Judgment P.S.Patwalia, J. 1. A perusal of the facts of this case would show that an FIR was registered against the plaintiff on 4.11.1989 under Section 354/452 of the Indian Penal Code and in that case the petitioner was convicted by the learned Judicial Magistrate (1st Class) Charkhi Dadri. In appeal, the conviction was upheld. However the plaintiff was released on probation of good conduct for one year vide judgment rendered by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Bhiwani on 1.10.1996. 2. In the meanwhile by an order dated 23.6.1995 the plaintiffs services had been terminated. The order, which is exhibited as P-2 before the trial Court reads as under : "HARYANA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD OFFICE ORDER NO. 386 DATED 23.6.1995 Sh. Ashok Kumar son of Ram Narayan while working as A.L.M. in T/L Sub Division No. 2 Charkhi Dadri had tried to rape the wife of Sh. Krishan Kumar, Telephone Mechanic of O/O Sub Division HSEB, Charkhi Dadri on dated 4.1.89. Necessary FIR was got lodged against Sh. Ashok Kumar, A.L.M. Vide FIR dated 4.1.89 u/s 354/459 IPC with the Sadar Police Station, Charkhi Dadri. The case Number 40-1 of 1989 was instituted in the Court of Shri Baljeet Singh, HCS, Judicial Magistrate, lst Class, Charkhi Dadri u/s 354/452 IPC P.S. Sadar Dadri vide FIR No. 8, Dated 4.1.89, the Honble Sub Judge, 1st Class, Charkhi Dadri decided the case on 3.4.95 in which Shri Ashok Kumar has been held guilty for the offences punishable u/s 354/452 IPC and the Honble Court sentenced Sh. Ashok Kumar to undergo R.I. for a period of two years and to pay fine of Rs. 500/- for the offence punishable u/s 452 IPC and to undergo R.I. for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- for the offence punishable u/s 354 IPC. In default of payment of fine Sh. Ashok Kumar shall further undergo R.I. for a period of 3 months. However, both two sentences shall run concurrently. Since the offence involved is that of moral turpitude and conviction of Sh. Ashok Kumar has been convicted u/s 354/452 IPC. 500/- for the offence punishable u/s 354 IPC. In default of payment of fine Sh. Ashok Kumar shall further undergo R.I. for a period of 3 months. However, both two sentences shall run concurrently. Since the offence involved is that of moral turpitude and conviction of Sh. Ashok Kumar has been convicted u/s 354/452 IPC. Keeping in view of the conduct which lead to conviction R.S. Sharma, Executive Engineer, Operation division, HSEB, Charkhi Dadri being competent authority (Appointing Authority) after applying my mind decide to terminate the services of Shri Ashok Kumar, ALM w.e.f. 3.4.95 i.e. the date from which the official has been convicted by the Honble Court." The plaintiff filed the suit challenging the said order. His suit was dismissed by the trial Court. First appeal against the said order filed by the plaintiff was also dismissed by the learned District Judge, Bhiwani. It is against the impugned judgment that the present Regular Second Appeal has been filed. 3. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has argued that since the plaintiff had been released on probation no disqualification can be attached to him on account of his conviction by virtue of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. He therefore submits that the order terminating his services cannot be sustained. He further prays that the judgments and decrees of the Courts below be set aside and the suit of the plaintiff be decreed with costs. 4. It is a settled issue that the order of termination can be passed against an employee on the basis of conduct which has lead to his conviction, if the punishing authority is satisfied that his conduct leading to conviction is Such that his further retention in public service would be undesirable. This proposition of law is in fact reiterated in the judgment relied upon by the counsel for the appellant himself in Hari Ram v. Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitaran Nigam Ltd. reported as 2006 (2) SCT 112 (Pb. & Hry.)] relevant part of which is as under :- "4. Ms. Nirmaljit Kaur appearing for the respondents submits that in view of Rule 7 of the Regulations, the respondents have validly terminated the services of the petitioner by looking into the conduct which led to his conviction. & Hry.)] relevant part of which is as under :- "4. Ms. Nirmaljit Kaur appearing for the respondents submits that in view of Rule 7 of the Regulations, the respondents have validly terminated the services of the petitioner by looking into the conduct which led to his conviction. She points out the order of his termination Annexure P-4 in which it is stated that the services of the petitioner have been terminated on account of the conduct which led to his conviction. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. We have also perused the original record which produced in the Court. The Full Bench has clearly observed as follows : "For the foregoing reasons, it is held that : (i) The departmental punishment of removal or dismissal from Government service is not an essential and automatic consequence of conviction on a criminal charge ; (ii) to (iv) xx xx xx xx (v) the liability to be departmentally punished for conduct which has led to the conviction of the employee does not attach to the conviction, but attaches to the original conduct (misconduct) which constituted the offence of which the official has been convicted ; (vi) to (xi) xx xx xx xx (xii)An order of dismissal or removal or for compulsory retirement can be passed under Rule 19 (i) (without conforming to the procedure prescribed in Rules 14 to 18) not on the basis of conviction, but only if the competent authority finds that the relevant misconduct of the concerned Govt. servant renders his further retention in public service undesirable; and (xiii) xx xx xx xx The law has further been clarified by the Supreme Court in the Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416. In the aforesaid case it has been held as follows : "Where a disciplinary authority comes to know that a Govt. servant has been convicted on a criminal charge, it must consider whether his conduct which has led to his conviction was such as warrants the imposition of a penalty and, if so, what that penalty should be. For the purpose, it will have to peruse the judgment of the Criminal Court and consider all the facts and circumstances of the case. Once the disciplinary authority reaches the conclusion that the Govt. For the purpose, it will have to peruse the judgment of the Criminal Court and consider all the facts and circumstances of the case. Once the disciplinary authority reaches the conclusion that the Govt. servants conduct was such as to require his dismissal or removal from service or reduction in rank, he must decide which of these three penalties should be imposed on him. This too it has to do by itself and without hearing the Govt. servant concerned by reason of the exclusionary effect of the second proviso. However, a conviction on a criminal charge does not automatically entail dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of the Govt. servant concerned and, therefore, it is not mandatory to impose any of these major penalties." Keeping in view the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court we have examined the record produced by the respondents. A perusal of the record shows that the respondents have not paid any attention to the conduct which led to the conviction of the petitioner as required by law. It was necessary for the respondents to examine the judgment of the Criminal Court and to assess the conduct of the petitioner to reach a conclusion as to whether it would be undesirable to keep him in service. The action of the management/employer must be based on relevant considerations. The impugned order in our opinion suffers from the vice of non-application of mind. Consequently, we are of the opinion that the impugned order deserves to be quashed on this short ground." In the present case, the allegations against the plaintiff- appellant were that he tried to outrage the modesty of the wife of his colleague. The allegations are apparent from the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, Rohtak in the criminal case against the petitioner. The allegations are apparent from the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, Rohtak in the criminal case against the petitioner. The same are as hereunder : "The prosecution allegation further are that on 4.1.1989, her husband had gone on duty and at about 11.00 A.M., when she had gone to the bathroom to take bath and had started taking bath, in the meanwhile, accused- appellant Ashok Kumar, who was also employed in the Electricity Board and was residing in the adjoining residential quarter, entered the house of the complainant, after scaling over the wall and entered the bathroom, by giving a push to the door of the bathroom and caught hold of her and she sustained minor injuries, in the scuffle and she raised raula, upon which Narayan Dutt. Chowkidar and Om Parkash entered the house and caught hold of Ashok Kumar accused." 6. In view of the aforementioned allegations I find no error in the view taken by the punishing authority that the conduct of the petitioner was such as to render him unfit to be retained in service. I am satisfied that the order of termination has been passed on the basis of conduct leading to conviction and not on the basis of conviction alone. The argument based on Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1956 therefore has no merit. 7. I find no infirmity in the view taken by the Courts below. The present Regular Second Appeal is therefore dismissed. Appeal dismissed.