JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the order, dated 25.07.2005, passed by the District Judge, Darrang, in Misc. (J) Case No. 07/ 2005, arising out of the Title Suit No. 08/ 2005, whereby the learned District Judge has granted temporary injunction restraining the Defendant-Appellant from selling their Bidi under the name and style of 'Super Babu Bidi' in poly packets with red and yellow colour label and the same artistic design as those of the Plaintiff-Respondent's Bidi sold under the name and style of 'Special Babu Bidi'. 2. The Plaintiffs case, while seeking the order of temporary injunction, was, in brief, thus: The Plaintiff-Petitioner, as sole proprietor of Sarkar Bidi Factory, situated at Kharupetia Town; District-Darrang, has been manufacturing and selling Bidi and tobacco products in whole of Assam and, especially, in the districts of Darrang, Sonitpur and Kamrup, since the year 1987. The Plaintiff-Petitioner's Bidi is sold and marketed under the name and style of 'Special Babu Bidi' under the trademark No. 1322924 and registration No. AIEPS 5089 D x M001, issued by the Central Excise, Mangaldoi range. The Plaintiff's product, namely, ' Special Babu Bidi' is sold in poly packet with photograph of the proprietor on the front side of the poly packet. The Bidi, so produced, in poly packets, having yellow and red colour combination on the front side of the packet, has become popular amongst the consumers of Bidi. The Defendant-opposite party have started selling their Bidi since the last week of December, 2004, under the name and style of 'Super Babu Bidi', without quoting the trademark number, deceptively adopting similar artistic combination of design and colour in their poly packets as those of the Plaintiff-Petitioner with the obvious intention to create confusion amongst the consumers of Bidi and make thereby wrongful gain. If the Defendant-opposite party are not restrained, by granting of suitable temporary injunction, from selling their Bidi by using the same colour combination and label as those of the Plaintiff-Petitioner, the Plaintiff-Petitioner, will irreparable loss. 3. The Defendants-Appellants filed their written objection resisting the prayer for temporary injunction, the case of the Defendants being, briefly stated, that the Plaintiff-Petitioner has no registered trademark and the Plaintiff-Petitioner has not been selling his Bidi after getting the Central Excise Registration Certificate issued by the Commissioner, Central Excise. 3. The Defendants-Appellants filed their written objection resisting the prayer for temporary injunction, the case of the Defendants being, briefly stated, that the Plaintiff-Petitioner has no registered trademark and the Plaintiff-Petitioner has not been selling his Bidi after getting the Central Excise Registration Certificate issued by the Commissioner, Central Excise. The 'Super Babu Bidi', manufactured by the Defendant-opposite party, are not sold in poly packets with similar design, colour combination, label or photograph as those of the Plaintiff-Petitioner's poly packets and that the colour combination and style imprinted on the poly packets are of the choice of the Defendants-opposite party, there is no similarly between the two poly packets nor are the names of the products phonetically same and that the poly packets of both the parties are so strikingly dissimilar and different that no one of average intelligence would be deceived or would fail to distinguish the Plaintiffs Bidi from the Bidi manufactured and produced by the Defendants-opposite party. 4. I have heard Mr. A.K. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the Defendant-Appellants, and Mr. N. Dhar, learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the Plaintiff-Respondent. 5. The challenge to the order of temporary injunction is posed, broadly speaking, on three grounds. It is pointed out by Mr. Goswami that the Plaintiff had merely applied for registration of their trademark, but without the registration having been granted, the Plaintiff averred that their Bidi was being sold under a registered trademark. This averment, contends Mr. Goswami, was completely false and injunction, being equitable relief, ought not to have been granted, when the Plaintiff had made false and misleading averments in its petition for injunction and had not, thus, come to the Court with clean hands. 6. It is next contended by Mr. Goswami that in the impugned order, dated 25.07.2005, the learned District Judge, while granting temporary injunction, has recorded that the Plaintiff sells its Bidi under a registered trademark. This finding, submits Mr. Goswami, is palpably incorrect and wholly perverse and since this finding had a bearing on the ultimate decision of the Court, while granting injunction, the order of injunction is bad in law. 7. Lastly, it is contended by Mr. This finding, submits Mr. Goswami, is palpably incorrect and wholly perverse and since this finding had a bearing on the ultimate decision of the Court, while granting injunction, the order of injunction is bad in law. 7. Lastly, it is contended by Mr. Goswami that though the learned District Judge has held to the effect that the Bidi manufactured and produced by the Defendants are likely to create confusion and lead to deception, these findings are also incorrect inasmuch as there are too many dissimilar features between the two products. On such erroneous conclusions, submits Mr. Goswami, the order of temporary injunction