ORDER 1. This appeal, by grant of special leave, has been filed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Lucknow, V.P. (for short "the appellant") against the impugned final order of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Sales Tax Revision No. 799 of 1979 dated 17-4-1979 whereby the High Court has dismissed the revision petition filed by the appellant. 2. The respondent in spite of service is not present and proceeded ex parte. 3. Brief facts giving rise to the present controversy are: The dispute• in the present case relates to the year 1966-67. The respondent assessee, hereinafter referred to as "the respondent" is a dealer in foodgrains, cement, kerosene oil, etc. The account books of the respondent were accepted but the assessing officer did not allow tax exemption on purchase of rice for Rs 31,278.44. Similarly, the assessing officer did not allow tax exemption to the respondent on the purchase of broken dal worth Rs 8,71,474.13. The assessing officer also fixed the turnover of imported kerosene oil at Rs 1,47,898.43. 4. Aggrieved against the aforesaid order of the assessing officer, the respondent filed an appeal. In appeal the order passed by the assessing authority was confirmed. The respondent thereafter filed Revision Application No. 986 of 1978 before the Additional Revising Authority, Sales Tax, Kanpur. The revising authority accepted the revision and set aside the orders passed by the Appellate Authority and assessing authority and remanded the case back for reassessment in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in the order of the revising authority. 5. The appellant, being aggrieved, filed Sales Tax Revision No. 799 of 1979 in the High Court. The High Court relying upon a decision of a Single Judge in Gouti Sandhu v. CSTI held that Explanation II to Section 3-D of the V.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 (for short "the Act") ceased to be on the statute book in view of the subsequent amendments and was not applicable to the present case and, therefore, the distinction between the split and processed foodgrains and the unsplit and unprocessed foodgrains no longer existed. Contention of the respondent that he was not liable to pay tax on the broken dal purchased by him from the dal mills on the ground that dal mills had already paid tax on the unbroken dal from which the broken dal was produced was accepted and revision was dismissed. Legislative history 6. In Tilok Chand Prasan Kumar v. STO the High Court of Allahabad considered the question "as to whether arhar dal purchased by dal mills and converted into broken down dal was a commodity different from arhar dal". It was held that dehusking, cleaning and breaking down of the dal or grain does not bring into existence a new commercial commodity. 7. Purchase tax was being levied under Section 3-D of the Act and after this decision the legislature stepped in to resolve the controversy in favour of the State by adding an Explanation with retrospective effect to Section 3-D by amending the Act by the V.P. Sales Tax (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1970 (V.P. Act 2 of 1970). The said Explanation II reads as under: "Explanation 1I.-For the purposes of this sub-section, split or processed foodgrains, such as in the form of dal, shall be deemed to be different from unsplit or unprocessed foodgrains, and accordingly, nothing in this sub-section shall be construed to prevent the imposition, levy or collection of the tax in respect of the first purchases of split or processed food grains merely because tax had been imposed, levied or collected earlier in respect of the first purchases of those foodgrains in their unsplit or unprocessed form." 8. In view of this amendment, when the case of processed dal came up for consideration before the High Court again in 1972, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Prakash Trading Co. v. CSJ3 held that processed dal was different from unprocessed dal purchased by dal mills and, therefore, purchase tax could be levied on the first purchase of each of such commodities. 9. A four-Judge Bench of this Court in Hiralal Rattanlal v. State of u.p'4 upheld the vires of the aforesaid Explanation II by observing thus: (SCC pp. 222-23, para 16) "16. Now coming to Point 3, there is no justification for the contention that the legislature has usurped any judicial power. 