Judgment : These batch of Revision Petitions are directed against the Order of delivery of possession ordered in various execution Petitions, arising out of the suits filed by the Respondent Trust. 2. Since common points are involved for determination, all the Revision Petitions were heard together and disposed of by this Common Order. 3. Brief facts of the case are as follows :- 3.1. 1. Anextent of a 8.65 acres of Punja Lands comprised in S.No. 150/2 and Old No. 196/1, New No. 199/1 in Siruvadi Village was allotted to a Private Trust for the purpose of performing religious rites and charities etc. in terms of the Partition Deed dated 18.12.1951, registered as document No. 4508/51. The Revision Petitioners and other persons are said to have trespassed into the various portions of the aforesaid property. Hence the Trust, represented by its Power of Attorney, filed several suits for declaration of their Title and for recovery of properties from the respective parties, out of which, O.S.Nos. 203, 205, 214, 194 of 1983 were disposed of as in the year 1991. Some of the other suits O.S.Nos. 180, 192, 183, 185, 196, 197, 198, 199, 209, 211 of 2003 were decreed in the year 1993, after contest. 3.2. 2. Execution Petitions were filed for delivery of possession. When the Court Amin went to execute the Delivery Warrant, it was noticed that there was discrepancy in Survey Number of the Suit Property and delivery could not be effected for want of correct Survey Number in the Decree. Thereafter, the Respondents/Decree Holders filed I.As. to amend the Decree, incorporating the correct Survey Number as 186/1 instead of 186/2. Those applications were contested by the Petitioners and finally, the Court has allowed the amendment in the year 1996 and in certain cases, in the year 1997. Subsequently, the decrees were amended. Since suitable amendment were made in the decrees, the earlier E.P.s were withdrawn and fresh E.P.s were filed in the year 1996. The Petitioners seriously contested the Execution Petition on the various grounds interalis that the E.P.s are barred by limitation. Overruling the objection, Executing Court has ordered delivery of possession, which is challenged in these revisions. 4. Since suitable amendment were made in the decrees, the earlier E.P.s were withdrawn and fresh E.P.s were filed in the year 1996. The Petitioners seriously contested the Execution Petition on the various grounds interalis that the E.P.s are barred by limitation. Overruling the objection, Executing Court has ordered delivery of possession, which is challenged in these revisions. 4. Assailing the impugned Order, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners Judgment-Debtors raised the following points:- E.P.s are barred by limitation; Person who is prosecuting the Decree is not competent to represent the Decree Holder;Order passed by the Executing Court is a non-speaking one and unsustainable. 5. Contending that all the E.P.s are well within time, the learned Counsel for the Respondent/Decree Holder has submitted that though amendment applications were filed as early as in the year 1993, it was allowed only in the year 1996 and the delay occurred only due to the act of the Petitioners and the Petitioners cannot be allowed to take advantage of their own wrong. Submitting that by oversight mistake has crept in the Survey Number, the learned Counsel for the Decree Holder has submitted that the period of pendency of I.A. is to be included in view of Section 17(3) of the Limitation Act. 6. Whether the Decree Holder is entitled for exclusion of 3 years 3 months and 21 days, during which the amendment applications were pending; and whether the E.P.s are barred by limitation, are the main points arising for consideration in these Revision Petitions. 7. Theplea that Sirajudeen Syed is not competent to represent the Decree Holder is unarguable. I.A.No. 1299 of 1994 in O.S.No. 203 of 1983 was allowed and the said Sirajudeen Syed was permitted to represent the Trust of the family of Dr. Zazir Ahmed Syed and his brothers. Challenging that Order in I.A. No. 1299 of 1994, CRP No. 3238 of 1996 was filed and the High Court has ordered that evidence could be adduced by either party in deciding the application. The matter was taken by District Munsif Court, Tindivanam, and at that time Execution Petition was filed and heard. It is stated that an elaborate Order was passed dated 27.4.2005, with detailed discussion, permitting Sirajuddin Syed as the representative of the Trust of the Family. That Order permitting Sirajuddin Syed to represent the family of the Trust has not been challenged by the Petitioners. It is stated that an elaborate Order was passed dated 27.4.2005, with detailed discussion, permitting Sirajuddin Syed as the representative of the Trust of the Family. That Order permitting Sirajuddin Syed to represent the family of the Trust has not been challenged by the Petitioners. While so, they cannot raise the objection regarding the representative capacity of the said Sirajudeen Syed. 8. The third contention raised by the Petitioners is that the impugned Order, ordering delivery, is a non-speaking Order. The learned Counsel for the Respondent/Decree Holder has submitted that delivery was ordered simultaneously when the Order was passed in the applications allowing Sirajudeen Syed, permitting him to represent the family and a detailed Order was passed in the said applications. Since the other connected applications were ordered on merits, on 27.4.2005, simultaneously ordering delivery of possession by the learned District Munsif, Tindivanam, no separate reasoning are necessitated. Though elaborate Orders was passed in the connected applications, it would have been desirable had the Executing Court recorded the brief reasoning for ordering delivery of possession. But the impugned Order is not vitiated on that deficiency. 9. On the ground that the order is a non-speaking Order, this Court does not consider it necessary to remit back the matter to the Executing Court at this distant point of time. After all, in the revision, the Court is obligated to consider the correctness or legality or propriety of the impugned Order. 