Judgment :- (Writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus calling for the records of the respondent in his order in No.PM/RO-II/97/AR/2003 dated 21.09.2005 and quash the same and direct the respondent to issue a licence to the petitioner for the purpose of holding Indian Classical Dance at Hotel Al Rasheed, Citadel at Door No.1, 100, Feet Road, Ellapillai Chavady, Pondicherry – 5) By consent of the counsel on either side, the writ petition itself is taken up for disposal. 2. The petitioner, in support of the relief asked for, has submitted that he is a businessman involved in hotel business at Pondicherry and has taken on rent, the Al Rasheed Hotel premises including the building on a monthly rent of RS.20,000/-. 3. He has contended that in his hotel, he wanted to conduct “Indian Classical Dance” performances for which licence was required under the Pondicherry Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) and to that effect, he gave an application for licence on 08.01.2003 and the same was not considered by the respondent due to which he was forced to file Writ Petition no.22935 of 2003 for a mandamus and this Court, by order dated 05.12.2003, directed the respondent to consider the application of the petitioner and pass orders thereon. 4. It is further contended by the petitioner, that the respondent, by his proceedings dated 30.01.2004, pointed out certain defects and all these defects were rectified by the subsequent letter of the petitioner dated 10.03.2004. He has also mentioned in the said letter about the conduct of similar classical dance performances in other hotels in Pondicherry. To follow-up the matter, he had authorized one Gautham Bhat as his authorized representative to proceed in the matter and his representative also has sent some representations but of no use. 5. It is also the case of the petitioner that the respondent rejected his application by order dated 12.04.2004 for grant of No Objection Certificate on the ground that the Additional District Magistrate has objected to the grant of licence for conducting Classical Dance. The said order was communicated to the petitioner which did not contain any reason which prompted the respondent to reject the application other than the statement that the Additional District Magistrate has objected to for grant of such a licence. The said order was communicated to the petitioner which did not contain any reason which prompted the respondent to reject the application other than the statement that the Additional District Magistrate has objected to for grant of such a licence. This order of the respondent has been challenged by the petitioner in W.P. No.32662 of 2004 and this Court, as per order dated 15.04.2005 set aside the order of the respondent and directed the respondent to consider the grant of licence afresh as per law and on merits and in the meanwhile, to grant a temporary licence to the petitioner for conducting Classical Dance, taking into consideration the fact that similar licences were granted in respect of other hotels. Against this order of the High Court in W.P. No.32662 of 2004 dated 15.04.2005, the respondent filed a Writ Appeal in which the main ground of challenge was confined to the grant of temporary licence, pending consideration of grant of permanent licence. The learned counsel for the respondent reported before the Division Bench of this Court that there is no necessity for grant of temporary licence since the very issue of granting permanent licence will be decided within three weeks. Taking into account the submission of the respondent’s counsel, the Division Bench disposed of the Writ Appeal as per judgment dated 10.08.2005 directing the respondent herein to consider the grant of permanent licence to the petitioner within three weeks. 6. The petitioner submits that subsequently, he was called by the respondent for personal hearing and he appeared before the respondent and requested him to grant licence in the same way similar licences were granted to other four hotels. In the meanwhile, the respondent, as per his order dated 21.09.2005, once again rejected the petitioner’s application for licence on the grounds that there is objection from Senior Superintendent of Police and that, as per G.O. Ms. 27 dated 20.09.2005, the Government of Pondicherry has prohibited the grant of further licences for performing Indian Classical Dance. 7. Aggrieved by the said order dated 21.09.2005 passed by the respondent, the petitioner has filed this Writ Petition challenging the impugned order on the following grounds. i. That the order of the respondent is per se illegal and in violation of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. ii. 7. Aggrieved by the said order dated 21.09.2005 passed by the respondent, the petitioner has filed this Writ Petition challenging the impugned order on the following grounds. i. That the order of the respondent is per se illegal and in violation of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. ii. That the respondent issued municipal licence to four other hotels to conduct Indian Classical Dance and since those four hotels are similarly situated like that of the petitioner, the respondent ought to have adopted the very same yardstick and treated this petitioner also on par with them to consider the grant of licence. iii. That the respondent relied on G.O. Ms. No.27 dated 20.09.2005 to reject the application as the said Government Order is not applicable to Municipality which is a body corporation and locality by the Statute. iv. That the possibility of