JUDGMENT Narendra Nath Tiwari, J. 1. The petitioners in both the writ applications are aggrieved by the common order dated 24.1.2005 passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Circuit Bench, Ranchi in O.A. Nos. 308/04 & 310/04 whereby the learned Tribunal while quashing the impugned order of their termination from the post of Principal has given liberty to the respondents to take action in accordance with law and procedure, if deemed appropriate. The petitioners have prayed for a direction to the learned Central Administrative Tribunal to decide their case on merit by holding that they are the direct recruits on the post of Principal in the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan appointed by the respondents on substantive basis in accordance with all the prescribed procedure and rules and by holding written examination and interview on all India basis and were subsequently regularized on the said posts against the vacancy. The petitioners, admittedly, on their posting have been working as Principal in their respective schools. All the petitioners were appointed in the different Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan (hereinafter to be referred to as K.V.S. for short) as P.G. teachers and their services were confirmed. The petitioners were posted in various schools of the K.V.S. throughout the country after their joining and they have been performing their duties sincerely without any blemish in the service career. 2. The facts of the cases are almost identical. In the edition of the Employment News dated 2.8.1999, a notice was published by the K.V.S. inviting applications for filling up the vacancy to the post of Principals in K.V.S. from amongst the Central/State/Semi Government/Autonomous Body/C.B.S.E. affiliated +2 schools fulfilling the conditions given in the advertisement. The petitioners belonging to the same autonomous organization of K.V.S. and being posted as P.G. teachers (P.G.T.) in C.B.S.E. affiliated +2 schools and having all the eligibilities and essential qualifications, applied for the post of Principal. A written test was held and the petitioners appeared at the said examination. Having qualified in the said examination, the petitioners were called for interview. The petitioners appeared before the Interview Board and selected by the Selection Committee. Letters of appointment to the post of Principal in the K.V.S. on transfer/deputation basis were issued to them individually. The petitioners assumed their charges as principal in the respective schools. Having qualified in the said examination, the petitioners were called for interview. The petitioners appeared before the Interview Board and selected by the Selection Committee. Letters of appointment to the post of Principal in the K.V.S. on transfer/deputation basis were issued to them individually. The petitioners assumed their charges as principal in the respective schools. As per the terms and conditions, the said appointment was initially on deputation basis for a period of one year subject to subsequent extensions. After the lapse of one year, the period of deputation was extended for a further period of one year. The petitioners, thereafter, were confirmed on the post of Principal. Suddenly by order No. F7-7/2002/K.V.s. (Esst. 1) dated 18.11.2004. the appointments of the petitioners as Principals were terminated and the petitioners were reverted to the last post held by them before their appointment to the post of Principal. The grievance of the petitioners is that they were duly appointed by following the due procedures prescribed by law and the Constitutional provision as also under the rules of the K.V.S. and there was no violation of any law, prescribed rule/procedure. Their further grievance is that before issuing the said order of termination, no reason whatsoever was conveyed to them and no notice to show cause was given to them. The petitioners complained that as many as 140 similarly situated teachers have been working on regular basis on the post of Principal after regularization of their services. According to the petitioners, the appointment to the post of Principal is made as per the Education Code for Kendriya Vidyalaya, Appendix III, Schedule 1, Clause 10 which prescribes recruitment rules and procedures for the post of Principal and according to which the post of Principal is to be filled up by promotion on the basis of merit-cum-seniority amongst the Vice Principals who have rendered minimum five years of service in K.V.S. of which at least three years should be in the grade of Vice Principal. The said rule is being followed for regular promotion. The said rule is being followed for regular promotion. Another prescribed mode for appointment of the Principal as provided in the said Appendix- III, Schedule I, Clause 10 is that if suitable candidate is not available then the Commissioner may fill up the vacancy on deputation basis from amongst the employees of the Government of India/State Government/Autonomous organizations including K.V.S./C.B.S.E. affiliated +2 schools provided the candidate fulfils all the qualifications prescribed for direct recruitment. The petitioners having possessed all the eligibilities and educational qualifications and having experience of more than 15-20 years as P.G. teachers were appointed as Principals by a Selection Committee after following all the prescribed procedures. There was thus no visible valid reason for terminating the petitionerss services as Principal and according to them, the impugned order is wholly arbitrary, discriminatory, illegal and without jurisdiction. 