10. We may now proceed to consider the main point urged that all the E.P.s filed in 1996 are barred by limitation. This contention that the E.P.s are barred by limitation is not applicable in so far as the CRP Nos. 1322, 1323, 1326, 1317 and 1312 of 2005 are concerned. In this matters decrees were passed in 1991 or 1990. E.P.s were filed in 1996, which is well within the period of limitation. 11. In all other suits, Decree were passed in 1983. The learned Counsel for the Respondent has contended that the Decree have been obtained in the year 1983 and the E.P.s should have been filed within 12 years, as stipulated under Article 136 or the Limitation Act. E.P.s were filed in 1996, which is well within the period of limitation. 11. In all other suits, Decree were passed in 1983. The learned Counsel for the Respondent has contended that the Decree have been obtained in the year 1983 and the E.P.s should have been filed within 12 years, as stipulated under Article 136 or the Limitation Act. It was further submitted that previously under the Limitation Act, 1908, there was a provision for filing E.P. within three years, when the Decree was amended under Article 182(4) and in the present Limitation Act, 1963, there is no such corresponding Article. The learned Counsel has referred to the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908, herein after referred as repealed Act. Article 182 of repealed Act provided for a different period of limitation. Article182 read:- Description of application Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run 182. For the execution of a Decree or Order of any civil Court not provided for by Article 183 or by Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Three Years 1. … 2. … 3. … 4.Wherethe Decree has been amended the date of amendment or 5. … 6. … 7. … It was submitted that no longer the period of limitation of 12 years has been provided for under the Limitation Act 1963, irrespective of the fact whether Decree has undergone amendment or not and hence, the Decree Holder is not entitled to seek for any extension of time, when due to his own fault, he has chosen to make an application for the amendment of the description of property. Contending that the amendment will not provide for extension of time, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner placed reliance upon - AIR 1972 Madras 322; AIR 1975 Punjab and Haryana 246; AIR 1976 Patana 118; AIR 1979 Kerala 14. 12. Explaining the changes made by the present Act, in Ouseph v. Lona , AIR 1979 Ker. 14 , Kerala High Court has held as :- “Act.182 of the repealed Act [Limitation Act of 1908] had to be read in conjunction with Section 48 of the C.P.C. which was repealed by Section 28 of the present Act of 1963. Section 48 of the Code provided for an outer limit of 12 years for the execution of a Decree. Section 48 of the Code provided for an outer limit of 12 years for the execution of a Decree. This maximum period of 12 years from the date of Decree was the total time allowed for the execution of a Decree, although the three year period provided under Article 182 of the repealed Act ran from the date of amendment of a Decree. Article 136 of the present Act which provides for a 12 year period of limitation for the execution of a Decree. The period being to run from the date on which the Decree became enforceable and that in the present case as the date of the Decree itself. Although the Decree underwent a change with its amendment, until the date of the amendment, the Decree in its original form was enforceable as from the date on which it was passed. It was that date which was crucial for computing the period of limitation as provided under Article 136.” 13. Article 136 of the present act provides for 12 year period of limitation for the execution of the Decree. Article 136 reads as under :- Description of suit Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run 136. For the execution of any Decree [other or than a Decree granting a mandatory injunction] or order of any civil Court Twelve years The Decree order be-comes enforceable or where the Decree or any subsequent Order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, when default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which execution is sought, takes place: provided that an application for the enforcement or execution of a Decree granting a perpetual injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation. 14. Article 136 of the present Act has set a new deadline, beyond which no application for execution of the Decree could be made. The period of 12 years is long enough to execute the Decree when it is enforceable. Un-disputedly, the Plaintiff has taken out E.P. after expiry of 12 years from the date of the Decree. However, according to the Plaintiffs, the Decree was not enforceable in view of the mistake in the Survey Number. The period of 12 years is long enough to execute the Decree when it is enforceable. Un-disputedly, the Plaintiff has taken out E.P. after expiry of 12 years from the date of the Decree. However, according to the Plaintiffs, the Decree was not enforceable in view of the mistake in the Survey Number. According to the Plaintiffs, the Decree has “become enforceable” only when the mistake in the Survey Number was rectified and the Survey Number in the Decree was amended. According to the Plaintiff, the period during which the amendment application was pending i. e. 3 years, 3 months and 21 days, is to be excluded from calculating 12 years and the execution Petitions filed in the year 1996 are well within the period of Limitation. 