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2006 DIGILAW 3260 (RAJ)

Union of India v. Ramavtar

2006-12-19

PRAKASH TATIA

body2006
Prakash Tatia, J.— This appeal has been preferred by Union of India against the order of Civil Judge (S.D.) Sri Ganganagar dated 23.01.1995 passed in land acquisition proceedings under Sec. 18 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act on reference made by the District Collector to the Civil Court. 2. The only point involved in the appeal is with respect to interest and solatium and with respect of the date from which interest is payable to the claimants. Appellant-Union of India has not challenged the market value of the property determined by Civil Court nor they raised dispute with respect to any individual person’s right to get compensation. It will be worthwhile to mention here that so far as the land cost is concerned, the Civil Court upheld the decision of the Land Acquisition Officer and has not enhanced the compensation. 3. The appeal has been preferred by Union of India by impleading 100 lands owners whose lands have been acquired under the land acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1894’). These 100 respondents have been impleaded because of the reason that the reference application under Sec. 18 of the Act of 1894 was submitted by 100 claimants jointly and there was one reference on application of 100 claimants before the Civil Court. During the pendency of the appeal, respondents No. 18, 20, 23, 25 to 27, 33, 34, 56, 59, 61, 62, 66 and 97 died. Admittedly, no steps were taken by the appellant for brining on record the legal representatives of the above respondents, therefore, the remaining respondents have raised objection about the maintainability of the appeal and prayed that the appeal may be dismissed having been abeted with the death of all the above mentioned 14 respondents. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that in view of the specific provision i.e., under Sec. 46 of the Rajasthan Court Fees & Suit Valuation Act, 1961, Court fees is payable on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant in appeal. This has two facets, one who is seeking enhancement of award and another is seeking reduction in the awarded amount. This has two facets, one who is seeking enhancement of award and another is seeking reduction in the awarded amount. In the present case, the award has been passed by the Court below and the appellant is seeking reduction in the amount awarded, therefore, the negative difference amount is the valuation of appeal and, therefore, Court fees is leviable on the said difference amount. It is also submitted that the appellant themselves have admitted that they are liable to pay Court fees on the difference between the amount awarded and the relief which the appellant is seeking, which is apparent from memo of appeal wherein the appellant itself put the valuation of appeal as Rs. 1,37,23,102/- Learned counsel for the respondents relied upon Division Bench decision of this Court delivered in the case of Prayag Chand vs. Land Acquisition Officer & Anr. reported in 2005 (3) Western Law Cases (Raj.)143. 5. According to the learned counsel for the respondents in view of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of State of Punjab vs. Nathu Ram reported in AIR 1962 SC 89 , the appeal has abeted. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, in the present appeal, the only question of law is involved and, therefore, the issue involved is common to all the respondents. It is submitted that in case the appeal of the appellant is allowed against the remaining respondents, then there will be two conflicting judgments on the question of laws. The questions of law involved in the appeal are that: (a) From which date the claimants are entitled for interest on compensation; and (b) Whether the Court committed error of law in calculating interest? 6. If there is any modification in the order of the Court below, then for 40 claimants, there will be different dates for calculating interest for the respondents who are dead and different date for the respondents who are alive. Further, there will be different initial date; from which the interest will be payable. It is also submitted that the decree by its nature is joint in character and inseparable also, therefore, the appeal has abeted for all purposes in the light of decision given by Apex Court in Nathu Ram’s case. 7. Further, there will be different initial date; from which the interest will be payable. It is also submitted that the decree by its nature is joint in character and inseparable also, therefore, the appeal has abeted for all purposes in the light of decision given by Apex Court in Nathu Ram’s case. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently submitted that if the legal representatives of some of the respondents have not been brought on record by the appellant, then the appeal can only abate against the dead respondents and not against the respondents who are alive and party in the appeal. So far as the deceased respondents are concerned, because of plain and simple reason, that in land acquisition claim cases, each claim is separate one irrespective of the fact that one has joined with some other or others whose land are under acquisition. It is also submitted that even if all the land owners or the khatader-tenants submits joint claim petition before the Land Acquisition Officer, still they can agitate their own claim according to their right, title and interest in the land in question. The Land Acquisition Officer is required to pass separate award for each claimants, may it be by common order, therefore the nature of the proceedings for each individual is separate proceedings irrespective of common order on common application and even after there is one order of reference to the Civil Court and Civil Court decides the issues for individuals. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that the decision of Nathu Rma’s case has already been considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in detail in the judgment delivered in a case Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra & Others vs. Pramod Gupta reported in (2003) 3 SCC 272 . The Apex Court held that even if it is likely to result in two different sets of judgments of varying content, purport or reason, as long as the enforcement of the decrees passed therein is not rendered impossible due to mutual contradiction in terms of self-destructive nature, there is no justification whatsoever to assume them to be inconsistent or contradictory decrees. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, in view of the subsequent binding decision of the Apex Court passed after considering Nathu Ram’s case, the appeal has not abeted. 9. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, in view of the subsequent binding decision of the Apex Court passed after considering Nathu Ram’s case, the appeal has not abeted. 9. On the question of payment of Court fees, learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the judgments of Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in AIR 1970 (Andhra Pradesh) 139, judgment of Karnataka High Court reported in AIR 1975 (Karnataka) 129 and the judgment of Punjab & Haryana High Court reported in AIR 1979 (P & H) 271 and submitted that solatium and interest are not the part and parcel of the award, therefore, Court fees in not payable on the amount of interest or solatium. 10. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the facts of the case and have also considered the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties. 11. The facts are not in dispute that the respondents mentioned above died during the pendency of appeal and no steps have been taken for bringing on record the legal representatives of those respondents. Therefore, the appeal so far as those respondents are concerned, has abeted. A question is that whether due to death of these co-respondents, the appeal as a whole abeted or not? The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra (supra) held that the reasons for abatment of appeal given by Hon’ble Apex Court in Nathu Ram’s case were that, in that case the lease of the land was joint, the claim was joint, based on the allegation that the land belonged to them jointly, that the award and joint decree was on that basis and since a claim put forward by the State before the arbitrator itself that the joint application should be treated as separate applications and separate awards should be passed relating to their respective shares was rejected by the arbitrator who in his discretion decided and passed a joint award and the frame of the appeal, with particular reference to the nature of the decree challenged. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Nathu Ram’s case held that there could not be different assessments of compensation for the same parcel of land and, therefore, the said question cannot be decided merely on the basis of separate share. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Nathu Ram’s case held that there could not be different assessments of compensation for the same parcel of land and, therefore, the said question cannot be decided merely on the basis of separate share. Thus, the distinct features of Nathu Ram were taken note of by the Apex Court in the case of Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra but the learned counsel for the respondents have heavily relied upon the observations made by the Apex Court, which were made after considering the said Nathu Ram’s case in para-21. Particular observations which have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents, read as under: “Where the dispute between two groups of parties centered around claims or was based on grounds common relation to the respective groups litigating as distinct groups or bodies-the issue involved for consideration in such class of cases would be one and indivisible. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, in the present case also, the relief claimed by the appellant in the present appeal centers around common question of law only and there is no dispute with respect to any fact. In view of the above, any decision given in this appeal, will be a decision on the point of law and that will be indivisible and not divisible between the land owners claimant-respondents - alive or deceased.” 12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra after observing so in detail, considred, the legal position and made it clear that there can exit two different decrees in some situations. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that: “Though the Reference Court has decided all such claims together, having regard to the similarity or identical nature of issues arising for consideration of the claims, in substance and reality the proceedings must be considered in law to be of multifarious claims disposed of in a consolidated manner resulting in as many number of awards of the Reference Court as there were claimants before it. There was no community of interest between them and that each one of them is vindicating their individual rights was not obliged to implead the other claimants of their shares in one common action/proceeding and the orders/judgment though passed in a consolidated manner, in law, amounts to as many orders or judgment as there were claimants and, by no reason, can it be branded to be a joint and inseverable one. Similarity of the claims cannot be a justification in law to treat them as a single and indivisible claim for any