Judgment : D. Murugesan, J. As both the writ petitions and writ appeal raise a common issue they are taken up together for disposal by this order. For convenience, the parties are referred as arrayed in W.P. No. 6893 of 2006. 2. The petitioner Shri Padmavathy Cotton Mills, had defaulted in the payment of Employees Provident Fund contributions for the periods from 7/98 to 8/99 and 6/01 to 11/02. Hence, the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Employees Provident Fund Organisation, Madurai issued a demand notice for a sum of Rs.1,80,910/-and a prosecution notice dated 25.8.2004. The petitioner questioned the prosecution notice in W.P. No. 1262 of 2004. While admitting the writ petition, this Court had granted an order of interim injunction on 16.9.2004, subject to the condition that the petitioner should remit a sum of Rs.25,000/-. The said condition was complied with. The interim injunction was extended by subsequent order dated 23.2.2005 again with a condition that the petitioner should pay a further sum of Rs. 25,000/-. This was also complied with. However, the order of injunction came to be vacated and the main writ petition is posted for final hearing on the ground that the conditions imposed by this Court were not complied with. According to the petitioner, on the date when the injunction petition was taken up for hearing, there was no representation for the petitioner and therefore, the fact that the conditions were complied with was not brought to the notice of the Court which resulted in vacation of the order. 3. As the order of injunction was vacated the Recovery Officer of the Organisation issued a proclamation of sale notice dated 30.6.2005 demanding a sum of Rs.1,53,806/-. According to the petitioner, even before the proclamation of sale notice was issued, a further sum of Rs.25,000/-was paid and, in all, a sum of Rs.75,000/-was paid. The said proclamation of sale notice was again questioned by the petitioner in the writ petition No.6893 of 2006 on the ground that while the earlier writ petition in W.P. No. 1262 of 2004 was pending, the respondent ought not to have issued the impugned sale notice. While the writ petition was admitted, this Court by order dated 9.8.2006, granted interim injunction with a further condition that the petitioner should send a demand draft for a sum of Rs.1,28,806/- to the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner. 4. While the writ petition was admitted, this Court by order dated 9.8.2006, granted interim injunction with a further condition that the petitioner should send a demand draft for a sum of Rs.1,28,806/- to the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner. 4. Aggrieved by the said order, one K.R. Sarang, claiming to be the successful bidder in the auction held pursuant to the proclamation of sale notice, had filed the Writ Appeal in W.A.No.387 of 2006 with the leave of this Court, as he was not a party to the writ petition. When the writ appeal came up for hearing, considering the issue, the writ petitions were also directed to be called along with the writ appeal. 5. We have heard the respective learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, the Employees Provident Organisation and the impleaded third respondent in the writ petitions. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner had submitted that as against the total sum of Rs.1,80,910/- the petitioner had deposited a sum of Rs.75,000/-even when the writ petition in W.P.No.1262 of 2004 was pending. Further, when the sale was schedule to be held on 4.8.2006, the petitioner offered for payment of the entire amount in installments. As the respondent - Organisation refused to accept the said offer, in fact on 7.8.2006, he expressed willingness to pay the entire amount in lump sum. Without acceding to the said request, the organisation had proceeded with the sale and confirmed in favour of the third respondent. It is also argued that in the sale notice, no upset price was fixed and the sale consideration is far below the actual price regarding the machineries. On the above two grounds, the sale is liable to be set aside. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the Organisation submitted that the petitioner is a chronic defaulter in payment of the employees provident fund contributions. In fact, on the previous occasions, for the months of 7/85, 12/85, 4/94 to 2/95, the petitioner had remitted the contributions belatedly. As the petitioner did not pay the employees provident fund contributions for the periods from 7/98 to 8/99 and 6/2001 to 11/2002 amounting to a sum of Rs. 1,80,910/-, a prosecution notice dated 26.8.2004 was issued and in spite of the above, the petitioner did not pay the employees provident fund contributions. Hence, it became necessary for the Organisation to take legal action to recover the accumulated arrears. 1,80,910/-, a prosecution notice dated 26.8.2004 was issued and in spite of the above, the petitioner did not pay the employees provident fund contributions. Hence, it became necessary for the Organisation to take legal action to recover the accumulated arrears. Hence, the petitioner is not entitled to question the sale notice. 8. The learned counsel appearing for the third respondent, however, submitted that the writ petitions cannot be entertained on the sole ground that the petitioner is estopped from approaching this Court after allowing the sale to be concluded and confirmed in favour of the third respondent. 9. According to the learned counsel appearing for the third respondent, he is a bona fide purchaser and pursuant to the sale notice, he participated in the auction conducted on 4.8.2006 and on deposit of entire amount, the sale was confirmed in his favour on 7.8.2006. After the sale is confirmed, the petitioner cannot question the sale and, if at all, he could maintain a suit for damages against the respondents-organisation. For his inaction, a bona fide purchaser should not be deprived of his benefit of the sale. He would also submit that merely because the upset price is not fixed, the sale cannot be invalidated. The learned counsel therefore would rely upon the procedures that are being followed under the Income-Tax Rules. 