having been granted, the same may not be sustained and be interfered with. 8. Controverting the submissions made on behalf of the Defendants-Appellants, Mr. Dhar has pointed out to Annexure-A, which the Plaintiff had enclosed along with the petition for injunction, and has submitted that Annexure 'A' indicates that an Advocate had informed the Plaintiff that the application for registration of the trademark, made by the Plaintiff, had been given a registration number by the authorities concerned and, on the strength of the said registration number, the Plaintiff was entitled to denote its trademark with the symbol, which it had applied for, and, based on this legal opinion, the Plaintiff inferred that the Plaintiff was entitled to use the registered trademark, which the Plaintiff had applied for. This impression, though legally incorrect, points out Mr. Dhar, was a bona fide one and cannot be taken to have non-suited the Plaintiff. This apart, further points out Mr. Dhar, though the learned District Judge has mentioned in the impugned order that the Plaintiff sells its Bidi under registered trademark and although this observation is incorrect, the fact remains that the temporary injunction has not been granted on the ground of infringement of the trademark, but on the ground that unless stopped by a suitable order of injunction, the Bidi, produced by the Defendants, would easily pass-off as the product of the Plaintiff. For the findings, so reached, by the learned District Judge, the learned District Judge, according to Mr. Dhar, has assigned adequate cogent reasons. 9. For the findings, so reached, by the learned District Judge, the learned District Judge, according to Mr. Dhar, has assigned adequate cogent reasons. 9. While considering the rival submissions made before me on behalf of the parties, what attracts my attention, most prominently, is that notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiff averred in its application for injunction that its Bidi is sold under a registered trademark, the fact remains that the Plaintiff, in support of this averment, relied on the letter of their Advocate, whose advice was that the Plaintiff was entitled to use the trademark, applied for, as its trademark, for, pursuant to the Plaintiffs application for registration of its trademark, the authorities concerned had granted registration number in respect of the application so made. It is crystal clear from the averments made by the Plaintiff coupled with the letter aforementioned that the Plaintiff inferred, though on the basis of an incorrect legal opinion, that the Plaintiff had received registration of the trademark, which it had applied for, though the reality was that what the Plaintiff had been allotted was merely a registration number in respect of its application for registration and not in respect of its trademark and this aspect of the case appears to have escaped the attention of the learned District Judge. That the Plaintiff acted bona fide is crystal clear from the fact that the Plaintiff did not suppress the letter aforementioned, which, as a matter of fact, nullified the Plaintiffs claim that the Plaintiff was entitled to use the trademark, which the Plaintiff had applied for. The averments, so made in the petition for injunction, can, no doubt, be held as incorrect; but in the absence of even an iota of material on record indicating that the Plaintiff had made the said incorrect averments mala fide and knowingly that its said statement was incorrect and when there is, admittedly, overwhelming material on record to indicate that the Plaintiff had made the said averments under a genuinely incorrect impression based on an incorrect legal opinion, it is not possible, at least, at this stage, to infer that the Plaintiff had consciously and knowingly made the said averments incorrectly. The present one is a classic case, which shows that every incorrect statement need not necessarily be a false statement. The present one is a classic case, which shows that every incorrect statement need not necessarily be a false statement. Situated thus, one cannot reasonably conclude that the Plaintiff had deliberately lied and/or made false statements in the petition for injunction. On the mere ground, therefore, that the Plaintiff had incorrectly averred in the application for injunction that its Bidi was sold under a registered trademark, the Plaintiff cannot be said to have come to the Court with unclean hands and/or was disentitled to obtain equitable relief of injunction. 10. Moreover, though the learned District Judge has observed, in the impugned order, that the Plaintiff's product is sold under a registered trademark, a careful reading of the impugned order clearly reveals that the temporary injunction has not been granted for infringement of the Plaintiff's registered trademark, but on account of the fact that there was possibility of the product of the Defendants being passed off in place of the product of the Plaintiff and thereby cause irreparable loss to the Plaintiff. In fact, the learned District Judge has granted temporary injunction on being satisfied that there was a prima facie case to go in for trial, the Plaintiff would suffer irreparable loss if the injunction was not granted and that the balance of convenience was also in favour of granting of the temporary injunction. 