9. A four-Judge Bench of this Court in Hiralal Rattanlal v. State of u.p'4 upheld the vires of the aforesaid Explanation II by observing thus: (SCC pp. 222-23, para 16) "16. Now coming to Point 3, there is no justification for the contention that the legislature has usurped any judicial power. The legislature has not purported either directly or by necessary implication to overrule the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Tilok Chand Prasan Kumar Case. On the other hand it has accepted that decision as correct; but has sought to remove the basis of that decision by retrospectively changing the law. This Court has pointed out in several cases the distinction between the encroachment on the judicial power and the nullification of the effect of a judicial decision by changing the law retrospectively. The former is outside the competence of the legislature but the latter is within its permissible limits. From the Statement of Objects and Reasons, it appears that in the principal Act, the legislative intent was not clearly brought out. By means of the amending Act the legislature wanted to make clear its intent." 10. If Explanation II, as introduced by the 1970 amending Act, to Section 3-D stood as it was, there was hardly any room for controversy. However, the Explanations to Section 3-D were amended by three subsequent amendments: (i) Act 11 of 1972; (ii) Act 17 of 1974 and (iii) Act 23 of 1976. 11. Section 6(e) of the amending Act 11 of 1972 reads: "6. (e) at the end, the following Explanation shall be inserted and be deemed always to have been inserted, namely 'Explanation.-For the purposes of this Act, the following goods shall be deemed to be different from each other, namely- (a) khandsari molasses, including sheera-sayar, sheeragalawat, and sheera-salawat; (b) rab, including rab-sayar, rab-galawat and rab-salawat; (c) gur-lauta and gur-raskat; and accordingly, nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the imposition, levy or collection of tax under Section 3-A in respect of any one of the said goods merely because tax has been imposed, levied or collected under this section in respect of any other of them, or vice versa.' " 12. After this, Amendment Act 17 of 1974 again amended Section 3-D. Section 2 of the amending Act of 1974 runs as under: "2. After this, Amendment Act 17 of 1974 again amended Section 3-D. Section 2 of the amending Act of 1974 runs as under: "2. Amendment of Section 3-D of u.P. Act 15 of 1948.-ln Section 3-D of the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act), in sub-section (1), at the end, the following Explanation shall be inserted and be deemed to have been inserted with effect from the first day of October, 1964, namely'Explanation.-For determining the turnover liable to tax under clause (b), the amounts for which goods are purchased by one registered dealer from another registered dealer shall be deducted from his gross turnover only if the purchase in question is proved not to be the first purchase.' " 13. After this, the Act was again amended by U.P. Act 23 of 1976; Section 3-D was again amended. Section 3 of the amending Act recites as under: "3. Amendment of Section 3-D-ln Section 3-D of the principal Act, in sub-section (I), the existing Explanation shall be renumbered as Explanation I, and thereafter the following Explanation II shall be inserted and be deemed always to have been inserted, namely'Explanation .-For the purposes of this sub-section, in relation to purchases of foodgrains in pursuance of any order made under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Act 10 of 1955), or under Rule 114 of the Defence and Internal Security of India Rules, 1971 including any purchase in excess of the levy share, the purchase first made by a dealer from the State Government or its purchasing agent shall be the first purchase of such foodgrains and the tax shall accordingly belevied at that point on such dealer.' " 14. The learned Single Judge in Gouti Sandhu easel after considering the amendments brought about in Section 3-D by the amending Act of 1970; Act 11 of 1972; Act 17 of 1974; and Act 23 of 1976 observed in paras 7 and 8: (UPTC pp. 710-11), "7. The learned Single Judge in Gouti Sandhu easel after considering the amendments brought about in Section 3-D by the amending Act of 1970; Act 11 of 1972; Act 17 of 1974; and Act 23 of 1976 observed in paras 7 and 8: (UPTC pp. 710-11), "7. If one were to read amendments effected by Act 11 of 1972, and Act 17 of 1974, which have already been extracted above, it might have been possible to take the view that these amending Acts did not impinge on Explanation I and Explanation II in Section 3-D as existing in 1972, for the amending sections only direct that an Explanation be added at the end of Section 3-0(1) without making any reference to Explanation I and Explanation II, which were already there on the statute-book. Section 3 of Act 23 of 1976 however dispels such a view. The reason being that it numbers the Explanation added by the earlier amending Acts as Explanation I, and adds another Explanation numbering it as Explanation II, with retrospective effect. If the intention of the legislature, while passing the two earlier amending Acts, had been to preserve Explanation I and Explanation II as found in Section 3-D at the time when the amendments were made, Section 3 of Act 23 of 1976 would not have directed that the existing Explanation should be numbered as Explanation I and a new Explanation set out in that Act should be numbered as Explanation II. It is not possible to take the view that the legislature intended that there should be two Explanations, both having the same number. The intention appears to be that the amending Acts of 1972 and 1974 died away with the earlier Explanations occurring at the end of Section 3-(1), and Act 23 of 1976 numbered the single Explanation in Section 3-D as Explanation I, and added a new Explanation with retrospective effect. As the amendment is retrospective, the matter has got to be decided by referring to the Explanations as now exist. It hardly admits of dispute that while deciding a reference a court can take notice of an amendment to the law which is retrospective in nature. (See CST v. b Cotton Mills.) 