Judgment Rajive Bhalla, J. 1. Prayer in the present petition, filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., is for quashing the charge-sheet, filed against the petitioner, in case FIR No. RC-7(5)/98/SIU-XV/CHG, dated 1.8.1998, as also for setting aside the order dated 12.10.2004, whereby the petitioners application for dropping proceedings against him, was dismissed. 2. Harjeet Singh, alleged to be a Sikh terrorist, was killed in a police encounter on 12/13.10.1993, at Shahjahanpur (UP). The petitioner, who was posted as SHO/Inspector of Police, at Police Station Puwayan, District Shahajahanpur (U.P.), was a member of the police team, involved in the encounter. The encounter led to the registration of an FIR, namely, Case Crime No. 327 of 1993, at Police Station Puwayan, District Shahjahanpur (UP). The Superintendent of Police, Shahjahanpur, vide his order dated 26.10.1993, awarded a cash award to the entire police team, including the petitioner, for this act of bravery. Thereafter, vide order dated 29.5.1995, the Magistrate concerned accepted the final report. 3. Mohinder Singh-respondent No. 2, the father of Harjeet Singh, filed Criminal Writ Petition No. 1118 of 1996, praying therein that a direction be issued to the CBI to conduct an investigation/inquiry into the circumstances under which Harjeet Singh was kidnapped by officials of the Punjab Police, from village Saharan Majra, District Ludhiana, illegally detained, physically tortured and eventually killed in a fake encounter, in connivance with the U.P. police, in district Shahjahanpur. The aforementioned writ petition was decided, vide order dated 27.5.1998 (Annexure P-3), and a direction was issued to the CBI to hold an inquiry into the circumstances of the case that eventually led to the death of Harjeet Singh, investigate the matter, identify the persons responsible for the same, and submit a report. 4. The CBI lodged FIR No. RC-7(5)/98/SIU-XV/CHG, dated 1.8.1998 and proceeded to investigate the matter. A charge-sheet was filed in the Court of Special Judicial Magistrate, CBI, Patiala against the petitioner and his co-accused. The trial Court issued warrants of arrest against the petitioner and his co- accused-Brij Lal Verma, SI. Brij Lal Verma, SI impugned the warrants of arrest, by way of a writ petition, filed before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. The said petition was dismissed, vide order dated 9.4.2001. SI Brij Lal Verma thereafter filed a Special Leave Petition before the Honble Supreme Court, which was eventually treated as Criminal Appeal No. 719 of 2001. Brij Lal Verma, SI impugned the warrants of arrest, by way of a writ petition, filed before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. The said petition was dismissed, vide order dated 9.4.2001. SI Brij Lal Verma thereafter filed a Special Leave Petition before the Honble Supreme Court, which was eventually treated as Criminal Appeal No. 719 of 2001. Vide order dated 16.7.2001, the Honble Supreme Court dismissed the said appeal, with the relief that as warrants had been issued for interrogation, the appellant therein would be interrogated at Delhi and would not be required to go to Punjab for that purpose. It was also ordered that in case, the appellant therein was to be arrested in connection with the death of Harjeet Singh, he would be released on bail on his executing a bond to the satisfaction of the Arresting Officer. The findings, returned by the High Court, with respect to jurisdiction, in its order dated 9.4.2001, were vacated. It was, however, left open for the parties to raise the question of jurisdiction at an appropriate time, if found necessary. 5. It would be appropriate to notice at this stage that the Criminal Appeal, decided by the Honble Supreme Court, was filed by SI Brij Lal Verma and not by the petitioner. 6. The petitioner filed Crl. Misc. No. 44500-M of 2003, before this Court, praying that the charge-sheet and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom be quashed. Vide order dated 27.4.2004, the said petition was disposed of by this Court by observing that the trial Court would consider the entire controversy, namely, the questions with regard to jurisdiction, sanction to prosecute, as also exemption from personal appearance. 7. The petitioner thereafter filed an application, before the learned Special Judicial Magistrate, CBI, Punjab Patiala praying therein that proceedings, against him, be dropped, as the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance, frame charges and proceed against the petitioner. Vide order dated 12.10.2004, the Special Judicial Magistrate, CBI, Punjab Patiala, dismissed the application. Hence the present petition. 8. It is argued that on the night intervening 12/13.10.1993, Harjeet Singh was killed in a police encounter. Case Crime No. 327/93, dated 13.10.1993 was lodged at Police Station Puwayan, District Shahjahanpur (U.P.). The petitioner and other members of the police party were awarded cash awards for bravery. Hence the present petition. 8. It is argued that on the night intervening 12/13.10.1993, Harjeet Singh was killed in a police encounter. Case Crime No. 327/93, dated 13.10.1993 was lodged at Police Station Puwayan, District Shahjahanpur (U.P.). The petitioner and other members of the police party were awarded cash awards for bravery. A final report, praying for closure of the case, was filed before the concerned Magistrate who, vide order dated 29.5.1995, accepted the report, thus, bringing to an end to the case with respect to the death of Harjeet Singh. It is submitted that as the case with respect to Harjeet Singhs death stood closed, the CBI had no jurisdiction to register an FIR, proceed to investigate the matter and thereafter file a charge-sheet. It is further contended that the charge-sheet, filed by the CBI, in essence, seeks to prosecute the petitioner for offences, which were subject-matter of investigation by the U.P. Police, regarding which a closure report has already been accepted and, therefore, no fresh charge-sheet could have been filed. If at all, the CBI had any jurisdiction to investigate and file a charge-sheet, it could only have been filed in UP and that also before a Special Court competent to take cognizance of prosecutions, launched by the CBI and that also after the order, accepting the closure report, was set aside, by a Court of competent jurisdiction. 