11. Now, turning to the question as to whether temporary injunction could have been granted, in the present case, on the basis of the principle of "passing off", what needs to be borne in mind is that a person may sell his goods under a particular brand name or style. With the lapse of time, such a person's product may acquire a reputation or goodwill, which becomes a property and such a property needs to be protected by suitable orders of the Court. A competitor, who initiates sale of his goods in the same name or by imitating a name or style in such a way, which is likely to cause injury to the business of the one, who has already established his product, is not permitted by the principle of passing off from carrying on his business in such a way as would persuade the customers into believing that the latter product is same as the former one or is a derivative of the earlier one. In such a case, it does not really matter whether the latter person does so fraudulently or otherwise. The reasons are two, namely, (i) honesty and fair play are, and ought to be, the basic policies in the world of business and (ii) when a person adopts or intends to adopt a name in connection with his business, which already belongs to someone else, it results in confusion and has the propensity of diverting the customers of the former product to the latter one, for, the customers may buy the latter products under such confusion and without really knowing the difference between the two products, the resultant effect being injury to the one, who had established his name or brand. (See Laxmikant v. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah reported in (2002) 3 SCC 65 ). Where there is probability of confusion in business, an injunction will be granted even though the Defendants adopted the name innocently. (See Laxmikant v. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah reported in (2002) 3 SCC 65 ). 12. In Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. reported in (2001) 5 SCC 73 , a three-Judge Bench, at para 35, has, while dealing with the concept of 'passing-off', laid down that the following factors shall be considered, when a Court has to decide the question of deceptive similarity: (a) The nature of the marks i.e. whether the marks are word marks or label marks or composite marks i.e. both words and label works. (b) The degree of resembleness between the marks, phonetically similar and hence similar in idea. (c) The nature of the goods in respect of which they are used as trade marks. (d) The similarity in the nature, character and performance of the goods of the rival traders. (e) The class of purchasers who are likely to buy the goods bearing the marks they require, on their education and intelligence and a degree of care they are likely to exercise in purchasing and/or using the goods. (f) The mode of purchasing the goods or - placing orders for the goods. (g) Any other surrounding circumstances which may be relevant in the extent of dissimilarity between the competing marks. Weightage to be given to each of the aforesaid factors depending upon facts of each case and the same weightage cannot be given to each factor in every case. 13. In Midas Hygiene Industries (P) Ltd. and Anr. (g) Any other surrounding circumstances which may be relevant in the extent of dissimilarity between the competing marks. Weightage to be given to each of the aforesaid factors depending upon facts of each case and the same weightage cannot be given to each factor in every case. 13. In Midas Hygiene Industries (P) Ltd. and Anr. v. Sudhir Bhatia and Ors. reported in (2004) 3 SCC 90 , while the Plaintiff's product was being sold under the name of Laxman Rekha, the Defendant chose to sell his product under the name of Majic Laxman Rekha. The Supreme Court refused to interfere with the order of injunction, when it found that the names are not entirely dissimilar and when the Defendant's cartons did have the similar colour, getup, background and colour combination as those of the Plaintiff. Though in Midas Hygiene Industries (P) Ltd. (Supra), the injunction was granted for infringement of copy right, the fact remains that the observations of the Court made in para 3 and 6 are relevant, while considering the scope of the principle of 'passing off', for, the observations read as follows: In view of these facts, the learned Single Judge granted an interim injunction preventing the Respondents, their servants, agents distributors, stockists or any other person acting on their behalf from manufacturing, marketing, distributing or selling insecticides, pesticides as well as insect repellent under the name laxman rekha as well as packing design having similar colour scheme, get-up, background and colour combination as that of the Appellants copyright. The Respondents filed an appeal which has been disposed of by the impugned judgment. The Division Bench in spite of noting the factors which have been set out by the learned Single Judge, has vacated the injunction merely on the ground that there was delay and laches in filing the suit. It has held that such delay and laches disentitled grant of injunction. The Respondents were merely directed to file regular accounts of their sales in Court. The law on the subject is well settled. In cases of infringement either of trade mark or of copyright, normally an injunction must follow. Mere delay in bringing action is not sufficient to defeat grant of injunction in such cases. The grant of injunction also becomes necessary if it prima facie appears that the adoption of the mark was itself dishonest. In cases of infringement either of trade mark