Judgment :- Common Judgment: G. Rajasuria, J. W.A. No. 445 of 2006 is directed against the order of the learned single Judge dated 18.10.2006, made in M.P. (MD) Nos. 1 and 2 of 2006 in W.P. (MD) No. 7119 of 2006. W.P. No. 7119 of 2006 has been filed for is­suance of a writ of certiorari by calling for the records pertaining to the order of transfer passed by the respondent in his office proceed­ings No. 353/PA/2006, dated 3.8.2006 and quash the same. W.P. No. 8327 of2006 has been filed for is­suance of a writ of certiorari by calling for the records pertaining to the order of suspension passed by the respondent in his office proceed­ings No. 353/PA/2006 dated 5.9.2006, and quash the same. 2. The facts giving rise to the aforesaid original writ proceedings, including the writ appeal, as stood exposited from the records, could be portrayed thus: (a) One M. Subramanian (hereinafter re­ferred to as "the petitioner"), who has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court, was appointed as Deputy Project Manager in the Tamil Nadu Salt Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as "the Corporation") on 9.10.1991, by direct recruitment, vide the official proceedings of the Corporation No. 3158/91, dated 9.10.1991, issued by the Chairman and Man-aging Director, Tamil Nadu Salt, corporation (hereinafter referred to as "the respondent"). The petitioner functioned as Head of the Pro­ject at Alathur Iron Fortified Salt Project. He was transferred from one place to another.. (b) According to the petitioner, within a pe­riod of 12 years' of service, he was transferred seven times; he was degraded quite against his recruitment terms and conditions and was ap­pointed as Deputy Manager, Deputy Project Manager (IFS), Deputy Manager (Sales Rep­resentative Work), Deputy Project Manager (Sales) and Regional Manager. While so, he was promoted as Project Manager. By virtue of the official proceedings No. 353/PA/2006 dated 3.8.2006, the respondent transferred him from MVSC (Mariyur Valinnokkam Salt Complex) to Trichy Region as Regional Man­ager, who shall have his headquarters at Trichy whereas one P.K. Dillikumar, Project Man­ager (FS) was given additional charge of the entire MVSC project so as to humiliate the pe­titioner. (c) The fact remains that the petitioner filed the W.P. (MD) No. 7119 of 2006 before this Court, seeking to get such transfer order quashed by writ of certiorari. (c) The fact remains that the petitioner filed the W.P. (MD) No. 7119 of 2006 before this Court, seeking to get such transfer order quashed by writ of certiorari. The petitioner also filed M.P. (MD) No. 1 of 2006 and ob­tained an interim order of stay of the operation of the order of transfer, whereupon, M.P. (MD) No. 2 of 2006 was filed by the respon­dent to get the stay order vacated. The learned single Judge, by his order dated 18.10.2006, made the stay absolute and dismissed the peti­tion filed by the respondent to vacate the stay granted. Being aggrieved by the said order, the respondent has preferred the present W.A. (MD) No. 445 of 2006. (d) According to the petitioner, he applied for medical leave with effect from 5.8.2006 to 24.8.2006; on 25.8.2006, with the medical cer­tificate and fitness certificate, he reported for duty; on the same day it was communicated to him that his matter was referred to the Medical Committee. Thereupon the petitioner filed contempt petition in SR. No. 35912 of 2006 on 5.9.2006 before this Court. However, the peti­tioner also appeared before the Ramanatha­puram Medical Board on 14.8.2006 and for further medical examination he appeared be-fore the Madurai Regional Medical officer on 4.9.2006 as directed by the Regional Medical Board, Madurai and he was discharged from the hospital on 6.9.2006. To his dismay and surprise, he found that he was suspended from service with immediate effect vide the pro­ceedings of the respondent in No. 353/PA/ 2006, dated 5.9.2006. Thereupon, the peti­tioner filed W.P. (MD) No. 8327 of 2006 to quash the order of suspension and also filed a miscellaneous petition to get the order of suspension stayed. The learned single Judge ad­mitted the writ petition and granted interim stay of the suspension order. 3. While hearing the writ appeal, it was felt necessary to hear the relevant writ petitions also along with the writ appeal so as to compre­hensively and effectively deal with the matter. As such, the aforesaid all the three matters hav­ing come before this Bench, both the sides were heard in entirety. 4. 3. While hearing the writ appeal, it was felt necessary to hear the relevant writ petitions also along with the writ appeal so as to compre­hensively and effectively deal with the matter. As such, the aforesaid all the three matters hav­ing come before this Bench, both the sides were heard in entirety. 