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2006 DIGILAW 339 (CAL)

TUSHAR CHAKRABORTY v. SANTOSH KUMAR BANERJEE

2006-06-13

PRATAP KUMAR RAY

body2006
Pratap Kumar Ray, JJ. ( 1 ) HEARD the learned Advocates appearing for the parties. ( 2 ) AFTER the remand order passed by the second appellate Court, namely, bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. in S. A. No. 466 of 1996, the matter has come up for final hearing to consider the findings of the first appellate Court "on remand issue" as framed. ( 3 ) THE suit was an eviction suit against the tenant, who is the appellant herein on the ground of default and reasonable requirement. The trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the landlord being Title Suit No. 258 of 1986. On reasonable requirement issue the trial Court held that the plaintiff/landlord being an Ex-Reader of Rabindra Bharati University, being a Sitarist to coach the students had the necessity of one room. The trial Court further held that the landlord with a family of three members, the landlord, his wife and the daughter since is occupying only four rooms without any kitchen, got the necessity to evict the tenant to use the said tenanted room as a kitchen. ( 4 ) ASSAILING that finding of trial Court on issue of reasonable requirement as well as the default, an appeal was preferred being Title Appeal No. 298 of 1994 which was dismissed by affirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court by the Fourth Court of Assistant District Judge, Alipore, South 24-Parganas confirming the finding of the reasonable requirement issue only. The second appeal was filed registered as S. A. No. 466 of 1996 assailing the jugment and decree of both the Courts below by the tenant. Bhaskar bhattacharya, J. after hearing the said second appeal quashed the finding on default ground of both the Courts below. The second appeal was filed registered as S. A. No. 466 of 1996 assailing the jugment and decree of both the Courts below by the tenant. Bhaskar bhattacharya, J. after hearing the said second appeal quashed the finding on default ground of both the Courts below. On issue of reasonable requirement though His Lordship was satisfied that the landlord has the requirement of the suit premises for his own accommodation, but in view of the application filed by he respondent/landlord disclosing that though at the material time of filing of he suit, the landlord was the owner of a premises but as the entire premises was a tenanted premises, so he had no alternative suitable accommodation as would dis-lodge the ground of Section 13 (1) (ff) of the West Bengal Premises tenancy Act, 1956, the matter was remanded back for consideration of the point as framed, by the first appellate Court by passing the following essential findings:-" I think instead of remanding the entire matter there should be a limited remand in terms of Order 41 Rule 25 read with Order 42 of the Code of civil Procedure by directing the learned first appellate Court below to decide only the question whether the respondent had at the time of institution of the suit any reasonably suitable accommodation in premises No. 17a, Iswar Ganguly j lane. For the purpose of adjudicating the aforesaid question, both the parties will be permitted to lead evidence in support of their respective cases. I, thus, direct the learned first appellate Court to permit the parties to lead evidence only on the aforesaid question and to arrive at a finding of such issue and to return the finding of the Court and the reasons there for along with the evidence adduced positively within a month from the date of communication of the order". However, while remanding the matter to decide the issue, His Lordship held further "i find that as regards the point of ownership, there is no dispute and if it is established that the respondent has no other reasonably suitable accommodation elsewhere, the findings of the learned Courts below on the question of reasonable requirement cannot be interfered with". However, while remanding the matter to decide the issue, His Lordship held further "i find that as regards the point of ownership, there is no dispute and if it is established that the respondent has no other reasonably suitable accommodation elsewhere, the findings of the learned Courts below on the question of reasonable requirement cannot be interfered with". ( 5 ) A review application was filed against the order of remand dated 19th january, 2000 aforesaid on the ground that the finding of the High Court on the question of reasonable requirement should be recalled. This review application as filed by the tenant/appellant was dismissed by Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. on 22nd November, 2000 by holding, inter alia, that there was no error in the judgment dated January 19,2000 justifying interference under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 6 ) HENCE, ultimately, the order of remand reached its finality. On considering the issue, the first appellate Court answered the order and remand to this effect, that on the date of institution of the suit, the landlord had no alternative suitable accommodation as the entire premises which was under the ownership of the landlord at the time of institution of the suit namely 17a, iswar Ganguly Lane, was fully occupied by four tenants. The order of remand was limited only to this extent to identify the issue as to whether on the date of institution of the suit landlord/plaintiff had any suitable reasonable accommodation in