Judgment :- (Writ petition filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India praying for issue of a Writ of Certiorari, calling for the records in proceedings of the second respondent in tender specification No.Coal-35 dated 2.9.2005 and quash the same.) The Tamil Nadu Electricity Board floated a tender in Specification No.Coal-35 dated 2.9.2005 for the supply of one lakh tonnes of Washed Coal per month for a period of six months. The tender was also duly advertised in the papers on 4.9.2005 and the tender forms were sold on 6.9.2005. The petitioner purchased the tender form on 9.9.2005 and found two areas in which the tender specification made a deviation from the specifications of the previous years. They were (1) while in the previous years the tender was for the handling of Coal moved by Rail cum Sea route from the various collieries through the load ports and movement to the Thermal Power Stations by Rail which involved mere transportation of Coal, the present tender specification was for washing the Coal for the purpose of removal of the ash content and for its transportation as a washed Coal and (2) While in the tender specifications of previous years the emphasis was on transportation, in the present tender specification, the emphasis was on washing the Coal, making the task of transportation insignificant. 2. Therefore challenging the tender specification dated 2.9.2005, the petitioner filed the present writ petition and also obtained an interim order of injunction restraining the respondents from opening, processing and awarding the tender. 3. The third respondent herein got impleaded as a party to the writ petition by an order dated 27.9.2006 and also filed petition to vacate the injunction, on the ground that his resources including an Ernest Money Deposit got locked up with the Electricity Board on account of the impasse created by the writ petitioner. 4. When the vacate injunction petition came up for hearing, the learned counsel appearing for the parties, by consent, advanced arguments in the main writ petition itself and I heard Mr.R.Muthukumaraswamy, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr.P.S.Raman, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents 1 and 2 and Mr.M.Sundar, learned counsel appearing for the third respondent. 5. 4. When the vacate injunction petition came up for hearing, the learned counsel appearing for the parties, by consent, advanced arguments in the main writ petition itself and I heard Mr.R.Muthukumaraswamy, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr.P.S.Raman, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents 1 and 2 and Mr.M.Sundar, learned counsel appearing for the third respondent. 5. The main grounds of attack to the impugned tender specification are only two fold and they are as follows:- (a) As per para-1.6(a) in Section I of the Tender Specification specifying the Bid Qualification Requirement, it was stipulated that a tenderer should have an established washery in Talcher Area of Mahanadhi Coal Fields Limited. In para-11 of the affidavit in support of the writ petition, the petitioner made a specific averment that “there was only one individual company owning two washeries in the said place and that no other washeries are available in that area and that therefore the tender specification has been manipulated and tailor made to favour some one”. (b) Though more than 90% of the contract involved transportation of Coal by Rail cum Sea mode and only 10% of the contract related to washing the Coal, paragraph 1.7 of Section I of the Tender Specification shifted the emphasis of the contract from transportation to washing, thereby distorting the nature of the work to be performed. 6. Mr.P.S.Raman, learned Additional Advocate General admitted that as a matter of fact, there was a deviation in the Tender Specification from what it was in the previous years, but that such a deviation became inevitable in view of a notification issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forests of the Government of India, prescribing that the ash content of Coal used in Thermal Stations situate more than 1000 kilometers from the pit head should not exceed more than 34%. Therefore, the Electricity Board became obliged in law, to shift the emphasis from a mere transportation of Raw Coal to the supply of Washed Coal. 7. Mr.M.Sundar, learned counsel appearing for the third respondent contended that the third respondent, while participating in the tender, made a huge Earnest Money Deposit which is now locked up as a dead investment for the past more than a year. 8. The law relating to the scope of judicial review in matters relating to Government Contracts and Contracts of Statutory and Public Bodies, is well settled. 8. The law relating to the scope of judicial review in matters relating to Government Contracts and Contracts of Statutory and Public Bodies, is well settled. The Supreme Court held in Tata Cellular vs. Union of India ( (1994) 6 SCC 651 )) that the duty of the Court is to confine itself to the question of legality and that the concern of the Court should be:- “1. Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers? 2. Committed an error of law, 3. Committed a breach of the rules of natural justice, 4. Reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached or, 5. Abused its powers.” It was further held in the same judgment as follows:- “Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under:- (i) Illegality: This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. (ii)Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness. It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at. The decision is such that no authority properly directing itself on the relevant law and action reasonably could have reached it. (iii) Procedural impropriety.” 9. In another decision in Association of Registration Plates vs. Union of India and Others ( (2005) 1 SCC 679 )) the Supreme Court held as follows:- “Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits the Government from arbitrarily choosing a contractor at its will and pleasure. It has to act reasonably, fairly and in public interest in awarding contract. At the same time, no person can claim a fundamental right to carry on business with the Government. All that he can claim is that in competing for the contract, he should not be unfairly treated and discriminated against, to the detriment of public interest. It has to act reasonably, fairly and in public interest in awarding contract. At the same time, no person can claim a fundamental right to carry on business with the Government. All that he can claim is that in competing for the contract, he should not be unfairly treated and discriminated against, to the detriment of public interest. Undisputedly, the legal position which has been firmly established from various decisions of the Supreme Court is that government contracts are highly valuable assets and the court should be prepared to enforce standards of fairness on the Government in its dealings with tenderers and contractors.” Dealing with the scope for interference with tender conditions, the Supreme Court held in the said judgment as follows:- “In the matter of formulating conditions of a tender document and awarding a contract of the nature of ensuring supply of high security registration plates, grater latitude is required to be conceded to the State authorities. Certain preconditions or qualifications for tenders have to be laid down to ensure that the contractor has the capacity and the resources to successfully execute the work. Unless the action of tendering authority is found to be malicious and a misuse of its statutory powers, tender conditions are unassailable.” 