4. The main grievances of the petitioner inter alia would run thus: (i) the order of transfer made by the respon­dent amounts to re-designating him and plac­ing him in a lower position in service, in violation of his appointment order dated 9.10.1991; (ii) he was transferred from the post of Pro­ject Manager (IGS) to Regional Manager; the time scale of pay of the Regional Manager is Rs. 9100-275-14050; whereas for the Project Manager, the scale of pay is Rs. 10,000-325-15,200; and that such transfer re­sults in reduction in his scale of pay; (iii) the order of transfer is a biased one; and (iv) the respondent deprived him of his powers which were delegated to him earlier, vide proceedings No. 783/PA/2003, dated 29.5.2003. 5. In this factual matrix, the points for con­sideration would run thus: (1) whether the impugned transfer order has the effect of demoting or degrading or af­fecting the petitioner in getting the scale of pay which he was getting as Project Manager be-fore such transfer order or whether it would in any way affect his future prospects? (2) whether such transfer order was actu­ated by mala fides and extraneous consider­ation? (3) whether the suspension order is unjusti­fied in the eye of law. 6. Point No. 1: (a) The unassailable and incontrovertible, the indubitable and irrefutable facts, as could be understood from the records and the arguments advanced on both sides, would be to the effect that the petitioner was appointed as Deputy Project Manager during the year 1981 in the service of the respondent-Corporation, subsequently he worked in various capacities so to say, not exclusively on the project side but also on the marketing side, under the same Corporation; while so, he was promoted as Project Manager and posted obviously on the project side and that subsequently as per the impugned transfer order, he was ordered to work on the marketing side. (b) The main thrust of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner would be that the petitioner qua Project Manager has a vested right in working only on the project side; he was a direct recruit; he cannot be made to work on the marketing side as contemplated under the impugned transfer order, which ac-cording to him, has the effect of degrading him from the higher post of Project Manager to the lower post of Regional Manager and that the scale of pay and also the total emoluments at­tached to the present post are lesser than the post of Project Manager in which he has been working all along. (c) Disputing and contradicting, gainsay­ing and challenging such an argument, the learned counsel for the respondent would try to torpedo the contention of the petitioner by ad­vancing his arguments that the Regional Man­ager post owing to administrative exigency, expediency, viability and felt need, now treated and imbued with higher salary and sta­tus unlike as it stood previously, is in no way lower to that of the post from which the peti­tioner was transferred; both posts are now car­rying the same scale of pay and in no way it can be labelled that the petitioner was demoted or degraded or in any way made to suffer any dis­advantage by such order of transfer. (d) The very submissions made by the learned counsel for the respondent before this Court, would by itself would enure to the bene­fit of the petitioner, for the reason that in the Regional Manager post the petitioner cannot be given with any lesser pay or emoluments and his functioning in the post to which he was transferred would not be a disadvantage to him in his service and for his future promotions. As such, even by relying on this, we could dispose of the matter. However, for the purpose of comprehensively dealing with the matter, it is just and necessary to refer to the records filed before this Court also. (e) The appointment order dated 9.10.1991 issued to the petitioner would reveal that origi­nally he was appointed as Deputy Project Manager by direct recruitment method in the respondent-Corporation. However, for the purpose of comprehensively dealing with the matter, it is just and necessary to refer to the records filed before this Court also. (e) The appointment order dated 9.10.1991 issued to the petitioner would reveal that origi­nally he was appointed as Deputy Project Manager by direct recruitment method in the respondent-Corporation. Placing reliance on the said order of appointment, the learned counsel for the petitioner would focus and de­velop his argument that the petitioner should not have been transferred to the post of Regional Manager, as per the impugned order of transfer, dated 3.8.2006. Clause (v) and Clause (xi) of the order of appointment, dated 9.10.1991, are extracted hereunder for ready reference as they do have some significance. "(v) Your services are also transferable from one project to other and project to Corporate Office and vice-versa. …………………… (xi) You will be governed by the rules and regulations of the Corporation in force from time-to-time and the services rules; and …………………(emphasis added) (f) The above excerpts from the said order which are extracted supra, would unambigu­ously and unequivocally highlight that even as per that order at the time of initial appoint­ment, during the year 1991, the petitioner was bound to work in the respondent-Corporation in various capacities including the one as Re­gional Manager on promotion. However, it has to be read conjunctively to wit along with the service rules as envisaged