10. We have carefully considered the rival contentions. 11. So far as the right of the Organisation is concerned, in exercise of power under Section 7A of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, the determination of moneys from the employers can be computed. On such determination, under Section 7C, the organisation is also entitled to determine the escaped amount from the employer both under Sections 7A and 7B. Any order passed under the above provisions are appealable to the Tribunal under Section 7I of the Act. In addition to that, the Organisation is entitled to claim interest for belated payment under Section 7Q. Apart from levy of damages under Section 14B of the Act, in order to execute the orders of recovery, the organisation is also entitled to proceed with the assets of the employer both movable and immovable and can bring it for sale by public auction. To this extent, the law is well settled. 12. Apart from levy of damages under Section 14B of the Act, in order to execute the orders of recovery, the organisation is also entitled to proceed with the assets of the employer both movable and immovable and can bring it for sale by public auction. To this extent, the law is well settled. 12. It is the specific contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that while he was prepared to pay the entire amount, the respondent-Organisation ought not to have brought the property for sale. Insofar as this contention is concerned, the averments made in the counter affidavit are referable. It is not the first time that the petitioner had defaulted. From Paragraph-4, it is seen that the petitioner had defaulted even on earlier occasions in the year 1985 and 1994-1995. The default period in question covers the years 1998-99 and 2001-2002. Prosecution notice was issued as early as on 26.8.2004. If the petitioner was really interested in depositing the contributions, he could have done immediately at least after receiving the prosecution notice. Nevertheless, he has only chosen to approach this Court to quash the same only to buy time. Proclamation of sale was made on 30.6.2006 and notice calling for tenders was issued on 20.7.2006. The sale was conducted on 4.8.2006. It appears that the petitioner had approached the respondent-Organisation only on 7.8.2006 and the said letter reads as under: “Shri Padmavathi Cotton Mills, 69, Srivilliputhur Road, Rajapalayam -626 117, India To The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Lady Doak College Road, Madurai, Sub, We are taken a D.D. for the value of Rs.2,50,000/- on 4.8.2006 and 5.8.2006 Rs.1,00,000/- and balance Rs.28,806/- D.D. taken on 6.8.2006 the total amount being Rs.1,53,806/- as fully and balance settlement value. Therefore, we request you to cancel the sale action and release our machinery and others as per your proclamation. Your kind favourable action and orders will help run industry smoothly. Thanking you, Yours faithfully, (Sd/-) Shri Padmavathi Cotton Mills, Partner. 13. From the above said letter, it is seen that the petitioner had approached the respondent-Organisation after the sale was confirmed in favour of the third respondent. This is evident from the said letter, wherein the petitioner requested the Organisation to cancel the sale auction and release the machinery as they are prepared to pay the said amount. 14. 13. From the above said letter, it is seen that the petitioner had approached the respondent-Organisation after the sale was confirmed in favour of the third respondent. This is evident from the said letter, wherein the petitioner requested the Organisation to cancel the sale auction and release the machinery as they are prepared to pay the said amount. 14. The power of judicial review in matters of tenders is very limited because an invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. It is equally well settled that only the decision making process and not the merits of the decision itself is reviewable, as the Court does not sit as an Appellate Authority while exercising the power of judicial review, as has been held in Tata Cellular v. Union of India AIR 1996 SC 11 : (1994) 6 SCC 651 . The power of judicial review could be exercised when a decision is such as no reasonable person on proper application of mind could take or procedural impropriety. The correct test is as to whether the wrong is of such a nature as to require intervention of the Court. The power of judicial review is exercised to reign in any unbridled executive functioning. 15. Keeping the above principle in mind, it has to be now considered whether the challenge to the proclamation of sale and the consequential sale notice could be interfered. It must be kept in mind that the sale in question is not normally construed to be one of tender by the Government or Government undertakings in dealing with the largesse. The sale has been effected in consonance with the powers conferred on the Organisation. The sale was notified to be held on 4.8.2006. It is not the case of the petitioner that the respondent organisaton has no power to conduct the sale and had acted arbitrarily and unreasonably, except a pleading that when the petitioner had offered to pay the entire amount the respondent organisation ought not to have proceeded with the sale. As we have already referred to, the petitioner is a chronic defaulter and the respondent organisation had initiated action as early as on 26.8.2004 while it issued prosecution notice as early as on 26.8.2004 and thereafter the proclamation of sale notice dated 30.6.2006. The tenders were called on 20.7.2006, fixing the date of sale as 4.8.2006. As we have already referred to, the petitioner is a chronic defaulter and the respondent organisation had initiated action as early as on 26.8.2004 while it issued prosecution notice as early as on 26.8.2004 and thereafter the proclamation of sale notice dated 30.6.2006. The tenders were called on 20.7.2006, fixing the date of sale as 4.8.2006. The petitioner did not act and did not make any offer for settling the amount till the sale was confirmed on 7.8.2006 in favour of the third respondent. On the facts of the given case, we do not find any arbitrariness or unreasonableness on the part of the organisation. 