Judgment :- 1. Being aggrieved by the order dated 31.12,2002 passed In an Application filed under Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants' Protection Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") in I.A. No.2064 of 2000 in O.S. No.5987 of 1997 on the file of the Second Additional City Civil Judge, Madras, the respondent/plaintiff therein has filed the above Appeal under Section 9-A of the Act. 2. The short facts of the case as pleaded by the respondent are as follows: The predecessors in-interest or the respondent herein namely ESSO Eastern Inc. became a tenant under the appellant herein in respect of an extent of land measuring 1187.3 sq. mts. situated at St. George's Cathetral Road, Madras under a lease deed, dated 11.07.1972, for a period of 10 years commencing from 01.07.1972 for the purpose of running a petrol bunk. In pursuance thereof ESSO Eastern Inc. put up a super-structure over the said land for the purposes of running a petrol bunk. Subsequently by an Act of Parliament all rights, title and interest of ESSO Eastern Inc. in relation to its undertakings in India were transferred to and vested in the Central Government with effect from 13.3.1974. Thereafter under a notification issued by the Central Government the rights, liabilities and interest of ESSO Eastern Inc. vested in ESSO Standard Refining Company of India Limited, a Government company with effect from 15.3.1974 and subsequently the name of ESSO Standard Refining Company of India Limited was changed to Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited, the respondent herein. The lease period expired on 01.12.1982 and thereafter the lease was not extended beyond 01.12.1982, however the appellant though initially refused to receive the rent, later received the same under protest without prejudice to their, claim and after issuing the Statutory Notice filed a Suit in C.S. No.856 of 1993 before the High Court, Madras on its Original Civil Jurisdiction demanding the appellant to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the suit property. The respondent filed Application No.3352 of 1995 in the said suit under Section 9 of the Act seeking direction against the appellant herein to sell the entire suit land as per Section 9 of the Act at a price to be fixed by the Court by appointing an Advocate Commissioner.. The respondent filed Application No.3352 of 1995 in the said suit under Section 9 of the Act seeking direction against the appellant herein to sell the entire suit land as per Section 9 of the Act at a price to be fixed by the Court by appointing an Advocate Commissioner.. Because of the enlargement of pecuniary jurisdiction, the Suit was transferred to the City Civil Court, Madras and it was renumbered as O.S. No.5987 of 1997. The Application filed under Section 9 of the Act was re-numbered as I.A. No.2064 of 2000. 3. The appellant/land lady contested the Application by filing a detailed counter affidavit by inter alia contending as follows: The respondent is not entitled to protection under the Act as much as the respondent is not in physical possession of the property; one M/s. Bhandari Agencies is in physical possession of the suit property and when the respondent is not in physical possession, it is not entitled to invoke the benefits of the Act and it was further contended that the respondent is not entitled to the total extent of the land as claimed by it. The appellant subsequently pleaded that as the respondent is not in continuous physical possession of the suit land and is not a tenant within the meaning of Section 2(4)(ii)(b) of the Act the respondent is not entitled to purchase the suit land. 4. Before the Court below, on the side of the respondent, one Thiru M. Selvakumar, Senior Regional Manager of the respondent was examined as P.W.1 and Exs.P-1 to P-21 were marked. On the side of the appellant herein no oral evidence was let in but Exs.R-1 to R-10 were marked. The Court below on a consideration of the evidence on record allowed the Application holding that the respondent is entitled to purchase the entire property and being aggrieved by that the above Appeal has been filed by the appellant. 5. Heard both. 6. On a perusal of the pleadings in the case it is seen that the claim of the respondent that ESSO Eastern Inc. viz., the predecessors in-interest of the respondent put up a super-structure over the demised land for the purposes mentioned in the lease deed has not been denied by the appellant in the counter affidavit filed by her. Therefore the respondent is the owner of the super-structure in the suit property. viz., the predecessors in-interest of the respondent put up a super-structure over the demised land for the purposes mentioned in the lease deed has not been denied by the appellant in the counter affidavit filed by her. Therefore the respondent is the owner of the super-structure in the suit property. The respondent further claims that ever since the date of the lease the respondent is in continuous physical possession of the suit land and as it has put up the super-structure in the suit property it will come within the