abuse of a licence is not a ground to reject the application for licence, especially when the respondent is armed with powers under the Act for violation of the licence condition. v. That the respondent rejected the earlier application as per order dated 12.04.2004 on the ground that there is objection from the Additional District Magistrate for grant of licence and when the Additional District Magistrate has granted No Objection Certificate, the respondent has changed his stand and rejected the application on a totally different reason by projecting the objection seems to have been given by the Police and this shows the malafides of the respondent who is bent upon to reject the application with a clear mind not to grant licence to the petitioner. vi. That four other hotels in Pondicherry which are run by very influential persons including former legislators and Ministers, have been granted licences with the intention of monopolizing those four hotels and the same is the reason for rejection of the petitioner’s application. vii. That issuance of the Government Order under Section 349 of the Act is an erroneous one and that order cannot be relied upon and instead, the respondent ought to have relied upon the statute and the regulation under the Act. viii. That the order of the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.1456 of 2005 has to be complied with in the matter of grant of licence to the petitioner. Ix. That the G.O. Ms. viii. That the order of the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.1456 of 2005 has to be complied with in the matter of grant of licence to the petitioner. Ix. That the G.O. Ms. No.27 dated 20.09.2005 prohibiting the grant of fresh licence to the petitioner has been passed long after the deadline fixed by the Division Bench of this Court and thus the malafides of the respondent is evident by the fact that he was waiting for the Government Order to be passed by the Government, who acted at the instance of the existing four licencees to reject the petitioner’s application and as such, the impugned order is bad in law. 8. Mr. R. Thiyagarajan, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, during the course of his exhaustive arguments, has submitted that the impugned order challenging the writ petition, is in infringement of the constitutional rights and various provisions of the Act, which deal with the control, administration and regulation in respect of grant of licence. In support of the petitioner’s case, he has pointed out that Indian Classical Dance, in all its form, is encouraged by the Government of India and other State Governments and Classical Dances are performed even in Government functions and in other social gatherings and that there is no object sought to be achieved by the issue of the impugned order inasmuch as the existing licences issued for conducting Classical Dance are not disturbed by the respondent and therefore, the impugned order is bad for selective discrimination. 9. In this regard, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has contended that other four hotels run by very influential persons of Pondicherry who are having licence to hold Indian Classical Dance, approached the Local Administration Department to ban the issue of further licence for conducting Indian Classical Dance and at their instance, with a view to create monopoly in the hotel industry, the present impugned order dated 21.09.2005 has been passed. 10. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has also questioned the power of the Government in issuing such a Government Order which contravenes Article 239 of the Constitution of India and it is not issued by the Lt. Governor of Pondicherry and has submitted that the Legislature of Pondicherry has given powers to Municipal authorities to issue such a licence to the applicants seeking licence according to the provisions of the Act. 11. Governor of Pondicherry and has submitted that the Legislature of Pondicherry has given powers to Municipal authorities to issue such a licence to the applicants seeking licence according to the provisions of the Act. 11. In support of his above contention, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2003) 5 SCC 134 (J.P. Bansal Vs. State of Rajasthan and Another) which reads as follows: "The Constitution requires that action must be taken by the authority concerned in the name of the Governor. It is not till this formality is observed that the action can be regarded as that of the State. Constitutionally speaking, the Council of Ministers are advisers and as the Head of the State, the Governor is to act with the aid or advice of the Council of Ministers. Therefore, till the advice is accepted by the Governor, views of the Council of Ministers do not get crystallised into action of the State." 12. It is also the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the respondent is very well within the powers to act in accordance with the provisions of the Act and take appropriate action under the relevant provisions of the Act. 13. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner has also brought to the notice of the Court, a document filed in Common Additional Typedset of papers which is a communication dated 30.01.2003 from the Commissioner, Pondicherry Municipality to the Superintendent of Police (North), Law and Order, Pondicherry wherein, it is stated as follows: "I am to state that one Thiru. Abdul Razeed has applied for grant of Municipal Licence for the conduct of Indian Classical Dance (Entertainment Programme) at Hotel Al Rasheed, No.1, Ellapillai Chavady, Pondicherry. I am therefore to request you kindly to issue "No Objection Certificate" so as to enable us to examine the application." 