Judgment :- Ramachandran, J. These two appeals have been filed by third parties, after obtaining leave, challenging the judgment of a learned single Judge, in O.P.No.11407 of 1996. The Special Rules governing the service authorizes the Government to earmark 10% of the vacancies to sportsmen in certain categories, and the issue centres round the exercise of powers by the Government in these region. The facts leading to these proceedings could be stated herein below. 2. The first respondent, in both the appeals, was the petitioner in O.P.No.11407 of 1996. At the time when the Original Petition was filed in July 1996, the petitioner was working as Armed Police Inspector attached to the Special Armed Police, Trivandrum. The State of Kerala and the Director General of Police were respondents in the Original Petition. The petitioner had urged that denial of appointment to him as Armed Police Inspector with retrospective effect from the date of his initial appointment is discriminatory, since such relief had been granted to others. He prayed for a direction to command the respondents to appoint him with retrospective from the date of initial appointment and with all consequential benefits. 3. Petitioner is seen to have been appointed as a Trainee Sub Inspector of Police in the Armed Police Battalion as per the order of the Director General of Police dated 28-01-1986. After completion of the training period, he was appointed as Armed Police Sub Inspector, which was regularized with effect from the date of his joining duty. On 07-09-1989, by Ext.P3 order, the petitioner and nine others had been conferred with a special benefit, the Government invoking the powers under Rule 39 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules (hereinafter referred to as the KSSR). They were appointed as Armed Police Inspectors after creating supernumerary posts. It has been observed in Ext.P3 that the Director General of Police had recommended that the officers, who have brought credit to the Kerala Police by their outstanding performance required to be suitably rewarded. 4. The petitioner though had accepted the appointment, perhaps felt that the recommendation as above did not give full justice to him. It has been observed in Ext.P3 that the Director General of Police had recommended that the officers, who have brought credit to the Kerala Police by their outstanding performance required to be suitably rewarded. 4. The petitioner though had accepted the appointment, perhaps felt that the recommendation as above did not give full justice to him. He had, therefore, made a representation on 14-09-1991 (Ext.P6) requesting that taking notice of the benefits, which had been granted to some of his senior colleagues, as gatherable from Exts.P4 and P5, he may also be conferred with appointment in the higher category of Inspector of Police from the very date of initial appointment. It had been pointed out that such anti-dating had been granted in respect of other officers considering the merit of their contributions and denial of such benefit to him is discriminatory. The request of the petitioner apparently had been considered by a Committee, which had been constituted to recommend the proposal for appointment of Sportsmen in the Police Department. By communication dated 14-01-1993, the petitioner and two other officers, who had made similar representations, had been given on 15-04-1993 to reconsider the decision, the same was rejected on 12-08-1994. This had been shown as cause of action for him to file the Original Petition on 14-07-1996. 5. The Government, by way of a counter affidavit, had taken a stand that the Original Petition was ill-conceived. Government also had indicated that Committee decided not to recommend the case “as it would set an inconvenient precedent�. The learned single Judge, however, was of opinion that there is no justification for a discrimination practiced towards the petitioner, who as an athlete had made substantial contributions in individual items. The Court further found that anti-dating of appointments to higher categories adopted by the Government in Exts.P4 and P5 were not solitary and perhaps there was even an attempt to withhold information from the Court. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside and there was a direction to consider the representation (Ext.P6) afresh “taking note of the observations contained in this judgment and pass fresh orders� within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. 6. Appellants in W.A.No.445 of 2005, at the time of filing the appeal, were Assistant Commandants and the appellant in W.A.No.1435 of 2005 was a Deputy Commandant attached to the Special Armed Police. 6. Appellants in W.A.No.445 of 2005, at the time of filing the appeal, were Assistant Commandants and the appellant in W.A.No.1435 of 2005 was a Deputy Commandant attached to the Special Armed Police. Appellants 1 to 3 in W.A.No.445/05 were appointed, similar to the petitioner, in the sports quota on an earlier date than him viz., on 25-02-1984. The date of appointment of the 4th appellant is shown as 18-04-1985. They pointed out that the petitioner was appointed only on 28-01-1986 on contract basis for five years and was only considered as junior to them at all time. All of them got the benefit of Ext.P3 order dated 07-09-1989, whereby they were appointed as Assistant Police Inspectors, in exercise of powers under Rule 39 of the KSSR. The petitioner continued to be their junior. Perhaps after receiving the benefit of Ext.P3, he might have been making efforts to supersede them by seeking for larger benefits, but behind their back. 7. The appellant in W.A.No.1435 of 2005 also was recognized as an outstanding sportsman. Taking notice of the vacancy position, as was in existence, he had been appointed as an Inspector on 25-09-1986 and to this category the petitioner had come by way of Ext.P3 only on 07-09-1989. He was, therefore, far senior to him. But, because of the judgment, that had been obtained by the petitioner, the Government was compelled to issue Annexure-A order dated 16-11-2004, whereby the claim put up by the petitioner had been upheld in its entirety, as he was directed to be considered as appointed in the category of Assistant Police Inspector with effect from 28-01-1986. This was altogether illegal, the appellants submit. 