3. The petitioners, aggrieved by the said order of termination, moved the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Circuit Bench, Ranchi in O.A. Nos. 308/04 & 310/04 respectively. Learned Central Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter to be referred to as CAT for short) initially stayed the operation of the said impugned order and after hearing the parties, considering the facts and materials on record, the provisions of law and the rules of the K.V.S. allowed the petitioners applications by the judgment and order dated 24.1.2005 and set aside the impugned order. However, the learned Tribunal has given liberty to the respondents to take action, if deemed appropriate, in accordance with law and procedure. The petitioners, now aggrieved by the latter part of the judgment and order of the learned Tribunal, have filed these writ applications. 4. The respondents contested the writ applications by filing a copious counter-affidavit. It has been contended, inter alia, that by impugned order of termination no rights of the petitioners have been infringed as their appointments were on deputation. In clear terms it was mentioned in the advertisement inviting applications for the appointment that the deputation shall be for a period of one year extendable from year to year up to a maximum period of five years and the same will be governed by the existing instructions of the Government of India relating to deputation. The K.V.S. had reserved the right to repatriate the deputationists at any time even before the completion of the deputation period without assigning any reason. The K.V.S. had reserved the right to repatriate the deputationists at any time even before the completion of the deputation period without assigning any reason. It was made clear in the advertisement that the appointment on deputation basis will not confer any right on the candidate for permanent absorption in the K.V.S. It was contended that no right whatsoever was existed in the beginning and the same cannot be conferred later on contrary to the rules and the terms of the appointments. There is also no question of violating the principle of natural justice as the contract itself makes it clear that the petitioners have no right to be regularized. It has been further contended that the petitioners appointment as Principal was contrary to rules from the very beginning and such being the circumstances, alleged non- observance of principles of natural justice would not ipso facto render the order bad. It would be useless formalities to issue the show cause notice which would ultimately end up in the same result and as such absence of any show cause notice do not vitiate the termination order. Learned CAT while setting aside the order as given liberty to the respondents to take action, if deemed appropriate, only in accordance with law and procedure and there is no illegality in the impugned order of the learned Tribunal. It has been further stated that the Board of Governors (BOG for short) has decided that the Commissioner, K.V.S. can appoint the Principals on deputation basis only and Commissioner has no power to appoint the Principals on regular basis. The present Chairman found the action of the then Commissioner as violative of the rules and directed the present Commissioner to cancel the appointments. The Chairman, K.V.S. is a superior authority who has a definite role in running of the Kendriya Vidyalayas. The Chairman, K.V.S. does not discharge his functions in the capacity of the Union Minister for Human Resources Development but in the capacity of the Chairman of the K.V.S. It has been wrongly submitted by the petitioners that the decision has been taken by the Chairman, K.V.S. in the capacity of the Union Minister for Human Resources Development. The Chairman, K.V.S. does not discharge his functions in the capacity of the Union Minister for Human Resources Development but in the capacity of the Chairman of the K.V.S. It has been wrongly submitted by the petitioners that the decision has been taken by the Chairman, K.V.S. in the capacity of the Union Minister for Human Resources Development. It has been contended that the appointment of the petitioners as Principal is irregular/illegal for various reasons, such as : (i) Direct recruitment quota of S.C./S.T./O.B.C. Categories have been utilized by the deputationists, incidentally reservation rules are not applicable when the posts are filled up-by way of deputation. Similarly, promotion quotas of all the categories of candidates have been used by the deputationists. The deputatlonists for such long tenure frustrate the very purpose of reservation rules. (ii) By denying the opportunity to the general public, the Constitutional provisions have been violated, (iii) By regularizing the deputationists against the vacant posts of Principals, the appointing authority i.e. the then Commissioner, K.V.S. has exercised the power not vested in him. 5. At the time of hearing of these writ applications, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners emphatically urged that the petitioners have been recruited to the post of Principal on the basis of the open advertisement and after qualifying in the written test and facing the interview. They were selected by a duly constituted Selection Committee and their appointments are by way of one of the recognized modes of appointment of Principals as envisaged in the Education Code of Kendriya Vidyalaya Appendix III, Schedule I, Clause 10. It has been further contended that though the appointment has been shown as on deputation basis, in the appointment