or of copyright, normally an injunction must follow. Mere delay in bringing action is not sufficient to defeat grant of injunction in such cases. The grant of injunction also becomes necessary if it prima facie appears that the adoption of the mark was itself dishonest. In this case, it is an admitted position that the Respondents used to work with the Appellants. The advertisements, which had been issued by the Appellants in the year 1991, show that at least from that year they were using the mark Laxman Rekha on their products. Not only that but the Appellants have had a copyright in the marks Krazy Lines and Laxman Rekha with effect from 19.11.1991. The copyright had been renewed on 23.04.1999. A glance at the cartons used by both the parties shows that in 1992, when the Respondent first started he used the mark Laxman Rekha on cartons containing colours red, white and blue. No explanation could be given as to why that carton had to be changed to look almost identical to that of the Appellant at a subsequent stage. This prima facie indicates the dishonest intention to pass off his goods as those of the Appellants. 14. From the observations made in Midas Hygiene Industries (P) Ltd. (Supra), it is clear that when a person sells, as is the present case, his product in cartons or poly packets, which is identical to an established brand and no explanation is offered for choosing such a carton or poly packet, it prima facie indicates dishonest intention to pass off the goods, which is subsequently introduced in the market. Reliance placed by Mr. Dhar to Midas Hygiene Industries (P) Ltd. (Supra) cannot, therefore, be said to be entirely incorrect. 15. While considering a case of passing-off, the Court has to bear in mind the ground reality that the common population, in India, is largely illiterate and unlike English people, who know English language. All the English decisions, on the principle of passing-off', may not, thus, be relevant in deciding cases in India (See Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. reported in (2001) 5 SCC 73 ). All the English decisions, on the principle of passing-off', may not, thus, be relevant in deciding cases in India (See Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. reported in (2001) 5 SCC 73 ). In an action of passing off, what, therefore, needs to be borne in mind is whether the misrepresentation is of such a nature as is likely to confuse an ordinary consumer and is likely to make an ordinary confused consumer buy one product for Anr. product due to similarity of various features, such as, name, colour combination, design, layout and get-up. 16. In the backdrop of the above discussion of the position of the law with regard to 'passing-off, I am, now, required to determine the correctness or otherwise of the impugned order of temporary injunction. While considering this aspect of the matter, what also needs to be borne in mind is that injunction is an equitable relief. The power to grant or decline injunction essentially lies in the realm of discretion of the Court. The norms for exercise of such powers are no longer vague and indefinite. It is well acknowledged that before a Court grants injunction, it must ascertain if the Plaintiff seeking injunction has a prima facie case to go for trial, whether the balance of convenience lies in favour of granting injunction and whether irreparable loss and injury will be caused to the Plaintiff if injunction is refused. Coupled with these conditions precedent, the Court has also the onus to ascertain if any question of public interest is involved. These conditions precedent have been accepted as the cardinal principles to be considered by the Court, while adjudicating the rival claims of the parties made for and against grant of injunction. In fact what are the settled principles governing grant of injunction are not difficult to state; the difficulty, however, lies in applying these principles to the facts of a given case. The power to grant and/or refuse injunction is a drastic power and may have the effect of causing serious consequences to the party against whom the injunction is granted. This discretionary power has, therefore, to be exercised with the great circumspection, care and caution. 17. In a catena of cases, the Apex Court has laid down, the scope of the appellate Court power to interfere with the grant or refusal of injunction. This discretionary power has, therefore, to be exercised with the great circumspection, care and caution. 17. In a catena of cases, the Apex Court has laid down, the scope of the appellate Court power to interfere with the grant or refusal of injunction. In Wander Ltd. v. Antox Indian Pvt. Ltd. reported in (1990) Supp. SCC 727, the Apex Court has held that unless discretion has been exercised by the Trial Court arbitrarily, capriciously, whimsically or without due regard to the established principles governing the grant or refusal of injunction, the appellate Court should be slow to interfere with the discretion exercised by the Court below. A view possible on the facts of the case, if adopted by the Trial Court, must be allowed to prevail, notwithstanding the fact that the appellate Court, on the same facts, might be inclined to take Anr. view. If, however, the view taken by the Trial Court is neither possible nor a reasonable one at all, the appellate Court can interfere. 