8. The principal contention is that the learned Judge had erred in entertaining the writ petition, and the directions given were uncalled for. Inter alia they challenge Annexure-A consequential order as well, which have made serious inroads to their recognized position of seniority and status. During the pendency of the writ petition, taking note of the seniority of the officers, further promotions were conferred on the appellants as Assistant Commandants and Deputy Commandant, and in any case, the actualities could not have been overlooked, when the writ petition was disposed of during 2003. 9. We had heard Sri. During the pendency of the writ petition, taking note of the seniority of the officers, further promotions were conferred on the appellants as Assistant Commandants and Deputy Commandant, and in any case, the actualities could not have been overlooked, when the writ petition was disposed of during 2003. 9. We had heard Sri. S.P. Aravindakshan Pillai appearing for the first respondent, who submits that the writ appeals are not maintainable, and in any case, challenge against Annexure-A order was misconceived. He refers to pendency of another writ petition, where there is challenge thereto. According to him, the Government had been directed by the learned Judge to look into the element of discrimination that had been highlighted. Government had rose to the occasion and had granted the reliefs, which were justified, and the appellants had no locus standi for challenging it on any grounds. 10. The learned Government Pleader of course is in an unenviable position, especially because of Annexure-A, but however submits that although an appeal had not been filed at their instance, substantially the objections that had been raised in the counter affidavit had not been appropriately taken notice of. Annexure-A order was passed as it was obligatory that orders were to be required to be issued within a deadline prescribed by the judgment. 11. The questions, which may arise for consideration generally appear to be the following: (i) Is there any substance in the contention that the writ appeals are not maintainable? (ii) If not, whether the directions/observations in the judgment were warranted and sustainable; (iii) Is it proper to adjudicate the merits of Annexure-A order in the present proceedings; (iv) The extent of relief, if any, which could be granted. 12. In support of the contentions about the maintainability aspect, Mr. Pillai submits that the appellants were neither proper nor necessary parties to the proceedings, as the Court had been approached with a complaint that there was a discrimination practiced against him and it required rectification at Government levels. It, therefore, was on questions beyond the realms of seniority. Secondly, it is contended that after the judgment, Sri. Unwin J. Antony, appellant in W.A.No.1435 of 2005, had been heard by the Government, when a hearing had been arranged consequent to the judgment, and the objections possibly to be raised, in fact had been raised, and dealt with. It, therefore, was on questions beyond the realms of seniority. Secondly, it is contended that after the judgment, Sri. Unwin J. Antony, appellant in W.A.No.1435 of 2005, had been heard by the Government, when a hearing had been arranged consequent to the judgment, and the objections possibly to be raised, in fact had been raised, and dealt with. Therefore, the remedy if at all would have been to challenge the resultant order. Thirdly, it is submitted that since consequential orders have forthcome, appeal proceedings are to be declared as infructuous irrevocably beyond retrace, and therefore not entertainable. 13. In support of his third point, as above, Sri. Pillai had referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Nagaland v Toulvi Kibami [2003 (8) SCC 671). The impugned judgment had already been acted upon and the Supreme Court had laid down that a review petition was not maintainable. The principle appears to be that the subsequent events, which had taken place consequent to the judgment, created a situation that whereby (direction in) the judgment stood exhausted and the review petition was futile. 14. However, the facts of the case were totally different, and in any case, the merits of the substantive contentions agitated by the appellants that a judgment had been obtained behind their back could not have gone unnoticed. The presence of Annexure-A order could be directly linked to the directions which had come to be passed by the learned single Judge, and if the contentions of the appellants would have been accepted, the substratum of Annexure-A is to be observed as lost to the petitioner and simultaneously releaving the Government from any obligations created by the judgment. Therefore, we are constrained to hold that the preliminary objection, as above, is not sustainable. We hold that the appeals are maintainable. 