the other premises which was not suit premises. This issue was answered in favour of the landlord by the first appellate Court on adjudication. The order of remand was limited only to this extent to identify the issue as to whether on the date of institution of the suit landlord/plaintiff had any suitable reasonable accommodation in the other premises which was not suit premises. This issue was answered in favour of the landlord by the first appellate Court on adjudication. But, the first appellate Court while dealing with the matter however, held that the premises No. 17a, Iswar Ganguly Lane which was a tenanted premises at the material time when the eviction suit was filed praying eviction of the tenant from the suit premises on the ground of reasonable requirement and default, but during the pendency of the suit at one point of time out of four tenants who were occupying total eight rooms of the said premises, one Shri Sushil Mallick, a tenant in respect of the two rooms thereof vacated the rooms which subsequently was sold out to one Shri Anil Chatlerjee by a registered Deed of sale dated 17th January, 1992 and in the sale deed the landlord of the concerned suit premises disclosed that he got khas possession of some portions of the premises and the other portions were tenanted. However, the learned first appellate Court also recorded the finding that the purchaser, Shri Anil Chatterjee deposed that before purchase of the property in November, 1991 as he had relationship with the tenant, Shri Sushil Mallick, prior to purchase of the property in January, 1992, the said Shri Mallick vacated the premises in favour of Shri anil Chatterjee, the intended purchaser by mutual arrangement. This finding that sometime from the month November, 1991 till 10th January, 1992, the two rooms were lying vacant being in possession of the landlord when admittedly this premises No. 17a, Iswar Ganguly Lane is at a walking distance of more or less one and half minutes walk from the suit premises, whether would nullify the reasonable requirement ground of the landlord, to quash and set aside the findings of both the Courts below on reasonable requirement issue as answered in favour of the landlord. This point was not answered by the first appellate court only for the reason that Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. while passing an order of remand limited the question for decision by the first appellate Court by identifying the contour of adjudication as on the date of institution of the suit. This point was not answered by the first appellate court only for the reason that Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. while passing an order of remand limited the question for decision by the first appellate Court by identifying the contour of adjudication as on the date of institution of the suit. In view of the said factual finding that sometime during pendency of suit, roughly for two months another premises under the ownership of the landlord having accommodation of two rooms was vacant which subsequently was sold out to the purchaser Shri Chatterjee whether it could be a ground to nullify the reasonable requirement issue of the suit premises to utilise the same as a kitchen by the landlord on satisfying the ground under Section 13 ( 1) (ff) of the west Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. Both the parties urged in their respective angles on that point. Those arguments of the parties now are recorded herein below. ( 7 ) MR. Roy Chowdhury, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant has submitted that as admittedly two rooms in different premises though situated at a walking distance of more or less one and half minutes walk, were vacant during the pendency of the suit which satisfied the test that the landlord is not entitled to have any eviction decree in his favour on reasonable requirement issue and to that effect reliance has been placed to the judgment in the case Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamorain, reported in AIR 1987 SC 741 . Mr. Roy Chowdhury further has urged relying upon the case Hasmat Rai and anr. v. Raghunath Prasad, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1711 that reasonable requirement issue even could be considered up to the appellate decree stage and, as such, the factual finding as reached by the first appellate Court while answering the remand that two rooms in another premises which were subsequently sold to Shri Anil Chatterjee came into the possession of the landlord would nullify the ground of reasonable requirement of suit premises. ( 8 ) MR. ( 8 ) MR. Bidyut Kumar Banerjee, learned Senior Advocate replied the issue by contending that as both the two premises namely, the suit premises and the premises No. 17a, Iswar Ganguly Lane are not at all the adjacent premises, but admittedly at a distance of one and half minutes walking distance, same would not nullify the ground of Section 13 (1) (ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy act since that premises wherein two rooms were vacant for two months prior to the sell of the rooms were not reasonably suitable accommodation to satisfy the need of kitchen of the landlord which was considered as the basis to pass the decree by both the Courts below answering the issue on reasonable requirement of the landlord affirmatively. In support of such submission reliance has been placed to the judgment passed in the case Jeeban Jamini Debi and ors. v. Banku Behari Guin, reported in 65 CWN 799, a judgment of the Division bench