JUDGMENT A.B. Pal, J. 1. The judgment dated 24.11.2000 passed by a Single Judge of this Court (B.B. Deb, J) in Civil Rule No. 558 of 1997 has been called in question in the present writ appeal. By the said judgment, learned Single Judge refused to interfere with the minor penalty of 'censure' imposed upon the Appellant herein by the disciplinary authority. 2. We have heard Mr. M.N. Indu, learned Counsel for the Appellant and Mr. A.C. Debnath, learned Counsel for the Respondents. 3. The Petitioner was a driver under the Tripura Road Transport Corporation (for short, 'the Corporation'), a State Government undertaking. He was placed under suspension on 26.8.96 in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding. On 12.9.96, a disciplinary proceeding against him was formally initiated and charge was framed alleging that on 24.8.96 while the Appellant was driving a truck he was found carrying 20 cases of fish unauthorisedly with a mala fide intention to earn money for his personal monetary gain. One Babul Debbarma and another Sudhangshu Saha, both traffic supervisors of the said Corporation detected the aforesaid unauthorized activity of the Appellant when they were on line checking duty. It was further alleged in the said charge that the Appellant misbehaved with the said officials when they asked him to handover the log sheet of the vehicle. The disciplinary authority, however, decided to proceed against the Appellant with a view to impose a minor penalty if he was found guilty of the alleged misconduct. On 21.11.96 after less than three months, the suspension order was revoked and he was reinstated in service. As it was decided to proceed for a minor penalty, the procedure laid down in Rule 16 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 (for short, 'the rules') which provides for a summary procedure, was followed. The Appellant was asked to show cause on the charges so framed to which he submitted his reply. However, the reasons shown in his reply were not found satisfactory and he was afforded opportunity to adduce evidence in support of his plea of innocence which he refused to do. On 16.11.96, he was asked for personal hearing which, however, had to be adjourned to 21.12.96, 25.1.97, 15.3.97. Finally on 19.4.97 personal hearing was actually taken. The Appellant during his personal hearing made a prayer for exoneration from the charges. On 16.11.96, he was asked for personal hearing which, however, had to be adjourned to 21.12.96, 25.1.97, 15.3.97. Finally on 19.4.97 personal hearing was actually taken. The Appellant during his personal hearing made a prayer for exoneration from the charges. On 3.5.97, the Managing Director being the disciplinary authority of the Corporation imposed a minor penalty of 'censure'. As regards the period of suspension for less than three months, it was directed that the same would be treated as not on duty. 4. Aggrieved by the above mentioned order of penalty, the Appellant instituted the writ petition which was, however, dismissed as noticed above. Learned Single Judge observed that having regard to the gravamen of the charges the delinquent deserved to be dealt with more stringently, but he was let off by the disciplinary authority only with a minimum punishment of 'censure'. It was, however, observed that as the Appellant had already superannuated from service at the time the writ proceeding was heard, the punishment of censure would not in any way harm him. As regards the procedural aspect, it was observed that the inquiry being under Rule 16 of the rules for minor penalty only, no detailed inquiry was a legal necessity. The Appellant was given opportunity to present his defence which he did accordingly though the same was not found to be satisfactory. He was also given personal hearing where after, taking a lenient view, the minor penalty of censure was imposed. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case in its entirety, the learned Single Judge refused to interfere with the penalty imposed though a direction was given to the Corporation to pay an amount of Rs. 1,000/- only as token amount for the period of suspension. 5. In the appeal before us Mr. Indu submits that the suspension order was not legally sustainable as the disciplinary authority had decided to proceed against him with a view to impose a minor penalty. According to Mr. Indu, in a disciplinary proceeding for minor penalty, the delinquent cannot be placed under suspension as held by a Division Bench of this Court in Civil Rule No. 132 of 82. A copy of the order dated 9.6.91 passed in the said Civil Rule had been made available for our perusal. Upon perusal of the same, we find certain observation made therein from which Mr. Indu sought to derive support. A copy of the order dated 9.6.91 passed in the said Civil Rule had been made available for our perusal. Upon perusal of the same, we find certain observation made therein from which Mr. Indu sought to derive support. The relevant part of the observation reads: As such Government has issued instructions to the effect that the order of suspension can be passed only in cases where a major penalty of dismissal/removal from service or compulsory retirement of the delinquent employee is likely to be imposed and suspension is indispensable. 