15. Mr. K.R.B. Kaimal and Smt. Pearly Jose, appearing for the appellants, submit that this court should have restrained itself while entertaining a stale claim, even if be one of discrimination. They argue that the petitioner had acquiesced himself to a situation where he had accepted initial appointment, a re-appointment and promotions from time to time. It is highlighted that the directions were capable of upsetting the settled seniority position accepted by one and all. Therefore, without their presence such issue could not have been adjudicated. 16. Mr. They argue that the petitioner had acquiesced himself to a situation where he had accepted initial appointment, a re-appointment and promotions from time to time. It is highlighted that the directions were capable of upsetting the settled seniority position accepted by one and all. Therefore, without their presence such issue could not have been adjudicated. 16. Mr. Kaimal submits that the petitioner had accepted his first appointment, as also the renewed appointment without demur. Ext.P3 order was passed in the year 1989. Even, according to the petitioner, he had submitted Ext.P6 representation only in the year 1991. This was not entertainable. It was rejected on 14-09-1993. Once again, the review was rejected on 12-08-1994. It was only in 1996 that the writ petition was filed. The Delay had not been explained. The laches were on the fact of the records. If at all any third person was present, the attention of the Court could have been invited about the frivolous nature of the contentions. They submit that adequate attention was not invited to the appointment given in 1989. In the category of Inspectors, 10 persons, including the petitioner, got the benefits. The Special Rules provided for reservation of 10% of the vacancies in the Police Force and appointments could be made to eligible hands to the categories of Armed Police Sub Inspector, Armed Police Inspector and Havildars. A total of 28 persons had been given the benefits by Ext.P3 order, and story of discrimination urged by the petitioner after this, forgetting the circumstance that the Government had conferred benefits on such large number of persons was a self serving contention. In any case, according to them, the court had a duty to discourage such contentions and there was no sportsman spirit at all about such a requesting coming from a sportsman, when he very well knew that the net result would have been a super session upsetting the seniority position, which was in existence for years. The laches ought not have been therefore overlooked. 17. It is pointed out that the petitioner had accepted the position for a long number of years and a direction granted in a writ petition, forgetting the circumstance that there were further promotions awarded to the petitioner as well as other persons, who might be affected thereby was impermissible. The laches ought not have been therefore overlooked. 17. It is pointed out that the petitioner had accepted the position for a long number of years and a direction granted in a writ petition, forgetting the circumstance that there were further promotions awarded to the petitioner as well as other persons, who might be affected thereby was impermissible. Seniority lists were dawn from time to time and a walk over in the manner attempted was not recognized by service law. Perhaps it may be possible to invoke the powers under Rule 39 of the KSSR by the Government in appropriate cases. The petitioner was a beneficiary of such consideration in 1989. But digging and retagging on the benevolence was uncalled for. The Government had advised him of the unreasonableness of the request. A writ petition, after three years, therefore was not entertainable. 18. If the appellants succeed in their contentions as above, the judgment requires interference and the consequent position would be that since the Government had expressed their opinion by Ext.P7 and again by an order dated 12-08-1994 (not produced), the issue is to be given a quietus. Again it could be noticed that Annexure-A order was passed as a desperate measure. The Question is, are we required or expected to pronounce upon these. 19. Sri. Pillai submits that the submissions made in such a tenor is on a misunderstanding of law. Government has always a right to rectify a mistake that was committed. The Government was requested to exercise the powers under Rule 39 of the KSSR and what was required was a correction of a mistake. Thereby the petitioner’s initial appointment was to be reckoned as one made to the post of Assistant Police Inspector and not as Assistant Sub Inspector of Police. This would have naturally meant that he was always to be treated as appointed to the higher cadre and it necessarily did not affect others, as is normally understood. When it is recognized that the Government had wide powers under Rule 39 of the KSSR, it would have been possible for the petitioner to urge a contention, and if the Government was satisfied of his credentials, it was their discretion to grant him relief as the Government thought. When it is recognized that the Government had wide powers under Rule 39 of the KSSR, it would have been possible for the petitioner to urge a contention, and if the Government was satisfied of his credentials, it was their discretion to grant him relief as the Government thought. This alone had been requested for and ultimately this alone had been granted, the learned Judge in the meanwhile had found that he had been subjected to hostile discrimination. 