14. From a reading of the above communication, it is made clear that the No Objection Certificate was considered by the authorities concerned in respect of grant of licence and therefore, grant of licence has to be considered. 15. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has pointed out that the Constitution of India, under Part-III, has guaranteed fundamental rights, more particularly, protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc. 15. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has pointed out that the Constitution of India, under Part-III, has guaranteed fundamental rights, more particularly, protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc. under Article 19(1)(g) which provides as follows: "to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business." and also Clause 19 (6) which provides as under: "Nothing in sub-clause(g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law insofar it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and in particular [nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of nay existing law insofar as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to: i. the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or ii. the carrying on by the State, or by a Corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial,of citizens or otherwise.]" 16. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has also referred to Sections 349, 350 and 352 of the Act which provides as below: 349. Application and grant of licence: 3(a) If the Commissioner, after consulting such authority or officer as the Government may from time to time, by notification direct, is satisfied (i) that the enclosed place or building may safely be used for the purpose of public resort or entertainment proposed. 350. Revocation or suspension of licence The Commissioner may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, revoke or suspend the licence when he has reason to believe:- a. that the licences has been fraudulently obtained; b. that the enclosed place or building has been used for other purposes of public resort or entertainment that that for which the licence was granted; c. that the place or building can no longer be safely used for the purpose for which the licence was granted d. that any condition of the licence has been contravened. 352. 352. Power to enter place of public resort to inspect licence or to prevent further use:- It shall be lawful for any officer of police in charge of a station or of higher rank than Head Constable or any other officer duly authorised by the Government by notification, to enter at any time for enclosure or building for which licence is required under this Act, to inspect the licence if any has been issued, and, if there is no licence or if the conditions of the licence are not observed and if he sees reason to apprehend imminent danger to the public, to prevent the further use of such enclosure or building as a place of public resort or entertainment. 17. In support of his contentions, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme court reported in AIR 1969 SC 48 wherein it was held as under: “If the power exercised by the Collector was a quasi judicial power-as we hold it to be – that power cannot be controlled by the directions issued by the Board. No authority however high placed can control the decision of a judicial or a quasi judicial authority. That is the essence of our judicial system. There is no provision in the Act empowering the Board to issue directions to the assessing authorities or the appellate authorities in the matter of deciding disputes between the persons who are called upon to pay duty and the department. It is true that the assessing authorities as well as the appellate authorities are judges in their own cause; yet when they are called upon to decide disputes arising under the Act, they must act independently and impartially. They cannot be said to act independently if their judgment is controlled by the directions given by others. Then, it is a misnomer to call their orders as their judgments; they would essentially be the judgments of the authority that gave the directions and which authority had given those judgments without hearing the aggrieved party. The only provision under which the Board can issue directions is Rule 233 of the Rules framed under the Act. That rule says that the Board and the Collectors may issue written instructions providing for any supplemental matters arising out of these Rules. The only provision under which the Board can issue directions is Rule 233 of the Rules framed under the Act. That rule says that the Board and the Collectors may issue written instructions providing for any supplemental matters arising out of these Rules. Under this rule, the only instruction that the Board can issue is that relating to administrative matters; otherwise that rule will have to be considered as ultra vires Section 35 of the Act.” 18. Further, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has drawn the attention to the fact that Section 350 of the Act, gives the power of revocation or suspension of licence and Section 352 deals with the power to enter place of public resort to inspect licence or to prevent further use and thus, these provisions have given enormous powers to the Municipal authorities to regulate, control and grant licence and there is no need for the Government to come out with such a Government Order prohibiting issue of licence based on which the present impugned order dated 21.09.2005 has been passed and is the subject matter of the challenge. 19. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, in support of his arguments, has placed reliance on a decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1970 SC 93 (Mohd. Faruk, Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others) which reads as follows: "The Notification dated 12.01.1967 issued by the Governor of Madhya Pradesh in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 430(3) of the Act canceling confirmation of the bye-laws made by the Jabalpur Municipal Committee for inspection and regulation of slaughter houses insofar as the bye-laws relate to slaughter of bulls and bullocks, which has the effect of prohibiting the slaughter of bulls and bullocks within the municipality of Jabalpur imposed a direct restriction upon the fundamental right of the petitioner and is ultra vires as infringing Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The impugned notification though technically within the competence of the State Government, directly infringes the fundamental right of the petitioner guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g), and may be upheld only if it be established that it seeks to impose reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public and a less drastic restriction will not ensure the interest of the general public. The Court must in considering the validity of the impugned law imposing a prohibition on the carrying on of a business or profession, attempt an evaluation of its direct and immediate impact upon the fundamental rights of the citizens affected thereby and the larger public interest sought to be ensured in the light of the object sought to be achieved, the necessity to restrict the citizen’s freedom, the inherent pernicious nature of the act prohibited or its capacity or tendency to be harmful to the general public, the possibility of achieving the object by imposing a less drastic restraint, and in the absence of exceptional situations such as the prevalence of a state of emergency-national or local- or the necessity to maintain essential supplies, or the necessity to stop the activities inherently dangerous, the existence of a machinery to satisfy the administrative authority that no case for imposing the restriction is made out or that a less drastic restriction may ensure the object intended to be achieved." 20. Thus, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has made it very clear that the Government Order passed by the Government is exfacie illegal and against the Constitutional rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India and there is a discrimination motivated by some persons who have already had the licence and are conducting entertainment programmes and in order to monopolise their business and at their instance, the impugned order in this writ petition has been passed and this amounts to discrimination and violation of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. 21. The learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner has contended that the above decision of the Supreme Court has made it clear that any order passed by the authority of the Governor alone is a valid one and therefore, the G.O. Ms. No.27 dated 20.09.2005 issued by the Under Secretary to Government, L.A., which is the subject matter in the other writ petition is in nullity since it is not a valid one and consequently, the present impugned order dated 21.09.2005 which is based on G.O. Ms. No.27 dated 20.09.2005 needs to be quashed automatically. 22. No.27 dated 20.09.2005 issued by the Under Secretary to Government, L.A., which is the subject matter in the other writ petition is in nullity since it is not a valid one and consequently, the present impugned order dated 21.09.2005 which is based on G.O. Ms. No.27 dated 20.09.2005 needs to be quashed automatically. 22. He has further contended that in any event, the power of issuing such a Government Order in directing Municipal authorities not to issue any fresh licence for the above-mentioned purposes in any permanent building as defined under Rule 2(c) of Pondicherry Municipalities (Places of Public Resort and Entertainment) Rules 1950 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules") is an arbitrary exercise of powers and against the constitutional guarantee and as such, the same is infirmed by its prohibition clause and needs to be quashed and in the event of that Government Order getting quashed, the present impugned order dated 21.09.2005, which is based on the Government Order dated 20.09.2005 cannot be sustainable and hence, needs to be quashed. 23. The respondent has filed a counter in the capacity of the Commissioner, Pondicherry Municipality and denied the various allegations and contentions raised in the affidavit and contended that the writ petitioner made an application on 08.12.2003 for the purpose of grant of licence to conduct Indian Classical Dance at the petitioner’s hotel and the same was not considered and therefore, he preferred W.P. No.22935 of 2003 for a mandamus and this Court, by order dated 05.12.2003, directed the respondent to consider and pass orders on the petitioner’s representation. 