umar Abdul Sakoor Sorathia v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau, 1999 CrLR 499 (SC) ; Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia & Anr., 1989 (1) SCC 715 ; Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja & Ors., AIR 1980 SC 52 ; State of Maharashtra v. Priya Sharan Maharaj, AIR 1977 SC 2041 ; and State of Delhi v. Gyan Devi & Ors. JT 2000 (Suppl. 2) SC 635 . 7. In view of the above settled legal principles, it is clear that at the stage of framing the charge, the trial Court is not required to meticulously examine and marshal the material available on record as to whether there is sufficient material against the accused which would ultimately result in conviction. The Court is prima facie required to consider whether there is sufficient material against the accused to presume the commission of the offence. Even strong suspicion about commission of offence is sufficient for framing the charge, the guilt or innocence of the accused has to be determined at the time of conclusion of the trial after evidence is adduced and not at the stage of framing the charge and, therefore, at the stage of framing the charge, the Court is not required to undertake an elaborate inquiry for the purpose of sifting and weighing the material. In the instant case, there is prima facie evidence against the accused-petitioner for framing the charge for aforesaid offenses. 8. In the instant case, there is prima facie evidence against the accused-petitioner for framing the charge for aforesaid offenses. 8. Section 27-A of NDPS Act pertains to punishment for financing illicit traffic and harbouring offenders and provides that whoever indulges in financing, directly or indirectly, any of the activities specified in Sub-clauses (i) to (v) of Clause (viiia) of Section 2 or harbours any person engaged in any of the aforementioned activities, shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to twenty years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees, provided that the Court may, for reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a fine exceeding two lakh rupees. 9. In the instant case, from the evidence of on record, prima facie there is evidence that the petitioners tried to offer money to the seizure officer for getting the poppy straw and the truck, as also the persons carrying the contraband narcotic substance released. Thus, there is prima facie evidence on record that the petitioners by offering illegal gratification/bribe to the seizureofficer harboured the other accused persons who were engaged in transporting huge quantity of poppy straw. As such, there is no error, illegality or perversity in the impugned order framing charge against the petitioners for the offence under Section 27-A of the NDPS Act. 10. Consequently, the revision petition is dismissed. The stay petition also stands dismissed.Revision petition dismissed. *******