6. No copy of the said instruction has been made available by the Appellant for our examination. The instruction issued by the State Government must be with a view to provide certain guidelines for the disciplinary authorities of various departments under the Government which cannot be said to have any legally binding effect. Rule 10 of the rules deals with the suspension of the Government employees. Clause (a) of Rule 10(1) empowers the appointing authority or the disciplinary authority or any other authority on its behalf to place an employee under suspension where a disciplinary proceeding is contemplated or pending. The provision is understood to mean that even before the disciplinary authority finally decided whether the delinquent should be proceeded against for imposition of major or minor penalty considering the factual situation, an order of suspension in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding is legally permissible. In the case on hand, the order of suspension was passed on 26.8.96 in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding and the said suspension order remained in force for a short period of less than three months as the same was revoked on 21.11.96. As noticed above, the charge was framed on 12.9.96 and thereafter the disciplinary authority decided not to make an inquiry for imposing a major penalty on the delinquent. Under the above circumstances, the order of suspension in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding, in our view, did not violate the instructions of the State Government as at that point of time, no decision can be said to have been taken about the nature of penalty to be imposed following the departmental inquiry. 7. The order of the appellate authority which found the appeal of the delinquent lacking any merit has been assailed by Mr. 7. The order of the appellate authority which found the appeal of the delinquent lacking any merit has been assailed by Mr. Indu pointing out that it was not at all a speaking order being not in accordance with Rule 27 of the said rules. The said provision no doubt provides that the appellate authority shall consider whether the procedure laid down in the rules has been complied with and if not whether such non-compliance has resulted in violation of any Constitutional provision or in failure of justice. It is also to be seen by the authority whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on the record and whether the penalty is adequate, inadequate or severe. The order of the appellate authority has not been enclosed for our examination. What has been made available is an order of the Managing Director of the Corporation whereby the decision of the appellate authority was only communicated stating that the said authority did not find any merit in the appeal filed by the delinquent Appellant herein. The Managing Director is the disciplinary authority and, therefore, the appeal was certainly heard by a superior authority whose order disposing of the appeal was necessary for examining the point raised by the Appellant that it was not a speaking order. Even without the same, we have seen from the discussion made above that no procedural irregularity in making the inquiry under Rule 16 of the rules has been brought to our notice which convincingly shows that at no stage of the proceeding there has been any occasion of justice being denied. We are in full agreement with the observation of the learned Single Judge that if considered from the gravity of the charges against the Appellant an inescapable view gains the ground that the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority took a very lenient view in imposing only a minor penalty of 'censure' which was practically rendered ineffective as the Appellant had already gone on superannuation. 8. As regards the pay and allowances during the period of suspension, the order of penalty provides that the said period would not be treated as in service. Nothing has been said what should be the pay and allowances for the said period of suspension. FR. 8. As regards the pay and allowances during the period of suspension, the order of penalty provides that the said period would not be treated as in service. Nothing has been said what should be the pay and allowances for the said period of suspension. FR. 54B provides that when an employee is reinstated after revocation of the suspension, the competent authority shall make a specific order regarding pay and allowances to be paid for the period of suspension ending with reinstatement. If the authority is of the opinion that the suspension was fully unjustified in that event only, an order is called for to the effect that he would be entitled to full pay and allowances. In the present case, the Appellant having been found guilty and punished with 'censure' it cannot be said that his suspension was wholly unjustified. In that view of the matter, it is incumbent upon the disciplinary authority to pass an appropriate order under FR. 54B about the pay and allowances for the suspension period which has not been done. 9. For the reasons aforementioned, this writ appeal has no merit and consequently we dismiss the same with the direction to the disciplinary authority to make necessary order regarding pay and allowances of the Appellant for the period he was under suspension in order to give a final shape to the entire episode. No cost. Appeal dismissed