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2006 DIGILAW 3387 (PNJ)

Gursher Singh v. President, Improvement Trust Tribunal, Jalandhar

2006-08-25

M.M.S.BEDI

body2006
JUDGMENT M.M.S. Bedi, J. - To question the validity of the Award of the Tribunal constituted under the Town Improvement Act, 1922 (for short the Act) this petition has been preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the ground that the same suffers from an error patent on the face of the record. 2. It is averred in the petition that the petitioners are owners of 89 kanal 3 marla of land comprising in different khasra numbers mentioned in the petition. Vide Notification under Section 36 of the Act, the respondents had sought to acquire 143.50 acres of land situated in the municipal limits of Jalandhar on the south of Model Town, Jalandhar for execution of a development scheme framed by respondent No. 4. Notification under Section 42 of the Act was published on 5.8.1977. The land of the petitioners was covered under the aforesaid notifications. The Land Acquisition Collector, Improvement Trust, Jalandhar gave an Award No. 3 of 1976-77 on 12.4.1980 allowing compensation at the rate of Rs. 450/- per marla even though the District Collector had recommended payment of Rs. 800/- per marla. Solatium at the rate of 15% was also awarded. 3. The possession of the land has already been taken from the petitioners. Being not satisfied with the Award given by respondent No. 3, the Land Acquisition Collector, Improvement Trust, Jalandhar they filed a reference application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which was duly forwarded to the President, Improvement Trust, Jalandhar respondent No. 1. Vide Award dated 13.2.1985 (Annexure P-3), respondent No. 1 awarded the compensation for the acquired land at the rate of Rs. 750/- per marla. However, a belt of the depth of 100 feet on the Southern side of the Model Town, Jalandhar was created, for which compensation was awarded at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per marla. 4. The petitioners were also held entitled to 15 per cent of solatium and 6 per cent interest on the enhanced amount of compensation from the date of their dispossession till realisation. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners Mr. Sarin has contended that the Tribunal has erred in adopting the procedure of belting for the purpose of assessment of compensation. He has argued that the similarly circumstanced owners whose land has been acquired under the same scheme have been awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners Mr. Sarin has contended that the Tribunal has erred in adopting the procedure of belting for the purpose of assessment of compensation. He has argued that the similarly circumstanced owners whose land has been acquired under the same scheme have been awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per marla. 6. Challenging the classification of the land on the basis of the proximity to the road, ignoring the cases of similarly circumstanced land owners, it was argued that the compensation has been inadequately assessed. It was also argued that the solatium at the rate of 30 per cent and interest and the rate of 9 per cent for the first year and 15 per cent per annum thereafter from the date of taking of the possession till the date of realisation in accordance with the amended provisions of the Land Acquisition Act should have also been granted. Mr. Sarin further argued that respondent No. 1 had acted arbitrarily in fixing the depth of first belt at 100 feet, whereas in a similar case arising out of the same acquisition, the acquired land of Manjit Singh and others and Rajpal Singh and others, the market value of the land has been assessed at Rs. 1,000/- per marla even beyond the belt, which was more than 200 feet away from the road. The reliance has been placed on the decision of Raj Pal Singh and others v. The Tribunal constituted under the Town Improvement Act, Jalandhur through its President and others, CWP No. 243 of 1984, decided by I.S. Tiwana, J. on 12.7.1984. 7. Shri H.S. Mattewal, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 has argued that the scope of interference in writ jurisdiction in the Award is limited in view of the law laid down in Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others, AIR 1964 Supreme Court 477, that the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. A finding of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal on the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ jurisdiction. It is only an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact. A finding of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal on the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ jurisdiction. It is only an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact. For the same proposition he placed reliance on Raj Kumar and another v. State of Punjab and another, 1995 LACC 297 and Khanna Improvement Trust v. Land Acquisition Tribunal and others, 1995 LACC 281. 8. So far as the maintainability of the writ petition and scope for interference in the Awards of the Tribunal are concerned, there is no controversy regarding the principle that the writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or Tribunals when the order is passed either without jurisdiction, or is in excess of jurisdiction vested or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. It is also a settled principle of law that where an inferior court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly in violation of the rules of natural justice or in contravention to the statutory provisions or procedures of law the interference by writ court is permissible. So far as the finding of fact arrived at on the basis of appreciation of evidence is concerned, the same cannot be reopened or questioned in writ jurisdiction. It is only an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected in writ jurisdiction but the scope in the error of fact can be interfered if the Tribunal has erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence, which has influenced the impugned finding. A finding of fact, if it is based on no evidence, is also treated as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. The inadequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the interference (inference ?) of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. 