JUDGMENT Vinod K. Sharma, J. (Oral) - This revision petition has been filed against an order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Hisar vide which application made by the plaintiff-respondent for leading secondary evidence to prove the execution of an agreement to sell was allowed. 2. The case set up by the plaintiff-respondent was that an agreement for sale was executed and reduced to writing between the petitioner and respondent with regard to the agricultural land measuring 40 Kanals 14 marlas situated at village Kuttabadh Tehsil Ellenabad District Sirsa on 21.7.1998. 3. It was the case of the plaintiff-respondent that the sale could not materialise and therefore, the petitioner herein handed over a cheque of Rs. 10 lacs to the plaintiff-respondent in lieu of the total amount of earnest money which was given to the petitioner at the time of signing of the agreement of sale. The plaintiff-respondent further claimed that the petitioner has denied the execution of the agreement to sell as such the same is required to be proved by producing secondary evidence. The application moved by the plaintiff-respondent was opposed on the ground that there existed no agreement between the parties and was merely concocted to justify the delivery of cheque of Rs. 10 lacs. It was also claimed that no amount was received towards the earnest money nor the plaintiff-respondent had the financial capacity to purchase the land. It was further claimed by the petitioner that the photo copy of the agreement was prepared to extort money from the petitioner by the plaintiff-respondent who was a lady of easy virtue. In support of the application, the plaintiff-respondent contended that the original agreement was in possession of the petitioner herein and therefore, permission should be granted to adduce secondary evidence to prove the execution of the agreement for sale. It was also claimed that the photo copy of the said agreement had already been placed on file. 4. However, the stand of the petitioner was that the agreement for sale which was produced in the Court was materially different from the photo copy of the agreement of sale which was produced in another Court in a criminal complaint which has been filed by the plaintiff-respondent against the petitioner under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 5. 4. However, the stand of the petitioner was that the agreement for sale which was produced in the Court was materially different from the photo copy of the agreement of sale which was produced in another Court in a criminal complaint which has been filed by the plaintiff-respondent against the petitioner under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 5. It was argued before the learned Court below that the application deserved to be dismissed as no notice was given for production of this agreement as warranted under Section 66 of the Evidence Act. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the ratio of law reported as Smt. Sulochana Devi Bubna v. Gobinda Chandra Nag and others, AIR 1986 Calcutta 430 and Hemant Kumar Agrahari and another v. Smt. Lakshmi Devi and another, 2004(2) CCC 50. 6. The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner before the Court below was that once the execution of the document was denied the photocopy of the same could not be proved by way of secondary evidence and for this purpose reliance was placed on a judgment reported as Raljit Kaur v. Mohinder Kaur and others, 1994(2) PLR 488. 7. However, these contentions were rejected by the learned trial Court by holding that the plaintiff-respondent has prima facie proved the existence of document by placing on record the photo copy of the document. The learned Court further held that the plaintiff-respondent had maintained that the original of this document was handed over to the respondent hence the loss was also prima facie proved and therefore, allowed the application. 8. The contention of the learned counsel for defendant-petitioner that there was variation in the photocopy of the agreement was rejected by holding that they would be entitled to an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses on the point of variation and accordingly the Court did not find any merit in this contention also. 9. Mr. Akshay Bhan, learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the above said finding firstly on the ground that the impugned order could not be sustained as it was in violation of Section 65 of the Evidence Act. 9. Mr. Akshay Bhan, learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the above said finding firstly on the ground that the impugned order could not be sustained as it was in violation of Section 65 of the Evidence Act. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that before photo copy of the original sought to be proved as secondary evidence it was incumbent upon the plaintiff-respondent to first prove the loss of the document and to establish as to why the photocopy was obtained if the duplicate of the document was not required to be maintained under any law and in support of this contention he placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Banarsi Dass v. Om Parkash and others, 2005(2) PLR 358 and Mangat Ram v. Prabhu Dayal and others, 2002(4) RCR(Civil) 706. 10. I have considered this argument as well as gone through the judgments passed by this Court referred to above and find that they are not applicable to the facts of the present case. The plaintiff-respondent in the plaint itself had submitted that the original was in possession of the petitioner herein and had further explained as to how the photocopy of the document was got prepared even though in law it was not so required. The case of the plaintiff-respondent was that when cheque of Rs. 10 lacs was handed over to the plaintiff-respondent due to failure of an agreement the original was taken away by the petitioner herein and it was at that stage that photo copy was got prepared. Thus the requirement as envisaged in the above authorities stood fully complied with as the plaintiff-respondent in the present case also proved the factum of the document to be in possession of the petitioner herein as well as explained as to how the photocopy was prepared and therefore, no fault can be found with the order passed by the learned trial Court on this account. 11. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that in the absence of notice under Section 66 of the Evidence Act, the secondary evidence could not be allowed. For this purpose reliance was placed on the judgment of Allahabad High Court in Hemant Kumar Agrahari and another v. Smt. Lakshmi Devi and another, 2004(3) Latest Judicial Reports 481 and Smt. Sulochana Devi Bubnas case (supra). For this purpose reliance was placed on the judgment of Allahabad High Court in Hemant Kumar Agrahari and another v. Smt. Lakshmi Devi and another, 2004(3) Latest Judicial Reports 481 and Smt. Sulochana Devi Bubnas case (supra). However, I do not find that this argument is also available to the petitioner in view of the positive finding recorded by the Courts below holding herein that an application was moved by the plaintiff-respondent in the Court for issuance of directions to the petitioner herein for producing the original agreement in Court. Therefore, the requirement of notice under Section 66 of the Evidence Act was also met with. 12. Mr. Akshay Bhan, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that no secondary evidence of the document could be allowed as the photo copy produced was in fact a forged and fabricated document. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that there was a material difference between the agreement of sale produced by the plaintiff-respondent along with the plaint from that of one produced in the Criminal Court in the proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 13. However, this argument also cannot be of any help to the petitioner in view of the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in Nawab Singh v. Inderjit Kaur, AIR 1999 SC 1668 wherein it was held as under : "3. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the trial Court was not justified in rejecting the prayer seeking leave of the Court for producing of secondary evidence. The prayer has been rejected mainly on the ground that the copy of the rent note sought to be produced by the appellant was of doubtful veracity. The trial Court was not justified in forming that opinion without affording the appellant an opportunity of adducing secondary evidence. The appellant has alleged the original rent note to be in possession of the respondent. The case was covered by Clause (a) of Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872." In view of what has been stated above, I find no merit in the present revision petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.