and specified in Clause (xi) above. (g) A perusal of the service rules of the Cor­poration relating to transfer, namely Rule 2.19, would demonstrate thus: "Rule 2.19. Transfer: The competent authority shall be competent to effect any inter-departmental transfer of the employees of the Corporation, and also from one project to other and project to Reg­istered Office and vice-versa." (emphasis added) This rule has to be read in conjunction with Clause (v) and Clause (xi) of the appointment order, dated 5.10.1991 and accordingly if viewed, it is crystal clear that the respondent has got every right to transfer the petitioner from one post to another including transferring the petitioner from the post of Project Manager to the post of Regional Manager at Trichy. The petitioner also in his affidavit, in W.P. (MD) No. 7119 of 2006 in paragraph 2, has stated that his services are transferable as per the original appointment. The petitioner also in his affidavit, in W.P. (MD) No. 7119 of 2006 in paragraph 2, has stated that his services are transferable as per the original appointment. However, despite these clear realities, the learned counsel for the peti­tioner would stress upon the contention that the petitioner is having vested right to work only on the project side. Such an argument, is neither here not there. The petitioner cannot gainsay the real fact that before he got pro­moted as Project Manager, he worked as Dep­uty Manager, Deputy Manager (Sales Representative Work) and Deputy Manager, Deputy Project Manager (IFS), Deputy Pro­ject Manager (Sales) and Regional Manager. While so, he was promoted as Project Manager as per his own version and as such it is fait ac­compli that he worked other than on project side and a a fortiori we could hold that the plea of the petitioner that he has got vested right to work on the project side is untenable. (h) The proceedings No. 5770/PA/2003, dated 1.10.2003 whereby the petitioner was promoted as Project Manager would reveal that he was placed in the scale of pay of Rs. 10,000-325-15,200/-. The perusal of that pro­ceedings in no way demonstrates that he has got exclusive right to work only as Project Manager and that he should not be transferred to any other post under the respondent-Corpo­ration. (i) In the counter affidavit filed by the re­spondent in W.P. (MD) No. 7119 of 2006, it is stated thus: "4. It is further submitted it is not correct to state that he had been purposely disqualified and re-designated by the respondents 5 times against his recruited designation. Whenever transfer orders were made, the corresponding applicable designations are also made to suit the new assignment, with-out reducing their salary….. 10. Due to passage of time, promotions are made, designations are changed and whenever new assignments are made, des­ignations are changed to suit the new as­signment. However, there is no reduction in the salary when the transfers are made. The post of Project Manager is applicable to an employee as long as he is working in the project. When the employees are trans­ferred beyond the project office, the desig­nation applicable in the new post would be automatically applicable. However, there is no reduction in the salary when the transfers are made. The post of Project Manager is applicable to an employee as long as he is working in the project. When the employees are trans­ferred beyond the project office, the desig­nation applicable in the new post would be automatically applicable. In the petitioner's case, there is no reduction in the salary for his manager cadre, only his designation is changed….” (j) Learned counsel for the petitioner would argue that the post of Regional Manager at Trichy is lower to the post of Project Man­ager, for which he could not substantiate by pointing out as to how it should be treated so. The paragraph Nos. 5 and 7 of the reply affida­vit of the Chairman and the Managing Director of the Corporation would highlight as under: "5. Similarly it has been decided to utilize the service of the petitioner in the same scale of pay applicable to PM cadre with the re-designation as Regional Manager, Trichy. Therefore there is no reversion of his cadre from PM to RM as stated in the counter affidavit." "7. Earlier, the petitioner was transferred to Madurai as RM, in the same scale of pay, though his previous designation was Dep­uty Project Manager. In the same manner now he has been transferred from MVSC, Vallinokkam to Trichy as Regional Man­ager in the same scale of pay i.e., in the cadre of Manager only and for this purpose, one post of Manager was also transferred to Trichy. Therefore this does not amount to reversion and the post of Regional Manager Trichy carries the same scale of pay as ap­plicable to Project Manager only. As the designation of Project Manager is applica­ble only for service in the Project Office, the same designation cannot be continued when he has been given the responsibility of a dif­ferent assignment." To the risk of repetition we would state that right before this Court, in a responsible manner, the learned counsel appearing for the respon­dent on behalf of