of the Calcutta High Court wherein the Court held that even if there was an alternative accommodation in a premises which was at far off distance of ten minutes walk from the suit premises, but the same would not satisfy the reasonable alternative accommodation of the landlord and if the same was considered as satisfaction of reasonable requirement of the landlord, it would result a compulsion to the landlord to split up his family which a Court of Law should not pass. ( 9 ) MR. Banerjee, learned Senior Advocate further has urged the point that it is the landlord's choice to utilise a premises and a tenant cannot dictate such and reliance has been placed to the judgment passed in the case Ragavendra kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery and Co. , reported in 2000 (1) SCC 679 and particulary Paragraph-10 thereof. So far as the reasonable alternative accommodation issue is concerned qua consideration of the said issue even at the stage of appellate decree, relying upon the judgment passed in the case gaya Prasad v. Shri Pradeep Srivastava, reported in 2001 WBLR. (SC) 248. Mr. Banerjee, learned Senior Advocate has urged that alternative accommodation must be of such type and of such nature as would totally eclipsed the need of the landlord concerned for which the eviction suit was initiated. (SC) 248. Mr. Banerjee, learned Senior Advocate has urged that alternative accommodation must be of such type and of such nature as would totally eclipsed the need of the landlord concerned for which the eviction suit was initiated. Citing that judgment , it has been submitted that as the need was for a kitchen and a drawing room naturally that need would not be satisfied even if it is assumed that during the per dency of the suit another premises situated at a distance of one and half minute walk from the suit premises became vacant prior to transfer of the rooms by sale deed thereof to the purchaser, Shri Anil Chatterjee. It has been vehemently contended that a kitchen of the premises cannot be situated at such a distance in another premises, hence it was not an alternative suitable accommodation. ( 10 ) HAVING regard to the rival contention of the parties it appears before this Court that so far as the reasonable requirement about the need of the landlord namely, need of a kitchen, need of a room of provide tution to the student and the need of a drawing room as were considered by both the Courts below and duly affirmed by the judgment and order dated 19th January, 2000 in second appeal by Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. while passing the order of remand in S. A. No. 466 of 1996, which even in review application was not modified by his Lo dship, hence the finding of the second appellate Court so as the reasonable requirement of the landlord with reference to the identification of the need on the basis of the evidence-on-record reached its finality and got final seal as no challenge was made further by the tenant/appellant to the superior court. But only for remind order the matter again has been placed for hearing to decide the finding of the first appellate Court on issue of remand. The first appellate Court has duly answered that by holding that at the time of institution of the suit there was no alternative accommodation at all. But only for remind order the matter again has been placed for hearing to decide the finding of the first appellate Court on issue of remand. The first appellate Court has duly answered that by holding that at the time of institution of the suit there was no alternative accommodation at all. ( 11 ) SECTION 13 (1) (ff) is the relevant ground whereby a landlord may succeed in an eviction suit on reasonable requirement issue by satisfying the court that there was no other alternative reasonably suitable accommodation to satisfy the need of the landlord 13 (1) (ff) of the West Bengal Premises tenancy Act, 1956 reads to this effect: -"subject to the provisions of sub-section (3a), where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord for his own occupation if he is the owner or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held and the landlord of such person is not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation. "it appears from the said provision that landlord not only has to prove the reasonab e requirements of the tenanted premises for his own occupation but also to satisfy that he had no alternative reasonable suitable accommodation. The word "reasonable suitable accommodation" has a specific connotation, meaning thereby that the accommodation must be suitable and that suitability must be of reasonable in the angle of landlord's need. The word accommodation in the statute has been qualified by two adjectives "reasonably" and "suitability" and the mere exercise of an accommodation will not satisfy the ground. Here in the instant case it appears from the evidence-on-record that the two premises are situated at a distance of one and half minutes walk. Hence, it is proved that two premises are not adjacent. Furthermore, so far as the reasonable requirement is concerned landlord satisfied the Court on leading evidence as was considered by both the Courts below that he had a need of a kitchen as a reasonable requirement of the suit premises. This findings of the fact that the landlord requires a kitchen being a finding of the facts reached by both the two courts below, should be considered by the second appellate Court as a final fact in the lis in question and it cannot be disturbed in view