Judgment :- Basheer, J. These four revision petitions are at the instance of a common landlady of a row of shop buildings. The respondents/tenants had given vacant possession of their respective buildings to the landlady pursuant to an order passed by the Rent Control Court in terms of a settlement entered into among them during the pendency of the eviction proceedings initiated by the landlady under Section 11(4) (iv) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short ‘the Act’) The landlady had agreed that the respondents/tenants would be put back in possession of the buildings on completion of reconstruction. The compromise was recorded before the court below on September 9, 1998 and the buildings were surrendered by the respondents/tenants on December 30, 1998. The landlady had undertaken that the respondents/tenants would be put in possession of the reconstructed building on June 30, 1999. 2. Respondents/tenants had to approach the Rent Control Court again since the landlady had failed to honour her commitment. Though the buildings were demolished by the landlady, she had not made any attempt to construct a new building as undertaken by her. It was at that stage that the respondents/tenants had moved the Rent Control Court seeking its intervention as provided under the second and third proviso to section 11(4) (iv). Respondents/tenants prayed for a direction to the landlady to reconstruct the building in implementation of the order passed by the court pursuant to the compromise. It was also prayed that appropriate penal action be taken against the landlady. 3. In response to the above prayer, it was contended by the landlady that subsequent to the compromise order, she had sought eviction of the respondents/tenants under Section 11(3) of the Act for the bonafide own occupation of her son to start a business in those buildings. Her son had retired as Professor from the Devaswom Board College, Sasthamcotta in 1998 and there was no other building in her possession to accommodate her son. Unless and until a final adjudication had been made by the Rent Control Court on the above claim made by the landlady, respondents/tenants were not entitled to get the compromise order implemented. 4. Her son had retired as Professor from the Devaswom Board College, Sasthamcotta in 1998 and there was no other building in her possession to accommodate her son. Unless and until a final adjudication had been made by the Rent Control Court on the above claim made by the landlady, respondents/tenants were not entitled to get the compromise order implemented. 4. The Rent Control Court considered the rival contentions raised by the parties and held that it would be open to the landlady to modify the plan of the building to be reconstructed in such a way as to cater to the need of her son as well apart from that of the respondents/tenants. Accordingly, the landlady was directed to make available a revised plan for perusal of the tenants, who would be free to raise their objections before the court and suggest necessary modifications, if any. The Rent Control Court further held that if the building so reconstructed, did not contain enough rooms to satisfy the requirements of the respondents/tenants, the landlady shall be bound to allot the available rooms to the respondents/tenants. The landlady was granted 10 months time to complete the construction in tune with the above direction. The applications filed by the respondents/tenants were disposed of with the above directions. 5. The landlady challenged the above common order in separate appeals under Section 18 of the Act. The Rent Control Appellate Authority dismissed those appeals by a common judgment. In modification of the order passed by the Rent Control Court, the appellate authority directed the landlady to complete the construction of the building in tune with the original plan submitted by her at the time of compromise. This view was taken by the appellate authority since it was brought to its notice that the eviction petitions subsequently filed by the landlady under Section 11(3) of the Act had already been dismissed by the Rent Control Court. The appellate authority directed the landlady to complete the construction within six months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment and to make available the reconstructed rooms to the respondents/tenants, failing which, the tenants were given liberty to seek further directions for reconstruction by themselves. The above common judgment has been challenged by the landlady in these revision petitions under Section 20 of the Act. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner at length. The above common judgment has been challenged by the landlady in these revision petitions under Section 20 of the Act. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner at length. We have also perused the materials on record carefully. 7. It is not in dispute that the landlady had got vacant possession of the buildings pursuant to the compromise recorded before the Rent Control Court in the eviction proceedings initiated against them under Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act. After getting vacant possession of the buildings on December 30, 1998, the landlady had admittedly demolished the old structure. Under the terms of the compromise, she was bound to hand over possession of the reconstructed buildings to the respondents/tenants on or before June 30, 1999. But she had admittedly failed to comply with the direction issued by the Rent Control Court. 8. When the respondents/tenants had informed the court about the failure of the landlady, she took up a contention that the order of compromise could be implemented only after the culmination of the fresh round of litigation initiated by her against the respondents/tenants seeking eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act. The case of the landlady was that her son wanted to start a business for which he needed a building. She had no other buildings of her own to accommodate her son. It was therefore that she had sought eviction of the respondents/tenants under Section 11(3) of the Act. She further contended that her liability to reconstruct the building would entirely depend on the order that had to be passed by the Rent Control Court in the newly instituted eviction proceedings. It was thus contended by the landlady that the applications filed by the respondents/tenants seeking for a direction to her to reconstruct the building in terms of the compromise, and also to take penal action against her were liable to be dismissed. 9. Curiously, the Rent Control Court had accepted the ingenious plea made by the landlady partially. The court directed the petitioner to resubmit a fresh plan making adequate provision for additional room to accommodate her son in the new building which was proposed to be constructed. The court further directed that the revised plan be made available to the tenants for perusal so that they could raise their objections, if any. The court directed the petitioner to resubmit a fresh plan making adequate provision for additional room to accommodate her son in the new building which was proposed to be constructed. The court further directed that the revised plan be made available to the tenants for perusal so that they could raise their objections, if any. The landlady was also directed to complete the construction of the building in terms of the revised plan within 10 months from the date of the order. The court made it clear that if the building so reconstructed did not contain enough rooms to satisfy the requirements of all the tenants, the available rooms shall be allotted to the evicted tenants only, and “the landlady shall have the discretion to elect the tenants”. 