or all purposes and such a thing cannot be legitimately done without sacrificing the substance to the form. The claim on behalf of the respondents that the compensation awarded is of a lump sum, though shares are divided, is belied by the scheme underlying Sections 11, 18, 30 and 31 of the Act, and cannot be countenanced as of any merit. Against the award of the Reference Court in this case, it was possible and permissible in law for every one of the appellants to file an appeal of his own separately in respect of his share without any need or obligation to implead every other of the claimants like him, as party-respondent or as co-appellant, because there is no conflicting interest or claims amongst them inter se. As such, the alleged and apprehended fear about possible inconsistent or conflicting decrees resulting thereform if the appeals are proceeded with and disposed of on merits has no basis in law nor is well founded on the facts and circumstances of these cases. Even if the appellants succeed on merits, dehors the fate of the deceased appellants the decree passed cannot either be said to become ineffective or rendered incapable of successful execution. To surmise even then a contradictory decree coming into existence, is neither logical nor reasonable or acceptable by courts of law. Otherwise, it would amount to applying the principle of vicarious liability to penalize someone for no fault of his and denial of one’s own right for the mere default or refusal of the other(s) to join or contest likewise before the Court. Otherwise, it would amount to applying the principle of vicarious liability to penalize someone for no fault of his and denial of one’s own right for the mere default or refusal of the other(s) to join or contest likewise before the Court. The fact that at a given point of time all of them joined in one proceedings because one Court is the hierarchy has chosen to club or combine all their individual and separate claims for the purpose of consideration on account of the similarity of the nature of their claims or that or the sake of convenience they joined together for asserting their respective, distinct and independent claims or rights is no ground to destroy their individual right to seek remedies in respect of their respective claims. In cases of this nature, there is every possibility of one or the other among them subsequently reconciling themselves to their fate and settle with their opponents or become averse to pursue the legal battle for ever so many reasons, as in the case on hand due to disinterestedness, indifference or lethargy and, therefore, the attitude, approach and resolve of one or the other should not become a disabling or disqualifying factor for others to vindicate the their own individual rights without getting eclipsed or marred by action or inaction of the others. Consequently, the fact that about 37 out of the total number of interested persons, like the appellants, were not parties before the High Court of this Court, does not, in any manner effect or deprive the appellants to have their claims, duly and properly considered and adjudicated in accordance with law, on merits.” 13. Consequently, the fact that about 37 out of the total number of interested persons, like the appellants, were not parties before the High Court of this Court, does not, in any manner effect or deprive the appellants to have their claims, duly and properly considered and adjudicated in accordance with law, on merits.” 13. In light of the decision of the Apex Court delivered in the Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra’s case, if the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties are examined, then the whole of the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondents is based on the principal on the basis of which the appeal against inseverable decree abates on the death of one of the joint decree-holder i.e. because of the reason that gives rise to birth of inconsistent decrees and those inconsistent decrees may be self-destructive in nature but as observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra’s case that even if the claimants have filed one claim in respect of their specified separate share, it could not have the effect of altering the nature of their claim or the character of their right so as to make it an indivisible joint right. The possibility of different type of decree is not altogether impermissible under law as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra’s case. In land acquisition cases, it there are several claimants and further in reference Court under Sec. 18 of the Act of 1894, there may one, some are all parties and about all one or more may prefer appeal for further enhancement of their compensation, may it be, for increase of interest or solatium amount and some may not prefer appeal, then the order passed in a separate award inspite of fact that order/award is one. The decree passed altering the amount of interest or solatium cannot affect the rights of the person in whose favour the decree has already become final. In view of the above reasons, the appeal has not abeted. 14. The decree passed altering the amount of interest or solatium cannot affect the rights of the person in whose favour the decree has already become final. In view of the above reasons, the appeal has not abeted. 