Judgment :- (Prayer: Appeal filed under Clause 15 of Letters Patent Act against the portion of the order dated 3.8.2000 by which back wages have been denied from 21.7. 1994 to 31.8.1999 and to set aside that portion of the order denying back: wages for the period from 21.7.1994 to 31.5.1999. in W.P. No.10314/96, Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue a writ of certiorari calling for the records from the 1st Respondent relating to the order in Petition No. 74/1994 dated 09.01.1996 and quash the same.) Dharma Rao Elipe, J. 1. This Writ Appeal is directed against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No.10314 of 1996 dated 3.8.2000, in and by which the petitioner was denied back wages for the period from 21.7.94 to 31.8.1999. 2. The brief facts of the case of the appellant are that the appellant who was a Driver under the second respondent-Corporation, was implicated in a murder case of his younger brother Varadababu. He was convicted by the Sessions Court and sentenced to life imprisonment. Against the conviction, he preferred Criminal Appeal No.562 of 1988. He was enlarged on bail and he reported for duty. Thereafter, disciplinary action was initiated by way of show cause notice dated 24.7.1993 and he submitted his explanation on 21.8.1993 and not satisfying with the explanation, the Corporation ordered enquiry into the charges. After conducting enquiry, the second show cause notice was issued as to why the petitioner should not be dismissed from service. He again submitted his explanation. Subsequently, he was dismissed from service. The Corporation moved the first respondent Industrial Tribunal for approval and obtained the approval by the order dated 9.1.1396, approving the dismissal of the petitioner. So, against the order of dismissal, the Writ Petition was filed on the ground that as per Clause 17(c) of the Standing Order, the employer can dismiss the employee only after final conviction and not when the Appeal is pending. The criminal appeal against conviction was allowed by the Appellate Court by judgment dated 2.2.1999 and the appellant was acquitted. Hence, the Corporation expressed its desire to reinstate the appellant. Therefore, the only question raised was with regard to bake-wages. The criminal appeal against conviction was allowed by the Appellate Court by judgment dated 2.2.1999 and the appellant was acquitted. Hence, the Corporation expressed its desire to reinstate the appellant. Therefore, the only question raised was with regard to bake-wages. The learned Single Judge hold that the appellant is entitled to back-wages for the period from 1.9.1999 till the date of reinstatement, but he is not entitled to back wages from 21.7.1994 to 1.9.1999. Challenging the denial of back wages for the above said period, this Writ Appeal is filed. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon a Division Bench judgment of Orissa High Court in Md. Mazim v. District Transport Manager (Admn.), 1975 (2) LLJ 259, wherein a similar standing order was considered and in the said Judgment of Orissa High Court, it is held as follows: "The petitioner was not absent from service an his own volition but he had been suspended from service during the pendency of the criminal charge and discharged from service on conviction. There was no disciplinary proceedings. On acquittal, the petitioner must have normally returned to service. That being so, the Transport Authority had no justification at all to treat the absence as on leave. He was kept out of service. Absence would postulate a voluntary action on the part of the employee." 4. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the judgment of this Court in M. Palani v. Executive Engineer, TNEB and Another, 1990 LW (Cri.) 337, which deals with the matter relating Standing Order 20(c), wherein it is held that when an appeal against conviction by Criminal Court is pending, initiation of disciplinary action is not legal; the standing order being couched in an appropriate and generous manner, which would be beneficial both to the employee and the employer, it must be given its due meaning; if so done, it will be appropriate to await the conclusion of the criminal proceedings whenever it is found that they have not concluded in the sense as against the decision the first Court, there is a further agitation before the High Court and such agitation has not reached any finality. 5. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant further contended that in view of the judgments above referred to, denial of back wages for period from by the learned Single Judge in the Writ Petition while allowing the continuity of service, is contrary to law. 6. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent would rely upon the judgment of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar (Gujarat) and Another, 1996 (11) SCC 603 , wherein the Supreme Court considered the question whether the employee who was reinstated into service after acquittal by the Appellate Court, is entitled to for payment of back-wages. In the said case, the learned Single Judge directed the respondent to reinstate the petitioner into service with continuity of service, but denied back-wages and the Appeal preferred by him was also dismissed. Then, he approached the Supreme Court. Considering the issue raised, the Supreme Court held as follows: "The only question is whether he is entitled to back-wages. It was his conduct of involving himself in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the basis of the conviction by operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable to the situation. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by way of disciplinary proceedings and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant. Each case requires to be considered in its own backdrop. In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages." 7. This judgment was followed by the Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. Jaipal Singh, 2004 (l) LLN 520. 8. We have given our careful considerations to the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages." 7. This judgment was followed by the Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. Jaipal Singh, 2004 (l) LLN 520. 8. We have given our careful considerations to the order passed by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge granted back-wages from 2.9.1999 till the date of his reinstatement with continuity of service but denied back-wages from 21.7.1994 to 1.9.1999 following the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in District Manager, A.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. N. Lakshminarayana and another, 1994 (3) SCC 379 and The Management of Reserve Bank of India v. Bhopal Singh Panchal, AIR 1994 SC 552 . 9. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we are not accepting the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that based of the Standing Order 17(c) of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1947, which contemplates that if on the conclusion of the inquiry or, as the case may be, of the criminal proceedings, when an order of dismissal is passed, the workman shall be deemed to have been absent from duty during the period of suspension, even though the enquiry is conducted, after the conclusion of the criminal proceedings, as the second respondent-Corporation has passed the impugned order before conclusion of the Criminal Appeal, which was ended in acquittal and the impugned Order of dismissal from service is contrary to the Section 17(c) of the Standing orders and therefore, he is entitled to for back wages. We gave gone through the above said Clause 17(c) and Clause 17(c) of the Standing Orders contemplates only with regard to passing of the order of dismissal or suspension, if the workman is found guilty of the charges in the departmental enquiry or Criminal Case, but it is nothing to do with the payment of back wages. 10. As observed by the Supreme Court in the above two decisions cited by the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent with regard to entitlement of back wages, we are satisfied that the appellant was reinstated after acquittal in the Criminal Case by the Appellate Court, but he was denied back wages for the period from 21.7.1994 to 1.9.1999, since he has not attended the work by virtue of his involvement in the criminal case on his own volition. Therefore, we are not able to appreciate the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that the order passed is contrary to Standing Order 17(c). Hence, we see no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Accordingly, the Writ Appeal fails and the same is dismissed. No order as to costs.