meaning of 'tenant' as defined under Section 2(4)(ii)(b) of the Act and as such the respondent is entitled to purchase the suit land at the price to be fixed by the Court. In the counter affidavit the appellant has specifically denied the said averments contained in the affidavit and has specifically stated that the respondent is not entitled to protection under the Tamil Nadu City Tenants' Protection Act as the respondent is not in actual physical possession of the suit property and one M/s. Bhandari Agencies is in actual physical possession of the suit property. The appellant has denied the averment that the respondent is in continuous physical possession of the suit land and has stated that the respondent is not a ‘tenant' within the meaning of Section 2(4)(ii)(b) of the Act. It is also stated in the counter affidavit that the respondent is not entitled to the total extent of the land as claimed by it. 7. The Court below has found that the respondent is entitled to purchase the entire extent of the suit property after recording a finding that the respondent is in actual physical possession of the suit property. In the Memorandum of Grounds of Appeal the appellant has not questioned the finding of the lower Court that the respondent is entitled to purchase the entire extent of the suit property and the learned counsel for the appellant also has not advanced any arguments on that aspect. In the Memorandum of Grounds of Appeal the appellant has not questioned the finding of the lower Court that the respondent is entitled to purchase the entire extent of the suit property and the learned counsel for the appellant also has not advanced any arguments on that aspect. But the main contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that when the evidence on record clearly establishes that the respondent is not in actual physical possession of the suit property, which is a pre-requisite for the applicability of Section 9 of the Act, the lower Court without applying the legal principles laid down in the various decisions cited before it to the facts of the case has erroneously brushed aside the decisions by observing that it will only add to the pages. The learned counsel further contended that the lower Court has not properly considered the oral evidence of P.W.1 and Exs.P-18, P-21, R-9 and R-10 and has not understood the difference and distinction between ‘legal possession'/'constructive possession' and ‘actual physical possession' and further submitted that the finding of the lower Court that the respondent is in actual physical possession of the suit property is not only patently erroneous but it is totally opposed and contrary to the legal principles laid down by this Court and the Apex Court. The said contention is stoutly opposed by the learned counsel for the respondent. 8. In the light of the above submissions made by the learned counsel on either side the only point to be decided in this Appeal is as to whether the Defendant/Respondent herein is in actual physical possession of the suit property and whether the respondent .is entitled to claim the benefit under Section 9 of the Act and whether the order passed by the lower Court is sustainable? 9. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the petrol bunk erected by the respondent in the suit property is not being run by the respondent directly but it is being run by the dealer, M/s. Bhandari Agencies and therefore the respondent is not in actual physical possession of the property and hence the respondent is not a tenant within the meaning of Section 2(4)(ii)(b) of the Act. Therefore it is necessary to extract the relevant Section itself. Section 2(4)(ii)(b) of the Act defines 'Tenant' as follows: "Section 2(4) 'Tenant' in relation to any land — (i) …. Therefore it is necessary to extract the relevant Section itself. Section 2(4)(ii)(b) of the Act defines 'Tenant' as follows: "Section 2(4) 'Tenant' in relation to any land — (i) …. (ii) includes – (a) …. (b) any person who was a tenant in respect of such land under a tenancy agreement to which this Act is applicable under sub-section (3) of Section 1 and who or any of his predecessors in interest had erected any building on such land and who continues in actual physical possession of such land and building, not-withstanding that….." By referring to the definition of 'Tenant' in Section 2(4)(ii)(b) of the Act, learned counsel contended that the sine qua non for maintaining an Application under Section 9 of the Act is that a tenant should not only establish that he erected the super-structure in question but also further establish that he continues to be in actual physical possession of the property and the super-structure there on. But according to the learned counsel as the respondent in this case is not in actual physical possession of the suit property as it had appointed M/s. Bhandari Agencies as its dealer under a license issued by it and had parted with physical possession of the suit property and it is M/s. Bhandari Agencies which is in actual physical possession of the suit property the respondent herein does not come within the meaning