18. Observed a Division Bench of this Court in Bindeswar Narayan Singh and Ors. v. Managing Committee, Shri Sundarmal Hindi School and Ors. reported in 1981 (1) GLR 231, 16. The power of the appellate Court in the matter or injunction is rather circumscribed. The appellate Court would be slow to interfere with the exercise of discretion and would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of the discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it may have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate Court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial Court's exercise of discretions. If it appears to the appellate Court that in exercising its discretion the trial Court has acted unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored relevant facts, then, it would certainly be open to the appellate Court to interfere with the trial Court's exercise of discretion AIR 1967 SC 249 Where the trial Court had not exercised its discretion capriciously or arbitrarily, no case for interference would be made our, AIR 1969 SC 938 . Only if the discretion is not exercised by the trial Court in the spirit of statute or fairly or honestly or according to the rules of reason and justice, the order passed by the lower Court can be reversed by the superior Court, (1977) 2 SCC 457 . 19. In short, thus, the power of the appellate Court to interfere with exercise of discretion by the trial Court, in the matter of granting of temporary injunction, is, somewhat, circumcised. Unless the exercise of discretion is based on perverse findings and/ or contrary to law, interference in appeal is not permissible, for, even if there were two views possible and the trial Court accepts one of such views, the appellate Court will not substitute the other view as a more reasonable one unless the appellate Court comes to a finding that the view, which the trial Court has taken, is completely perverse, irrational and contrary to law. 20. Bearing in mind the scope and ambit of an appeal arising out of exercise of discretionary power, when I turn to the facts of the present case, what I notice is that the product, in question, is Bidi and that Bidi is, generally, smoked by illiterate and semi-illiterate people and, largely, in rural areas. It is the people of such average intelligence, who would be, generally, as rightly contended on behalf of the Plaintiff, buy Bidi. Though the Plaintiffs product is sold under the name and style of "Special Babu Bidi", it is correctly submitted by Mr. Dhar, on behalf of the Plaintiff-Respondent, that generally, a villager would ask for Babu Bidi and it would not be difficult for an unscrupulous seller to pass-off 'Super Babu Bidi' in place of 'Special Babu Bidi'. Phonetically speaking, therefore, the names of the two products, in question, are not so strikingly different from each other that the same would not mislead or deceive anyone, particularly, the average consumers of Bidi. Far from this, phonetically, the names of the two products are such that one can easily pass-off one product in place of the other. Phonetically speaking, therefore, the names of the two products, in question, are not so strikingly different from each other that the same would not mislead or deceive anyone, particularly, the average consumers of Bidi. Far from this, phonetically, the names of the two products are such that one can easily pass-off one product in place of the other. Moreover, it is not in dispute before me that the Plaintiff had started manufacturing Bidi as early as in 1987 and acquired a market of its own and it was only in the last week of December, 2004, that the Defendant, in the same area, i.e., Kharupetia Town, started manufacturing and selling Bidi under the said trade name. In such a situation, it is not difficult to perceive, even at this stage, the clear possibility of the Plaintiff loosing its business and Defendants selling-off their product, because of the name and reputation, which the Plaintiffs product has acquired. 21. Coupled with the above, both the poly packets, which are the subject-matter of controversy, were placed before the learned trial Court and have been placed before this Court too. The design and the colour combination of both the products bear great similarity. Though it is contended by the Defendant-Appellants that their colour combination is different from that of the Plaintiff's product, the fact remains that while the Plaintiff's product bears combination of red and yellow colour, the Defendant's product, sold in similar poly packets, bear a lighter shade of almost of the same colour. It is not that while Plaintiff's poly packet bears the colour scheme of red, the colour scheme of the product of the Defendants is green and/ or while the label of the Plaintiff's colour is pale yellow, the colour of the label used by the Defendant is blue. A bare glance on the two poly packets show that the two poly packets have almost similar colour schemes and designs, and that even the photographs of the proprietors of the product are similar inasmuch as in the photograph of the Plaintiffs product, while the proprietor is shown to wear a shirt with a tie and coat, the product of the Defendants appear with the photograph of the proprietor, who has donned a shirt and a tie. In short, both the products appear with photographs of their proprietors and the photographs show that proprietors are wearing ties. 22. In short, both the products appear with photographs of their proprietors and the photographs show that proprietors are wearing ties. 22. The learned trial Court was, therefore, correct in observing that though the yellow colour used by the Defendants is a bit lighter than the yellow colour found in the poly packets of the 'Special Babu Bidi' most of the consumers of Bidi, being illiterate people, would be easily deceived by the size, colour and style of the poly packets, particularly, because the average consumers of Bidi are not concerned with the writings on the poly packets and it would not be possible for them to differentiate one from the other, when both the poly packets bear similar looks. 