10. It appears that by the time the appeals preferred by the landlady came up for consideration before the appellate authority, the eviction petitions filed by the landlady under Section 11(3) of the Act had been dismissed by the Rent Control Court. A certified copy of the judgment was made available for perusal of the appellate authority. In view of the above development, the appellate authority held that the landlady could not have any further excuse in not effecting reconstruction as per the original plan. Accordingly, the Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal and directed the landlady to complete the reconstruction within six months from the date of the judgment. 11. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the appellate authority was not justified in interfering with the directions issued by the Rent Control Court in the matter of reconstruction of the building in terms of the revised plan to be submitted by the landlady. Learned counsel submits that the respondents/tenants had not impugned the order passed by the Rent Control Court and therefore they were bound by the directions contained therein. Learned counsel has even gone to the extent of contending that the Rent Control Court had entered a finding that the landlady had established her bonafide need to accommodate her son to start a business in the building. Learned counsel has even gone to the extent of contending that the Rent Control Court had entered a finding that the landlady had established her bonafide need to accommodate her son to start a business in the building. It was therefore that the Rent Control Court had directed the landlady to submit a fresh plan providing for an additional room to accommodate her son, though it might have reduced the area which would have been available to the tenants if the building were to be reconstructed in accordance with the original plan. 12. Interestingly, the petitioner has taken up a new contention before us that dismissal of her applications for eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act was immaterial and inconsequential in view of the directions issued by the Rent Control Court in the order which was of course impugned by her before the appellate authority. Petitioner’s contention is that so long as respondents/tenants had not taken any exception to the directions issued by the Rent Control Court and the said order having become final as far as respondents/tenants are concerned, they were undoubtedly bound by the directions contained therein. 13. It may be remembered that the petitioner had contended before the Rent Control Court that her liability to reconstruct the building was subject to the finding to be entered by the Rent Control Court in the applications filed under Section 11(3) of the Act. But she has now gone to the extent of contending that the dismissal of those applications notwithstanding, the appellate authority was not justified in asking the petitioner to reconstruct the building in terms of the original plan. 14. We are afraid the above contentions raised by the petitioner are totally misconceived and untenable. It may be true that the respondents/tenants had not challenged the order passed by the Rent Control Court giving liberty to the petitioner/landlady to submit a fresh plan and extending the time for reconstruction further. But the petitioner had challenged the above order before the appellate authority on whatever grounds or for whatever reasons that might have been. The fact remains that the order of the Rent Control Court has now merged with the order of the appellate authority. But the petitioner had challenged the above order before the appellate authority on whatever grounds or for whatever reasons that might have been. The fact remains that the order of the Rent Control Court has now merged with the order of the appellate authority. The appellate authority has modified the directions contained in the order of the Rent Control Court in explicit terms and has issued a direction to the petitioner to complete the reconstruction in terms of the original plan submitted by her. This is apparently in reversal of the order passed by the Rent Control Court. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be heard to say that the directions contained in the order of the Rent Control Court do still prevail. It is immaterial that the respondents/tenants have not challenged the order of the Rent Control Court, though they could have, applying the principles contained in Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, challenged those findings in the appeal preferred by the petitioner/landlady. The appellate authority was obviously persuaded to dismiss the appeal in view of the dismissal of the eviction petitions filed by the petitioner under Section 11(3) of the Act. 15. We are persuaded to repel all the above contentions raised by the petitioner for yet another reason. Petitioner could not have instituted fresh eviction petitions against the respondent/tenants under Section 11(3) of the Act for two reasons. First of all, there existed no building, admittedly, because the petitioner had demolished the existing building immediately after she got vacant possession in December 1998. Eviction of a tenant can be sought from a building which is in existence on ground. Even in the eye of law, petitioner could not have instituted a fresh round of eviction proceedings against the very same tenants after obtaining an order against them under Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act on the ground of reconstruction. Obviously, the attempt of the petitioner was to frustrate the statutory right which had accrued in favour of the respondents/tenants in terms of the compromise order passed under Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act. Even applying the principles of res judicata the petitioner could not have been allowed to seek eviction under Section 11(3) particularly in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. Even applying the principles of res judicata the petitioner could not have been allowed to seek eviction under Section 11(3) particularly in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. Of course, change of circumstances during the pendency of a proceeding for eviction may enable a landlord to add additional ground of eviction in a given circumstance. But the situation available in the case on hand did not justify the action of the petitioner. Apparently, the petitioner was trying to make a mockery of the compromise order. She had in fact abused the process of the court through her attempt to obtain an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act. 16. Having regard to the entire facts and circumstances, we are satisfied that the direction issued by the appellate authority (albeit for a different reason) is fully justified. There is no merit in any of the contentions raised by the petitioner. The revision petitions fail. They are accordingly dismissed.