of tenant as defined in the Act and hence the Application itself is not maintainable. Learned counsel submitted that though the said objection was raised in the counter statement filed before the lower Court and documents were marked to establish that the respondent is not in actual physical possession of the suit property and several decisions of this Court and the Apex Court were relied upon, the lower Court without considering the decisions cited before it brushed aside those citations by observing thus, "The judgment relied upon by the petitioner and the respondent are not discussed in length, because it will only add the pages". Learned counsel further submitted that though the lower Court observed as follows: "The only tenable objections raised by the landlord is that the defendant is not a statutory tenant and not in actual physical possession but by Bhandari Agency". Learned counsel further submitted that though the lower Court observed as follows: "The only tenable objections raised by the landlord is that the defendant is not a statutory tenant and not in actual physical possession but by Bhandari Agency". without properly understanding the distinction and difference between 'actual physical possession' and 'constructive possession' the Court below erroneously held that since the property tax in respect of the suit property is assessed in the name of the respondent and they are paying the taxes as proved by receipts and documents the contention that the respondent is not in actual physical possession cannot be accepted and rejected the objections raised by the appellant. 10. The learned counsel on either side referred to several decisions of the Courts including those of the Supreme Court of India and it is proposed to refer only to the following among them which are relevant and necessary without much multiplication. (i) In the decision reported in S.R. Radhakrishnan v. Neelamegam, 2003 (3) CTC 488 : 2003 (10) S.C.C.705 in paragraph 13 it is laid down as follows: "13 As already noted, Section 9 read with Section 3 of the Act makes it imperative that the tenants should be in possession of the premises with respect to which the right to purchase is sought to be exercised. If a tenant is not to hand over possession of the suit premises to the landlord at the time of ejectment, there is no question of payment of any compensation to him under Section 3 of the Act. If he is not entitled to compensation under Section 3 of the Act he cannot invoke Section 9 of the Act. Actual physical possession is essential in the context of relevant provisions of the Act. In fact in P. Ananthakrishnan Nair v. Dr. G. Raraakrishnan, 1987 (2) S.C.C. 429 (though cited by the learned counsel for the appellant), it was held by this Court that the premises must be in personal occupation of the tenant before he could exercise the right under Section 9 of the Act. It was also observed by this Court that: (SCC pp.437-38, paras 10-11). 'Section 9 confers an additional statutory right on a tenant against whom suit for ejectment is filed to exercise an option to purchase the demised land through the medium of Court on fulfilment of conditions specified therein. It was also observed by this Court that: (SCC pp.437-38, paras 10-11). 'Section 9 confers an additional statutory right on a tenant against whom suit for ejectment is filed to exercise an option to purchase the demised land through the medium of Court on fulfilment of conditions specified therein. It is not an absolute right, as the Court has discretion to grant or refuse the relief for the purchase or the land. The tenant has no vested right in the property, instead it is a privilege granted to him by the statute which is equitable in nature. The policy underlying Section 9 is directed to safeguard the eviction of those tenants who may have constructed superstructure on the demised land, so that they may continue to occupy the same for the purposes of their residence or business' From these observations it follows that actual physical possession of the demised premises of the tenant is the sine qua non of an Application under Section 9". (ii) In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Spencer and Company, A.I.R. 2004 Mad. 110 a Learned Judge after referring to several decisions and particularly basing reliance on decision reported in S.R. Radhakrishnan v. Neelamegam, 2003 (3) CTC 488 : 2003 (10) S.C.C. 705 observed as follows: "9. Both in the pleading and in the evidence, it is proved that Bon Service Et Lubrication is in actual physical possession even though he may be a licensee under the petitioner defendant. The petitioner/ defendant may be in legal or constructive possession of the suit property, but no doubt, he is not in actual physical possession of the property. That the law requires under the Tamil Nadu City Tenants' Protection Act is to invoke the benefit and privilege, the petitioner must be in actual physical possession of the property. Legal or constructive possession of the property does not entitle the petitioner to claim the benefits or privilege under the Tamil Nadu City Tenants' Protection Act". Learned counsel painted out that the respondent herein was the petitioner in the above case and the facts of that case and the facts of the case on hand are similar and as such this decision squarely applies to the facts of this case. Learned counsel painted out that the respondent herein was the petitioner in the above case and the facts of that case and the facts of the case on hand are similar and as such this decision squarely applies to the facts of this case. (iii) Learned counsel relied upon yet another decision reported in M/s. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. M/s. Keyaram Hotels (P) Ltd., Chetpet, 2002 (2) CTC 21 : 2002 (2) LW 620 wherein also the respondent was the petitioner. In this decision, in paragraph 9, it is observed as follows: "9 . …. It is clear that such physical and actual possession of the land and building is a sine qua non to protect the benefit or statutory entitlement under the Act. The Act is not intended to enrich a tenant at the cost of the landlord. A tenant who has sublet the leased property and is not himself in possession nor carrying on business in the leased property cannot claim the right under Section 9 or the Act". and in the same decision in paragraphs 17 to 20, it is further observed as follows: "17. It is also necessary to state that according to the plaintiff, the defendant had sublet the land to the dealer and he is doing the business and most of the area was rented out to third parties for the purpose of parking vehicles or repairing lorries, etc. As adverted to, the defendant should positively establish that he continues to be in possession and enjoyment of the property. No doubt, learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that the dealer is dealing in petroleum products only under leave and licence and the defendant had got every right to enter into the property. It is necessary to keep in mind that when the dealer is in actual possession of the property, it cannot be considered possession in the eye of law that the defendant is in actual possession of the property. It only means that even assuming that the defendant was a tenant in the property, considering the fact that now a third party is in possession and enjoyment, the person now in occupation is only a sub-tenant. It only means that even assuming that the defendant was a tenant in the property, considering the fact that now a third party is in possession and enjoyment, the person now in occupation is only a sub-tenant. If that be so, when the defendant is not in actual possession of the property, he is not entitled to claim benefit under the Act because possession is an important sine qua non M/s invoke Section 9. However, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner attempted to explain that their officers can enter the premises for conducting various tests and the dealer is bound to vacate the property as and when demanded. Perusal of the agreement also indicates that the dealer has to remove the structures within the period granted by them. This is one more circumstance to show that there could not have been a permanent structure and that is why the question of removal has been introduced in the agreement. 18. P.W.1 also admitted in the course of evidence that selling of petroleum products and service station are the activities going on in the suit property and approximately 7 or 8 employees were working there. However, the defendant has not paid salary to them and there is no control over their appointment or termination of such employees except the dealer. On the other hand, Harrigton Service Station manager alone is having the key to the bunk and the said manager is also not paid by the defendant. On the other hand, Auto Care Centre in a different place is run by the defendant company and all the employees of the Auto Care Centre are paid by the defendant. 19. … The language employed under Section 2(4), 2(ii)(b) of the Act, that the party continues in actual physical possession of land and building, has to be kept in mind. Unless both conditions are satisfied, I am of the view that the defendant is not entitled to claim benefit under the provisions of Section 9 of the Act. 20. ... The tax receipts produced by the revision petitioner relating to payment of tax alone are not sufficient to establish that they are in physical possession of the property. Even according to the agreement, the electricity charges and water charges are paid only by the dealer, who is in possession of the property. 20. ... The tax receipts produced by the revision petitioner relating to payment of tax alone are not sufficient to establish that they are in physical possession of the property. Even according to the agreement, the electricity charges and water charges are paid only by the dealer, who is in possession of the property. Considering the fact that the revision petitioner has failed to establish that they are in actual possession and enjoyment of the property and they do not come within the definition of Section 2(4) of the Act, I am of the view that the order passed by the lower Appellate Court is proper and correct and no interference is called for". (iv) Learned counsel also relied upon the decision reported in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited & another v. K.M. Yakub (died) & others, 1996 (2) LW 817 wherein in paragraph 8, a Learned Judge of this Court has observed as follows: "8. As per various decisions or this Court, physical possession by the tenant must be proved, and only such persons can claim the benefit of the Act". 11. Learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the following decisions: (i) Mahendra Saree Emporium (II) v. G.V. Srinivasa Murthy, 2005 (1) S.C.C. 481 wherein the Apex Court in paragraph 16 has observed as follows: "16. ... The mere fact that another person is allowed to use the premises while the lessee retains the legal possession is not enough to create a sub-lease. Thus, the thrust is, as laid down by this Court, on finding out who is in legal possession of the premises. So long as the legal possession remains with the tenant the mere factum of the tenant having entered into partnership for the purpose of carrying on the business in the tenancy premises would not amount to sub-letting". (ii) P. Senniappan and others v. Kannammal and two others, 1998 (1) CTC 537 , wherein this Court in paragraph 16 haa observed as follows: "16. In a number of cases, the Apex Court and this Court have dealt with the meaning of sub-lease falling under Section 10(2)(ii)(a) of the said Act. A tenant can be said to sublet the demised premises to a third party only if the tenant had permitted the third party to occupy the premises and had divested himself completely of the possession of the premises or part thereof. A tenant can be said to sublet the demised premises to a third party only if the tenant had permitted the third party to occupy the premises and had divested himself completely of the possession of the premises or part thereof. In other words there must be transfer of exclusive right to enjoy the demised premises by a tenant in favour of third party and the said right must be in lieu of payment of compensation or rent. If a tenant had permitted a third party to use the premises along with him and the tenant retains the legal possession, it will not amount to subletting. There cannot be a subletting under the lessee, if he has not parted with legal possession. A grant in favour of third party only of the right to use the premises without being entitled to the exclusive possession thereof operates mere licence only". (iii) Vender Limited v. Antox India Private Limited, 1990 (Supp.) SCC 727 wherein the Apex Court in paragraph 14 it is observed as follows: "… Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the Court below if the one reached by that Court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate Court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under Appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the Trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the Appellate Court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the Trial Court's exercise of discretion". 12. If the discretion has been exercised by the Trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the Appellate Court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the Trial Court's exercise of discretion". 12. While elaborating the above said submissions, the learned counsel for the appellant drew the attention of this Court to Clauses 6, 18, 41, 46, 47 and 57 of the dealership agreement-Ex.P-18 entered into between the respondent and M/s. Bhandari Agencies, Ex.R-9-Receipt issued by Auto Care Centre and Ex.R-10-Receipt issued by M/s. Bhandari Agencies and the fallowing admission of P.W.1 in his cross-examination, viz., Tamil On the basis of the above exhibits and the admission of P.W.1 the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that as M/s. Bhandari Agencies, the dealer, had to install and maintain at his own expense at the suit property the equipment described in the third schedule to Ex.P-18 as per Clause 6; as per Clause 18 the dealer shall not remove the outfit or any part thereof from its position on the premises nor deliver possession thereof to any other person, firm or company other than the Corporation nor encumber nor sell the same etc., Clause 34 stipulates that the dealer shall not sell, assign, mortgage or part with or otherwise transfer the interest in the dealership, etc., and Clause 57 stipulates that on the termination of the license and permission the dealer will immediately remove from the premises all goods, property and effects belonging to him and handover to the Corporation vacant and peaceful possession of the premises and the Corporation shall be entitled to enter upon the premises without any hindrance or objection from the dealer, etc., It is evident that M/s. Bhandari Agencies is in exclusive and actual physical possession of the suit "property. The learned counsel submitted that a perusal in the "above said clauses of Ex.P-18 clearly shows that unless M/s. Bhandari Agencies is in exclusive actual physical possession of the suit property there was no need for incorporating the above said clauses containing the above said terms and conditions. Unless M/s. Bhandari Agencies is in exclusive and actual physical possession of the suit property, there is no need to incorporate Clause 57 stipulating that the dealer on the termination of the license will immediately handover to the respondent-corporation vacant and peaceful possession of the premises. 