23. In Manmohan Garg v. Radha Krishna Narayan Das Through Its Partners reported in (1998) 3 SCC 244 , the Plaintiff used to sell their Bidis with the label Khargosh Chhap and subsequently, the Defendant started selling their Bidi by using a label, which was deceptively similar to, and was a colourable imitation of, the Plaintiff's Khargosh Chhap Bidi in respect of design, colour, layout, getup and the colour scheme. The Apex Court held that there was sufficient justification for granting of injunction in such a case. In the present case too, after the Plaintiff had established its brand, namely, 'Special Babu Bidi', the Defendant started producing and selling their Bidi under the name of 'Super Babu Bidi' using a label, which is substantially similar to, and, in fact, colourable imitation of, the Plaintiff's product in respect of design, layout getup and colour scheme. In the face of these noticeable facts, the grant of temporary injunction by the learned trial Court cannot be said to be unfounded, illogical, unreasonable, perverse and/or not sustainable in law. 24. In Cadila (Supra), in place of a product, which was earlier sold under a brand name Amritdhara, Anr. similar product under the brand name Laxmandhara was brought into market. The Court took the view that the two names bear phonetic similarity. In the case at hand, for a common man, there is little or no difference between the Special and Super Babu Bidi and the brand name, which the Defendants have started using subsequently, is likely to confuse an ordinary consumer of 'Special Babu Bidi' and make him buy 'Super Babu Bidi' in place of 'Special Babu Bidi'. In the case at hand, for a common man, there is little or no difference between the Special and Super Babu Bidi and the brand name, which the Defendants have started using subsequently, is likely to confuse an ordinary consumer of 'Special Babu Bidi' and make him buy 'Super Babu Bidi' in place of 'Special Babu Bidi'. For an unwary consumer of average intelligence, it would be difficult to distinguish the two products. 25. In the case at hand too, though a categorical comparison of the two names of the products, in question, may disclose some points of differences or dissimilarities, but to an ordinary illiterate consumer of average intelligence and imperfect recollection, the product sold under the name of' Super Babu Bidi' is likely to be passed off in place of the Plaintiffs established brand, namely, 'Special Babu Bidi'. In the circumstances, such as the present one, it was not illegal, unjust or unfair, on the part of the learned trial Court, to pass the impugned order of temporary injunction. 26. While considering the present appeal, it is pertinent to note that the present one is really a case of 'passing-off', and not of infringement of any registered trademark. In a case of 'passing-off', the brand name or the carton or the packet in which the product, in question, is marketed, shall be compared as a whole. It is not wise to take a portion of a word or a portion of a design and say that as that particular portion of the word or that particular part of the design differs from the corresponding portion of the brand name or the design of the product, there is no sufficient similarity to cause confusion. The true test is whether totality of the get-up in which the product is sold is likely to cause deception or confusion or mistake in the minds of those, who are accustomed to the existing brand or product. The action of 'passing-off', lies when taking advantage of an established product in the market, Anr. person brings out his product with the similar brand name or with similar carton or packet and thereby confuse customers used to the established brand and pass off the subsequently manufactured product in place of the established one. 27. The action of 'passing-off', lies when taking advantage of an established product in the market, Anr. person brings out his product with the similar brand name or with similar carton or packet and thereby confuse customers used to the established brand and pass off the subsequently manufactured product in place of the established one. 27. In view of the fact that the Plaintiff had been using poly packets for selling of its products since 1987 and the Defendants started selling their product only towards the end of the year 2004, it was clear that if suitable order of injunction was not passed, the Plaintiff would have suffered irreparable loss. Balance of convenience was also in favour of the Plaintiff inasmuch as the Defendants, if not suitably restrained, would have continued to sell their products in poly packets and thereby cause irreparable loss to the Plaintiff. 28. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, I do not find that the impugned order suffers from any infirmity. Considered thus, it is clear that the present appeal is wholly without merit. 29. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed with cost of Rs. 2,000/-. Appeal dismissed