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2006 DIGILAW 331 (HP)

The Chairman-Cum-Managing Director H. P. Ex-Servicemen Corporation v. Hari Chand

2006-11-01

V.K.GUPTA

body2006
JUDGMENT V.K. Gupta, C.J. 1. A letter dated 8th August, 2005 issued by the Manager, H.P. Ex-servicemen Corporation, Camp Office, Barmana, District Bilaspur and addressed to the respondent-plaintiff gave rise to a cause of action to him to file a suit for declaration with consequential relief for permanent injunction. For ready reference, the text of the letter is reproduced hereunder, which reads thus: It has been reported by the ACC Authorities that your truck No. HP-24-3510 was loaded on 07/8/2005 to Anandpur Sahib vide excise invoice No. 53027 (LA No. 118381), but the cement has been sold by you in H.P., other than delivering the material at appropriate place, which is clear cut violation of undertaking given by you. Keeping in view the unlawful activity committed by you, your both trucks viz. HP 24-3510 and HP 24-5510 are blacklisted. You are further warned to submit the reply why you have committed such lapse and for this acts of breach of contract, your truck should not be delisted from the carriage of cement. 2. It is the common case of the parties that the respondent-plaintiff owns two trucks bearing registration Nos. HP-24-3510 and HP-24-5510. It is also the common case of the parties that truck No.HP-24-5510 was not involved in any incident and that it is the alleged involvement of only truck No. HP-24-3510 based upon which the aforesaid impugned action of black listing of both the trucks was taken and carried out by the petitioners-defendants. 3. The allegation of the petitioners-defendants against the plaintiff-respondent was that there was some irregularity with respect to the carriage of 200 bags of cement from the factory at Barmana to Anandpur Sahib, the said cement having initially been loaded at the factory at Barmana on truck No. HP-24-3510. The allegation was that 200 bags of cement meant for Anandpur dump for unloading even though were taken there, on the way at a place called Bhatoli 100 bags were unloaded but subsequently 100 bags were purchased once again by the driver from a non dealer, namely, M/s. Sharma Cement Store at Delhi. The allegation was that 200 bags of cement meant for Anandpur dump for unloading even though were taken there, on the way at a place called Bhatoli 100 bags were unloaded but subsequently 100 bags were purchased once again by the driver from a non dealer, namely, M/s. Sharma Cement Store at Delhi. Whatever be the effect of this allegation and whatever be the effect of the denial thereof by the plaintiff-respondent, the net result was the black listing of the plaintiff-respondent by the petitioners-defendants with respect to both the trucks despite the fact that the other truck had nothing to do with the aforesaid alleged unsavory incident. 4. It was no part of any allegation by the petitioners that the plaintiff-respondent was in any way involved with the aforesaid unsavory incident. The tone and tenor of the letters issued by the petitioners as well as ACC pointed out only to the acts of omission and commission allegedly committed by the driver of truck No. HP-24-3510 arid none by the plaintiff-respondent. 5. It was in the aforesaid background that the plaintiff-respondent filed the aforesaid suit for declaration with consequential relief of permanent injunction in which the following prayers were made: PRAYER: In the light of submission as made above, plaintiff seeks the indulgence of this Hon'ble Court for the following reliefs: (a) That plaintiff is entitled to get his trucks bearing registration No. HP-24-3510 and HP-24-5510 engaged with the H.P. Ex-servicemen Corporation Barmana being ex-serviceman and letter No. 775 dated 8.8.2005 is illegal, mala fide in nature, null and void and may be declared so. (b) That the defendants be directed to engage vehicles of plaintiff bearing No. HP-24-3510 and HP-24-5510 with the Corporation as usual and they may be restrained permanently from interfering with the working and business of plaintiff in any manner. (c) Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems fit in the light of facts and circumstances of the case. 6. The suit was accompanied by an application for grant of temporary injunction filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 7. The learned trial Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bilaspur vide order dated 4th October, 2005 granted injunction in favour of the plaintiff-respondent by issuing a direction qua the petitioners-defendants to engage the aforesaid two vehicles of the respondent forthwith. 7. The learned trial Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bilaspur vide order dated 4th October, 2005 granted injunction in favour of the plaintiff-respondent by issuing a direction qua the petitioners-defendants to engage the aforesaid two vehicles of the respondent forthwith. A restraint order was also issued qua the petitioners retraining them from interfering with the working and business of the respondent till the disposal of the suit. 8. An appeal against the aforesaid order filed by the petitioners before the learned District Judge, being CMA No. 27 of 2005 was dismissed by him vide his judgment dated 16th January, 2006. The injunction granted by the learned trial Court was maintained by the learned Appeal Court. It is against the aforesaid judgment that the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioners before this Court. 