( 1 ) THIS petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India is at the instance of the plaintiff. It is directed against the order dated 15 2-2005 passed by the Additional district Judge, Barwaha, in Civil Suit no. 6-A/2004. By the order impugned, learned trial Judge while deciding application under O. VII, R. 11 of the Code of the civil Procedure, 1908 directed petitioner to suitably amend the plaint to claim appropriate relief under S. 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as 'the act' for short) and pay requisite Court-fee thereon. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated, relevant facts are as under. Petitioner filed a suit for permanent injunction on the allegations that respondent nos. 1 to 3 are the owners of suit land and superstructure standing thereon more particularly described in the plaint. Respondent no. 4 is holder of power of attorney. On 14-1-2004, an agreement of sale of the suit property together with fixtures, attachments etc. was entered into between the parties for valuable consideration. During the subsistence of the agreement and ignoring terms thereof, the agreement respondent nos. 1 to 3 started damaging suit property and threatened to dispose of it to third party. Hence the suit for permanent injunction wherein petitioner valued the suit at Rs. 51,000/- and paid Court-fees of Rs. 560/ -. ( 3 ) RESPONDENTS herein filed an application under O. VII, R. 11 praying for rejection of plaint, on various grounds, amongst other on the ground of relief of permanent injunction was misconceived and improper valuation and payment of Court-fees. Application was opposed by the petitioner. Learned trial Judge, after hearing submissions, partly allowed the application by the order impugned and directed amendment of plaint in the light of provisions contained in s. 34 of the Act and to pay requisite Court-fee as mentioned above. ( 4 ) WE have heard rival submissions of learned counsel for parties at length and perused material available on record. Learned counsel for petitioner assailed the legality of the order impugned and submitted that it is unsustainable in law. On the other hand learned counsel for respondents supported the order impugned and submitted that petition deserves dismissal as no interference is warranted with it in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction conferred by Art. 227 of the Constitution. Learned counsel for petitioner assailed the legality of the order impugned and submitted that it is unsustainable in law. On the other hand learned counsel for respondents supported the order impugned and submitted that petition deserves dismissal as no interference is warranted with it in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction conferred by Art. 227 of the Constitution. ( 5 ) FROM a perusal of order impugned, it is clear that learned trial Judge was of the opinion that petitioner did not acquire any right, interest over the suit property by virtue of agreement dated 14-12-2004, hence no relief of permanent injunction could be granted under S. 38 of the Act, but he could claim specific performance of the agreement of sale, therefore, instead of rejecting the plaint, directed petitioner to amend it and to pay requisite Court-fee on the proper valuation of relief. ( 6 ) THE approach of the learned trial judge is clearly wrong and incorrect. It is against settled principle of law that a covenant to sell immoveable property runs along with it and creates an enforceable obligation which is recognised by S. 2 of the Act. In Plews v. Samuel, 1904 (1) Ch D 464, kekewich, J. held that the position of a vendor in possession, qua the person who has taken agreement for purchasing property, was in a sense that of a trustee and he was not entitled to treat the asset at his own as long as he had an obligation which can be specifically performed by reason of contract which he had entered into with the purchaser. If he wilfully damaged or injured the property he was liable to the purchaser. In other words, vendor in possession holds the property in fiduciary capacity and owes a duty to the purchaser. In such a situation under S. 38 of the Act, during the subsistence of the contract for sale, a vendee can maintain a suit for permanent injunction till relation of vendor and vendee are completely discharged. In the case in hand, plaintiff has come out with specific pleading that respondent nos. 1 to 3 through their attorney entered into an agreement of sale and, contrary to terms of the subsisting covenant, are damaging suit property. Respondent nos. In the case in hand, plaintiff has come out with specific pleading that respondent nos. 1 to 3 through their attorney entered into an agreement of sale and, contrary to terms of the subsisting covenant, are damaging suit property. Respondent nos. 1 to 3 during the subsistence of the covenant are holding the suit property in their fiduciary capacity and petitioner has a remedy of permanent injunction against them till the relationship created under the covenant is discharged completely. In view of this, learned trial Judge committed an illegality in holding that plaintiff's remedy lay only under S. 34 of the Act; consequently direction to amend the plaint is unsustainable. The upshot of the above discussion is that the order impugned deciding application under O. VII, R. 11 cannot be sustained and deserves to be set aside. ( 7 ) ACCORDINGLY the writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above and the order impugned is hereby quashed. Petitioner shall be entitled to Rs. 2500/- as costs of the petition. Order accordingly. .