respondent authentically sub­mitted that the scale of pay of the petitioner and his emoluments would not be affected in any manner and that the post of Regional Manager, Trichy is in no way lower to the post of Project Manager and we hereby record the same which shall be the part and parcel of this order. A pri­ori assumption by the petitioner relating to his future prospects have driven him to initiate the proceedings. Permissiveness of transfer as per rules was challenged by the petitioner as though his promotion as Project Manager is in­domitable and beyond the scope of transfer to the Regional Manager post, for which we would hold that a challenge to an order of transfer should be eschewed and should hot be countenanced by the Courts as they were ap­pellate authorities over such orders, which could assess the niceties of the administrative needs and requirements of the situation con­cerned. Accordingly, this point is decided as against the petitioner. 7. Point No. 2. (a) What has to be seen under this point is as to whether the order of transfer was actuated and accentuated, propelled and impelled, geared and motivated by ill-will, spite, malice, bias, detest, dislike, odium, antipathy, abomi­nation, aversion, abhorrence, etc., as against the petitioner. Trait the proposition of law is, that an employer is entitled to transfer an em­ployee from one post to another, but it should not be by way of punishment. The petitioner in his affidavit would detail and delineate, nar­rate and expatiate, as though he was trans­ferred within a period of 12 years to seven posts, in addition to he having been singled out for harsh treatment. There is no iota or shred of allegation as to why he was singled out so or treated allegedly so harshly by the employer. (b) For every action there would be some purpose or motive. Here, the petitioner went to the extent of giving a colour to the transfer order passed by the employer during his tenure of office. But nothing has been spelt out in the affidavit as to what was the reason for he hav­ing been allegedly treated so. Except the alle­gation relating to transfers, nothing is found in the affidavit of the petitioner. Ex facie and prima facie, apparently and obviously, it is clear that by virtue of the order dated 1.10.2003, he was promoted to the post of Pro­ject Manager, as already referred to supra, considering his performance in service. If, as alleged by the petitioner, he was previously transferred and degraded several times out of ill-will, then he would not have been promoted as Project Manager at all. The petitioner cannot approbate and reprobate, blow not and cold. If, as alleged by the petitioner, he was previously transferred and degraded several times out of ill-will, then he would not have been promoted as Project Manager at all. The petitioner cannot approbate and reprobate, blow not and cold. One fact is clear that the petitioner is not interested in working as a Regional Manager at Trichy and because of his attitude, all these writ proceedings cropped up and nothing more we could see in this matter. This Court should be au courant with Apex Court's rulings on this issue. Accordingly, in seriatim, the prece­dents are discussed infra (c) The learned counsel for the petitioner would cite the fallowing decisions and it is therefore just and necessary to consider them. (i) State of U.P. v. Sughar Singh AIR 1974 SC 423 : 1974-I-LLJ-260. This decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court would be on the point that after promotion to a particular post, one should not be reverted back as a matter of course. An excerpts from the said decision would run thus at (p. 266 & 267 of LLJ): "16.... An order of reversion is in its imme­diate effect bound always to be a reduction in rank. Even a reversion from a higher but temporary or officiating rank to a lower sub­stantive rank is in a sense a reduction. But such orders of reversion are not always re­duction in rank within the meaning of Arti­cle 311. If the officer is promoted substantively to a higher post or rank, he gets a right to that particular post or rank and if he is afterwards reverted to the lower post or rank which he held before, it is a "reduc­tion in rank" in the technical sense in which the expression is used in Article 311. The real test in all such cases is to ascertain if the officer concerned has a right to the post from which he is reverted. If he has a right to the post then a reversion is a punishment and cannot be ordered except in compliance with the provisions of Article 311. If on the other hand, the officer concerned has no right to the post, he can be reverted without attracting the provisions of Article 311. But, even in this case, he cannot be reverted in a manner which will show conclusively that the intention was to punish him. If on the other hand, the officer concerned has no right to the post, he can be reverted without attracting the provisions of Article 311. But, even in this case, he cannot be reverted in a manner which will show conclusively that the intention was to punish him. The order itself may expressly state that the