8. As the amendment is retrospective, the matter has got to be decided by referring to the Explanations as now exist. It hardly admits of dispute that while deciding a reference a court can take notice of an amendment to the law which is retrospective in nature. (See CST v. b Cotton Mills.) 8. Now, the Explanations as now stand do not throw any light on the controversy as to whether the processed foodgrains should be treated different from the foodgrains from which it is obtained after processing. This being so, the decision given in Tilok Chand case covers the controversy. It was pointed out that the principle laid down in Tilok Chand case should not be applied as in the present case as there is a finding by the Judge (Revisions) that dehusked barley is a commercially different commodity from barley. The Judge (Revisions) has given this conclusion solely by holding that dehusked barley was a commercially different commodity from barley as it was obtained after processing barley by a machine. In Tilok Chand case it has been held that dehusking by a machine will not bring into existence a new commodity. As a result it is not possible to distinguish Tilok Chand case on this principle." and came to the conclusion that Explanation II added by the amending Act, 1970 ceased to be on the statute book and, therefore, the law laid down in Tilok Chand case by the Division Bench of the High Court to the effect that dehusking by machines would not bring into existence a new commodity, would become operative. 15. The Single Judge in the impugned order, although aware of the order of the Division Bench of the High Court in Prakash Trading Co. case and of the decision of this Court in Hira lal Rattanlal held that in view of the decision in Gouti Bandhu easel Explanation II added by the amending Act, 1970 ceased to be on the statute book and, therefore, cannot be applicable to the facts of the case. 16. Counsel for the appellant has brought to our notice that in order to remove the basis of the judgment in Gouti Sandhu easel the State Legislature has passed the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1980 (U.P. Act 2 of 1980) and thus reintroducing Explanation II which had been introduced by the amending Act, 1970 with retrospective effect. Counsel for the appellant has brought to our notice that in order to remove the basis of the judgment in Gouti Sandhu easel the State Legislature has passed the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1980 (U.P. Act 2 of 1980) and thus reintroducing Explanation II which had been introduced by the amending Act, 1970 with retrospective effect. Section 4 of the amending Act of 1980 reads as under: "4. Amendment of Section 3-D-In Section 3-D of the principal Act, the existing Explanation, at the end, shall be numbered as 'Explanation l' and thereafter the following Explanation shall be inserted, namely Explanation II.-For the purposes of assessment relating to any period commencing on 1-10-1964 and ending with 14-11-1971, split or processed foodgrains, cereals or pulses shall be deemed to be different from unsplit or unprocessed foodgrains, cereals or pulses and, accordingly, nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent imposition, levy or collection of tax in respect of the first purchase relating to such period, of split or processed foodgrains, cereals or pulses merely because tax has been imposed, levied or collected earlier in respect of such foodgrains, cereals or pulses in their unsplit or unprocessed form.' " 17. In view of the reintroduction of Explanation II to Section 3-D with retrospective effect by the State Legislature by the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1980 (U.P. Act 2 of 1980), the split and processed foodgrains would now be different from un split and unprocessed foodgrains and the respondent would be liable to pay purchase/sales tax on the split dal purchased by him from the dal mills in the State of U .P. although the mills had already paid the tax on the unsplit and unprocessed dal from which broken dal purchased by the respondent was produced. 18. For the reasons stated above, this appeal is accepted and the order under appeal is set aside. Parties shall bear their own costs.