Judgment 1. The plaintiffs-appellants have filed the present appeal impugning the judgment and decree dated 4-9-2002 passed by Additional District Judge, Hisar (hereinafter described as the lower Appellate Court ) whereby the judgment and decree dated 24-7-1999 rendered by Civil Judge (Junior Division), Hisar (hereinafter referred to as the trial Court ) was set aside. 2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that one Khairati Lal (arrayed as defendant No. 1 in the suit and now represented by his legal heirs) executed an agreement to sell dated 13-9-1989 regarding the suit land for a sum of Rs. 3,06,500/-. According to the terms of the agreement, the sale deed was to be executed by 25-6-1990. A sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- was paid as earnest money and the rest of the amount was to be paid at the time of execution of the sale deed (Rs. 50,000/- were paid on 13-9-1989 and Rs. 50,000/- were paid on 9-10-1989), Khairati Lal defaulted in carrying out his part of agreement and on 12-6-1990 when he was threatening to sell the suit land to some other persons, the appellants filed a suit for permanent injunction against him, Sheo Lal and Birbal (arrayed as respondent Nos. 7 and 8 herein) seeking to restrain Khairati Lal from alienating the suit property by way of sale in favour of respondent Nos. 7 and 8. On 13-6-1990, temporary injunction was granted in favour of the appellants. Subsequently, it transpired that Khairati Lal sold the suit land to respondent Nos. 9 to 11 herein. The suit was then converted into a suit for possession by way of specific performance by making an appropriate application on 17-10-1990 which was allowed on 22-10-1990. 3. The case set up by the appellants was that they were always willing and ready to perform their part of agreement and on 25-6-1990, they remained present in the office of Sub-Registrar, but Khairati Lal did not appear. On 10-7-1990, a registered notice was served upon Khairati Lal and he was asked to execute the sale deed on 17-7-1990, but he again did not turn up. According to the appellants, their willingness to get the sale deed executed is also reflected from the fact that they had filed a suit for permanent injunction, but Khairati Lal defaulted and sold the land to some other persons, who are, in fact the sons of Sheo Lal. According to the appellants, their willingness to get the sale deed executed is also reflected from the fact that they had filed a suit for permanent injunction, but Khairati Lal defaulted and sold the land to some other persons, who are, in fact the sons of Sheo Lal. They pleaded that the sale in favour of respondent Nos. 9 to 11 was bad and that their suit for possession by way of specific performance deserved to be decreed. 4. Khairati Lal died during the pendency of the suit and he is now represented by his legal heirs, who have been arrayed as respondent Nos. 1 to 6 herein. In his written statement, Khairati Lal had admitted the execution of the agreement to sell in favour of the appellants, but had pleaded that they had not come to the office of Sub-Registrar on 25-6-1990 and rather, he had been present and an affidavit to that effect was sworn by him. He had further pleaded that the appellants had met him, but they had expressed their inability to pay the balance amount. The receipt of the amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- as earnest money was not denied by him, but it was averred that the same could not have been returned according to the terms of the agreement which stipulated that the same would stand forfeited in case of default. He had further averred that the land in dispute was sold for the same consideration to present respondent Nos. 9 to 11. 5. Respondent No. 7 Sheo Lal, who was arrayed as defendant No. 2, did not contest the suit and respondent No. 8 Birbal, who was defendant No. 3, pleaded in his written statement that an oral agreement to sell the suit land had been made by Khairati Lal in his favour and he had paid Rs. 1000/- as earnest money, but when he came to know of the agreement to sell with the appellants, he refused to purchase the same. 6. In their written statement, respondent Nos. 9 to 11 set up a plea to say that they were the bona fide purchasers of the suit land which was purchased vide registered sale deed dated 6-9-1990. 7. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues :- 1. Whether the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of contract, if so, to what effect ? 7. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues :- 1. Whether the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of contract, if so, to what effect ? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the possession of suit property by way of specific performance of the contract dated 13-9-1989 on the grounds mentioned in the plaint ? OPP 3. Whether Nathu Ram was the power of attorney of the plaintiffs and was competent to sign the amended pleadings ? OPP 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form ? OPD 5. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped by their own act and conduct from filing the present suit ? OPD 6. Whether the plaintiffs have no cause of action to file the present suit ? OPD 7. Whether the defendants No. 4 to 6 are the bona fide purchaser of the suit land without notice and with consideration, if so, to what effect ? OPD 8. Relief. 8. After perusing the entire evidence on record, the trial Court decreed the suit of the appellants and it was directed that the sale deed be executed in their favour within a period of one month. The sale of the suit land in favour of respondent Nos. 9 to 11 was held to be hit by the principle of lis pendens. 9. An appeal was preferred by respondent Nos. 9 to 11. The same was accepted by the lower Appellate Court vide the impugned judgment and decree which has given rise to the present appeal. 10. Shri Shailendra Jain, learned counsel for the appellants contended that the execution of the agreement to sell in favour of the appellants had been validly established, which fact was not denied by Khairati Lal and, therefore, the only questions which remain to be determined are as to whether the appellants were ready and willing to perform their part of contract; whether the default had been committed by Khairati Lal and whether in the facts and circumstances of the case when the appellants had filed a suit for permanent injunction on 12-6-1990, the sale made in favour of respondent Nos. 9 to 11 during the subsistence of the suit, would be hit by the principle of lis pendens. 