officer concerned is being reverted by way of pun­ishment. In fact, the order may in various other ways, cast a stigma on the officer con­cerned. In all such cases, the order is to be taken as a punishment. Sometimes again, the order of reversion may bring upon the officer certain penal consequences like for­feiture of pay and allowances or loss of se­niority in the subordinate rank or the stoppage or postponement of future chances of promotion, in all such cases, the Govern­ment servant must be regarded as having been punished and his reversion to the sub­stantive rank must be treated as a reduction in rank. In such a case Article 311 will be at­tracted." A plain reading of the extract above and also the entire reading of the decision would show that this precedent has been cited out of context, as, our above discussion supra, would highlight that in the facts and circumstances of this case, there is no reversion at all and the de­cision cited is not applicable. (ii) C. C. Padrnanabhan v. Director of Pub­lic Instruction AIR 1981 SC 64 : 1980 Supp. SCC 668. This decision has been cited to can-vas the vary same point and also to highlight that there should not be any deficiency in emoluments. As has been already set out supra by us, the petitioner's emoluments would in no way be affected by his working in the post to which he was transferred. (iii) Hussain Sasansahab v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1987 SC 1627 : 1987-II­LLJ-506. This decision is also on the point that an employee cannot be reverted to a lower post and the same remarks and comments offered by us for the earlier two decisions cited above are also applicable to the third one. (d) In the facts and circumstances of the case, we consider that it is just and necessary to suo motu refer to a few decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court having relevance to this matter. (d) In the facts and circumstances of the case, we consider that it is just and necessary to suo motu refer to a few decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court having relevance to this matter. (i) Union of India v. S.L. Abbas AIR 1993 SC 404 : 1993-II-LLJ-626, of the Hon'ble Apex Court would be on the point that unless it is shown that transfer order is imbibed with malice, the question of quashing it does not arise and an excerpt from it would run thus: "7. Who should be transferred where, is a matter for the appropriate authority to de­cide. Unless the order of transfer is vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provisions, the Court cannot inter­fere with it ..." (emphasis added) (ii) State of Punjab v. Joginder Singh Dhatt AIR 1993 SC 2486 the Hon'ble Apex Court would also highlight the fact that it is entirely within the competency of the employer to transfer an employee and the Court should not ordinarily interfere with that. An excerpt from it would run thus: "3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. This Court has time and again ex-pressed its disapproval of the Courts below interfering with the order of transfer of public servant from one place to another. It is entirely .for the employer to decide when, where and at what point of time a public ser­vant is transferred from his present posting. Ordinarily the Courts have no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of transfer. The High Court grossly erred in quashing the order of transfer of the respondent from Hoshiarpur to Sangrur. The High Court was not justified in extending its jurisdiction un­der Article 226 of the Constitution of India in a matter where, on the face of it, no injus­tice was caused." (Italics for emphasis) In fact the Hon'ble Apex Court in both the aforesaid cases would highlight that simply because the transfer orders are not strictly in accordance with the rules, the Courts are not justified in interfering with that unless mala fi­des could be attributed to such transfer. A few other illuminating decisions of the Honourable Apex Court could also fruitfully be referred to hereunder: (iii) In State of U.P. v. Siya Ram (2004) 7 SCC 405 , the Honourable Apex Court held as under: "5. A few other illuminating decisions of the Honourable Apex Court could also fruitfully be referred to hereunder: (iii) In State of U.P. v. Siya Ram (2004) 7 SCC 405 , the Honourable Apex Court held as under: "5. The High Court while exercising juris­diction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India had gone into the question as to whether the transfer was in the interest of public service. That would es­sentially require factual adjudication and invariably depend upon peculiar facts and circumstances of the case concerned. No Government servant or employee of a pub­lic undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place or place of his choice since transfer of a partic­ular employee appointed to the class or cate­gory of transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibit­ing any such transfer, the Courts or the Tri­bunals normally cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine, as though they were appellate authorities substituting their own