9. The next argument, urged by counsel for the petitioner, is that as an FIR regarding the same incident was investigated and closure report in respect thereof, accepted, a second FIR, with respect to the same offence, could not have been lodged. It is contended that the gravamen of both the offences, being the same, investigation/prosecution could not have been launched and, therefore, cognizance by the trial Court is inherently flawed. Reliance for the above proposition is based upon a judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in K. Kalimuthu v. State by DSP, 2005(2) RCR(Cri.) 463. 10. In so far as the plea, under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C., counsel for the petitioner submits that it is not denied that the petitioner was a public servant on the date of the commission of the offence and continues to be a public servant. 10. In so far as the plea, under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C., counsel for the petitioner submits that it is not denied that the petitioner was a public servant on the date of the commission of the offence and continues to be a public servant. The death of Harjeet Singh, in a police encounter, was an act, in discharge of or in the purported discharge of his official duties and, therefore, the petitioner was entitled to the protection, available to a public servant, under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. It is further contended that the trial Court committed an error of jurisdiction by declining to opine as to the question of sanction, under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. and leaving it for adjudication during the trial. 11. Counsel for the CBI, on the other hand, submits that the impugned order, dated 12.10.2004, does not suffer from any error of jurisdiction, illegality or such perversity as would require interference by this Court. It is contended that the learned trial Court rightly held that as Harjeet Singh had been abducted in Punjab and then taken to UP where apparently he was eliminated in a so-called encounter, the offence commenced in Punjab, culminated in U.P. and, therefore, could be tried in the State of Punjab. The investigation was with respect to an offence, under Section 307 of the IPC, namely, that Harjeet Singh and the person accompanying him fired at the police party with an intention to kill. It is, thus, submitted that the FIR, registered in U.P., would have no bearing upon the present case. It is further argued that the petitioner and his co-accused including members of the Punjab Police, were part of a conspiracy to eliminate Harjeet Singh and his accomplice. Harjeet Singh was abducted from a village in District Ludhiana, taken to U.P. and in connivance with the petitioner and other members of the police party, eliminated. His death was subsequently altered into an encounter wherein Harjeet Singh and another, on being challenged by a police party, refused to surrender and instead fired gun shots at the police. The police party fired in-self defence leading to the death of Harjeet Singh. His death was subsequently altered into an encounter wherein Harjeet Singh and another, on being challenged by a police party, refused to surrender and instead fired gun shots at the police. The police party fired in-self defence leading to the death of Harjeet Singh. It is contended that the facts in the FIR, registered in U.P., were an attempt to alter a cold blood murder into a genuine police encounter and, therefore, the fact that the FIR, registered in U.P., has concluded with the acceptance of a closure report would have no bearing upon the present controversy. The petitioner and his co-accused were part of conspiracy, hatched by them with officials of the Punjab Police to eliminate Harjeet Singh, an alleged terrorist. This conspiracy and the circumstances surrounding Harjeet Singhs abduction and murder were never subject-matter of the FIR, registered in U.P. and, therefore, the subject matter of proceedings, pending before the learned Magistrate, and the case in U.P. being entirely different, the acceptance of the closure report by the learned Magistrate in U.P. has no relevance to the present case. 12. It is further argued that the learned trial Court rightly held that the CBI had jurisdiction to investigate the case and file a charge-sheet in Punjab. It is also argued that the learned trial Court specifically held that the two FIRs, namely, the one in U.P. and the other in Punjab, did not pertain to the same facts and, therefore, the question with respect to jurisdiction was rightly decided against the petitioner. 13. As regards the question of sanction, it is contended that though the learned trial Court has held that no sanction was necessary, the said question has been left open to be determined at the stage of the trial and, therefore, no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. Even otherwise, it was no part of the official duty of the petitioner to conspire with his co-accused to murder Harjeet Singh, whatever may be the antecedents and, therefore, the protection, provided by Section 197(3) of the Cr.P.C., is not available to the petitioner. 14. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, and perused the paper book, as also the impugned order. 15. The facts that led to the filing of the present petition need not be referred to in detail. 16. 14. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, and perused the paper book, as also the impugned order. 15. The facts that led to the filing of the present petition need not be referred to in detail. 16. The first point urged in support of the plea that the order declining to drop proceedings against the petitioner be set aside, is that the death of Harjeet Singh, having been investigated in the FIR, lodged in U.P. and a closure report having been accepted by a Magistrate in respect thereof, the present FIR could not have been registered, investigation conducted and the charge-sheet filed against the petitioner. Case Crime No. 327, dated 13.10.1993 was lodged at Police Station Puwayan, District Shahjahanpur (U.P.), under Section 307 of the IPC, Section 25 of the Arms Act and Sections 3, 4 of the TADA Act. A perusal of the contents of the aforementioned FIR reveals that a police party, led by the petitioner, saw two armed individuals, apparently Harjeet Singh and his accomplice, proceeding on the road. They were challenged by the police party, commanded to raise their arms and surrender. At this, Harjeet Singh and the individual accompanying him, are alleged to have opened fire at the police party and raised slogans of "Khalistan Jindabad", "Vaheguruji Ki Fateh" etc. They were warned to stop firing and surrender. As they failed to stop firing, the police party fired in self-defence. A bullet hit one of these persons. He fell down and died. The other person continued to raise slogans and fire at the police party. He was eventually shot dead by the police party. This alleged police encounter became the subject-matter of the case, registered at Police Station Puwayan, Distt. Shahjahanpur (U.P.). An investigation was conducted and eventually a closure report filed. A perusal of this report reveals that the offences alleged were by the deceased under Section 307 of the IPC, Section 25 of the Arms Act, and Sections 3, 4 of the TADA Act. No reference was made as to any conspiracy to abduct and eliminate Harjeet Singh, no investigation was carried out into the aforementioned facts. It would also be necessary to notice here that in the FIR, lodged in U.P., the accused were Harjeet Singh and the person accompanying him. Neither the petitioner nor his co-accused were cited as accused. No reference was made as to any conspiracy to abduct and eliminate Harjeet Singh, no investigation was carried out into the aforementioned facts. It would also be necessary to notice here that in the FIR, lodged in U.P., the accused were Harjeet Singh and the person accompanying him. Neither the petitioner nor his co-accused were cited as accused. No investigation, as to their respective roles in the conspiracy, as detailed in the charge-sheet, filed by the CBI, was ever conducted. Consequently, as the facts, narrated in the closure report, being entirely different, in all material particulars, namely, the nature of the offence, the facts narrated, the name of the accused, the investigation conducted, the contentions raised by counsel for the petitioner, cannot be accepted. The material, upon which the closure report was accepted was with respect to different accused, different facts, different offences and, therefore, the acceptance of the closure report cannot be pressed into service to impugn the validity of the proceedings, before the trial Court. The order, passed by the learned trial Court, thus, does not suffer from any error of jurisdiction or such illegality or perversity as would warrant interference by this Court. 17. The next contention urged, namely, that as the closure report, with respect to the FIR, disclosing the death of Harjeet Singh, was accepted, by a Court, in U.P., the charge-sheet should have been filed in U.P. and that also after obtaining appropriate orders with respect to the closure report, in view of the facts, noticed herein above, cannot be accepted. The FIR lodged in U.P., and as narrated in the charge-sheet, filed by the CBI, was apparently a total fabrication cooked by the police of two States so as to cover their misdeeds. No trial was ever held and no order of discharge or acquittal ever passed with respect to the offences, which are subject-matter of the charge- sheet filed by the CBI, namely, a conspiracy on the part of the petitioner and his co-accused to kidnap Harjeet Singh from a village in District Ludhiana and thereafter in connivance with his co-accused and other police officials to eliminate him in a so-called encounter. 18. 18. The next contention urged, namely, that as the gravamen of the offence in the two FIRs is identical, the FIR discloses identical or similar facts, a second FIR on the same set of facts cannot obviously be registered or permitted to continue. It is not mere similarity of facts that would bar a second FIR but similarity or identity as to the "gravamen of the offences", an expression used in a judgment, rendered by the Honble Supreme Court K. Kalimuthu v. State by DSP, 2005(2) RCR(Cri.) 463 (SC) (supra). In the present case, and as noticed herein above, the two FIRs are entirely different. The first FIR was lodged against the deceased, for offences allegedly committed by him. The second FIR is with respect to the abduction of the deceased, his subsequent death in a police encounter, and the conspiracy to commit these offences. The two FIRs, being entirely different on facts, the contention, raised by counsel for the petitioner, is devoid of any merit. 