letters, yet the said appointment made after following the due selection procedure prescribed for appointment of regular principal and the word deputation is a misnomer. It has been further submitted that the word deputation is used in context of appointing a person as a substitute. Normally deputation means service of the employees outside the parent department and after the expiry of the period of deputation, the deputationist normally comes back to the parent department. Such deputation is made in order to meet exigencies. The word deputation is not a concept which is akin to recruitment or appointment on promotion on the basis of selection. Normally deputation means service of the employees outside the parent department and after the expiry of the period of deputation, the deputationist normally comes back to the parent department. Such deputation is made in order to meet exigencies. The word deputation is not a concept which is akin to recruitment or appointment on promotion on the basis of selection. The person who is sent on deputation cannot be placed on probation while the petitioners were placed on probation. Learned counsel placed reliance on a decision reported in 1978 Labour & Industrial Cases 1198, Sohan Lall v. Union of India and submitted that the concept of deputation is consensual and involves a voluntary decision of the employer to lend the services of his employee and corresponding acceptance of such services by the borrowing employer. It may also involve the consent of the employee who is to go on deputation. There can hardly be any direct recruitment by way of deputation. In all cases of deputation there must be a borrowing department and a lending department, otherwise the concept of deputation cannot be worked out. It has been submitted that there is no ingredient of deputation in the petitioners appointment which is direct and regular appointment and that it is not the form but the substance which determines the nature and character of the action. Learned counsel further relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of State of Punjab and Ors. v. Inder Singh and Ors. and Umapati Choudhary v. State of Bihar and Anr. 6. In the case of State of Punjab and Ors. (supra) the Supreme Court described the concept of deputation as thus :- The concept of "deputation" is well understood in service law and has a recognized meaning. "Deputation" has a different connotation in service law and the dictionary meaning of the word "deputation" is of no help. In simple words "deputation" means service outside the cadre or outside the parent department. Deputation is deputing or transferring an employee to a post outside his cadre, that is to say, to another department on temporary basis. After the expiry of period of deputation the employee has to come back to his parent department to occupy the same position unless in the meanwhile he has earned promotion in his parent department as per the Recruitment Rules. After the expiry of period of deputation the employee has to come back to his parent department to occupy the same position unless in the meanwhile he has earned promotion in his parent department as per the Recruitment Rules. Whether the transfer is outside the normal field of deployment or not is decided by the authority who controls the service or post from which the employee is transferred. There can be no deputation without the consent of the person so deputed and he would, therefore, know his rights and privileges in the deputation post. In the case of Umapati Choudhary, (supra) the Supreme Court relying on the decision in State of Punjab and Ors. (supra) reiterated thus: Deputation can be aptly described as an assignment of an employee (commonly referred to as the deputationist) of one department or cadre or even an organization (commonly referred to as the parent department or lending authority) to another department or cadre or organization (commonly referred to as the borrowing authority). The necessity for sending on deputation arises in public interest to meet the exigencies of public service. The concept of deputation is consensual and involves a voluntary decision of the employer to lend the services of his employee and a corresponding acceptance of such services by the borrowing employer. It also involves the consent of the employee to go on deputation or not. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners further relied on decision of the High Court of Calcutta in a writ petition filed by the similarly situated persons wherein the said Court clearly held the petitioners of that case as not on deputation by its judgment dated 11.8.2005 passed in W.P.C.T. No. 63/05. The said writ petition was filed by 14 petitioners who had also applied against the same advertisement and passed through the same selection process and were also appointed as Principal on deputation basis. The said case was based on similar facts and the stand of the respondents was almost the same. 8. The said writ petition was filed by 14 petitioners who had also applied against the same advertisement and passed through the same selection process and were also appointed as Principal on deputation basis. The said case was based on similar facts and the stand of the respondents was almost the same. 8. After a detail discussion of the facts and circumstances as also the relevant provisions and decisions of the Apex Court, the Division Bench of the said Court disposing of the said writ application recorded its conclusion, thus: Now, the question is that the respondent authorities have described the said appointment as by way of deputation