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2006 DIGILAW 3401 (PNJ)

Jalaluddin (Dead) by LRs. v. State of Haryana

2006-08-30

AJAY K.MITTAL

body2006
JUDGMENT Ajay Kumar Mittal, J. - In this writ petition filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, prayer is for quashing the notifications dated 31.5.1976 and 3.8.1976, Annexure P-1 and P-2, respectively issued under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short "1894 Act") and for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent-State to resume the acquired land from respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and to return the same to the petitioners and to the original landowners. 2. Briefly stated, the facts necessary for adjudicating the present writ petition are that the petitioners were owners in possession of land measuring killa Nos. 6/2, 7/2, 8/2, 9/2, 12/2, 12/3, 15, 12/4, 13, 14/1 M. No. 72 situated within the revenue estate of village Badkhal, Tehsil Ballabgarh, District Faridabad. It was pleaded that State of Haryana vide notification dated 31.5.1976 issued under Section 4 of 1894 Act followed by notification dated 3.8.1976 under Section 6 of the 1894 Act acquired the land measuring 26 acres including the land of the petitioners for setting up of Drive-in-Cinema at Badkhal for public purpose. The petitioners filed objections against the acquisition but all went in vain as their land was acquired. It was further pleaded that on coming to know that the proposal for the development of Drive-in-Cinema at Badkhal had been dropped, they moved an application for return/restoring of their land to them. The case of the petitioners for restoring the land to them was recommended but respondent No. 1 did not agree and ordered for using the land for agriculture purposes. It was further pleaded that when respondent Nos. 1 and 2 failed to get the land of respondent No. 3, then the State had exchanged the acquired land of the petitioners with the land of respondent Nos. 3 and 4 vide deed of exchange dated 7.5.1993 (Annexure P-6). Therefore, the possession of respondent Nos. 3 and 4 was that of a tress passer. It was further pleaded that as the land was not being utilized for the purpose for which it was acquired, the petitioners and other land owners have every right to get back their land as the petitioners are prepared to pay back the compensation received so far with reasonable interest thereon. The petitioners have made various requests/applications to the respondent-authorities for restoration of their land but no action has yet been taken. The petitioners have made various requests/applications to the respondent-authorities for restoration of their land but no action has yet been taken. However, on their application, the Deputy Commissioner Faridabad vide order dated 18.10.1995 had stayed the alienation of the acquired land. Hence, the present writ petition. 3. Respondent No. 1 filed written statement controverting the averments made in the writ petition. It was pleaded that the petitioners were owners in possession of the land in the estate of village Badkhal, Tehsil Ballabgarh, District Faridabad. It was admitted that due to certain subsequent developments affecting the viability of the project, the Drive-in-Cinema scheme was not implemented and was dropped. It was further admitted that the land measuring 34 kanals 19 marlas was exchanged with the land of Murti Devta Parsoon Mandir at village Badkhal through its Pujari Mahant Naval Kishore under registered agreement deed dated 7.5.1993. It was pleaded that the land of the petitioners and other land owners was acquired after notifications having been issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the 1894 Act and all the parties were fully compensated by way of enhancements in their compensation and the acquired land had vested in the State free from all encumbrances. It was further pleaded that the land owners were divested of all rights and, therefore, they cannot claim restoration of land to them. The other averments made in the writ petition were also denied. 4. Respondents No. 3 and 4 and also filed written statement raising various preliminary objections. It was pleaded that the petitioners being Muslims and not followers of the Mandir have no locus standi to allege that the exchange deed was not valid. The other averments made in the writ petition were also denied and prayer for dismissal of the writ petition was made. 5. I have heard counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. The primary question that requires consideration in the present case is whether the land in dispute which was acquired for public purpose of setting up of Drive-in-Cinema at Badkhal and possession thereof was taken from the landowners, but the same had not been utilized for the purposes for which it was acquired, whether the landowners have right to get back their land. 7. 7. The Apex Court in Gulam Mustafa and others v. The State of Mahrashtra and others, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 448 had held as under :- "The Municipal Committee had sold away the excess land marking them out into separate plots for a housing colony. Apart from the fact that a housing colony is a public necessity, once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the Municipality, how it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long later the requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in the Section 5(3) declaration." 8. Following the judgment of the Apex Court in Gulam Mustafas case (supra), a Division Bench of Bombay High Curt in Raghunath Abajirao Shinde and others v. State of Maharashtra and others, 2003(2) LACC 158 had observed as under:- "That an expropriated owner cannot insist on restoration of the land even if the land has not been utilised for the purpose for which it was acquired or for other purpose and if the land has not at all been used, the land of the government should be sold through public auction and not to the expropriated owner. There appears to be no doubt about the legal position that once the land has been acquired and acquisition has become final, the expropriated owner ceases to have any right, title and interest in the property and pre- existing right, title and interest held by the erstwhile owner ceases to exist and is divested." In view of the above, there is no merit in the writ petition and the same is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.