20. It may not be necessary for us to refer to Exts.P4 or P5, or examine extent to which the Government have conceded the claims made by certain other officers in the Department. It is true that the Government had powers under Rule 39 of the KSSR, which were very wide. Perhaps it may not be a case where the mischief pointed out by the Full Bench of this Court in T.C. Sreedharan Pillai and Others v. State of Kerala (1973 KLT 151-FB) could have had application. In this light, it may also be possible for the petitioner to contend that impleading of any person was not a prerequisite as the vast powers of the Government for conferment of appointment reserved under Rule 39 of the KSSR was beyond such restrictions. 21. But, however, we have to see the realities. As in a pair of bellows, there is only forced breath in such arguments totally bereft of life or force. Government is the protector of rights of the citizens and also had to take case of the rights and aspirations of the servants employed by it. Without going to the minute details, the facts of the case has to be appreciated. The petitioner was junior, by all standards, to the appellants herein. He was satisfied about such appointment and reappointment, which was conferred on him on 07-09-1989. He was assigned the position of seniority as among his contemporaries and was being conferred with promotions from time to time as admissible to a member of the organization. However, to urge a claim after a decade, that he deserved better treatment and his appointment order has to be re-written comes without glance. To characterize it as appointment is to use borrowed phrases. However, to urge a claim after a decade, that he deserved better treatment and his appointment order has to be re-written comes without glance. To characterize it as appointment is to use borrowed phrases. Recognition of such claims hoists him to a high colleagues but also the moral of the whole contingent, when at all relevant times, the Government had not shown any inclination to grant any such relief. It may be also relevant to notice that in Exts.P4 and P5, the concerned officers were given a place, below their seniors, and perhaps it was not considered as objectionable. That the order went unchallenged does not mean that the steps were in right directions. We feel that, on the facts and circumstances, this Court ought not have permitted the petitioner to agitate any such claims. We find from the records that the Government had been exercising the powers under the Special Rules judiciously, and it was manifestly wrong to allege or find that there was favoritism or discrimination practiced. 22. The yardstick generally applied while examining a claim under Article 226 of the Constitution, and especially objections about time limit usually available to a litigant to contest a claim cannot be denied to the State. Delay corrodes every rights. We fine that satisfactory reasons had not been agitated by the petitioner to get the delay condoned. The service history as a whole of the person concerned should have been appropriately examined to find whether he was discriminated. Advertence to the Special Rules, the availability of vacancies; the maximum appointments which could have been carried out in consonance with the rules etc., were very much relevant to be examined. Likewise, the impact the directions would have made on his colleagues also was an issue of high priority before exercising discretionary jurisdiction was decided to be exercised. 23. We have to understand Rule 39 of the KSSR as giving power to the Government to set right matters, when otherwise there was imminent hardship or illegalities. What was contemplated was a relaxation in public interest. 23. We have to understand Rule 39 of the KSSR as giving power to the Government to set right matters, when otherwise there was imminent hardship or illegalities. What was contemplated was a relaxation in public interest. Appointments to the Police Force are to be made with reference to the rules framed under Public Services Act and it should not be mistaken that Rule 39 of the KSSR by itself confers a special sui juris or exclusive power than that is prescribed by the Special Rules as well as the general rules are to be deemed as issued under the Public Services Act, vide section 2 read with section 3 of the Act. It is not as if the Public Services Act is subservient to Rule 39 of the KSSR; in fact the parent Act requires full obedience. The foundation for invocation of power under the Rule is justice and equity. The petitioner in the O.P cannot contend that what was proposed to be given to him was a fresh appointment, he being a serving officer. So, much so, Government was obliged to recognize the presence of third persons, and claims of his seniors. This is because the petitioner do only come within the first category spoken to by the Rules viz., a case where it deals with a person already in service. Of course, in the case of a fresh candidate, who is yearning for appointment, Government has power to relax, as could be gatherable from the latter part of the Rules, but the petitioner cannot claim that he belongs to this genere. Therefore, we have to notice that the principles laid down by the Full Bench in Sreedharan Pillai’s case would have relevance. The loss of seniority which was to befall on the appellants therefore could not have been overlooked. Such persons were likely to be seriously affected and prejudiced. The judgment and consequential order Annexure-A therefore offended principles of fair play, natural justice and requires to be annulled. 24. We find that the learned single Judge had no opportunity to get the full benefit of hearing of all concerned vis-à -vis the claims of the petitioner. The direction that Ext.P7 requires to be set aside, therefore was not warranted. We hereby reinstall Ext.P7. 25. As a consequence, we hold that Annexure-A is not liable to be enforced or acted upon. The writ appeals are allowed.