decision for that of the employer/man­agement as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned. This position was high-lighted by this Court in National Hydro-electric Power Corporation Ltd. v. Shri Bhagwan ." (iv) The dictum in State Bank of India v. Anjan Sanyal AIR 2001 SC 1748 : (2001) 5 SCC 508 : 2001-I-LLJ-1687 would run thus: "4. The order of transfer of an employee is a part of the service conditions and such order of transfer is not required to be interfered with lightly by a Court of law in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction unless the Court finds that either the order is mala fide or that the service rules prohibit such trans­fer or that the authorities, who issued the order, had not the competence to pass the order (v) The verdict of the Honourable Apex Court in Union of India v. Janardhan Debanath AIR 2004 SC 1632 : (2004) 4 SCC 245 would run thus: "14. For the purposes of effecting transfer, the question of holding an enquiry to find out whether there was misbehaviour or conduct unbecoming of an employee is un­necessary and what is needed is the prima facie satisfaction of the authority concerned on the contemporary reports about the oc­currence complained of and if the require­ment as submitted by learned counsel for the respondents, of holding an elaborate en­quiry is to be insisted upon, the very purpose of transferring an employee in public inter­est or exigencies of administration to en-force decorum and ensure probity would get frustrated. The question whether the re­spondents could be transferred to a different division is a matter for the employer to con­sider depending upon the administrative ne­cessities and the extent of solution for the problems faced by the administration. It is not for this Court to direct one way or the other." (vi) The dictum of the Honourable Su­preme Court in State of U.P. v. Govardhan Lal AIR 2004 SC 2165 : (2004) 11 SCC 402 : 2004-III-LLJ-749 would run thus: "7. It is too late in the day for any Govern­ment servant to contend that once appointed or posted in a particular place or position, he should continue in such place or position as long as he desires. Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essen­tial condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra in the law governing or conditions of service. . Un­less the order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of a mala fide exercise of power or violative of any statutory provision (an Act or rule) or by an authority not competent to do so; an order of transfer cannot lightly be interfered with as a matter of course or rou­tine for any of every type of grievance sought to be made. Even administrative guidelines for regulating transfers or con­taining transfer policies at best may afford an opportunity to the officer or servant con­cerned to approach their higher authorities for redress but cannot have the consequence of depriving or denying the competent authority to transfer a particular officer/ser­vant to any place in public interest and as is found necessitated by exigencies of service as long as the official status is not affected adversely and there is no infraction of any career prospects such as seniority, scale of pay and secured emoluments. This Court has often reiterated that the order of transfer made even in transgression of administra­tive guidelines cannot also be interfered with, as they do not confer any legally en-force able rights, unless, as noticed supra, shown to have been by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision." The aforesaid decisions are all on one and the same line that transfer orders cannot be in­terfered with merely for the purpose of asking for it by filing writ petitions. (vii) In National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. v. Shri Bhagwan AIR 2001 SC 3309 : (2002) 8 SCC 574 : 2001-II­LLJ-1243 the Honourable Apex Court held as under (at p. 1245 of LLJ): "5. On a careful consideration of the sub-missions of the learned counsel on either side and the relevant Rules to which our at­tention has been invited to, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the impugned orders of transfer. It is by now well settled and often reiterated by this Court that no Government servant or employee of a public undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public admin­istration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be outcome of mala fide exercise of power or stated to be in violation of statu­tory provisions prohibiting any such trans­fer, the Courts or the Tribunals cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine as though they are the appellate authori­ties substituting their own decision for that of management, as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exi­gencies of the service concerned. On the facts and circumstances of the cases before us, we are also unable to agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that Rule4.1.1 of the Seniority Rules interdicts any transfer of the employees from one of­fice or project or unit to any one of the other as long as the seniority of such