24. The respondent has contended that thereafter, a decision was taken, on consideration of all the materials necessary and after inter-departmental consultation as per the provision of the Act that such performance could not be permitted and therefore, the petitioner was given communication on the rejection of such claim and aggrieved by that, the petitioner filed a writ petitioner challenging the order dated 12.04.2004 and this Court set aside the order and directed the respondent to consider the claim for grant of licence afresh as per law and on merits pending such consideration , grant a temporary licence for conducting Indian Classical Dance taking into consideration the entire fact, including the grant of licence to four other hotels already. 25. 25. The respondent has submitted that this order in the writ petition has been challenged in Writ Appeal No.1456 of 2005 and this Court, by order dated 10.08.2005 set aside the whole order and directed the respondent to consider the claim for grant of licence afresh within three months from the date of the order and also held that in view of the said order, the question of grant of any interim licence did not arise. 26. The respondent has further submitted that on receipt of the said order, the matter was considered again in detail as per requirements of law. Under Section 349 of the Act read with Rules made thereunder, the basic requirement is to have inter-departmental consultation with Additional District Magistrate and Senior Superintendent of Police. Based on their consultation, the claim was considered subject to other conditions being satisfied. 27. It is the case of the respondent that the Senior Superintendent of Police, by communication dated 31.08.2005, has objected to the conduct of such a performance in the said building, based on which, the respondent had no other alternative except to reject the claim of the petitioner for the purpose of grant of licence. 28. The respondent has submitted that since the requirement of obtaining consent of two authorities is not fulfilled, the question of granting licence does not arise at all and only in the light of that situation, the impugned order dated 21.09.2005 was issued. 29. It is further contended that the impugned order is neither illegal nor in violation of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. It is also the contention of the respondent that the petitioner’s claim that the other hotels like that of the petitioner were given licence earlier and in his case, different yardstick was adopted and therefore, the impugned order dated 21.09.2005 is liable to be quashed, is not correct. It is the case of the respondent that in respect of other hotels where there was grant of licence, the authorities concerned have consented for conduct of such performance and did not raise objection as to the building where the performance was to be conducted not in reference to the locality and hence, when those licences were issued on the consent of the statutory authorities, there cannot be comparison with that situation. 30. 30. The respondent has further contended that the claim of the petitioner that Government has issued G.O. Ms. No.27 dated 20.09.2005 notifying to withhold any issue of licence further is also in addition to the submission made above and based on that, the decision has been taken. In fact, he has disclosed in the impugned order itself that the objection was from the police authorities and therefore, there is no possibility for grant of licence. 31. The respondent has contended the allegation of the petitioner that because the other four hotels are run by influential politicians, the petitioner’s licence was rejected and submits that only on non-satsifaction of requirements, the petitioner's application for grant was rejected. 32. The respondent has also brought to the notice of the Court that the subject matter of the G.O. Ms. No.27 dated 20.09.2005 is challenged in the other writ petition and that there is no malafide in the process of consideration of petitioner’s application. 33. It is the submission of the respondent that he had filed application for extension of time before the High Court and therefore, it is not correct to say that the respondent waited for the Government Order to reject the petitioner’s application for licence. 34. The respondent further submits that the allegation of the petitioner that foreign tourists are not preferring to stay in the hotel for want of dance is baseless and any grant of licence is subject to satisfaction of requirement only and not upon desire of the individual. 35. It is the further submission of the respondent that there are no two yardsticks in the matter of grant of licence and licences granted earlier were long back, that too, after getting all the statutory requirements and hence, the petitioner’s allegation to that effect is denied. 36. Mr. 35. It is the further submission of the respondent that there are no two yardsticks in the matter of grant of licence and licences granted earlier were long back, that too, after getting all the statutory requirements and hence, the petitioner’s allegation to that effect is denied. 36. Mr. T. Murugesan, the learned Government Pleader-cum Public Prosecutor, Pondicherry, appearing for the respondent has pointed out various provisions of the Act, more particularly to Section 349 of the Act read with Rules made therein and has contended that the basic requirement under the provisions of the Act is to have inter-departmental consultation with Additional District Magistrate and Senior Superintendent of Police and the authorities have considered the pros and cons of the matter and one of the statutory authorities who has to give consent for conduct of such performance, viz., Department of Police objected to the conduct of the same consequent to which rejection has to be made and therefore, the petitioner cannot be aggrieved of that position. 