9 to 11 during the subsistence of the suit, would be hit by the principle of lis pendens. He contended that the appellants had always been ready and willing to perform their part of contract which is borne out from the record that they were present before the Sub-Registrar on 25-6-1990 and even thereafter, a registered notice had been served by which Khairati Lal was asked to execute the sale deed by 17-7-1990. According to the learned counsel, all these were indicatives of the fact that the appellants had always been ready and willing to perform their part of agreement and in view of this, there was no occasion for the lower Appellate Court to come to any other conclusion which would result in the denial of the claim of the appellants. 11. On the other hand, Shri R. K. Jain, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 9 to 11 contended that the appellants had failed to show as to whether they were willing to perform their part of agreement. He urged that no reliable evidence was produced by the appellants in support of their plea that they were ready and willing to perform their part of agreement. Shri Jain argued that respondent Nos. 9 to 11 were bona fide purchasers without notice and, therefore, the sale in their favour could not be set aside. 12. I have thoughtfully considered the respective contentions and have perused the record. 13. In my opinion, once the agreement to sell had been established, then the next logical question which would arise was whether the appellants were willing to perform their part of agreement on the date in question i.e. 25-6-1990. The case of the appellants was that they were present in the office of the Sub-Registrar and had executed affidavit Exhibit P2 to that effect. Similarly, Khairati Lal had taken up the plea that in fact, he was present in the office of the Sub- Registrar and he had executed in affidavit which is on record as Exhibit D1. A perusal of the record shows that Exhibit P2 was not proved. This affidavit was said to have been attested by one Satbir Singh, Tehsildar, who appeared as P.W. 7, who testified in his cross-examination, that the appellants were not personally known to him and nor were they identified by any Sarpanch, Advocate or Lambardar of the village. A perusal of the record shows that Exhibit P2 was not proved. This affidavit was said to have been attested by one Satbir Singh, Tehsildar, who appeared as P.W. 7, who testified in his cross-examination, that the appellants were not personally known to him and nor were they identified by any Sarpanch, Advocate or Lambardar of the village. One of the appellants, namely, Amin Lal appeared in the witness box as P.W. 10 to support their case, but his statement is contradictory to that of P.W. 5 Nathu Ram, their power of attorney, who had conducted the case on their behalf. P.W. 8 R. S. Dhull, who was the Sub- Registrar, was examined by the appellants to prove the affidavit, Exhibit P3, dated 16-7-1990, but he did not say that the contents of the same were read over to them despite the fact that it was thumb marked. Thus, the evidence led by the appellants left a gaping hole in the story put forward by them regarding their willingness to perform their part of agreement. 14. In a suit for specific performance, readiness and willingness to perform one s part of contract has to be shown throughout and it has to be established beyond the pale of doubt. In a judgment reported as 2000 (1) Civil Court Cases 702 : (AIR 2000 SC 860), Ram Awadh (dead) by L.Rs. V/s. Achhaibar Dubey, it has been held by their Lordships that Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is categoric to the effect that the person seeking specific performance has to aver and to prove that he has performed or always has been ready to perform his part of the agreement. In the instant case, the appellants have failed to show by leading cogent evidence that they were ready and willing to perform their part of agreement. Had they been willing to perform their part of agreement, then there was no question of seeking the extension of time. On the contrary, Khairati Lal had proved affidavit Exhibit D1 which shows his presence in the office of Sub-Registrar on 25-6-1990. He also went on to say that on the said date, the appellants had met him, who pleaded that they had no money with them. On the contrary, Khairati Lal had proved affidavit Exhibit D1 which shows his presence in the office of Sub-Registrar on 25-6-1990. He also went on to say that on the said date, the appellants had met him, who pleaded that they had no money with them. This coupled with the fact that prayer for extension of time had been made shows that the appellants had actually defaulted in performing their part of contract. 15. The bona fides of the appellants are further shaken from the fact that although they had filed a suit for permanent injunction and succeeded in getting an interim direction in their favour, yet, the same was not communicated to the Sub-Registrar so as to restrain Khairati Lal from executing the sale deed or to make him aware of the factum of the dispute. P.W. 8 R. S. Dhull, Sub-Registrar, testified that no application was moved before him making a mention of the stay order. This shows that no attempt was made by the appellants to stall the prospective sale. 16. In so far as the question of respondent Nos. 9 to 11 being the bona fide purchasers without notice is concerned, it is held that the appellants had defaulted in performing their part of agreement. Once the default is established, then the appellants do not have any right to get the agreement enforced and the author of the agreement to sell was absolved of the commitment made therein and was free to execute the sale in favour of anybody. Consequently, the sale in favour of respondent Nos. 9 to 11 cannot be faulted with and is held to be valid. 17. For the reasons mentioned above, there is no merit in the appeal which is hereby dismissed.