Arun Kumar Bhattacharya, JJ. ( 1 ) THE hearing arises from an application filed by the petitioner praying for revision of the order dated 19. 5. 2003 passed by the learned Additional Sessions judge, Fast Track Court, 1st Court, rampurhat, Birbhum in Sessions Case no. 68/02 (ST. No. VIII/february 03) under Sections 493/417/376, I. P. C. , acquitting O. P. No. 2/accused. ( 2 ) SHORTLY put, the Prosecution case is that for the last one year the accused used to follow the de facto complainant/petitioner (P. W. 1) intending to have sexual intercourse, but the petitioner did not agree. On 27,7. 2001 in the afternoon, when the petitioner went to the riverside for collecting grass for her cattle, the accused forcibly committed rape upon her. When the petitioner threatened to disclose the matter to villagers, the accused took her to the nearest temple of goddess Kali and on putting vermilion on her forehead admitted her as his wife. She believed him to be her husband and the accused thereafter committed sexual intercourse several times, for which she became pregnant. The father of the accused noticed the same, agreed for a social marriage and demanded some dowry. The father of the petitioner gave Rs. 5,001/- to the accused as dowry. But the accused did not agree to marry her, as he was already married with another person. Hence, the accused was charged under Section 493/417/376, I. P. C. ( 3 ) THE defence case, as suggested to P. Ws. and as contended by the accused during his examination under Section 313, Cr. P. C. , is that the accused had no sexual intercourse with the complainant, nor he ever married her in Kali temple. Complainant's husband Ranjit Singh Paharia is the father of her child. The present case has been filed only to blackmail the accused for the purpose of earning or collecting some money. ( 4 ) TEN witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution, while none was examined on behalf of the defence, and after considering the facts, circumstances and materials on record, the learned Court below found the accused not guilty and as such acquitted him of all the charges. ( 5 ) BEING aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order of acquittal, the petitioner has come up before this Court. ( 5 ) BEING aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order of acquittal, the petitioner has come up before this Court. ( 6 ) ALL that now requires to be considered is whether the learned Court below was justified in passing the above order. ( 7 ) MR. Poddar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, assailed the impugned judgment and order contending that the evidence of witnesses, particularly P. Ws 1, 3 and 4 was not assessed from proper perspective, resulting in gross miscarriage of justice, and as such, the order should be set aside. Mr. Ahmed, learned Counsel for the State, on the other hand, while supporting the judgment and order, submitted that there is no material to disturb the findings of the learned Court below and as such, the revisional application should be dismissed in limini. ( 8 ) IT is only in glaring cases of injustice resulting from some violation of fundamental principles of law by the trial Court that the High Court is empowered to set aside the order of acquittal and direct a retrial of the acquitted accused. The power should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. The mere circumstance that a finding of fact recorded by the trial court may, in the opinion of the High Court, be wrong, will not justify setting aside the order of acquittal and directing retrial. The revisional power of the high Court is much restricted in its scope, as was held in the case of Bansi Lal v. Laxman Singh, reported in AIR 1986 SC 1721 : 1986 C Cr LR (SC) 132. It has been reiterated in the case of Chinnaswamy v. Andhra Pradesh, reported in AIR 1962 SC 1788 and in subsequent decisions that the power of the High court to set aside an order of acquittal at the instance of a private party is to be exercised only in exceptional cases of glaring defect of procedure or manifest error on a point of law resulting in flagrant miscarriage of justice. As sub-section (3) of Section 401 forbids the conversion of a finding of acquittal into one of conviction it places a limitation on the power of the High Court to set aside an acquittal order which should be exercised only in exceptional cases. As sub-section (3) of Section 401 forbids the conversion of a finding of acquittal into one of conviction it places a limitation on the power of the High Court to set aside an acquittal order which should be exercised only in exceptional cases. Such cases may be where (i) the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or (ii) the appellate Court has wrongly held the evidence admitted by the trial Court to be inadmissible, or (iii)material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial Court or appellate court or (iv) the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offences, invalid under the law etc. These categories are merely illustrative and there may be other cases of similar nature when retrial or rehearing of appeal may be ordered. ( 9 ) THREE essential ingredients of an offence under Section 493, I. P. C. are (1) the accused caused the woman to believe that she was lawfully married to him (2) he induced the woman to cohabit with him under that belief and (3)he caused such belief by deceit, while two important ingredients of an offence under Section 376, I. P. C. are (1) the accused had sexual intercourse with the woman in question and (2) the sexual intercourse must be under circumstances falling under any of the six clauses mentioned in Section 375, I. P. C. , the first and second being against her will and without her consent respectively, as are involved here. For an offence under Section 417, I. P. C. , apart from intentional inducement by the accused, there must be some evidence of fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of commission of the act in respect of which the cheating is alleged. ( 10 ) IN the present case, the complainant Champa Mal (P. W. 1) claimed that the accused married her in the temple by putting vermilion on her forehead and they had sexual union for the last 5 years. She further claimed that their love culminated into marriage, but the father of the accused denied to accept her, for which she has filed the case. The story of alleged love between P. W. 1 and the accused does not find place in the prosecution case. She further claimed that their love culminated into marriage, but the father of the accused denied to accept her, for which she has filed the case. The story of alleged love between P. W. 1 and the accused does not find place in the prosecution case. However, her father (P. W. 2) came to learn from his wife (P. W. 4) regarding intimacy of her daughter (P. W. 1) with the accused for the last 2/3 months and she was conceived for about 2/3 months. It appears from the testimony of the P. Ws. 1 to 5 that the marriage of P. W. 1 took place with one Ranjit Singh Paharia of village Jamuria, Dist. Dumka according to Hindu rites and customs after observing all formalities like exchange of garlands, saptapadi etc. which necessarily leads to suggest that P. W. 1 was quite aware that her alleged marriage with the accused by mere putting vermilion on her forehead by the accused in a Kali temple was not a lawful one. It further appears that the said ranjit Singh Paharia still pays visit to her house. ( 11 ) SO, there being no iota of evidence bearing out any ingredient of the alleged offences, the findings of the learned Court below do not suffer from any infirmity or illegality and thus do not call for any interference. ( 12 ) ACCORDINGLY, the present revisional application being devoid of any merit be dismissed.