an employee is protected based on the length of service with reference to the date of promotion or appointment to the grade concerned, irre­spective of the date of transfer. We also con­sider it to be a mere submission in vain, the one urged on the basis of alleged adverse consequences detrimental to heir seniority resulting from such transfer. In the facts of the present case, at any rate, no such result is bound to occur since the project undertaken to which the respondents have been trans­ferred is itself a new one and therefore, we see no rhyme or reason in the alleged griev­ance." Here there is no violation of any service rule also but in adherence to it transfer was or­dered. (viii) N.K. Singh v. Union of India AIR 1995 SC 423 : 1995-I-LLJ-854 would lay down the procedure as to how to understand or infer mala fides in case of transfer. An excerpt from the said decision would run thus: "17. Shri Jethmalani rightly urged that the record is bound to show that nothing un­usual was done and the inference of mala fi­des should be drawn, by reading in between the lines and taking into account the atten­dant circumstances. We have referred to the record only to mention that there is nothing therein to suggest that the transfer was un­usual. No other suspicious circumstance is made out to permit the contrary inference. No roving inquiry into the matter is called for or justified within the scope of judicial review of a transfer scrutinised with refer­ence to the private right of an individual. No other suspicious circumstance is made out to permit the contrary inference. No roving inquiry into the matter is called for or justified within the scope of judicial review of a transfer scrutinised with refer­ence to the private right of an individual. There is thus no basis to accept the appel­lant's contention that his transfer was occa­sioned by mala fides of the then Prime Minister on account of his annoyance with the appellant for the reasons stated or that it was in any manner contrary to the require­ments of the Tenure Rules." Here, applying the same procedure as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the re-cords available have been perused by us and we, by reading between the lines could not make out any mala fides on the part of the re­spondent. (e) In the wake of the above discussions, it is crystal clear that the impugned order of transfer cannot be quashed viewing it from any angle. Accordingly, this point is decided as against the petitioner. 8. Point No. 3: (a) In service jurisprudence, the concept of suspension is a well recognised one and in con­templation or pending disciplinary proceed­ings the employer has got the right to place its employee under suspension and normally Court cannot sit in judgment over the discre­tion of the employer. In this case, the petitioner in his affidavit in W.P. (MD) No. 8327 of 2006 would state that the order of suspension was vague and arbitrary; it was passed behind the back of the petitioner; and that it was resorted to as a revenge as against the petitioner in view of he (sic) approached the Court by filing writ challenging the transfer order. (b) The perusal of the order of suspension, dated 5.9.2006, would show that in contem­plation of disciplinary proceedings, the peti­tioner was placed under suspension. The relevant portion of the suspension order is ex­tracted hereunder for ready reference: "Certain major lapses had been noticed in terms of lack of overall control and supervi­sion by Thiru M. Subramanian the then PM (IGS), MVSC with regard to project activi­ties which are serious in nature. Therefore in order to avoid further deterioration in the project activities Thiru M. Subramanian was transferred immediately from the pro­ject to Trichy as Regional Manager, Trichy vide CO proceeding No. 353/PA/ 2006 dated 3.8.2006. 2. As per the rules Thiru. Therefore in order to avoid further deterioration in the project activities Thiru M. Subramanian was transferred immediately from the pro­ject to Trichy as Regional Manager, Trichy vide CO proceeding No. 353/PA/ 2006 dated 3.8.2006. 2. As per the rules Thiru. M. Subramanian has been referred to Medical Committee vide CO Lr. No. 353/PA/2006, dated 3.8.2006 since he immediately applied for Medical leave on receipt of transfer order 3. Whereas, an enquiry into grave charges against Thiru M. Subramanian is contem­plated. 