JUDGMENT 1. - Decree holder has filed instant revision petition against order dated 18.11.2002 whereby Additional District Judge No. 2, Jaipur City, dismissed application for execution of decree (Execution Case 22/2002) while treating it to be time barred. 2. Plaintiff (petitioner) along with one Madhobai Wd/o Brij Mohan jointly filed suit 20/73 (old 41/64) for declaration and possession of suit property against Moolidevi (since deceased) and her husband Jugal Kishore. The suit was decreed on 10.2.1975 in favour of plaintiffs and against defendant Moolidevi for possession of suit property as described in para 1 of plaint, against which respondents filed regular first appeal (CFA 94/1975) which was dismissed by this Court vide judgment dated 25.2.1988 against which defendant judgment debtor preferred further Special Appeal (Civil) No. 37/1988 before the Division Bench of this Court and which was admitted for hearing and is pending consideration. Initially on 4.4.1989, conditional stay order was passed in Special Appeal (Civil) and since the defendant failed to comply with condition, as such the stay order stood vacated on 3.6.1989 and thereafter there was no stay in operation, decree holder the petitioner filed application for execution of decree before the Executing Court, to which the respondents (judgment debtor filed their objection and submitted that as per Art. 136 of Indian Limitation Act, 1963 ("the Act") period of limitation is 12 years for execution of the decree and from original decree passed by learned trial Court, more than 27 years have elapsed and even after rejection of first appeal, more than 14 years have passed and there has been no stay order in operation, hence decree in question is not executable. Taking note of objection raised by judgment debtor, the Executing Court accepted their objections and rejected execution case vide order impugned holding that it is barred by limitation and the decree is not executable. Hence this revision petition. 3. Taking note of objection raised by judgment debtor, the Executing Court accepted their objections and rejected execution case vide order impugned holding that it is barred by limitation and the decree is not executable. Hence this revision petition. 3. Counsel for the petitioner submits that once appeal is pending before this Court having been filed by judgment debtor (defendant), decree holder has every right to get decree executed within 12 years from the date of disposal of special appeal and in the event of pendente appeal, decree of trial Court will merge with that of appellate Court; as such executing Court committed gross material irregularity in passing the order impugned by rejecting execution application holding it to be time barred instead of holding it to be premature. 4. Counsel further submits that executing Court has completely over- looked that as per settled principle of law, it is the decree of final Court of appeal, which is executable irrespective of fact that there is any stay order or injunction operative and this being legal position, the executing Court was not justified in rejecting execution application than to hold it premature or to have kept it pending till disposal of special appeal (Civil) of judgment debtor pendente before this Court; in such circumstances, order impugned holding execution apt ;cation as time barred smacks of gross error of law, which calls for interference by invoking Section 115, C.P.C. In support of his contention, counsel placed reliance upon decision of Apex Court in Union of India v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd., 2004 (1) DNJ (SC) 320 . 5. Contrarily, counsel for respondents while supporting finding recorded by executing Court under order impugned, contends that there was no stay operative and mere pendency of special appeal (Civil) will not absolve the decree holder from period of limitation which once has commenced after original decree was passed by trial Court in 1975 and thus execution application is time barred because it was not filed within 12 years period of limitation in view of Art. 136 of the Limitation Act. 6. I have considered contentions of counsel for both the parties and with their assistance, examined and gone through the finding recorded under order impugned. It cannot be disputed that appeal is considered to be continuation of suit and decree becomes executable only after the appeal is final disposed of. 6. I have considered contentions of counsel for both the parties and with their assistance, examined and gone through the finding recorded under order impugned. It cannot be disputed that appeal is considered to be continuation of suit and decree becomes executable only after the appeal is final disposed of. It is equally well established that in the event of pendente appeal, decree of trial Court merges with that of appellate Court. Doctrine of merger is too well known to call of further elaboration the moment appellate decree comes, original decree looses its entity and after passing of the appellate decree, original decree by way of merger looses its very existence as appellate decree subsists, which alone is enforceable and not decree passed by original decree. It goes without saying that in absence of any appeal, original decree is only enforceable and period of limitation will be computed from its original decree as has been considered by Apex Court in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359 ad infra: "12. The logic underlying the doctrine of merger is that there cannot be more than one decree or operative orders governing the same subject- matter at a given point of time. When a decree or order passed by an inferior Court, Tribunal or authority was subjected to a remedy available under the law before a superior forum then, though the decree or, order under challenge continues to be effective and binding, nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy. Once the superior Court has disposed of the lis before it either way - whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is the decree or order of the superior Court, Tribunal or authority which is the final, binding and operative decree or order wherein merges the decree or order passed by the Court, Tribunal or the authority below. However, the doctrine is not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view." It was further observed: 42. "To merge" means to sink or disappear in something else; to become absorbed or extinguished; to be combined or be swallowed up. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view." It was further observed: 42. "To merge" means to sink or disappear in something else; to become absorbed or extinguished; to be combined or be swallowed up. Merger in law is defined as the absorption of a thing of lesser importance by a greater, whereby the lesser ceases to exist, but the greater is not increased; an absorption or swallowing up so as to involve a loss of identity and individuality. (See. Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. LVII, pp. 1067-68)" In UOI v. West Coast Paper Mills (supra), Apex Court has finally observed in paras 42 and 43 ad infra: "42. In the aforementioned cases, this Court failed to take into consideration that once an appeal is filed before this Court and the same is entertained, the judgment of the High Court or the Tribunal is in jeopardy. The subject matter of the lis unless determined by the last Court, cannot be said to have attained finality. Grant of stay of operation of the judgment may not be of much relevance once this Court grants special leave and decides to hear the matter on merit. 43. It has not been and could not be contended that even under the ordinary civil law the judgment of the appellate Court alone can be put to execution. Having regard to the doctrine of merger as also the principle that an appeal is in continuation of suit, we are of the opinion that the decision of the Constitution Bench in S.S. Rathore (supra) was to be followed in the instant case." In Syed Abdul Rauf v. Nuru1 Hussain, AIR 1992 Raj. 3 this Court after taking note of law laid down by Apex Court (supra) held that the decree of trial Court get merged with appellate decree and which alone remains executable irrespective of fact that the appellate Court affirms, modifies or reverse the lower Court's decree. 7. In view of settled principles of law (supra), in my considered opinion, the executing Court has committed manifest error of law in rejecting execution application filed by the petitioner decree holder. Consequently, this revision petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. 7. In view of settled principles of law (supra), in my considered opinion, the executing Court has committed manifest error of law in rejecting execution application filed by the petitioner decree holder. Consequently, this revision petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. Order dated 18.11.2002 of ADJ No. 2, Jaipur City rejecting execution application No. 22/2002 holding it time barred is set aside. No costs.Stay application No. 812/2003 also stands disposed of.Revision petition allowed. *******