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2006 DIGILAW 3271 (PNJ)

State Of Punjab v. Ujagar Singh

2006-08-10

VINOD K.SHARMA

body2006
Judgment Vinod K. Sharma, J. 1. The present revision petition arises from an order dated 1.8.2003 of Addl. District Judge, Bathinda vide which the application moved under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing the appeal was dismissed. 2. The plaintiff respondent had filed a suit for declaration and mandatory injunction on 30.11.1999 claiming therein that he was appointed as Sub Inspector Consolidation (Patwari)on 16.7.1954 in the erstwhile State of Pepsu and retired from service on 31.1.1987 at the age of 58 years. The claim of the petitioner was that in the State of Pepsu retirement age was 60 years of Class IV employee. The suit was contested on the ground that the same was time barred. The learned Trial Court decreed the suit and rejected the plea of the petitioner herein regarding the suit being time barred by holding that he would be entitled to arrears for the period of 38 months prior to the date of filing of the suit along with interest @ 18% per annum from 30.9.1996. The learned Trial Court held that as claim to pension was a continuous cause of action and, therefore, the ground of limitation was not available to (he petitioner. 3. The suit was decreed on 27.7.2001. According to the petitioner it had applied for the certified copy on 28.7.2001 and same was supplied on 6.8.2001 to the District Attorney and was sent to the Director Prosecution and Litigation on 30.8.2001 and thereafter after complying with the formalities filed the appeal along with application under Sec.5 of limitation Act on 2.3.2002. The said application was contested by the respondent-plaintiff and the learned lower Appellate Court relied upon the judgment of the Honble Supreme court reported in 1997 (4) RCR (Civil) 242=air 1998 SC 2276, to hold that the limitation has to be applied with all its rigour prescribed by statute and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The reference was also placed on the judgment of this Court reported in 1996 (2) RRR 485 (Pandh)= 1995 (3) PLR 156, to hold that no details were given as to in what manner the delay had occurred and whether these bottlenecks were reasonable or not. In absence of that the delay could not be condoned. 4. The reference was also placed on the judgment of this Court reported in 1996 (2) RRR 485 (Pandh)= 1995 (3) PLR 156, to hold that no details were given as to in what manner the delay had occurred and whether these bottlenecks were reasonable or not. In absence of that the delay could not be condoned. 4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that in the present case all necessary details were given in the application and evidence was led to prove that the delay had occurred due to procedural delay of department of the State Government. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that in the present case the order dated 31.1.1987 was challenged by the petitioner after almost twelve years and, therefore, it was prima facie time barred. 5. The Honble Supreme Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan V/s. M. Krishnamurthy, 1998 (7) Supreme Court Cases 123, has been pleased to lay down that the sufficient cause under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act has to be construed liberally. The Honble Supreme court observed that in the absence of anything showing mala fide or deliberate delay as a dilatory tactic, Court should normally condone the delay. The Hon ble Supreme Court again in the case of M. K. Prasadv. P. Arumugam, 2001 (6) SCC 176, has been pleased to hold that the discretion under Sec.5 has to be exercised to advance substantial justice. 6. If it is to be noticed that by condoning the delay the parties are only allowed to contest their case on merits and the appeal could not be dismissed merely by holding that there were no sufficient cause to condone the delay without giving any reasons thereof. In the present case the learned lower Appellate Court had merely relied upon the judgments referred to above without giving any reason as to how these were applicable to the facts of the present case. Once the petitioner had given the necessary details as to where the bottlenecks were and why the delay had occurred, there were no reasons to dismiss the application filed by the appellant under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act. Accordingly, the revision is allowed. The order passed by the learned Addl. District judge is set aside and the application under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay is hereby allowed. Accordingly, the revision is allowed. The order passed by the learned Addl. District judge is set aside and the application under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay is hereby allowed. Learned Appellate Court is directed to decide the appeal on merit. Petition allowed.