10. Keeping the above principles in mind, if we take up the first ground of attack to the Tender Specification, it is the specific case of the petitioner that there is only one company owning two washeries in Talcher Area and hence the specification that a tenderer should own a washery in the area, would confine the choice of the respondent to one person, who can dictate terms and would make the tender process a mockery. Unfortunately, in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents 1 and 2, there was no specific denial of this fact. Para-13 of the counter-affidavit of the respondent-Board, which dealt with the averments contained in para-11 of the affidavit of the petitioner in support of the writ petition, did not deal with the issue at all. Therefore, I directed the learned Additional Advocate General to ascertain if this averment was true. After verification, the learned Additional Advocate General submitted that there are actually four washeries owned by four companies. Therefore, I directed the learned Additional Advocate General to ascertain if this averment was true. After verification, the learned Additional Advocate General submitted that there are actually four washeries owned by four companies. In response, Mr.R.Muthukumaraswamy, learned senior counsel for the petitioner filed a memo with a set of documents, pointing out that three out of those four companies belonged to the same group and that therefore, the first ground of attack was still valid. 11. However, I am unable to countenance the first ground of attack of the petitioner for the simple reason that if the respondent-Board was statutorily bound to transport only Washed Coal, the fact that there were only four washeries in the area, cannot give them a license to violate the notification issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forests. Though the result of the Bid Qualification Requirement prescribing the ownership of a washery, is that the choice of the tenderers is restricted to a few, the prescription of the said requirement is not found to be malicious or a misuse of official powers. Therefore, the first ground of attack is rejected. 12. Coming to the second ground of attack viz., that the emphasis in the Tender Specification, has been shifted from transportation which constitutes more than 90% of the part of the contract, to the task of washing coal which constitutes only less than 10% of the total part of the contract, it is seen from paragraph-1.7(c) that the focus has actually been shifted to washing the coal. The said para reads as follows:- “(c) The bidder must be able to transport the washed coal on his own from the plant to Ennore Port via Rail cum Sea route through Paradip Port or shall have a tie up with the Agency who is capable in transporting the coal by Rail cum Sea mode. The tenderer/partner shall be in possession of necessary license from Port and other authorities for stevedoring work at Paradip Port or should have working arrangements with listed stevedors at Paradip Port for carry out the work. The tenderer/partner shall be in possession of necessary license from Port and other authorities for stevedoring work at Paradip Port or should have working arrangements with listed stevedors at Paradip Port for carry out the work. The documentary proof for having such a tie up shall be furnished.” Such a prescription, is in contra distinction to the emphasis laid in the previous tenders upon the capacity of the tenderer to handle coal in a composite operation such as stevedoring, shore handling, intraport transportation, wagon loading or unloading, as seen from paragraph-3.0 of the previous Tender Specification No.Coal-31 dated 28.9.2001. 13. On a comparison of the Tender Specification of the yester year with the Tender Specification now under challenge, Mr.R.Muthukumaraswamy, learned senior counsel for the petitioner contended that the shift of focus and emphasis has resulted in an irrational approach and that irrationality is one of the grounds on which this Court is entitled to interfere with the Tender Specification. 14. It is true that as laid down by the Supreme Court in Tata Cellular’s case, irrationality is one of the grounds on which an administrative action is subject to judicial review. This principle of irrationality is otherwise known as Wednesbury unreasonableness, which was evolved after the decision in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd vs. Wednesbury Corporation (1947 II All E.R. 680). This principle was lucidly brought out by the Supreme Court in Tata Cellular case, as follows:- “The modern statement of the principle is found in the passage in the speech of Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions vs. Minister for Civil Service: ‘By “irrationality” I mean what can now be succinctly referred to as “Wednesbury unreasonableness”. (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. vs. Wednesbury Corporation). It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at.’” 80. At this stage, The Supreme Court Practice, 1993, Vol. 1, pp. 849-850, may be quoted: “4. Wednesbury principle.—A decision of a public authority will be liable to be quashed or otherwise dealt with by an appropriate order in judicial review proceedings where the court concludes that the decision is such that of authority properly directing itself on the relevant law and acting reasonably could have reached it. 1, pp. 849-850, may be quoted: “4. Wednesbury principle.—A decision of a public authority will be liable to be quashed or otherwise dealt with by an appropriate order in judicial review proceedings where the court concludes that the decision is such that of authority properly directing itself on the relevant law and acting reasonably could have reached it. (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd vs. Wednesbury Corporation, per Lord Greene, M.R.)”. 15. Applying the test of Wednesbury unreasonableness, I am unable to accept that the shifting of emphasis from transportation to washery is so outrageous in its defiance of logic. The decision to shift the emphasis has been arrived at on account of a statutory requirement prescribed by the Ministry of Environment and Forests. It is a business decision taken by the respondent-Board and even if the consequence of such a decision is bad, it cannot be termed as outrageous in defiance of logic. If the apprehension of the petitioner turns out to be true at the end of the day, the decision of the respondent-Board may be proved to be a bad business decision, but not an unreasonable decision warranting interference by this Court. It is not for this Court to correct bad business decisions, since the scope of judicial review does not cover such an area. 16. Therefore I find no merits in the writ petition and hence the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected WPMPs and WVMP are also dismissed.