ORDER This C.R.P. is directed against the order dated 20-07-2005, passed by the Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, rejecting the E.P. (SR) No.4479 of 2005 in O.S. NO.859 of 1974. 2. The petitioner-plaintiff (Masjid) filed suit in O.S.No. 859 of 1974 on the file of the IV Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, against the respondent-defendant (Hyderabad Allwyn Metal Works Limited), for declaration of title and recovery of possession of the suit schedule property. The suit was dismissed by judgment dated 31-10-1977. Assailing the said judgment, the petitioner plaintiff filed appeal in A.S. No. 455 of 1977 on the file of the Additional Chief Judge-cum-Special Judge for SPE Cases, City Civil Court, Hyderabad who, vide judgment dated 16-06-1978, allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment passed by the trial Court and decreed the suit as prayed for. Challenging the said judgment, the respondent-defendant preferred second appeal. A learned Judge of this Court, by judgment dated 30-07-1980, dismissed the second appeal. The S.L.P. (C) No. 9486 of 1980 filed by the respondent-defendant assailing the said judgment dated 30-07-1980, was also dismissed by the Honble Supreme Court, vide judgment dated 30-07-1980. To execute the said judgment, the petitioner plaintiff filed E.P. on the file of the IV Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. The E.P. on contest by the respondent-defendant, by reason of the order impugned in this revision, was dismissed by the Court below. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner-plaintiff-decree holder and the learned counsel for the respondent-defendant judgment-debtor. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the decree of declaration of title and recovery of possession dated 16-07-1978 obtained by the petitioner-plaintiff in appeal A.S. No. 455 of 1977 against the respondent-defendant from the Court of the Additional Chief Judge-cum-Special Judge for SPE Cases, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, which set aside the judgment and decree dated 31-10-1977, passed by the IV Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, dismissing the suit O.S. No. 859 of 1974, attained finality on 30-07-1980, when the Honble Supreme Court dismissed the S.L.P. filed by the respondent-defendant assailing the judgment and decree passed by this Court dismissing the second appeal and confirming the judgment and decree passed by the Additional Chief Judge-cum-Special Judge for SPE Cases, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. To execute the said judgment and decree, the petitioner plaintiff filed the E.P., but the Court below by reason of the order impugned in this revision, has erroneously rejected the same on the ground that it is barred by limitation. 5. He submitted that though Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short the Limitation Act) prescribed the period of limitation for executing the decree, other than a decree of injunction, as 12 years, but in view of the provisions of Section 107 of the Wakf Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the Wakf Act), which barred the application of the provisions of the Limitation Act, in relation to recovery of wakf properties, the E.P. filed by the petitioner-plaintiff to execute the decree, beyond the period of twelve years, is maintainable, more so when the Wakf Act, which is a beneficial legislation is silent about the period of limitation with respect to filing execution petitions for executing the decrees obtained prior to its enactment. 6. He submitted that in view of the provisions of Section 107 of the Wakf Act, the respondent defendant is prevented from taking the plea of adverse possession. In support of this argument, he placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Patel Naranbhai Marghabhai v. Deceased Dhulabhai Galbabhai1 and Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapati2. He submitted that the Court below committed grave error in refusing to entertain the E.P., and prayed that the impugned order be set aside and the C.R.P. be allowed. 7. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that the decree of injunction obtained by the petitioner-plaintiff attained finality and became executable on 30-07-1980, when the S.L.P. filed by the respondent-defendant was dismissed. As per Article 136 of the Limitation Act, the limitation for executing the decree, other than a decree of injunction, is 12 years. Since the period of limitation for executing the decree of injunction started to run from the day it attained finality, the period of 12 years for executing the decree expired on 29-07-1992, and as the petitioner plaintiff failed to execute the decree of injunction before expiry of the said date, its title in the property stood extinguished. Since the period of limitation for executing the decree of injunction started to run from the day it attained finality, the period of 12 years for executing the decree expired on 29-07-1992, and as the petitioner plaintiff failed to execute the decree of injunction before expiry of the said date, its title in the property stood extinguished. In support of this contention, he placed reliance on the judgment of the Privy Council in Chandri Abdul Majid v. Jawahir Lal3, of this Court in M. Bhikshmiah v. Venugopalrao4, of the Karnataka High Court in Thimaiah v. Madegowda5 and this Court in N.R. Tammewar v. Dy. Registrar of Co-op. Societies6. He submitted that since, even after expiry of the period of limitation of 12 years, the respondent defendant continued in uninterrupted possession of the property, the respondent defendant had perfected title thereto by way of adverse possession. He submitted that the provisions of Section 107 of the Wakf Act, which barred application of the provisions of the Limitation Act, in relation to wakf properties, is applicable only with respect to suit for possession of immovable property and not to execution proceedings. He submitted that the provisions of the Wakf Act are not beneficial, and as they have not been given any retrospective effect, the bar contained in Section 107 of the Wakf Act, is not applicable to proceedings, which already stood concluded before the enactment of the Wakf Act. He submitted that the E.P. filed by the petitioner plaintiff beyond the period of twelve years, is not maintainable as it is barred by limitation, and the Court below has rightly rejected the same, and no interference is called for therewith. 