9. The inadequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the interference (inference ?) of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. 9. All the objections, which have been raised by the learned counsel for the respondents regarding the exercise of writ jurisdiction in the Award of the President of Improvement Trust were raised in case Hissar Improvement Trust, Hissar v. The President Tribunal Improvement Trust, Hissar and others, 2005(3) AILLR 457. In the said case the learned single Judge of this Court while evaluating the Award of the Tribunal had gone into the details of the documents and the reasoning process adopted by the Tribunal and thereafter observed that the Award of the Tribunal was arbitrary and that the belting system was not justified, the Division Bench of this Court after considering the ratio of the judgment in State of A.P. v. P.V. Hanumantha Rao, 2004(2) All Indian Land Laws Reporter 129 and Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, 2003(3) All Indian Land Laws Reporter 334, held as follows : "In view of the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court of India and also the Division Bench of this Court as noticed above, it is apparent that when there is an arbitrary exercise of power or an error apparent on the face of record or any other error of law committed by a Tribunal, then this Court has the jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to correct the aforesaid errors. It is well settled by now that when there is misreading of evidence, misapplication of law or ruling out of any evidence available on the record or when the order does not disclose the reasons i.e. the decision making process is not disclosed to the court, then this Court always interferes and comes to the rescue of the aggrieved party. The learned Single Judge while evaluating the award of the Tribunal has gone into the details of the documents and the reasoning process adopted by the Tribunal the belting system was not justified. We have also examined the award of the Tribunal. We entirely agree with the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge while evaluating the award of the Tribunal has gone into the details of the documents and the reasoning process adopted by the Tribunal the belting system was not justified. We have also examined the award of the Tribunal. We entirely agree with the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge. For the reasons we shall give in later part of this judgment, we entirely uphold the assumption of jurisdiction by the learned Single Judge. Before parting with this order, we notice that the objection whatsoever with regard to jurisdiction of this Court for entertaining the petitions filed by the claimant-landowners under Articles 226 and 227 was never raised by the Improvement Trust before the learned Single Judge. It is only for the first time during the pendency of the present Letters Patent Appeals that the aforesaid objection has been raised." 10. In another case The Jalandhar Improvement Trust, Jalandhar v. Vidya Suri, 2006(1) PLR 153, a similar objection raised on behalf of the Jalandhar Improvement Trust was rejected regarding the maintainability of the writ petition holding that where there is misreading of evidence, misapplication of law or ruling out of any evidence available on the record when the order does not disclose the reasons i.e. the decision making process is not disclosed to the Court then the High Court always interferes and comes to the rescue of the arrived party. 11. After the above said observations, the Division Bench had thoroughly scrutinized the evidence produced before the Tribunal under the Punjab Town Improvement Trust (Act) and arrived at a conclusion that the High Court has got jurisdiction to interfere in the Award of the Tribunal if it was arbitrary or where the belting system was not justified. Following the ratio of the said judgment, I am of the opinion that in the present case there has been an arbitrary exercise of power by the Tribunal in adopting the belting system for the purpose of classifying the land and for the purpose of determining the market value of the land acquired and manifest injustice has been caused to the petitioner by adoption of different yardstick for assessing the market value whereas similarly circumstanced land owners of the same locality falling within the scheme have been awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per marla. 12. 1,000/- per marla. 12. It is an admitted fact that pursuant to the notification dated 5.8.1977 under Section 48 of the Act sanctioned by the Government, approval was accorded to the development scheme of 143.56 acres of land situated on the Southern side of Model Town, Jalandhar. The scheme was framed by the Jalandhar Improvement Trust under Section 24 read with Section 28 of the Act, the original Award was given by the Land Acquisition Collector, Jalandhar, Improvement Trust on 12.4.1980. The Land Acquisition Collector, Improvement Trust, Jalandhar determined the compensation at the rate of Rs. 450/- per marla. The Award of the Land Acquisition Collector was challenged by various claimants under land reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act for enhancement of the compensation awarded to them. The Tribunal vide Annexure P-3 had disposed of the Reference Nos. 49 of 1982, 48 of 1982, 50 of 1980, 51 of 1982 and 66 of 1982 (pertaining to the petitioners) and 3 of 1983, 4 of 1983, 5 of 1983 and 9 of 1983 by a common Award dated 13.2.1985. One Manjit Singh land owner, fell under the same scheme, was granted compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per marla in CWP No. 246 of 1983 decided on 11.8.1983 upholding the said Award of the Tribunal. 