in the appointment letters issued by them to the petitioners and subsequently also while purporting to extend the said period of deputation and the petitioners without objection, accepted those letters. From the aforesaid circumstances, can it be said that since the petitioners did not object to the use of the expression deputation in the case of their appointment letters the appointments must be treated to have been made on deputation though in fact it is clear from the discussion above that the appointment cannot be made by way of deputation. This Court is unable to accept this argument made by the learned counsel for the respondents. The relationship between employer and employee in Government service or in services under State or statutory corporation is not governed by pure relationship of master and servant and the relationship is not purely contractual. Such relationship is governed by statutes which confer on the employees a status under the relevant rules. It is well known that common law concept of master and servant is not attracted in such cases which are regulated by various statutory rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations are made in public interest in order to eliminate arbitrariness in cases of appointment and also in order to give the employees a sense of security in their services. It has been accepted by all Courts that while working in Government service and/or in services under the State, an employee should have a sense of security in his service and the employee should know that the service conditions are regulated by rules and regulations and not on the whims and caprice of the employer. It has been accepted by all Courts that while working in Government service and/or in services under the State, an employee should have a sense of security in his service and the employee should know that the service conditions are regulated by rules and regulations and not on the whims and caprice of the employer. After considering the other relevant aspects, the said Bench further held :- Petitioners who have been promoted to the post of Principal on the basis of a valid selection process and continued there for three years without any allegations cannot be asked to go on the basis of administrative whims or caprice. This is fundamentally opposed to the principle of rule of law. A citizen must know where does he stand. Predictability is one of the most essential facts of the rule of law which is enshrined under Article 14. This was pointed out by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in 1967 in the case of S.G. Jalsinghani v. Union of India in paragraph 14, of the report and which is set out below: That the absence or arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of law upon which our whole constitutional system is based In a system governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities, must be confined within clearly defined limits. The rule of law from this point of view means that decision should be made by the application of known principles and rules and, in general, such decisions should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule it is unpredictable and such decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. 9. In the said case the Calcutta High Court allowed the writ application holding that the authorities of K.V.S. cannot treat the petitioners promotion to the post of Principal of different schools as promotion by way of deputation as the same is contrary to the principles of deputation and the rules prescribed under the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan (Appointment, Promotion, Seniority etc.) Rules, 1971. It has been further held that the period of two years has expired since the appointment of the petitioners and, therefore, their appointments cannot be terminated in a manner which is unknown to law. 10. It has been further held that the period of two years has expired since the appointment of the petitioners and, therefore, their appointments cannot be terminated in a manner which is unknown to law. 10. After considering the facts, materials brought on record, the submissions made by the learned counsel and various decisions cited before us, we respectfully subscribe to the view taken by the High Court of Calcutta in the said similar case, and hold that the nature of appointments of the petitioners of these writ applications cannot be said to be by way of deputation and, therefore, their appointments cannot be terminated in such arbitrary manner as has been done in their cases. The mode of appointment, procedure adopted therefore and conduct of the respondents before terminating the appointment of the petitioners conformed to the procedures and mode of appointments on regular basis. The petitioners have all requisite qualifications and eligibilities for the post of the Principals. After their appointments(s) they, have been successfully discharging their duties without any complain so far and their services were confirmed on the said posts. Sudden termination of the petitioners appointments is thus wholly arbitrary, illegal and violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India and the order of the learned Tribunal to the extent by which the petitioners termination orders are quashed, is upheld. The remaining part of the concluding paragraph of the impugned order of the Learned Tribunal is held to be unnecessary in the context of the nature of the petitioners appointment and is hereby quashed. These writ applications are. accordingly, allowed. However there is no order as to costs. S.J. Mukhopadhaya, J. 11. I agree