9. As before the learned lower Courts, in this Court also it has been argued on behalf of the petitioners that the suit was not maintainable because of total lack of jurisdiction in a Civil Court in view of Section 26 of the Himachal Pradesh Ex-servicemen Corporation Act, 1979 (1979 Act for short). Mr. G.D. Verma, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners while drawing my attention to Section 26 of 1979 Act and by referring to Section 15 of the said Act submitted that in view of the aforesaid provisions of law the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and, therefore, the suit on this account was not maintainable. Section 26 of 1979 Act reads thus: 26. Bar of Jurisdiction. - Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which the Corporation or any officer or authority appointed under this Act is empowered by or under this Act to determine, and no injunction shall be granted by any Court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act. 10. Reliance was also placed by Mr. Verma upon Clause (i) of Sub-section (2) of Section 15 of 1979 Act. For ready reference, the entire Section 15 of 1979 Act is reproduced hereunder which reads thus: 15. Function of the Corporation. 10. Reliance was also placed by Mr. Verma upon Clause (i) of Sub-section (2) of Section 15 of 1979 Act. For ready reference, the entire Section 15 of 1979 Act is reproduced hereunder which reads thus: 15. Function of the Corporation. - (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the functions of the Corporation shall be to provide for the welfare and economic uplift of the ex-servicemen in the State. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, the Corporation may take such steps as it may think necessary,- (i) to plan, promote and undertake, on its own or in collaboration with or through such ex-servicemen organization or other agencies as may be approved by the Corporation, programmes of agricultural development, marketing, processing, supply and storage of agricultural produce, small scale industry, building construction, transport and such other business, trade or activity as may be approved in this behalf by the Government; (ii) to provide financial assistance to ex-servicemen or their organizations by advancing to them in cash or in kind loans including loans under hire-purchase system and/or loan towards margin money for any of the purposes specified in Clause (i) either directly or through such agency, organization or institution as may be approved by it; (iii) to give on hire agricultural or industrial machinery or equipment to ex-servicemen or their organization; (iv) to give grants and subsidies to and to guarantee loans taken by, the ex-servicemen or their organization; (v) to discharge such other functions as may be prescribed or as are supplemental, incidental or consequential to any of the functions conferred on it under this Act. (3) In discharging its functions, the Corporation shall have due regard to public interest, its solvency and welfare of ex-servicemen. 11. A plain reading of Section 26 clearly suggests that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been barred with respect to entertaining any suit concerning any matter which the Corporation or any officer or authority of the Corporation appointed under the Act is empowered, by or under the Act to determine. The empowerment to determine any matter under the Act, therefore, is a sine qua non to the ouster of the jurisdiction by a Civil Court in so far as entertaining a Civil Suit with respect to such a matter is concerned. The empowerment to determine any matter under the Act, therefore, is a sine qua non to the ouster of the jurisdiction by a Civil Court in so far as entertaining a Civil Suit with respect to such a matter is concerned. Apart from referring to Clause (i) of Sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the 1979 Act, Mr. Verma did not refer to either any other provision of the Act or any Rules or Regulations made under the Act to establish that under the Act or by the Act, the Corporation or any officer or authority of the Corporation has been empowered to determine or deal with any issue concerning the black listing of the trucks under the operation of the petitioners. The subject-matter of the suit filed by the respondent-plaintiff was only qua the black listing of his trucks by the Corporation. Nothing else was involved for consideration in the suit. 12. Neither Clause (i) of Sub-section (2) nor any other Clause of this sub-section directly or indirectly deals with or relates to the issue of either running or operation of transport carriage by the Corporation nor for that matter the black listing of any carriage contractor or any truck allegedly involved in any activity, rightly or wrongly. Since no other provision of the Act or Rules or Regulations was brought to my notice, I have no hesitation in holding that Section 26 of the 1979 Act could not have been invoked by the petitioners in support of their plea relating to the ouster of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court inasmuch as in the absence of empowerment of the Corporation or its officer or authority appointed under the Act for determination of an issue relating to the black listing of a truck or a matter identical, similar or akin thereto, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court could not be deemed or considered to be ousted in any manner. On its plain reading, Section 26 of 1979 Act is not a sweeping provision of law but it is conditioned to the aforesaid specific stipulation about the aforesaid determination. The learned Courts below, therefore, had the jurisdiction to entertain the aforesaid