15. Elaborating upon Article 136, which provided for limitation of 12 years for executing of Decree, in Hamed Joharan and Others v. Abdul Salam and Others Hamed Joharan and Others v. Abdul Salam and Others Hamed Joharan and Others v. Abdul Salam and Others , AIR 201 SC 3404 the Supreme Court has held as under:- “Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, prescribes a period of twelve years for the execution of a Decree other than a Decree granting a mandatory injunction or Order of any civil Court. The language used by the legislature in Article 136 if read in its proper perspective to wit : ‘when the Decree or Order becomes enforceable‘ must have been to clear up any confusion that might have arisen by reason of the user of the expression ‘the date of the Decree or Order‘ which was used in the earlier Act. The intention of the legislature stands clearly exposed by the language used therein viz., to permit twelve year certain period from the date of the Decree or Order. There cannot be any ambiguity in the language used in the third column and the words used therein to wit : ‘when the Decree or Order becomes enforceable‘ should be read in their literal sense. There cannot be any ambiguity in the language used in the third column and the words used therein to wit : ‘when the Decree or Order becomes enforceable‘ should be read in their literal sense. The requirement of the Limitation Act in the matter of enforcement of Decree is the date on which the Decree becomes enforceable or capable of being enforced - what is required is to assess the legislative intent and if the intent appears to be otherwise clear and unambiguous, question of attributing a different meaning other than the Literal meaning of the words used would not arise”. 16. In the above decision, the Supreme Court has held that furnishing of stamp papers being well within the domain of the Decree Holder, nothing prevented him from acting in terms therewith and held that the Decree was capable of being enforced from 20.11.1970 i. e. on the date on which it was pronounced by the Court and limitation ought to be counted therefrom. In the said case before the Supreme Court, the Decree Holder was directed to furnish stamp papers for drafting the Final Decree and the Decree Holder has not furnished the stamp paper for drafting the Decree. In that context, the Supreme Court has held that the period of limitation commenced on the date of the Order of such Decree and is not arrested by the non supply of stamp papers or extra Court Fees. In the said case, the Supreme Court held that furnishing of stamp papers was not an extraneous event but within the domain and control of the Decree Holder and hence, the Supreme Court has observed that the Decree was capable of being enforced on the date on which it was passed by the Court. 17. We have no doubt in holding that the Decree was enforceable from the day when it was passed. But this is not a case of enforceable Decree, but is a case where the Decree Holder was unable to execute the decree due to the mistake in the survey number and enforceability of the Decree. The Decree Holder has been proved to have filed similar E.P. for the execution of the Decree within the period of limitation. The Decree could not be executed since the survey number is to be corrected as S.No. 186/1 instead of S.No. 186/2 and only after correction, the Decree could be enforced. The Decree Holder has been proved to have filed similar E.P. for the execution of the Decree within the period of limitation. The Decree could not be executed since the survey number is to be corrected as S.No. 186/1 instead of S.No. 186/2 and only after correction, the Decree could be enforced. Applications for amending the Decree have been delayed. In view of the pendency of the Amendment Application, old Execution Petitions ought not to have been withdrawn or closed. For one reason or other, rightly or wrongly, the earlier E.P.s filed within the period of limitation have been withdrawn. Hence time during which I.A.s were pending, i. e. 3 years, 3 months and 21 days, ought to be excluded. Pendency of I.A.s to amend the Decree by correcting the Survey Number was neither within the domain nor within the control of the Decree Holder. Hence that period spent in Interlocutory Applications - 3 years, 3 months and 21 days is necessarily to be excluded. Any other interpretation would allow the Judgment-Debtors to take advantage of their conduct of delaying the I.A.s for amending the Decree. No one can be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. 18. As a general rule, Executing Court should not find ways to dismiss E.P.s as barred by time, unless it is established that such an application was beyond limitation. As noted earlier, the Decree Holder has been proved to have filed earlier E.P.s within the period of limitation. The subsequent E.P.s filed in 1996 could only be continuation of the earlier E.P.s. 19. We may also point out saving of limitation under Section 17(1)(c). Section 17 of the Limitation Act interalis provides that where in the case of any suit or an application for which a period of limitation is prescribed by the Act, the knowledge of the right or title on which a suit or application is founded is concealed by fraud of the Defendant or his agents [Section 17(1)(b)] or where the suit or application is for the relief from the consequences of the mistake [17(1)(c)], the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the Plaintiff or applicant has discovered the mistake with reasonable diligence. The Judgment-Debtors who have delayed the proceeding cannot be allowed to gain benefit of limitation in their favour by virtue of the pendency of the Interlocutory Application for amendment. 20. The Judgment-Debtors who have delayed the proceeding cannot be allowed to gain benefit of limitation in their favour by virtue of the pendency of the Interlocutory Application for amendment. 20. There is no merit in the contentions raised that the E.P.s. are barred by limitation. E.P.s are well within the period of limitation and all the Revision Petitions are bound to fail. 21. Order of delivery of possession ordered in E.P.Nos. 428, 480, 487 439, 436, 426, 425, 427, 438, 431, 456, 435, 476 of 1996; and 154, 155 of 1997; and 197 of 2003, on the file of the Principal District Munsif Court, Tindivanam is confirmed and these Revision Petitions are dismissed. No costs. Consequently CMP Nos. 9613 to 9629 of 2005 are also dismissed. Y.C. M.P. Nos. 14961 to 14975 of 2005 are closed.