37. Further, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent submits that there is no infringement or violation of the provisions of the Constitution of India under Article 19(1)(g) as contended by the petitioner and that there is no malafide in the process of consideration of the application which was duly considered and that the allegation that the respondent waited for the Government Order to be passed by the Government is incorrect inasmuch by the time, the respondent has already processed the application of the petitioner for grant of licence. 38. It is the case of the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent that the impugned order has been passed only on the basis of the Government Order in G.O. Ms. No.27 dated 20.09.2005 whereby Government have issued Notification to withhold any issue of licence further and thus, the impugned order is not in any way contrary to the rules established and the rights conferred under the Constitution of India. 39. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has further contended that there is no discrimination as contended by the petitioner as the respondent has followed the same yardstick in all the cases uniformly and he has also submitted that the allegation as four other hotels which have licence are run by very influential politicians including former Ministers, this licence was not granted and there is an act of discrimination, is absolutely incorrect. 40. 40. In his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has argued that that the respondent has followed the provisions under the Act and the Government Order in G.O. Ms. No.27 dated 20.09.2005 and only after considering all the circumstances therein, the impugned order of rejecting licence has been issued and therefore, the writ petition is devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed. 41. Heard both sides. 42. Upon perusing the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition and the counter affidavit filed by the respondent and based on the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for either side, it is seen that the main challenge to the impugned Order is illegal and against the constitutional rights. 43. It is seen that the petitioner has firstly questioned the power of the Government in issuing such an order which infringes the very fundamental rights conferred on the citizens under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India and also the provisions of Sections 349, 350 and 352 of the Act. 44. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, in support of his arguments, has brought to the notice of this Court a document filed in Common Additional Typedset of papers which is a communication dated 30.01.2003 addressed to the Superintendent of Police (North), Law and Order, Pondicherry wherein it is stated as follows: "I am to state that one Thiru. Abdul Razeed has applied for grant of Municipal Licence for the conduct of Indian Classical Dance (Entertainment Programme) at Hotel Al Rasheed, No.1, Ellapillai Chavady, Pondicherry. I am therefore to request you kindly to issue "No Objection Certificate" so as to enable us to examine the application." 45. The following endorsement has been made by the Superintendent of Police (North), Pondicherry in the afore-said letter: "S.P. (South) may please see and necessary action" 46. In response to the same communication, the Divisional Fire Officer, Pondicherry, has also replied to the Commissioner of Pondicherry Municipality as follows: "With reference to the above, I am to state that Hotel Al Rasheed at No.1, Ellapillai Chavady, Pondicherry proposed for conducting "Indian Classical Dance" by Thiru M.M. Dinesh was inspected by the official of this Department and found that there is no objection from the Fire Service angle to grant Municipal licence to the applicant, subject to the condition 2 nos. of CO2 Fire Extinguishers of 4.5 kg. of CO2 Fire Extinguishers of 4.5 kg. capacity each must be provided at the place of function as fire precautionary measures." 47. Similarly, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Orleanpet Police Station, Pondicherry, has sent a letter to the Superintendent of Police (North) Pondicherry, which reads as follows: "This is a reference received from the Commissioner, Municipality of Pondicherry, requesting to issue No Objection Certificate ............................ Necessary enquiries were made and it reveals that the said Hotel was taken as a Lease Deed from the said AL Rasheed on monthly rental basis. Spot was inspected and the parking lot is available. There is no objection on the point of traffic. For information please." 48. From the above series of communication, it is seen that there is a sufficient cause to decide that the two statutory requirements contemplated under the provisions of the Act are satisfactorily complied with, as indicated by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and hence, the question of issuing licence has to be considered. In the instant case, from the above discussion, it is seen that since the petitioner has complied with the requirements, the respondent ought not to have passed the impugned proceedings. 