13. Unless M/s. Bhandari Agencies is in exclusive and actual physical possession of the suit property, there is no need to incorporate Clause 57 stipulating that the dealer on the termination of the license will immediately handover to the respondent-corporation vacant and peaceful possession of the premises. 13. A perusal of Clause 46 shows that the dealer shall be solely responsible for and shall himself bear all expenses of and in connection with the dealership business, including administration, office insurance premia, telephone, license or other fees, rates, taxes, etc. A perusal of Clause 47 shows that the dealer shall at his own cost maintain an adequate and competent staff to attend to the work of filling the Corporations products into the customers' vehicles and for providing certain free service to the customers in accordance with the general instructions given or laid down by the Corporation from time to time. 14. Further a perusal or Ex.R-9 shows that it is a receipt issued by Auto Care Centre and in Ex.R-9 it is mentioned that it is operated by Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited at 625, Anna Salai, Chennai and a perusal of Ex.R-10 shows that the petroleum bunk at No. 11, Catheral Road, Madras is run by M/s. Bhandari Agencies. P. W.1 in his cross-examination has stated that the retail outlets run by the respondent-Corporation are of two types i.e., one full and fully run by the Corporation through it employees and other outlet wherein the site and the super-structure belongs to the respondent-Corporation and permission is given to the dealer to sell. P.W.1 has further stated that there is only one outlet at Chennai which is being run by the respondent-Corporation full and fully and that is meant for (Training and Experimentation) and that outlet is being run by the employees of the respondent-Corporation. He has further stated that in that outlet the entire affairs of the outlet and administration is being looked after by the respondent-Corporation and he has also stated that the site where the said outlet is located does not belong to the respondent whereas the super structure belongs to the respondent. P.W.1 has further admitted that in the petrol bunk located at the suit property none of the permanent employees of the respondent-Corporation are employed and the business therein is being conducted only through M/s. Bhandari Agencies. P.W.1 has further admitted that in the petrol bunk located at the suit property none of the permanent employees of the respondent-Corporation are employed and the business therein is being conducted only through M/s. Bhandari Agencies. Therefore it is clear that the outlet located in the suit property is full and fully run only by the dealer M/s. Bhandari Agencies and the entire administration is being looked after only by M/s. Bhandari Agencies and the respondent has no administrative control over the same, whereas Auto Care Centre located at No.625, Anna Salai, Chennai-6 is full and fully operated by the respondent-Corporation through its employees and the entire administration vests with the respondent exclusively. 15. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the lower Court by relying upon Ex.P-8-property tax demand notice and payment receipt has erroneously held that the respondent is in actual physical possession of the suit property and submitted that the mere payment of property tax by the respondent is not sufficient to prove that it is in actual physical possession of the suit property. The learned counsel further submitted that the lower Court has recorded a finding that the respondent is in actual physical possession simply by holding that the respondent is a statutory tenant. 16. The learned counsel for the respondent in his oral and written submissions has submitted that a perusal of Exs.P-1, P-8 and P-18 to 21 will prove that the respondent is in actual physical possession of the suit property. He further submitted that Exs.P-16 and P-21 would show that the respondent has granted permission on a Leave and License basis to its dealer M/s. Bhandari Agencies to enter the suit premises and use the premises, etc., and it has been specifically agreed that the dealer shall not be deemed to be in exclusive possession of the premises. The learned counsel by basing reliance on the decisions reported in Mahendra Saree Emporium (II) v. G.V. Srinivasa Murthy, 2005 (1) S.C.C. 481 and P. Senniappan and others v. Kannammal and two others, 1998 (1) C.T.C. 537 strenuously contended that so long as the legal possession remains with the respondent, the mere fact of the respondent entering into a dealership agreement on Leave and 'License basis with M/s, Bhandari Agencies will not amount to subletting. By basing reliance on the decision reported in Vender Limited v. Antox India Private Limited, 1990 (Supp.) S.C.C. 727 the learned counsel submitted that as the lower Court has rejected the contention of the appellant and has found on the basis of evidence on record that the respondent is in actual physical possession of the suit property, this Court being an Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the Court below as the conclusion reached by the lower Court is reasonably possible on the material available on record. 