16. Insofar as the challenge to the sale for want of fixing the upset price, in this context, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied upon the following judgments reported in Union Bank of India v. Official Liquidator H.C. of Calcutta and others Union Bank of India v. Official Liquidator H.C. of Calcutta and others Union Bank of India v. Official Liquidator H.C. of Calcutta and others 2000 (5) SCC 274 and Allahabad Bank v. ARC Holding Ltd., and Others Allahabad Bank v. ARC Holding Ltd., and Others Allahabad Bank v. ARC Holding Ltd., and Others AIR 2000 SC 3098 and contend that if the upset price is not fixed, the sale is liable to be set aside. We are not inclined to go into that such question for the simple reason that the sale of companys assets is under the provisions of the Companies Act and when the sale is ordered by the Government a procedure is contemplated under the Companies Court to follow before a sale is ordered through Court. That is firstly to assess the value of the property and thereafter directing the notification calling for tenders to be published and in view of the fact that the number of other third parties interest are also involved in such sale, the Courts have held that the upset price is mandatory. But on the given case, there is no such provisions brought to our notice under the Employees Provident Fund Act to mandate the organisation. In fact the same procedure is being adopted in the Companies Court. But on the given case, there is no such provisions brought to our notice under the Employees Provident Fund Act to mandate the organisation. In fact the same procedure is being adopted in the Companies Court. That apart, on the given case, the petitioner having allowed the auction to be concluded cannot now raise the contentions that in view of the non fixation of upset price, the sale is liable to be set aside. 17. Insofar as the conducting of public sale and the fixation of upset price, the Apex Court has held in the judgment in Gurumukh Singh v. Amarsingh reported in (1991) 2 MLJ 21 : (1991) 3 SCC 79 that the object of conducting public sale is to secure as much as price or revenue as possible to redeem the debt of the debtor or to secure maximum price to the exchequer for use of public purpose. If such a contract to form a ring among the bidders was to beg down the price and to have the property knocked out at a low price it would defeat the above economic interest of the debtor or public welfare. Thereby, the agreement becomes fraudulent and opposed to public policy and is void under Section 23 of the Contract Act. 18. The Apex Court held in Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. (2000) 2 MLJ 72 : 2000 (1) CTC 594 wherein it is stated that the award of a contract, whether it is by a private party or by a public body or the State, is essentially a commercial transaction. In arriving at a commercial considerations… Price need not always be the sole criterion for awarding a contract. It is free to grant any relaxation, for bona fide reasons, if the tender condition permit such relaxation. It may not accept the offer even though it happens to be the highest or the lowest. But the State, its Corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to adhere to the norms, standards and procedures laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though that decision is not amendable to judicial review, the Court can examine the decision making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by malafides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. 19. But the State, its Corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to adhere to the norms, standards and procedures laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though that decision is not amendable to judicial review, the Court can examine the decision making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by malafides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. 19. In a decision of the Apex Court in Anil Kumar Srivastava v. State of U.P. Anil Kumar Srivastava v. State of U.P. Anil Kumar Srivastava v. State of U.P. 2004 (8) SCC 671 , has also held that the fixation of upset price may be an indication of the probable price which the land may be fetch from the point of view of intending bidders. 20. From the above judgments and coupled with the fact that there are no specific rules compelling the respondent-organisation from indicating the upset price in the sale notice, we are not inclined to accept the contention of the petitioner that for want of indication of the upset price in the sale notice, the sale notice should be set aside. 21. The petitioner should also fail on the ground of estoppel. Though he was issued with the notice of prosecution on as early as on in the year 2004, having failed to discharge the liability, he waited till the proclamation of sale was ordered and the consequential issuance of sale notice. He allowed the sale to take place and also to be confirmed in favour of the third respondent. Having allowed the above, he cannot, after the sale is confirmed, question the action on the ground that he is prepared to pay the money. 22. For all the above reason, the writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are also dismissed. 23. In view of the dismissal of the writ petitions, no specific order is necessary in the writ appeal. Accordingly, the Write Appeal in W.A.No. 387 of 2006 is closed. No costs.