of the embergo under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This findings of the fact that the landlord requires a kitchen being a finding of the facts reached by both the two courts below, should be considered by the second appellate Court as a final fact in the lis in question and it cannot be disturbed in view of the embergo under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Reliance may be made upon the judgment of the Apex Court passed in the case of Santosh Hazari v. Purusottam Tewari, reported in 2001 (3) SCC 179 . Where the Apex Court held that the first appellate Court is the last Court of the fact as well as the law and pure findings of fact remain immune from challenging second appeal. There is no doubt that in the case of reasonable requirement even up to the appellate court decree stage it should be considered as to whether there is any alternative suitable accommodation. But such reasonable suitable accommodation must be in the angle of the landlord in question, not within the consideration of the tenant and/or his plea. It is a settled law that it is the landlord choice how the premises should be utilised and the tenant cannot dictate such. Reliance may be placed to the judgment passed in the case of Prativa Devi v. T. N. Krishnan, reported in 1996 (5) SCC 353 wherein the Court held "the landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. He has a complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the Courts to dictate to the landlord how and in what manner he should live or prescribed for him a residential standard of his own". The same view has been reached by the Apex Court in another case Raghavendra kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery and Co. , reported in 2000 (1) SCC 679 by hoping "it is a settled position of law that the landlord is the best Judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he had got complete freedom in the matter. " From the aforesaid settled legal position it appears that it is landlord's choice how the premises to be utilised and Court cannot suggest anything about utilization issue. " From the aforesaid settled legal position it appears that it is landlord's choice how the premises to be utilised and Court cannot suggest anything about utilization issue. Since both the Courts below came to a findings that the landlord has a need of a kitchen and the suit premises should be utilised for such purposes, this Court is of the view that this Court sitting in the second appellate jurisdiction cannot suggest that the landlord would split up his kitchen and/or his drawing room to another premises at a distance which, however, for a short period of two rinonths became vacant prior to sale of the same to another gentlerfian Shrli Cha^terjee. It is absurd proposition that a kitchen for a family would tj)e shifted to Whether premises and the family will live in other premises. Sectioiji 13 (1)i (ff) s|rjce qualified the alternative accommodation to nullify the reasonable requirement with the prefix reasonably and suitably, the Court has to consider as to whether an alternative accommodation as was vacant for two months| on'v during |j> indency of the suit, was reasonable and suitable to satisfy the requirements of the landlord. As already held that landlord proved his need of a kitdhen and a driving room and both the Courts below came to a concurrent finding of fact to this effect. The need of the landlord viz. the kitchen and a drawing room could hot be said as satisfied in view of vacancy of two rooms for certain period ijn another premises owned by the landlord during pendency of the suit, in view of the distance factor of that premises. This Court is fortified with such view that th|e accommodation is not suitable as the same is not adjacent to the suit premises, relying upon the judgment of Jeeban Jamini Debi and Ors. v. Banku Behari Guin, reported in 65 CWN page 799. This Court is fortified with the settled legal position that it is the landlord's choice to utilise the premises. The suit premises is a shop-room situated in the ground floor which very well could be utilised as a kitchen even it is attached with boundary wall as the same is within the premised as occupied by the landlord and being utilised by the landlord as a residential accommodation. The suit premises is a shop-room situated in the ground floor which very well could be utilised as a kitchen even it is attached with boundary wall as the same is within the premised as occupied by the landlord and being utilised by the landlord as a residential accommodation. ( 12 ) THE judgment as relied upon by the appellant, has no applicability in the instant case, in view of the fact that here the needs of the landlord/respondent to utilise the suit premises as a kitchen and/or as a drawing room would not satisfy as admittedly the premises No. 17a, Iswar Ganguly Lane was situated at a distance of one and half minutes walk from the suit premises. Even if it is considered that the two rooms were vacant in view of the first appellate Court's finding during pendency of the suit, but same would not satisfy the reasonable suitable accommodation concept in terms of Section 13 (1) (ff) of the West bengal premises Tenancy Act, 1956. ( 13 ) HAVING regard to such, accordingly this Court is not finding any merit in the second appeal to disturb the findings of facts of both the Courts below as well as findings of the first appellate Court on remand. T|his appeal accordingly stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.