17. I have carefully considered the submissions made on either side, the materials on record and the decisions cited before me. It is pertinent to point out that in the decision reported in P. Ananthakrishnan Nair v. G. Ramakrishnan, 1987 (2) S.C.C. 429 the Apex Court has observed that the tenant has no vested right in the suit property instead it has a privilege granted to him by the statute which is equitable in nature. The policy underlying Section 9 of the Act, is directed to safeguard the eviction of those tenants who may have constructed super-structure on the demised land, so that they may continue to occupy the same for the purposes pf their residence or business and in the decision reported in S.R. Radhakrishnan v. Neelamegam, 2003 (3) CTC 488: 2003 (10) S.C.C. 705 the Apex Court after referring to the above said observation has held that actual physical possession of the demised premises of the tenant is the sine qua non of an Application under Section 9. Therefore it is clear that the benevolent provisions contained in Section 9 of the Act are meant to safeguard the eviction of those tenants who have constructed super-structure on the demised land, so that they may continue to occupy the same for the purpose of their residence or business. Therefore it is clear that the benevolent provisions contained in Section 9 of the Act are meant to safeguard the eviction of those tenants who have constructed super-structure on the demised land, so that they may continue to occupy the same for the purpose of their residence or business. If the case on hand is considered in the light of the above said policy underlying Section 9 of the Act and in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court, it could be easily held that the respondent is not entitled to claim the privilege granted by the Statute which is equitable in nature, as equity is not in favour of the respondent since the respondent is not carrying on the business in the demised premises directly on its own and the respondent is not going to occupy the demised premises for the purpose of running the business namely the petrol bunk on its own and if the demised premises is not directed to be sold to the respondent, the respondent is not going to be in any way prejudiced or put to any hardship. The object of the Act is to give protection against eviction of tenants who in Municipal Towns and Townships and adjoining areas in the State have constructed building on others lands with a view to enable them to carry on the business, if the tenancy is in respect of a non-residential building, so that the livelihood of such tenants will not be affected. The lower Court has failed to understand the legal principles laid down by this Court and the Apex Court and has failed to apply the same to the facts of the case and come to the right conclusion that the respondent is not in actual physical possession of the suit property. 18. The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent have arisen under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 in the context of deciding as to whether the tenant in those cases have sublet the demised premises and whether they are liable for eviction on the ground of subletting. 18. The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent have arisen under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 in the context of deciding as to whether the tenant in those cases have sublet the demised premises and whether they are liable for eviction on the ground of subletting. While considering the said issue the Apex Court has held that so long as the possession remains with the tenant the mere factum of tenant having entered into partnership for the purpose of carrying on the business in the tenancy premises would not amount to subletting. Our High Court has also in P. Senniappan and others v. Kannammal and two others, 1998 (1) C.T.C. 537 held that unless the tenant parts with legal possession in favour of a third party there is no subletting. These principles laid down by the Apex Court and this Court for deciding the question of subletting under the Rent Control Acts cannot be applied for deciding the entitlement of the tenant to purchase the site over which he has put up the super-structure by invoking the benevolent provisions contained in Section 9 of the Act. The main thrust of the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is that there is no transfer of interest in favour of M/s. Bhandari Agencies in respect of the suit property and only Leave and License has been granted to them to run the petrol bunk and the legal possession