4. And whereas it is necessary in the public interest to place the said Thiru. M. Subramanian under suspension from ser­vice, pending framing of charges with im­mediate effect." (c) The perusal of the above excerpt would at once make us to understand and infer that the respondent, in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings only suspended the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner would sub­mit that as on date only charges relating to the petitioner having not joined the post, to which he was transferred alone, was framed and no other charges. At this stage, this Court cannot visualise as to what the respondent would do or would not do. In paragraph 1 of the suspension order, it is set out that such suspension order was passed in contemplation of disciplinary action relating to some serious lapses in the service of the petitioner as Project Manager. (d) A plain reading of the Service Rules of the Tamil Nadu Salt Corporation Limited at Chapter-V Conduct, Discipline & Appeal, Rule 5.4.3 would demonstrate that the respon­dent has got power to place an employee under suspension. The portion of the relevant part of Rule 5.4.3 is extracted hereunder for ready ref­erence. "5.4.3. An employee may be placed under suspension from service (a) Where an enquiry into grave charges is contemplated or is pending or; (b) Where a case against him in respect of criminal offence is under investigation or trial or; (c) Where there is a prima facie case of wil­ful disobedience of orders of superior offi­cer or; (d) For falsification of records by the ap­pointing authority " (e) Here, undoubtedly, the respondent, namely, The Chairman cum Managing Direc­tor of the respondent-Corporation, who is the appointing authority alone, placed the peti­tioner under suspension in contemplation of grave charges. (f) In this connection, the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Bimal Kumar Mohanty AIR 1994 SC 2296 : (1994) 4 SCC 126 : 1995-I-LLJ-568 could fruitfully be referred to. An excerpt from it would run thus at p. 573 of LLJ: "13. It is thus settled law that normally when an appointing authority or the disciplinary authority seeks to suspend an employee, pending inquiry or contemplated inquiry or pending investigation into grave charges of misconduct or defalcation of funds or seri­ous acts of omission and commission, the order of suspension would be passed after taking into consideration the gravity of the misconduct sought to be inquired into or in­vestigated and the nature of the evidence placed before the appointing authority and on application of the mind by disciplinary authority. Appointing authority or disci­plinary authority should consider the above aspects and decide whether it is expedient to keep an employee under suspension pend­ing aforesaid action. It would not be as an administrative routine or an automatic order to suspend an employee. It should be on consideration of the gravity of the alleged misconduct of the nature of the allegations imputed to the delinquent employee. The Court or the Tribunal must consider each case on its own facts and no general law could be laid down in that behalf. Suspen­sion is not a punishment but is only one of forbidding or disabling an employee to dis­charge the duties of office or post held by him. In other words, it is to refrain him to avail further opportunity to perpetrate the alleged misconduct or to remove the im­pression among the members of service that dereliction of duty would pay fruits and the offending employee could get away even pending inquiry without any impediment or to prevent an opportunity to the delinquent officer to scuttle the inquiry or investigation or to win over the witnesses or the delin­quent having had the opportunity in office to impede the progress of the investigation or inquiry etc. But as stated earlier, each case must be considered depending on the nature of the allegations, gravity of the situ­ation and the indelible impact it creates on the service for the continuance of the delin­quent-employee in service pending inquiry or contemplated inquiry or investigation. It would be another thing if the action is actu­ated by mala fides, arbitrary or for ulterior purpose. It would be another thing if the action is actu­ated by mala fides, arbitrary or for ulterior purpose. The suspension must be a step in aid to the ultimate result of the investigation or inquiry. The authority also should keep in mind public interest of the impact of the de­linquent's continuance in office while fac­ing departmental inquiry or trial of a criminal charge." The perusal of the available records would show that we could see no mala fide intention on the part of the Corporation in placing the pe­titioner under suspension. 9. Prima facie and ex facie the order of suspension does not suffer from any illegality or absence of any legal backing. The challenge to the suspension order is embedded on the logi­cal fallacy "Post hoc, ergo propter hoc" (After this, therefore because of this) simply because the petitioner's writ preceded the suspension order, the former event cannot be assumed as ‘Causa Causans' to the later. The events that occurred after the filing of the writ cannot be ignored also. The suspension order also, with-out mincing words, clearly highlights on what lines disciplinary action is contemplated. In such a case and also in view of the above dis­cussion supra, no interference is warranted as against the order of suspension. Accordingly, this point is answered against the petitioner. 10. In the result, the writ appeal is allowed and W.P. (MD) Nos. 7119 and 8327 of 2006 are dismissed. No costs. Connected M.P.(MD) No. 1 of 2006 in W.A. (MD) No. 445 of 2006 is closed and the stay granted in M.P. (MD) No. 1 of 2006 in W.P.(MD) No. 8327 of 2006 is va­cated and accordingly the said petition is also dismissed. Writ appeal allowed.