8. In the backdrop of the arguments advanced, the only question that arises for consideration in this revision is whether the bar contained in Section 107 of the Wakf Act with regard to application of the Limitation Act, for recovery of Wakf properties, is applicable to the proceedings, which already attained finality even prior to the Wakf Act coming into force? 9. The petitioner-plaintiff, admittedly, filed the suit for declaration of title and delivery of possession, and the same was dismissed by the IV Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, by judgment dated 31-10-1977. 9. The petitioner-plaintiff, admittedly, filed the suit for declaration of title and delivery of possession, and the same was dismissed by the IV Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, by judgment dated 31-10-1977. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner-plaintiff filed appeal in A.S.No. 455 of 1977 on the file of the Additional Chief Judge-cum-Special Judge for SPE Cases, City Civil Court, Hyderabad who, vide judgment dated 16-06-1978, allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. The second appeal filed by the respondent-defendant; against the said judgment, was dismissed by a learned single judge of this Court, by judgment dated 30-07-1980. The S.L.P. filed by the respondent-defendant assailing the judgment in the second appeal, was dismissed by the Supreme Court, by judgment dated 30-07 -1980. Thus, the decree of declaration of title and recovery of possession obtained by the petitioner-plaintiff against the respondent defendant in the first appeal, attained finality and became executable on 30-07-1980 when the Supreme Court dismissed the S.L.P. filed by the respondent-defendant. 10. It is the submission of the petitioner plaintiff that having regard to the provisions of Section 107 of the Wakf Act, which barred application of the provisions of the Limitation Act, the limitation of 12 years provided under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, has no application to the wakf properties, and as such, the execution petition, filed by the petitioner-plaintiff, could not have been rejected by the Court below on the ground that it is barred by limitation. On the other hand, it is the contention of the respondent-defendant that the prohibition contained in Section 107 of the Wakf Act applies only to suits for recovery of immovable property and it is not applicable to execution petitions, filed for execution of the decrees obtained prior to the coming into force of the Wakf Act, and as such, no exception can be taken to the order passed by the Court below, refusing to entertain the E.P., and more so when the Wakf Act is not given any retrospective effect. 11. The fact that the decree of declaration of title and recovery of possession, sought to be executed by the petitioner-plaintiff in the present execution petition has attained finality and became executable on 30-07-1980 when the Supreme Court dismissed the S.L.P. filed by the respondent-defendant, is not in dispute. 11. The fact that the decree of declaration of title and recovery of possession, sought to be executed by the petitioner-plaintiff in the present execution petition has attained finality and became executable on 30-07-1980 when the Supreme Court dismissed the S.L.P. filed by the respondent-defendant, is not in dispute. The petitioner-plaintiff, admittedly, to execute the said decree, filed the present E.P. in 2005, i.e. after lapse of 25 years. It is required to be noticed that as on the date when the petitioner plaintiff obtained the decree and as on the date it attained finality and became executable, the Wakf Act was not in existence for it was enacted only in 1995 and came into force w.e.f. 22-11-1995. The Wakf Act, which replaced the earlier Wakf Act, 1954, was intended to provide for the better administration of wakfs and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto, and for maintaining the wakf properties. As per Section 1 (3) of the Wakf Act, the Wakf Act shall come into force in a State on such date the Government concerned issues a notification. In Andhra Pradesh, the Government issued notification for coming into force of the Wakf Act from 01-01-1996. A perusal of the provisions of the Wakf Act, which came into force in Andhra Pradesh from 01-01-1996 would disclose that none of the provisions thereof, much less the provisions of Section 107, are given retrospective effect. The question, whether a statute is prospective or retrospective, was considered and answered by this Court in Pulipati Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. Principal Secretary7 as follows: It is settled rule of construction that - every statute is prospective, unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. This rule of construction is applicable where the object of any statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burden or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the Legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed to be of prospective operation only. Every statute, which takes away or impairs vested rights, acquired under existing laws, or creates new obligation or imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect of a transaction, which has already been completed, must be presumed to be intended not to have retrospective effect. Every statute, which takes away or impairs vested rights, acquired under existing laws, or creates new obligation or imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect of a transaction, which has already been completed, must be presumed to be intended not to have retrospective effect. Similarly, the power to make subordinate legislation, and frame rules and regulations is derived from the enabling Act, and cannot have retrospective operation, unless the parent statute confers the power to make rules retrospectively. 12. It is thus clear that a statute is always prospective, unless it is expressly or by necessary implication given retrospective operation. Be that as it may, to consider whether or not the provisions of the Limitation Act can be made applicable to the present petition, filed by the petitioner-plaintiff to execute the decree obtained much before the Wakf Act came into force, it is appropriate to refer to Section 107 of the Wakf Act, which reads as follows: Act 36 of 1963 not to apply for recovery of wakf properties: Nothing contained in the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) shall apply to any suit for possession of immovable property comprised in any wakf or for possession of any interest in such property. 