14. So far as the question of payment of Court fees is concerned, the appellants have right to submit that they are not liable to pay the Court fees even after admitting in the memo of appeal that what is valuation of appeal and appellants are liable to pay Court fees because of the simple reason that the principle of estoppel cannot be invoked against the statutory provision of law. In the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, a controversy was that whether Court fees is payable on the amount of interest which had not been awarded by the Court below and has been sought by the appellant in appeal. I need not refer the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in detail, which are: AIR 1970 (Andhra Pradesh) 139, AIR 1975 (Karnataka) 129 and AIR 1979 (P & H) 271 in view of the binding decision of this Court delivered in the case of Prayag Chand vs. Land Acquisition Officer & Anr., the Division Bench of this Court after considering the number of judgments delivered by Hon’ble Apex Court and this Court also took note of the binding decision of Apex Court delivered in the case of C.G. Ghanshyamdas & Ors. vs. Collector of Madras and the judgment of Supreme Court delivered in the case of Indore Development Authority vs. Tarak Singh & Others reported in AIR 1995 SC 1828 held that adjudication by the Reference Court is about compensation etc., is final adjudication unless it can be avoided in any other form known to law and it can be avoided only by filing appeal as prescribed under Sec. 54 of the Central Act. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that when its illegality is challenged by filing appeal under Sec. 54 of the Central Act, the difference of amount for which the appeal is filed ad valorem Court fees under Sec. 8 is required to be paid. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that when its illegality is challenged by filing appeal under Sec. 54 of the Central Act, the difference of amount for which the appeal is filed ad valorem Court fees under Sec. 8 is required to be paid. This Court held that Section 8 of the Madhya Pradesh under consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development Authority vs. Tarak Singh & Others is also pari materia with Section 8 of the Court Fees Act, 1870 and Section 46 of the Rajasthan Court Fees & Suits Valuation Act, 1961. In view of the above the Court fees is payable even in cases where the appellant is seeking to avoid the liability under award and Court fees is payable on the difference between and the amount awarded by the Court below and the amount which is sought to be reduced by the appellant in appeal. 15. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently submitted that in case the claimants prefer appeal against lesser award of interest or solatium, then in view of Full Bench decision of Karnataka High Court, the claimants are not required to pay the Court fees and, therefore, the appellant cannot be treated differently when appellant prefer appeal for reduction of the amount of interest or any statutory liability which has been created by the order or award of the Court below. In the case of D.M. Jawarilal & Ors vs. Special L.A.O. CITB, Bangalore reported in AIR 1975 Karnataka 129 Full Bench, the question referred to Larger Bench was: “In an appeal under Sec. 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, seeking for enhancement of the compensation, should the amount of statutory allowance proportionate to the amount of such enhancement, be included in the value of the subject-matter of appeal for purpose of Court-fees?” 16. The Full Bench of Karnataka High Court held that through solatium, unlike interest, is not in the discretion of the Court and the Court is bound to award it (solatium), the main reasoning of the Supreme Court, namely that claims are not based on any asserted right but dependent on the decision of disputed right, do not come within the purview of the expression ‘subject-matter of dispute in the memorandum of appeal’, applied to the claim for solatium in an appeal under Sec. 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court considered the earlier judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court also and also considered Section 49 of the Karnataka Court Fees Act, which is a general law for levy of Court fees of appeals against the orders, awards etc. The Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court was of the view that other interpretation will render Section 48 superfluous. 17. In the language of Section 48 of Karnataka Court Fees Act, as stated above, is also peri materia of Section 46 of the Rajasthan Court Fees & Suits Valuation Act, 1961. Section 46 of the Rajasthan Court Fees & Suits Valuation Act, 1961 is unambiguous and provides that the fees shall be computed on the difference between the amount of awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant. Therefore, in a case where award is passed by the Court below fixing a liability of ascertained amount and that ascertained amount is challenged by the appellant, then that is the subject-matter in the appeal and that is the valuation of appeal, which is clear from a plain and simple reading of Section 46, which says that “fees shall be computed on the difference between the amount of awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant”. In case, there is no determination of compensation or interest or solatium and the appellant seek relief of enhancement of compensation, then he is also liable to pay the Court fees in light of Section 46 of the Rajasthan Court Fees & Suits Valuation Act, 1961 and, therefore, the appellant who is seeking reduction of amount is liable to pay the Court fees, which he is seeking to be reduced. 18. In view of the above reasons, the preliminary objection about the abatment of entire appeal raised by the respondents is rejected. The preliminary objection about the Court fees is sustained and it is held that the appellant is required to pay the Court fees ad valorem as per Section 54 read with Section 46 of Rajasthan Court Fees & Suits Valuation Act, 1961. The appellant is, therefore, allowed to submit the requisite Court fees within a period of four months from today. 19. Put up after four months. * * * * *