19. In so far as the argument, addressed by counsel for the petitioner, that no sanction has been obtained, under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. It would be appropriate to reproduce a relevant extract of judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in K. Kalimuthus case (supra) which reads as under :- "10. Such being the nature of the provision the question is how should the expression "any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty", be understood ? What does it mean ? "Official" according to dictionary, means pertaining to an office and official act or official duty means an act or duty done by an officer in his official capacity. In B. Saha and others v. M.S. Kochar, 1979(4) SCC 177 it was held : (SCC pp. 184-85, para 17) : "The words `any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty employed in Section 197(1) of the Code, are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. If these words are construed too narrowly, the section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can be. If these words are construed too narrowly, the section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can be. In the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of Section 197(1), an act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution under the said provision." Use of the expression "official duty" implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public (servant ) in the course of his service and that it should have been in discharge of his duty. The section does not extend its protective cover to every act or omission done by a public servant in service but restricts its scope of operation to only those acts or omissions which are done by a public servant in discharge of official duty." 11. It has been widened further by extending protection to even those acts or omissions which are done in purported exercise of official duty. That is under the colour of office. Official duty therefore implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public servant in course of his service and such act or omission must have been performed as part of duty which further must have been official in nature. The section has, thus, to be construed strictly, while determining its applicability to any act or omission in course of service. Its operation has to be limited to those duties which are discharged in course of duty. But once any act or omission has been found to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of his duty then it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned. For instance a public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent the section has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. For instance a public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent the section has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. But once it is established that the act or omission was done by the public servant while discharging his duty then the scope of its being official should be construed so as to advance the objective of the section in favour of the public servant. Otherwise the entire purpose of affording protection to a public servant without sanction shall stand frustrated. For instance a police officer in discharge of duty may have to use force which may be an offence for the prosecution of which the sanction may be necessary. But if the same officer commits an act in course of service but not in discharge of his duty and without any justification therefor then the bar under Section 197 of the Code is not attracted. To what extent an act or omission performed by a public servant in discharge of his duty can be deemed to be official was explained by this Court in Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44, thus : "The offence alleged to have been committed (by the accused) must have something to do, or must be related in some manner, with the discharge of official duty. There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable (claim), but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty." 20. A perusal of the facts, narrated in the charge-sheet, namely, the abduction of Harjeet Singh, the conspiracy hatched by the petitioner and his co-accused, to eliminate Harjeet Singh in a false encounter, were no part of their official duty and by no stretch of imagination can take the colour of an offence, as required to be protected, under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. 21. It is, thus, apparent that the expression "official duty" or purporting to discharge an official duty, does not extend to every act or omission and only such an act, as is so inextricably linked to the discharge of an official duty, as to be indistinguishable therefrom, would require a sanction to prosecute. It is, thus, apparent that the expression "official duty" or purporting to discharge an official duty, does not extend to every act or omission and only such an act, as is so inextricably linked to the discharge of an official duty, as to be indistinguishable therefrom, would require a sanction to prosecute. The offences, complained of, must be so inextricably linked to the discharge of an official duty as to be inseparable therefrom. In my considered opinion, conspiracy to kill an individual can be no part of the official duty of a public servant. A conspiracy to commit an offence and thereafter to commit that offence cannot be a discharge or purported discharge of a public duty. 22. However, as the learned trial Court has left the question of sanction for adjudication during the course of the trial, it would not be appropriate to dilate any further on this issue. No other point has been urged or pressed by counsel for the petitioner. In view of what has been stated above, the present petition, being devoid of any merit, is dismissed.