is always with the respondent and as the respondent has reserved its right to enter upon the suit property as per the terms contained in Ex.P-18 it should be construed that the respondent is in actual physical possession of the suit property. This Court is unable to accept the said contention of the learned counsel for the respondent. There is lot of difference between the ‘legal possession' and ‘physical possession' and also there is lot of difference between the ‘legal possession' and ‘actual physical possession'. It may be true that the respondent is in 'legal/constructive possession' of the suit property through its dealer M/s. Bhandari Agencies but by no stretch of imagination it could be said that the respondent is in actual physical possession of the suit property. It may be true that the respondent is in 'legal/constructive possession' of the suit property through its dealer M/s. Bhandari Agencies but by no stretch of imagination it could be said that the respondent is in actual physical possession of the suit property. For being in actual physical possession the respondent should be running the outlet at the suit property through its own employees having full control over the entire operation and administration. But .as admitted by P.W.1 himself the outlet at the suit property is being run exclusively by M/s. Bhandari Agencies and the only outlet that is run full and fully by the respondent is Auto Care Centre located at No. 625, Anna Salai, Chennai-6. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant the mere payment of property tax by the respondent will not establish that the respondent is in actual physical possession of the suit property. In fact in the case reported in Mts. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. M's Keyaram Hotels (P) Ltd, Chetpet, 2002 (2) CTC 21 : 2002 (2) LW 620 the respondent was the unsuccessful petitioner and the facts of that case and the facts of this case on hand are same and therefore the law laid down therein squarely applies to the facts of this case. The learned counsel on either side submitted that the respondent herein who was the petitioner in the above case had accepted the claim and had not filed any Appeal. The legal principles laid dawn in the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant squarely applies to the facts of this case. Therefore it has to be held that the respondent does not come within the meaning of ‘tenant' as defined in Section 2(4)(ii)(b) of the Act as the respondent is not in actual physical possession of the suit property. 19. Therefore it has to be held that the respondent does not come within the meaning of ‘tenant' as defined in Section 2(4)(ii)(b) of the Act as the respondent is not in actual physical possession of the suit property. 19. It is highly unfortunate that the lower Court instead of considering the various decisions cited by the appellant and the respondent before it has brushed aside the same by stating as follows: "The judgment relied upon by the petitioner and the respondent are not discussed in length, because it will only add the pages" Had the lower Court made an endeavour to understand the legal principles laid down in the decisions cited before it and tried to apply the same to the facts established in the case the lower Court would not have come to the conclusion that the respondent is entitled to purchase the suit property under Section 9 of the Act. Therefore the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent by relying upon the decision reported in Vender Limited v. Antox India Private Limited, 1990 (Supp.) S.C.C. 727 is liable to be rejected. In the said decision itself the Apex Court has laid down that if the discretion has been exercised by the Trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the Appellate Court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the Trial Court's exercise of discretion. But as pointed out above in this case, the lower Court has not exercised its discretion reasonably and in a judicial manner by applying the legal principles laid down by this Court and the Honourable Apex Court and therefore unless this Court interferes with the order of the lower Court great injustice will be caused to the appellant. 20. As observed by the Apex Court in the decision reported in P. Ananthakrishnan Nair v. Dr. 20. As observed by the Apex Court in the decision reported in P. Ananthakrishnan Nair v. Dr. G. Radhakrishnan, 1987 (2) S.C.C. 429 it is a matter of common knowledge that price of land, specially in the urban areas has escalated to a great extent and it would not be fair to deprive the landlords of their property and to allow the tenants to enrich themselves at the landlords expense, simply because the respondent is a Government of India Undertaking and it is willing to purchase the property when the respondent does not come within the meaning of ‘tenant' as defined under Section 2(4)(ii)(b) of the Act. 21. For the above said reasons, the order of the Court below is set aside and the Appeal is allowed. However there will be no order as to costs. Consequently the connected CMP is closed.