13. A bare reading of the above provision," would make it clear that the application of the Limitation Act, in relation to recovery of wakf properties by way of any suit for possession of immovable property comprised in any wakf or for possession of any interest in such property, is only barred. Section 107 was incorporated in the Wakf Act, 1995 which replaced the Wakf Act, 1954. No provision similar or analogous to Section 107 of the Wakf Act, 1995 is found in the Wakf Act, 1954. Section 6 (1) of the Wakf Act, 1954 provides limitation of one year from the date of publication of notification in the official gazette as required under sub-section (2) of Section 5, for filing civil suit. This provision has no relevance, for in the instant case, the suit was already filed and it ended in a decree. As per Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the decree shall have to be executed within a period of 12years.ln the instant case, though the petitioner-plaintiff obtained decree, they did not execute it within a period of 12 years, and filed the E.P. after lapse of 25 years. 14. As per Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the decree shall have to be executed within a period of 12years.ln the instant case, though the petitioner-plaintiff obtained decree, they did not execute it within a period of 12 years, and filed the E.P. after lapse of 25 years. 14. The petitioner-plaintiff, admittedly, is not initiating any suit or proceedings for recovery of possession of immovable property, but it has initiated execution proceedings for executing the decree of declaration of title and recovery of possession, which attained finality on 30-07-1980 and which was obtained by the petitioner-plaintiff much before the Wakf Act came into force. Since the provision of Section 107 of the Wakf Act, has barred the application of the Limitation Act only to suits for recovery of possession of immovable properties of the Wakf, the petitioner-plaintiff cannot be heard to contend that the bar contained therein, is applicable even to execution petitions, and more so when the Wakf Act is not given any retrospective effect. Inasmuch as the petitioner-plaintiff filed the present E.P. for execution of the decree and it is not a case of recovery of possession by way of a suit, reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner-plaintiff on the judgment of the Apex Court in Patel Naranbhai Marghabhai v. Deceased Dhulabhai Galbabhai (1 supra), in support of his contention that E.P. is maintainable and the E.P. proceedings are not barred by limitation, is of no assistance to him for in the said case, the Apex Court was concerned with a suit for recovery of possession, and having dealt with provisions of Sections 2 (1),8 (4), 31, 34, 38 (3), 46 and 51-A of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, 1947, held that the period of limitation is not applicable to applications for recovery of possession under the said Act. 15. The period of limitation under Art. 136 of the Limitation Act for execution of any decree, (other than a decree granting of mandatory injunction), or order of any Civil Court, is 12 years. One of the conditions precedent for invoking Article 136 of the Limitation Act is that the application must be for execution of the decree or order of any Civil Court, when the decree becomes executable on a specific date, notwithstanding whether the condition is specific or not. The period of limitation runs from a specific date. One of the conditions precedent for invoking Article 136 of the Limitation Act is that the application must be for execution of the decree or order of any Civil Court, when the decree becomes executable on a specific date, notwithstanding whether the condition is specific or not. The period of limitation runs from a specific date. In this context, it is relevant to mention that filing of an appeal would not affect the enforceability of the decree unless the appellate court stays its operation. Therefore, though the Honble Supreme Court dismissed the S.L.P. on 30-07-1980, the date on which, the appellate Court decreed the suit setting aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court dismissing the suit, namely 16-06-1978, is the crucial date for computing the period of limitation for execution of the decree, unless the decree was set aside, modified or altered by this Court in second appeal. It is not known whether in the instant case, in second appeal, this Court stayed the operation of the judgment and decree of the appellate Court. If there was no stay granted by this Court in second appeal of the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court, then the period of limitation of 12 years for executing the decree started to run from 16-06-1978, the date on which the first appellate Court, decreed the suit. And if from 16-06-1978, the period 12 years for executing the decree, is counted, the decree should be executed on or before the expiry of 12 years i.e. on or before 15-06-1990. If there was stay granted by this Court in second appeal of the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court, then the period of limitation of 12 years for executing the decree, would start to run from 30-07-1980, on which date, the Supreme Court, dismissed the S.L.P. And if from 30-07-1980, the period of limitation of 12 years was to be reckoned, then the judgment and decree, should have been executed on or before 29-06-1992 (sic. 29-7-1992), which the petitioner did not do. 29-7-1992), which the petitioner did not do. Inasmuch as the petitioner-plaintiff filed the E.P. for executing the decree in 2005, i.e. after lapse of more than two decades from the date the decree attained finality and became executable, it is clearly barred by limitation, and no exception can be taken to the order of the Court below rejecting the E.P. on the ground that it is barred by limitation. 16. For the foregoing reasons, there is no merit in the C.R.P., and the same is accordingly dismissed. However, having regard to the provisions of the Wakf Act, it is left open to the petitioner to take recourse to the remedies available to them thereunder and in accordance with law.