Judgment ( 1. ) EVEN though the matter has been listed today before us for consideration of appellants repeat bail application registered as I. A. No. 231/2006, but learned Counsel appearing for the parties submitted that in view of the fact that the appellant has filed I. A. No. 1584/2006 for taking certain additional documents on record, the matter be heard on merits itself. ( 2. ) ON 3-2-2006, respondent had prayed for time to ascertain the correctness of the birth certificate filed by the appellant. On inquiry being made, statement at bar has been made before us that it has been found that the certificate produced by the appellant reflects his correct date of birth. Thus, the respondent has not disputed the documents filed alongwith the application. ( 3. ) AS per aforesaid documents, the date of birth of the appellant is said to be 1-1-1976. In the present matter, out of which this appeal has arisen, offence was said to have committed by the six accused on 31-1-1991. The appellant was produced before the Committal Court on 21-6-1991. ( 4. ) THE learned Counsel for the appellant, therefore, contended that in fact his whole trial stands vitiated as he could not have been tried by the sessions Court and instead, looking to his age, he should have been tried before the Juvenile Court. ( 5. ) HOWEVER, it appears that this defence was not set up by the appellant specifically and no plea in this regard was raised. Only at the appellate stage, the appellant has come forward with this plea that on the date when he was first produced before the Court, he was a juvenile under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 and even under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)Act, 2000. 5-A. By the impugned judgment pronounced by 12th Additional sessions Judge (Fast Track), Jabalpur, in S. T. No. 456/1992, dated 18-7-2005, this appellant has been found guilty for commission of offence under Sections 302/34 of IPC and has been awarded life imprisonment with fine of Rs. 500/-and in default thereof further R. I. for one year. ( 6. ) AS has been mentioned hereinabove that after inquiry being made by the respondent, it has been affirmed that this appellant was born on 1-1-1976. Record shows that he was produced before the Court for the first time on 21-6-1991. 500/-and in default thereof further R. I. for one year. ( 6. ) AS has been mentioned hereinabove that after inquiry being made by the respondent, it has been affirmed that this appellant was born on 1-1-1976. Record shows that he was produced before the Court for the first time on 21-6-1991. Thus, on the date when he was produced for the first time he was aged about 15 years. Under the earlier Act, i. e. , the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, a juvenile or child means a person who has not completed 16 years of age. This is with regard to male child. Under the subsequent Act, i. e. , the Juvenile justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 the said age with regard to male or female child has been enhanced to 18 years. Latter Act of 2000 has come into force w. e. f. 1-4-2001. Thus, the provisions of earlier Act would be applicable to the facts of this case. ( 7. ) AS has been mentioned hereinabove that on the date when this appellant was produced before the Court for the first time he was aged about 15 years and atleast less than 16 years of age. Thus, he could not have been tried alongwith other co-accused by Sessions Judge. However, since this plea was not specifically raised by the appellant herein, we do not intend to hold that the whole proceedings against him stood vitiated. The said plea has been raised before us in appeal for the first time. ( 8. ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 592 (Upendra Kumar Vs. State of bihar), which touches the issue directly involved in this case. The Supreme court has held that in view of the fact that the appellant was Juvenile at the time when he was first produced before the Court, benefit of the Act has to accrue to him. They have also given direction as to what should be the course open for deciding such a case. They have directed that the conviction of the appellant has to be sustained, but at the same time sentence awarded to him has to be quashed. They have also given direction as to what should be the course open for deciding such a case. They have directed that the conviction of the appellant has to be sustained, but at the same time sentence awarded to him has to be quashed. Following the aforesaid dictum of the Supreme Court, same course of action has to be applied to this case also, as it has been established that on the relevant date appellant was a juvenile. ( 9. ) SECTION 20 of the latter Act is the saving clause. For ready reference section 20 is reproduced hereinbelow :- "20. Special provision in respect of pending cases.- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any Court in any area on the date on which this Act comes into force in that area, shall be continued in that court as if this Act had not been passed and if the Court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile in accordance with the provisions of this Act as if ft had been satisfied on inquiry under this Act that a juvenile has committed the offence. " As per this provision, the appellant is to be produced before the Juvenile board, which shall pass an order in accordance with the provisions of this Act as if it had been satisfied on inquiry under this Act that a juvenile has committed the offence. The aforesaid provision is clear and leaves no doubts in our mind with regard to the mode of implementation, thus we have followed the same mode, as has been mandated in the aforesaid section. ( 10. ) IN the light of the aforesaid discussion, we uphold the conviction but his sentence is hereby set aside. Instead, he is directed to be produced before the Juvenile Board, which shall then act in accordance with the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. ( 11. ) WITH the aforesaid directions, this appeal stands disposed of.