49. The respondent has brought to the notice of the Court that under Section 349 of the Act read with Rules, the basic requirement is to have inter-departmental consultation with Additional District Magistrate and Senior Superintendent of Police. Accordingly, when such consultation was made, the Additional District Magistrate said that the claim can be considered subject to other condition being satisfied, i.e. the grant of No Objection Certificate from the police authorities. Since this is the reason that the impugned order came to be passed, it is the case of the petitioner that he has satisfied all the requirements and it is the bounden duty of the respondent to consider and scrutinize the application if there is no further defect and the respondent has got ample powers to decide the issue in accordance with the provisions of the Act, more particularly, under the provisions contemplated under Sections 349, 350 and 352. Instead of taking such a course, the respondent has decided to follow the Government Order No.27 dated 20.09.2005 which is the subject matter of the other writ petition wherein this Court has quashed the conflicting portion, i.e. the prohibition portion of the Government Order contrary to the fundamental right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business, guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. 50. As pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, it is worth-considering here the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India reported in AIR 1970 SC 93 (Mohd. Faruk, Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others) which reads as follows: "The Notification dated 12.01.1967 issued by the Governor of Madhya Pradesh in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 430(3) of the Act canceling confirmation of the bye-laws made by the Jabalpur Municipal Committee for inspection and regulation of slaughter houses insofar as the bye-laws relate to slaughter of bulls and bullocks, which has the effect of prohibiting the slaughter of bulls and bullocks within the municipality of Jabalpur imposed a direct restriction upon the fundamental right of the petitioner and is ultra vires as infringing Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution." 51. In view of the above decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India and since the respondent has taken the decision in the issuance of the present impugned order on the basis of G.O. Ms. No.27/LAS/2005 dated 20.09.2005 in which the conflicting portion has been quashed in W.P. No.34460 of 2005 wherein it was held as under: “In such view of the matter, the impugned Government Order is quashed to the extent of prohibiting the authorities from issuing any fresh licence insofar as the performance of Indian Classical Dance is concerned as it is an infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution of India and therefore, the particular portion prohibiting issue of any fresh licence has to be struck off. While doing so, this Court is conscious of the larger public interest involved in relation to maintaining public order, decency and morality and the authorities are empowered to regulate the same by invoking the provisions of the Act to prevent any act which is inherently dangerous, noxious or injurious to public interest, health or safety or is likely to prove nuisance to the community. In such a situation, the respondents can very well invoke the provision under Section 352 of the Act or any law time being in force to prevent misuse or abuse of any licence granted or to be granted. Further, it is open to the respondents to amend the Act accordingly, if necessary. In view of the above, the impugned order is quashed only to the extent indicated above and the issues raised by the petitioner are answered accordingly and the writ petition is allowed to that extent.” the present impugned order cannot be sustainable and in such view of the matter, the impugned order dated 21.09.2005 is in nullity and accordingly, it is quashed. 52. While doing so, this Court cannot keep the public interest in doldrums and there must be a cautious approach to the system of governance and public interest. Here, it is worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2003) 5 SCC 134 (J.P. Bansal Vs. State of Rajasthan and Another) which reads as follows: “Statute being an edict of the legislature, it is necessary that it is expressed in clear and unambiguous language. Where, however, the words were clear, there is no obscurity, there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the Court to innovate or take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions. In that situation, the Judges should not proclaim that they are playing the role of a law-maker merely for an exhibition of judicial valour. They have to remember that there is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed or erased.” 53. Hence, when there is a provision under Section 349 of the Act which stipulates clearly as to what is to be done and when such unambiguous provision is not property regulated, considered and scrutinized, this Court has got ample power to direct the respondent herein to apply the provisions stipulated in the Act in respect of consideration of grant of licence. 54. 54. Therefore, in view of the decision made in the other W.P. No. 34460 of 2005 (as stated supra) in quashing the prohibition portion of the impugned Government Order in G.O.Ms.No.27/LAS/2005 dated 20.09.2005, the present impugned order dated 21.09.2005 which is a consequential order of the said Government Order, is quashed and considering the facts and circumstance of the case, this Court is inclined to direct the respondent to consider the application of the petitioner afresh for grant of licence and pass orders thereon within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.