JUDGMENT A. S. NAIDU, J. : The Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation seeks to assail the Award dated 24th May, 1999 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jeypore in I.D. Case No.7 of 1997, vide Annexure-4 this Writ application. 2. Admittedly opposite party No.2 Sri Dinesh Kumar Dash claiming to be an employee under the management of the petitioner raised an industrial dispute inter alia challenging the order of his retrenchment. Conciliation having failed the State Government in exercise of its power under Sections 10 and 12 of the Indus¬trial Disputes Act (hereinafter called ‘the Act’) referred the following dispute to the Labour Court, Jeypore for adjudication :- “Whether the action of the management of Lift Irrigation Division, Berhampur in retrenching Sri D. K. Dash, Electrical Re-winder, Helper (DLR) from services with effect from 10.3.93 is legal and/or justified ? If not, what relief Sri Dash is entitled to ?” 3. According to the workman he was engaged on DLR basis against a sanctioned post of Helper on 24th April, 1992 in the Re-winding Workshop, Ganjam and he worked continuously from 1.5.1992 till 10.3.1993. Thereafter his services were terminated even though work was available for him without complying with the mandatory requirements of Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Act. It was alleged by him that after his retrenchment one Chaulia Das was engaged in his place and thus there was violation of the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. On behalf of the Management, its Executive Engineer of Berhampur filed a written statement inter alia taking the stand that the workman was engaged to work as Helper on DLR basis, and due to non-functioning of the Re-winding Workshop he was working as a Watchman. It was alleged that he had only worked for 212 days and was disengaged with effect from January, 1993 and not March, 1993 as claimed. 4. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings of the parties, the Labour Court framed as many as six issues. The workman got examined himself as W.W.1 while the Management got examined one witness on its behalf being M.W.1. The Labour Court after dis¬cussing the pleadings as well as evidence, both oral and documen¬tary,came to the conclusion that the workman had worked for 250 days during one calendar year preceding his disengagement on 10.3.1993. The workman got examined himself as W.W.1 while the Management got examined one witness on its behalf being M.W.1. The Labour Court after dis¬cussing the pleadings as well as evidence, both oral and documen¬tary,came to the conclusion that the workman had worked for 250 days during one calendar year preceding his disengagement on 10.3.1993. It also held that no notice having been served on the workman or notice pay having been paid to him at the time of retrenchment along with retrenchment compensation, the retrench¬ment order could not stand. Thus, the action of the management in retrenching the workman from service with effect from 10.3.1993 was held to be illegal. On the basis of such conclusion the reference was answered in affirmative. The order of retrenchment of the workman was set aside and the Management was directed to reinstate him with 25% back wages and full wages from 1.2.1993 to 10.3.1993. The Labour Court further directed the workman to be reinstated in his engagement by the Management as a DLR. The said Award of the Labour Court is assailed in this Writ application by the Management mainly on the ground that the Labour Court acted illegally and with material irregularity in arriving at the conclusion that the workman was engaged for more than 250 days continuously in a calendar year. According to the Management the workman had only worked for 212 days and hence the mandatory provisions of Sections 25-F and 25-N of the Act were not applica¬ble to his case. The aforesaid submissions on behalf of the Management were strongly repudiated by the learned counsel for the workman. 5. I have learned counsel for the parties at length. The only ground on which the Award of the Labour Court is assailed is that its finding with regard to engagement of workman for more than 250 days in a calendar year is not just and proper. On perusal of the impugned Award this Court finds that the Labour Court has dealt with the issue in that regard in para-6 of the Award in extenso. After discussing the materials and referring to the calculation made on the basis of engagement of the workman and perusing the documentary evidence such as Exts. 1, 2, E and F, the Labour Court arrived at the conclusion that the workman was engaged till 10.3.1993. After discussing the materials and referring to the calculation made on the basis of engagement of the workman and perusing the documentary evidence such as Exts. 1, 2, E and F, the Labour Court arrived at the conclusion that the workman was engaged till 10.3.1993. According to the Labour Court the workman had admittedly worked from May, 1992 to January, 1993. Thus the total admitted period of his engagement was 212 days. Relying on the evidence available on record, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that substantial materials were there to prove that the workman had also worked from 1.2.1993 to 10.3.1993, which was for a period of 38 days. Thus the total period of engagement of the workman was 250 days during twelve months preceding the order of his disengagement on 10.3.1993. 6. This Court to appreciate the arguments once again scrutinized the materials available. It appears that the Manage¬ment has admitted that the workman had been engaged for 212 days. In the following manner :- May, 1992 31 days June, 1992 30 days July, 1992 31 days August, 1992 31 days November, 1992 30 days December, 1992 31 days January, 1993 28 days 212 days But then according to the Management the workman had also worked during the months of September, 1992; October of 1992; and from February, 1993 up to 10th of March, 1993. The Attendance Register produced by the Management has been marked Ext.A. The evidence of M.W.1. coupled with the Attendance Register supports the stand taken by the Management. From Ext.E., a letter issued by the Assistant Engineer, Lift Irrigation Subdivision, Cuttack to the Superintending Engineer, Berhampur also shows that the latter had accorded permission to allow the workman to continue in service from 1.2.1993 to 10.3.1993. This fact is also corrobo¬rated by letter dated 11.8.1993, Ext.2. 7. The Labour Court has meticulously discussed on differ¬ent letters exhibited before it besides the oral evidence and has arrived at the conclusion that the workman was allowed to contin¬ue in service from 1.2.1993 till 10.3.1993. Such finding gets fortified from Exts.1 and 2 and other intra-departmental corre¬spondences. The period from 1.2.1993 till 10.3.1993 comes to 38 days. Thus the total period the petitioner workman worked was 250 days during a period of twelve months preceding his disengagement on 10.3.1993. Such finding gets fortified from Exts.1 and 2 and other intra-departmental corre¬spondences. The period from 1.2.1993 till 10.3.1993 comes to 38 days. Thus the total period the petitioner workman worked was 250 days during a period of twelve months preceding his disengagement on 10.3.1993. The Management has totally failed to prove that the mandatory requirements of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act had been complied with at the time of retrenchment of the workman from service cannot be sustained. The said finding arrived at by the Labour Court is just and proper and calls for no interference. It is needless to say that the workman will be entitled to salary for the aforesaid period of 38 days if the same has not been paid to him. 8. The only other point to be considered is with regard to direction for payment of back wages to the workman. A perusal of the written statement filed by the workman and the evidence adduced by him does not reveal that he was not gainfully employed anywhere else during the period after his retrenchment. There are some materials to show that he was earning his livelihood by alternative employment. Therefore applying the principle of ‘No work, No pay’ this Court feels that it is a fit case where the direction of the Labour Court for payment of 25% back wages to the workman cannot be sustained. Consequently this Court has no hesitation to quash the said direction in the impugned Award. 9. In the result, this Court allows the Writ application in part. The direction of the Labour Court in the impugned Award for payment of 25% back wages to the workman is quashed, but then its direction for reinstatement of the workman in service is upheld. Application allowed in part.