suit. 13. On its plain reading, Section 26 of 1979 Act is not a sweeping provision of law but it is conditioned to the aforesaid specific stipulation about the aforesaid determination. The learned Courts below, therefore, had the jurisdiction to entertain the aforesaid suit. 13. The learned Courts below by a proper exercise of discretion and on the basis of proper appreciation of facts and due application of mind have granted injunctions, both mandatory as well as prohibitory, although temporary, in favour of the respondent and on proper consideration of all relevant aspects involved in the matter, I see no reason to take a different view while exercising my jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Verma's contention that injunction in the mandatory form could not have been granted or should not have been granted because by doing so the suit itself has been decreed, has been duly noted by me to be rejected for the simple reason that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case where both the trucks owned by the respondent were black listed, and the Courts below having found prima facie case in favour of the respondent-plaintiff, if the black listing order had not been stayed, the respondent-plaintiff would have suffered irreparable loss and injury which could not have been compensated by any means because in the absence of a stay order his both the trucks would have remained idle, without being put to any use. 14. Even though the impugned action of the petitioners forming the subject-matter of the suit, being letter dated 8th August, 2005 did not give any indication at all that the ACC had ordered the black listing of one truck, namely, truck HP-24-3510, only in the written statement filed did the petitioners give this information and enclose therewith a copy of communication No. GL/CDS/4/193 dated 8th August, 2005 written by the Senior Manager (Distribution), Associated Cement Companies Limited and addressed to the Manager of the petitioner-Corporation which indicated that the ACC was black listing truck No. HP-24-3510. 15. Undoubtedly because of the lack of the aforesaid information in the letter aforesaid regarding the ACC having black listed the aforesaid vehicle the respondent-plaintiff did not and could not implead ACC as a party defendant in the suit. In view of the aforesaid changed situation, Mr. 15. Undoubtedly because of the lack of the aforesaid information in the letter aforesaid regarding the ACC having black listed the aforesaid vehicle the respondent-plaintiff did not and could not implead ACC as a party defendant in the suit. In view of the aforesaid changed situation, Mr. Jaswal, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff today has made a statement before me that his client shall take steps within three days from today for impleadment of ACC as a party defendant in the suit. Actually, Mr. Jaswal submits that application for amendment of the plaint to the aforesaid effect shall be filed in the trial Court during the course of this week itself. 16. Based on a totality of the aforesaid circumstances whereas I dismiss this petition and uphold the impugned judgment, I direct that upon the application for impleadment being filed by the respondent in the trial Court during the course of this week, the learned trial Court shall pass appropriate orders thereupon, after obtaining reply of the defendant in the suit within three weeks from today. There is no doubt whatsoever in my mind and Mr. G.D. Verma also agrees with me that ACC is a necessary and proper party in the suit. 17. On that being done, ACC shall be summoned in the suit as also in the application for temporary injunction. The learned trial Court thereafter shall proceed to re-hear the temporary injunction application, re-hearing undoubtedly includes the hearing of the newly impleaded defendant and thereafter to re-decide whether to continue or discontinue with the temporary injunction qua truck No. HP-24-3510. Consequential orders shall be passed accordingly by the learned trial Court before 31st December, 2006. 18. By way of clarification and to remove all doubts it is reiterated that the temporary injunction granted qua truck No. HP-24-5510 as ordered by both the Courts below is confirmed by this Court in toto till the pendency of the suit but the temporary injunction granted qua truck No. HP-24-3510 would continue to remain operative only till 31st December, 2006 whereafter its continuance or dis-continuance shall abide by the order which the trial Court passes in the light of the aforesaid observations and directions. 19. 19. Before parting, I do wish to observe and direct that the learned trial Court in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case shall take all possible steps to expeditiously dispose of the suit. I also wish to observe and direct that if in the process of any negotiated settlement, parleys have taken place between the parties consequent upon the order passed by this Court on 11th October, 2006, and if in that process any correspondence has been exchanged between the parties, any party wishing to make use of such correspondence against the other shall be doing so, if at all, only at its own peril, risk and responsibility but the learned trial Court shall not take note of any such correspondence except keeping in view the background under which it was issued based upon the unsuccessful effort for an amicable settlement. 20. The petition is dismissed. CMP No. 80 of 2006. In view of the dismissal of the main petition, this application is also dismissed. Interim order dated 3rd March, 2006 shall stand vacated.