JUDGMENT By the Court—These are two appeals from a judgment and order passed by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sunil Ambwani on the 25th November, 2005 in a will case. 2. One set of appellants being Smt. Deo Raji Devi and others, whom we shall call hereafter the appellants applied for Letters of Administration with will annexed in respect of the assets and estate of one Ram Deo Singh deceased. The alleged will set up was dated 1.6.1995 allegedly registered by Ram Deo on 3.6.1995. The second appeal is preferred by Arun Kumar and others, whom we shall call hereafter the cross-appellants. The cross appellants were caveators in the Court below. They set up another alleged will of Ram Deo dated 2.6.1995 although they had not themselves applied either for Letters of Administration or for probate. Ram Deo died on 3.6.1995; it is on record that he was a diabetic with gangrene in his toe and he was in delirium. 3. The Single Judge has opined that in his opinion Ram Deo was not in a fit disposing state of mind either on the 1st June, 1995 or on the 2nd June, 1995. 4. Both Ram Deo and his brother Ram Naresh were unmarried. The exact relationship of neither the appellants nor the cross-appellants to Ram Deo is apparent from the papers. It cannot be ruled out that both of them tried to grab the property of Ram Deo as against one and another. 5. His Lordship has also taken note of certain litigation which was pending between Ram Deo and the side of the appellants. The cross-appellants state that Ram Deo was living with them and Ram Deo was in a fit state of mind on 2.6.1995 and that the appellants came and whisked Ram Deo away just before his death for the purpose of grabbing his property. Will cases are disposed of on special principles; this jurisdiction is derived initially from the ecclesiastical Courts and thereafter from the Courts of equity. The principle of grant of letters or probate is basically very simple. The Court has to be clear in its conscience before it can grant such letters or probate; any type of reasonable suspicious circumstance remaining uncleared in the mind and conscience of the Court after both the parties have led evidence is a sufficient ground for refusal of either letters or probate. The Court has to be clear in its conscience before it can grant such letters or probate; any type of reasonable suspicious circumstance remaining uncleared in the mind and conscience of the Court after both the parties have led evidence is a sufficient ground for refusal of either letters or probate. This is a peculiar branch of the law where the Court not only can but is bound in duty to act on suspicion and even suspicion alone. 6. In the circumstance of the present case, it cannot be said that the Hon’ble Single Judge in any manner misdirected his Lordship or his Lordship’s conscience in opining that the execution of the two alleged wills so near the time of death of the testator, who was extremely ill at that time, creates a suspicion in the mind of the Court that he was not well enough to execute a will. The Court of appeal cannot in these circumstances reverse a discretionary use of power made by the Testamentary Court. 7. It is true that the cross-appellants did not make an application for Letters of Administration and that the Hon’ble Judge in answer to issue No. 4 said that both the wills dated 1.6.1995 and 2.6.1999 (should be 1995) are not proved. However, the giving of a finding on the alleged will of 2.6.1995 is not without jurisdiction as the cross-appellants would have no locus-standi to file a caveat, their relationship to the deceased not being exactly disclosed, unless they sought to have that locus-standi on the basis of another will of their own, i.e., in their favour. 8. This finding is, therefore, not without jurisdiction and would operate no doubt as an issue estoppel. 9. We however find that issues 4 and 5 raised by his Lordship were with regard to an alleged will of Ram Naresh Singh dated 21.7.1991; no evidence, according to his Lordship was led in regard to this will; perhaps his Lordship described Ram Naresh not quite correctly as Ram Sewak Singh but that does not matter. The will of 1991 is not to be taken as pronounced upon either by his Lordship or by us. His Lordship has directed at the end of the judgment for issuance of notice to the Administrator General, U.P. to take appropriate steps in the matter. 10. The will of 1991 is not to be taken as pronounced upon either by his Lordship or by us. His Lordship has directed at the end of the judgment for issuance of notice to the Administrator General, U.P. to take appropriate steps in the matter. 10. In the absence of exact relationship of the contesting parties to the deceased being known, the matter of escheat cannot be ruled out and mere giving of notice by the Testamentary Court to the State Government, is not at all without jurisdiction. 11. Parties, i.e. both the appellants and the cross-appellants were at pains to submit before us that the present is a will case. The matter has to be decided like in a suit and on a whole reading of the evidence; it cannot be disposed of summarily. We disagree. It is not ordinarily to be disposed of summarily. However, if a case of this type comes before a Court where two wills of one or two days before a person’s death is set up, the Court of appeal is not necessarily bound to spend further time of its, on having the appeal made ready and on reading the whole evidence which cannot ever clear up the basic problem of the Testamentary Court harbouring reasonable and unclearable suspicion. The appeals are both dismissed. Appeals Dismissed. ———