13. The other claimants Raj Pal Singh and others falling under the same scheme, who had been granted compensation at the rate of Rs. 625/- per marla filed CWP No. 243 of 1984 in July 1984 claiming compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per marla. I.S. Tiwana, J. observed that the land of Manjit Singh and others was atleast 40 karams (200 feet) away from the road and the Tribunal had misread its own earlier Award in the case of Manjit Singh and others and tried to avoid following the same on imaginary grounds and that there was no point of distinction between the location of the land of Manjit Singh and others and the land of Raj Pal Singh and others. As there was no point of distinction between two acquired pieces of land for the purpose of their market value, the order of the Tribunal qua Raj Pal Singh was held to be discriminatory. The compensation at the rate of Rs. As there was no point of distinction between two acquired pieces of land for the purpose of their market value, the order of the Tribunal qua Raj Pal Singh was held to be discriminatory. The compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per marla, as awarded in the case of Manjit Singh and others, was also awarded to Raj Pal Singh and others in CWP No. 243 of 1984 decided on 12.7.1984. 14. The other claimants Amar Chand and Darshan Lal, whose lands were also part of 143.58 acres scheme were awarded compensation at the rate if Rs. 750/- per marla by the Tribunal. They had filed CWPs titled Amar Chand v. State of Punjab and others, CWP No. 342 of 1984 and Darshan Lal v. State of Punjab and others, CWP No. 3286 of 1985, Mehtab S. Gill, J. vide judgment dated 18.8.2004 allowed their writ petitions holding that Amar Chand and Darshan Lal were also entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per marla with 15 per cent solatium over and above the enhanced compensation besides the statutory interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the date of dispossession till the date of appointment at par with that of Manjit Singh and others, relying upon the decision in the case of Manjit Singh and others (supra). It will not be out of place to mention here that in Gurjaipal Singh and others v. The Jullundur Improvement Trust, CWP No. 2456 of 1984 and New Finance and Credit Corporation (P) Ltd. v. The Tribunal Constituted under the Town Improvement Act, 1922, Jullundur and others, CWP No. 576 of 1984 arising out of the same scheme, compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per marla has been awarded following the case of Manjit Singh and others (supra). 15. 1,000/- per marla has been awarded following the case of Manjit Singh and others (supra). 15. I have considered the facts and circumstances of the cases of Manjit Singh and others, Raj Pal Singh and others, Amar Chand and Gurjaipal Singh etc., mentioned herein above and I am of the opinion that the impugned Award of the Tribunal is liable to the modified as counsel for the respondents either from the pleadings or from any material on record has not been able to point out any distinction between the pieces of land acquired in the case of petitioners and in the case of Manjit Singh and other land owners, whose cases are mentioned herein above. I have carefully perused Annexure P-1, the site plan which reflects that the khasra numbers, which immediately abut the main road on the Southern side for which compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per marla has been granted are adjacent to khasra numbers, for which compensation at the rate of Rs. 750/- per marla has been granted. It is pertinent to observe here that there is a road on the Western side of the khasra numbers for which compensation has been granted at the rate of Rs. 750/- per marla. 16. The reasoning adopted for classification by the Tribunal does not seem to be reasonable in view of the situation of the entire land belonging to the petitioners. The decision making process of the Tribunal is neither reasonable nor justified in view of the fact that Manjit Singh, whose land was beyond 200 meters away from the road had been granted compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per marla. 17. Mr. Sarin has argued that the petitioner is entitled to solatium and interest on the enhanced compensation as per amended Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act. I have considered the said contention in context to the law laid down in Union of India and another v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs. 1,000/- per marla. 17. Mr. Sarin has argued that the petitioner is entitled to solatium and interest on the enhanced compensation as per amended Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act. I have considered the said contention in context to the law laid down in Union of India and another v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs. etc., AIR 1989 SC 1933, wherein it was clarified that the benefit of enhanced solatium is extended by Section 30(2) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 to cases where the award of the Collector or by the High Court is made between 30.4.1982 to 24.9.1984 or to an appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court, which arises out of an award of the Collector or the Court between the said two dates. 18. In Union of India and others v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, AIR 1990 SC 981, the award had been passed by the Collector prior to 30.4.1982 and no proceedings were pending before the Collector on 30.1.1982. It was held that the petitioner in that case was not entitled to the benefit of additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act. In the present case the award has been pronounced by the Collector on 20.4.1980 and no proceedings were pending before the Collector on 30.4.1982, the date prescribed by Section 30(1)(a) of the Amending Act. The petitioner will not be entitled to the benefit of additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act. On the principle of parity also the said relief cannot be granted to the petitioners as similar relief was neither granted in the case of Rajpal Singh and others, Manjit Singh and others or Gurjaipal Singh and others. 19. In view of the above discussion, the writ petition is allowed and the petitioners are awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per marla but the prayer for additional solatium and interest under Section 23(1-A) of the Act as amended in 1984 on the enhanced compensation is declined. Petition allowed.