JUDGMENT Bilal Nazki J. Heard learned counsel for the parties. These matters raise same questions of fact and law. Therefore, they are being disposed of together. The main question that is raised in all these petitions is that when an appeal was pending before the State Sales Tax Tribunal, whether the sales tax authorities could exercise the power of revision ? It is contended by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners that this question is not res integra and has already been decided by a Full Bench of this court in Indo National Limited v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Hyderabad [2004] 136 STC 586; [2001] 33 APSTJ 206. The Full Bench was interpreting section 20(2-A) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 (for brevity "the Act") and it held that : "There cannot be any dispute that in the hierarchy of authorities provided for under the Act, the Appellate Tribunal is superior to the Commissioner of the Commercial Taxes. Irrespective of the fact that as to whether principles of res judicata will be applicable or not, we are of the opinion that the said provision creates a bar in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction by the Commissioner if the issue or question has already been decided by the Appellate Tribunal in relation to the earlier assessment year. A distinction must be borne in mind that had the intention of the Legislature been otherwise, the same could have been specified in explicit language as was done in section 264(4)(c) of the Income-tax Act. The words 'issue or question' are of wide amplitude. An issue or question may arise in relation to the self same assessee in respect of any assessment year or it may arise after some years in relation to some other assessee. If such issue or question was the subject-matter of appeal before the Appellate Tribunal or if it has been decided by the Appellate Tribunal under section 21, evidently, on a plain reading of sub-section (2-A) of section 20, the same cannot be the subject-matter of revision under sub-section (1) of section 21 of the Act. If such issue or question was the subject-matter of appeal before the Appellate Tribunal or if it has been decided by the Appellate Tribunal under section 21, evidently, on a plain reading of sub-section (2-A) of section 20, the same cannot be the subject-matter of revision under sub-section (1) of section 21 of the Act. Furthermore, judicial and administrative discipline demands that inferior authority must act in terms of the decision of a superior authority." However, the learned counsel for the department submits that there is a difficulty that if revisional power is not exercised within a particular period of time, the revision would become time-barred as there are limitations in section 20(3) of the Act and, therefore, if an appeal is pending before the sales tax authority and ultimately assessee loses the appeal, revisional authority cannot invoke the power of revision if the time prescribed under section 20(3) has already expired. The learned Senior Counsel has drawn our attention to a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Director of Inspection of Income-tax (Investigation), New Delhi v. Pooran Mall & Sons [1974] 96 ITR 390, which according to the learned counsel has held that once time is sought by a party, that party cannot take the defence of limitation. The relevant portion of the judgment is as under : "Even apart from the consent of the parties it was open to the court in writ petition No. 82 of 1972, to have set aside the earlier order of the Income-tax Officer and direct a fresh disposal of the matter by the Income-tax Officer on the ground which was in fact agreed to by the parties, that the aggrieved party had no reasonable opportunity of putting forward its case. It was within its power to do so. If respondents Nos. 1 and 2 wanted to urge that the order of the Income-tax Officer impugned in W.P. No. 82 of 1972 was liable to be set aside as they had no reasonable opportunity to put forward their case they could have done so. They need not have agreed to the matter being considered afresh. The court would in any case have passed such an order. Having agreed and thus persuaded the court to direct the Income-tax Officer to pass a fresh order respondents Nos. 1 and 2 cannot question the order of the Income-tax Officer on the basis of such direction. They need not have agreed to the matter being considered afresh. The court would in any case have passed such an order. Having agreed and thus persuaded the court to direct the Income-tax Officer to pass a fresh order respondents Nos. 1 and 2 cannot question the order of the Income-tax Officer on the basis of such direction. They should be deemed to be estopped from so contending. They had by their consent made the Income-tax Officer to put himself at a disadvantage, because he is now faced with the contention that he had no jurisdiction to pass a fresh order. Furthermore, it is not a case of the court conferring jurisdiction on the Income-tax Officer to decide a case after he had lost jurisdiction over the matter. The procedure from the date of seizure to the date of the second order of the Income-tax Officer is an integrated process. Though a proceeding under article 226 is an original proceeding and not by way of an appeal against the order of a court or of a Tribunal, it is part and parcel of our established judicial procedure and to treat it as though it were something outside the normal procedure and not part of an integrated whole would be wholly unrealistic. It is, therefore, possible for the parties to agree to a fresh disposal by the Income-tax Officer even as the court would have ordered. It is also not a case of the parties conferring jurisdiction on the Income-tax Officer by consent. It is a case where the parties agreed to a particular mode of exercise by the Income-tax Officer of a jurisdiction which he cannot be said to have lost or in respect of which he has become functus officio. It is also not a case of the parties conferring jurisdiction on the Income-tax Officer by consent. It is a case where the parties agreed to a particular mode of exercise by the Income-tax Officer of a jurisdiction which he cannot be said to have lost or in respect of which he has become functus officio. Though it is true that on passing an order under section 132(5) the Income-tax Officer can be said to become functus officio it is the court's order that revives his powers and jurisdiction." Going by this judgment and also the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court, we are of the view that when a matter is pending before the Sales Tax Tribunal and a revision is initiated by authority under the Act and if a request is made by the assessee to stay the revision till disposal of the appeal, in view of mandate of section 20(2-A), the stay should invariably be granted and the period spent in the litigation before the Tribunal should not be counted for the purpose of limitation under section 20(3) if the Revenue decides to initiate revision after Tribunal decides the matter. The impugned orders are set aside. However, the parties are at liberty to initiate revision if they so desire after the Tribunal decides the matter. The appeals and writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs. Cases referred : Indo National Limited V. Commissioner Of Commercial Taxes, A. P., Hyderabad. (And Other Ca....